

JUIS

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Letter from the Editor

Journal of Undergraduate International Studies

Dear Reader,

I am pleased to introduce the Spring 2011 issue of the Journal of Undergraduate International Studies from UW-Madison. We broke the submissions record for the third semester in a row! This issue features the first international submission ever published in JUIS: Martin McGloin of Cambridge explores Norwegian foreign aid, starting on page 41.

Sadly, even as we move forward, we bid goodbye to some of the longest-serving members on the JUIS editorial board this semester: Amjad Asad, Asad Asad, and Rashid Dar. The Asad brothers have been with us since Fall 2007 and Rashid since Spring 2008. I will be departing for Scandinavia myself. However, I am confident that a new cohort will continue JUIS's mission to foster international awareness, debate, and discussion.

We hope you enjoy the articles!

Alexander Hoppe

Editor-in-Chief

Journal of Undergraduate International Studies

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The cover photograph was taken by David Michaels.

Guilin, China. The two temples are of the sun and the moon, the orange one being the sun and the paler one being the moon. They were built recently and are by the docks for a boat cruise around Guilin. The cruise is targeted at tourists and the company that runs it has built what is essentially a Chinese Disneyland around the route. People dance traditional dances around buildings that are made to look old. The whole nine yards.

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Bethany is a senior majoring in Political Science, International Studies, and European Studies. After studying abroad in southern France for 6 months this past year, she has now become an avid traveler and lover of languages, with a healthy appetite for soaking up the little nuances each individual culture has to offer. Upon graduation, she hopes to take part in a post-grad program for one year before advancing her studies in pursuit of a higher degree in international affairs.

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Xander is a sophomore currently interested in pursuing a Journalism & Mass Communications major with an East Asian Studies minor. In addition to his editor position with this journal, he is a campus news writer and a copy editor for the Daily Cardinal. He will be working this summer in Chicago (home sweet home!) as a promotions and marketing intern for two of the best rock radio stations on the airwaves. If you enjoy classic and/or alternative rock and you live in Illinois, tune into either 101.1 (Q101) or 97.9 (The Loop); you won't be disappointed!

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Sarah is a fifth year senior studying photography and graphic design. She will graduate in spring of 2011 with a Bachelor of Fine Arts degree and plans to continue with her work in photography and design. Eventually, she would like to pursue a Master of Fine Arts degree. Sarah is passionate about books and is serving her third year as the Editor-in-Chief of the Wisconsin Badger Yearbook.

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Nathalie Cheng

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From the Chicago area, Nathalie is a third year undergraduate with an individual major in Human-Computer Interaction. Some things that keep her on the move are art and design, tennis, noodles, footless tights, new experiences, Halloween, Taiwan, Zelda, conversations with her brother, and enjoying the moment.

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The Politicization of Natural Resource Management

by Adrienne DaGue

In the past 50 years, the people of Madagascar have seen five presidents and, as of November 17, four constitutional republics. The current political instability has significantly contributed to the flight of foreign investors and aid programs, which account for three-fourths of the national budget. Subsequently, government institutions, ranging from the department of commerce to courts to local governments,

and public services are obliged to continue their daily functions. Examining the historical and cultural backdrop for corruption and political instability, Isalo National Park serves as a case study of natural resource management by the Malagasy state through the Madagascar National Parks organization. Conservation efforts and initiatives are met by the principle obstacles of pastoral fires, along with the socio-economic culture of the surrounding Bara people. Yet, the park seeks to contribute to the local community through a development fund; ultimately, the development funding falls victim to local politics and miscommunication, resulting in misdirection of funds away from the needs of local people.

Introduction

Statement of intent

Since Madagascar's independence from France on June 26, 1960, the country has suffered from political crisis.

In the past 50 years, the people have seen five presidents and, as of November 17, four constitutional republics. While the government structure reflects the French parliamentary model, its functions ebb and flow with the players in power; for the majority of its history, it has been dominated by one party at a time. Despite the Malagasy government's declared efforts to create a democratic state, political instability exists due to poorly-functioning institutions, rigged and contested elections with out-dated population statistics based on the most recent 1993 census, suppression of the opposition by the party in power, and a history of popular protests, presidential resignations and transitions. Cultural reasons also plague the government as citizens rarely question their leaders and *fibavanana* – a concept of sharing personal wealth with friends and family—which leads to corruption and government favors. After the 2009 “coup d'état” and resignation of former president Marc

Ravalomanana, a significant part of direct foreign investment was cut because most states and international organizations did not recognize the rise to power of the current transitional president, Andry Rajoelina, as legitimate. Turning off this faucet of foreign aid has nearly suffocated three-fourths of the Malagasy budget that flows into public investment.

Under this backdrop of political uncertainty and truncated spending, bureaucratic institutions continue their daily functions and keep the wheels of government turning. Considering the importance of Madagascar as a biodiversity hotspot, I observed the politics of environmental management at its finest – in the midst of this political transition, and one-of-a-kind habitats sporting countless endemic species. In this paper, I will address my findings and their subsequent significance and implications: I will (a) use Isalo National Park as a case study of natural resource management by the Malagasy state

through the Madagascar National Parks (MNP) organization; (b) understand conservation efforts and initiatives to overcome any obstacles; (c) examine the park's challenges defined by the socio-economic culture of the surrounding peoples; and (d) consider its role in local development, as well as the subsequent effectiveness of these projects in improving the community; and (e) evaluate the advantages and shortcomings of this park's management structure.

Background on Geographic Divisions and Institutional Hierarchy

As I attempt to explain how Madagascar National Parks fits into the state system of government, it is evident that I must first identify the administrative land divisions. During colonial rule, the French separated Madagascar into districts; under Ratsiraka and the Second Republic, the six provinces – Antananarivo, Diego Saurez, Fianarantsoa, Mahajanga, Tulear, and Tamatave – were instated as a break from colonialism. Again, these provinces were replaced under Ravalomanana by the 22 regions, 119 districts, and numerous communes that make up the current system.¹ Seen through this historical and political background of land division, the territorial distinctions in Madagascar have never been simple methods of governance; they nominally represent past colonizers, rulers, and presidents.

Though Malagasy people continue to identify and classify locations by province, regions and districts are the principal administrative divisions. The regional and district chiefs serve as civil administrators who focus on Malagasy law. The Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior nominate individuals to these posts, making each chief, in actuality, a functionary of the central government. They enforce policies and have at their disposal command of the armed forces, thus giving the central administration the potential “decentralized tools” to control and manipulate government functions at all levels. One government official in Ihosy, the regional and district capital of Ihorombe, points a finger at the corruption in the central administration for state dysfunction. He believes that regional and district chiefs have the obligation to remain neutral; however, it is difficult for these chiefs, though their jobs call for objectivity as public servants, because higher level politicians seek their own financial wealth, exploit power and resources, and abandon their state responsibilities.² Based on my six government visits in throughout the country, officials have nonetheless consistently claimed that everything runs smoothly under their guidance, but past or other distant officials are at fault for any current challenges. Therefore, I take this particular official's comment with a grain of salt; though I agree with his position, all government officials seem

to pass the blame and responsibility onto another to maintain their own positions of power.

Unlike these chiefs' acquisitions of political power, mayors, who are responsible for each commune, and the *fokotany* president in each village are both elected officials. In my experiences I still have yet to fully understand the role of the *fokotany* president, but he serves, to some degree, as a lobbyist of other government officials and politicians, and also as a resident leader. Though I will not claim that mayors and *fokotany* presidents exempt themselves from political pressures, these officials at least remain somewhat accountable to their constituents. However, this “accountability” also assumes a level of attention and scrutiny by the local populations; yet, this concept of the government's need to respond adequately to the needs of citizens exists very minimally. For example, the *fokotany* president in Ranohira only meets with resident villagers three times per year.³ These two officials seem to have minimal authority over substantial matters, perhaps structurally chosen because the people's role in placing them in their political positions. Nonetheless, even local governments are plagued with political games. The commune of Ranohira has requested its reclassification as an urban commune rather than a rural commune, primarily due to the mayor's individual initiative. The distinction between the two types



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of communes concerns the size of its population, and while Ranohira the village has arguably about 12,000 inhabitants, there are about 45,500 in the whole commune. While the commune also includes numerous other small villages, it is doubtful that the combine village populations triple that in Ranohira, which is considered a large town in the commune. Therefore, the mayor attributed this discrepancy to the large number of residents in Ilakaka, which has quickly expanded due to sapphire mining. This change in classification would provoke an increase in state funding.⁴ This financial increase would in turn augment the mayor's ability to accomplish tasks to "improve" the commune. Furthermore, other examples of this politicization of seemingly non-political constructions persist throughout the country. Despite one's place in the institutional hierarchy, government officials continue to exhibit hints of their questionable and self-interested intentions; and these actions historically and presently shape Malagasy society.

Findings

The creation of Isalo National Park

On July 19, 1962, the first president Philibert Tsiranana and former Minister of Agriculture and Peasantry René Rasidy created Isalo National Park with Decree No. 62-371 with the intentions of protecting flora and fauna,⁵ the rock formations that constitute the massif, and the historical and archeological value of the site. The name for the park comes from two aspects of the area it seeks to protect: the three layers of rock in the geological formations and from the

Malagasy name, Salotse, for *Ichnolepsis tuberosa*, a plant endemic to Isalo.⁶ The park opened to the public in 1992 when it became a part of L'Association Nationale de Gestion pour les Aires Protégées (ANGAP, the National Association of Management for the Protected Areas). The park came under new management as MNP replaced ANGAP in January of 2009 with the goals of creating more connection between all parks and employees, differentiating MNP from other conservationist organizations that claim to have the same goal, and strengthening "the meaning of its name in the eyes of its partners and its audience," whom are most likely tourists and potential investors.⁷

Before the creation of the park, Bara people lived by the Cave of the Portuguese but have now been relocated to Ranohira Bas, though some zebus still remain in this part of the park. Due to reasons such as the Bara people's consideration of the park as sacred land and their continuance to bury their dead within the boundaries, certain allowances for the Bara were written into the original decree that established the park.⁸ It details that residents of "the Ranohira commune are authorized to harvest landibe [silkworm] cocoons and tapia fruit" in the sector opened and specified by the Secretary of State each year in the Fianarantsoa province.⁹ Tapia, a fire-resistant tree common to the park, is well-adapted to the dry savanna and bears leaves that are the sole food of the landibe silkworm. Local weavers collect the cocoons to make shawls, cloths, and shrouds to wrap around their dead.¹⁰ The park administration created

a give-and-take system in which displaced peoples make sacrifices but still maintain their traditional customs and economic practices. These entry allowances set up a structure for resource sharing between villagers for sustainable daily use and the government for conservation, and thus the beginnings of park management as Isalo now knows it.

Park Management

As environmental sustainability and effective resource management become increasingly pertinent international issues, Madagascar plays a unique role as one of the world's biodiversity hotspots. Therefore, it is essential that Madagascar's government and conservationist institutions look toward local responses, as well as international theories and case studies. Many scholars argue that decentralized approaches work better than state-level efforts; thus, calling for the transfer of property rights to local individuals or communities, or formal power decentralization to governmental bureaucratic institutions. The World Bank, along with other scholars, argue for the benefits of decentralization because increased responsibility gives local governments and other immediately affected individuals more capacity to advance suitable policies due to their intimate knowledge of the environment and local needs. Devolution of resource management also creates a more participatory government, with more efficacy and accountability. Nevertheless, critics vie that these decentralization efforts

fall short because federal governments provide insufficient resources or create unfunded mandates, obligating local-level institutions to fulfill conservationist policies without state financial assistance. Accountability, which most scholars define as fair, democratic elections, is requisite for effective resource management by holding local officials responsible for their policies toward the environment. Here, Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq take a more skeptical view and argue that local politicians are not as benevolent as scholars have previously portrayed them, but instead take positions on environmental policy due to their own desire to stay in power and the possibility of any ensuing political or financial incentives.¹¹ While this study concentrates on resource management as sustainably utilizing forests in Guatemala and Bolivia and excludes a bureaucratic institution such as MNP, the central arguments translate to the conservationist policies in Madagascar, particularly as I observed them in the Isalo branch of Madagascar National Parks. Currently, MNP falls under Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq's second form of decentralization in which the formal powers of government to control resource access have been distributed down the bureaucratic chain of command – from the Ministry of the Environment and Forests to the

national headquarters of Madagascar National Parks to regional offices to the individual protected areas. However, the Isalo branch has now requested to privatize and become a nongovernmental, non-profit organization.¹² I hypothesize that this change in management would give MNP-Isalo immunity from potential budget cuts brought on by future political instability. Even so, regardless of the current form of decentralization, the central government has conferred policy decisions and application to its institutional branches, engendering complete control over conservation management with all its advantages and security challenges. Consequently, the MNP-Isalo management must consider the underlying goals of local politicians and work with them to fully enforce environmental policy and actualize their conservation goals. The Ranohira mayor involves himself in development projects, which I will discuss in depth later in another section. Additionally, his attempts to reclassify Ranohira as an urban commune further and evidently prove local politicians' personal motives – the maintenance of power positions via reelection and increased state financial assistance. Thus, at least to some degree, local political factors play directly into park management and functions. Even so, it is important not only to look at park management

on a local level, but also how one institution fits into the greater theoretical network.

Looking at Madagascar National Parks on a broader scale, the national-level takes on the task of conserving biological diversity and its large rate of endemic species – 80% of fauna and 90% of flora are unique to the island—but with a largely independent base of national parks and reserves.¹³ Though administratively under the Ministry of Environment and Forests, the national organization of MNP remains attached to and institutionally inseparable from the ministry. It consists of a general assembly that determines the direction of the organization, a board of directors that decides the projects to be carried out, and the general management that acts as the executive and enforces policies and projects. The minister or a representative of the ministry presides over the board of directors with six other members directly appointed by the ministry. At this point, the English and French-language records differ, but due to the poor translation into English, I will use the French account. Of the nine total directors on the board, the remaining two individuals are elected by the general assembly. Though seemingly democratic, an examination into the makeup of the assembly's membership reveals that the Ministry of the Environment and Forests is present again. The general

assembly compromises individuals from the ministry and national and international nongovernmental organizations.¹⁴ There is no manifestation of the democratic concept of checks and balances, even in such an institution as Madagascar National Parks. Perhaps I am too quick to judge the organization, but a deeper look exposes closer ministry ties than originally expected.

The MNP-Isalo staff is headed by the director, Aro Rajaonarivo, who leads and manages the rest of the park staff: two sector chiefs, four division chiefs in charge of development, conservation, ecotourism, and administration, 16 park agents, one curator at the Interpretation Center, one mechanic, one secretary, two drivers, two maids, and five guardians.¹⁵ These park agents are stationed in seven or eight bases in villages around the park, having two at each post. One comes from the respective village and another from Ranohira where the Isalo branch park office is found. Here, at these bases, their primary tasks include tourist access points and environmental education of village residents.¹⁶ Combining all these administrative elements, one finds the bureaucratic network that forms the functioning parts of Madagascar National Parks' system of management.

Conservation Techniques

Just as the broader park organization has its structure, the management at Isalo has different platforms to aid in its

conservation objectives at administrative and local levels. First, the park is divided into two sectors, the east for ecotourism and the west for conservation of ecosystems and research. Only MNP staff and permitted researchers can enter the four established core conservation sites, or *noyan dur*.¹⁷ These zones act as sanctuaries for biology, culture, history, esthetics, morphology, and archeology. The remaining land surrounding these restricted core sites are blocked zones, used to limit activities to assure the best protection of the park. In Isalo, the blocked zones comprise the majority of the territory. This zone again breaks down into a controlled occupation zone, a controlled utilization zone, and a zone of service. The latter two have the most impact on local populations. The zone of service provides space for touristic, educational, and government activities. Here, ecotourists hike park trails. The controlled utilization zone allocates space for the regulated collection of natural resources for use by the local communities.¹⁸ For example, under this allowance, Malagasy women protect their skin from the sun with a facial mask fabricated from the *masinjoany* plant, local populations treat liver disease with *Aphloia*, and the Bara brush their teeth with *Tamboro*.¹⁹ These uses of plants and other natural resources for daily tasks and medicine emphasize the importance of establishing positive relations between the park administration and the surrounding villagers; sustainable use of natural

resources and good government-people cooperation is crucial to the successful conservation of the protected area.

In addition, park management gives particular attention to five integrated targets: the riparian forest in the canyons, the sclerophyllous forest at middle altitude, rupicolous vegetation consisting of plants that grow in rock face, the dry dense forest on alluvial soil, and the three species of diurnal lemurs. By looking at the patterns, health, and specific characteristics of species and their habitats across the 81,540 hectares of the park, conservation efforts remain more integrated, universal, and effective. Furthermore, a protection zone and peripheral zone encircle the park limits and are closely monitored by park agents for agricultural and pastoral practices, such as slash-and-burn farming (or agriculture?).²⁰ Moreover, this language creates an adapted, individual discourse that conceptually divides the protected park space into zones based on their "importance" for conservation. While I felt that these jargon terms could help the park management to build a universal understanding within the staff, it creates a governing set of words that any outsider would need to learn in order to work with the park; this language could facilitate internal efficiency, but at the same time produce external confusion and a lack of real comprehension. Therefore, while I can understand the advantages of internal universality of terminology, I

think that MNP-Isalo must continue to produce updated plans of conservation, development, and other information that outside partners need to know, which includes clear definitions of relevant terms.

Overall, park management uses a handful of different methods to protect the forest and wildlife. But with any conservation effort come challenges. Fires, selective tree cutting, wood collection for burning and commercial products, the process of smoldering trees to turn into carbon for cooking fuel, and the exploitation of sapphires to the south all pressure the stability and success of the park.²¹ Even so, the five integrated biodiversity targets aid in ensuring the success of organized conservation efforts. Ecological follow-ups help with research of flora and fauna species by tracking the population and other characteristics at different points in time. Armed forces help protect and enforce the park boundaries. A fire perimeter separates the parkland and the village's agricultural land to prevent outside fires from entering park limits. In addition, the eight park bases, located in the village *fokotany* offices, educate local people on conservation and what they can and cannot do within the park. Also, to work on prevention of fires, vigilance committees have been created within the surrounding villages in which the MNP teach techniques to control the spread of fire.²² These disbursed efforts educate but also directly involve communities in safeguarding their local heritage of environmental biodiversity and distinctive ecosystems.

The administrative attempts to protect the park can only endure for so long without the local population's support and adherence to policy.

Dahalo and Brush Fires as Challenges to Security

More than ten thousand individuals live and work in the villages surrounding the massif;²³ it would be ignorant not to acknowledge both the successes and current challenges that impact the park, particularly those by human creation. The two principal challenges to the security and sustainability of the park are brush fires and *dabalo*, the Malagasy word for cattle thieves. In this section, focusing on these concerns, I will continue to utilize this term because it incorporates more than thievery in Malagasy culture, but a greater sense of pride and wealth.

To fully explain the menace of the *dabalo*, one must understand the landscape of the basic economic activities in this region of Madagascar. Due to the island's location and position in the Indian Ocean, cyclones bring heavy rains to the northern and eastern coasts from November to April. The entire island experiences the most rainfall during this season; however, the western and specifically southern regions of the island, protected by mainland Africa and the calm Mozambique Channel, are substantially drier. Savannas cover the western coast and arid south, giving rise to dry forests. The central highlands with plateaus and mountains separate the coasts; this further traps the cyclone-invoked rains to drench eastern coastal land and rainforests.²⁴ In response to surrounding environments,

certain industries have prospered, with the exception of rice. One guaranteed economic staple that exists no matter where one might go is rice; the Malagasy are one of the highest per capita consumers of rice in the world. An example of economic specialization due to climate includes vanilla production, which exploded as a cash crop in the northeast. Simultaneously, the cattle industry is prevalent in the southwest, where zebu can sometimes outnumber people in a village.

In this agrarian and pastoral society, crops and animal products have an intense economic significance, but also a cultural sense of pride. To the Bara specifically, zebu symbolize beauty, strength, pride, fame, prestige, health, happiness, and security.²⁵ Initially, the Bara men practiced cattle theft to achieve societal affirmation of their strength and manhood. Under these practices, men would steal two to five cattle; however, intentions have changed now and 100 to 600 zebu can go missing in a short amount of time.²⁶ Bosco, a Bara resident of Ranohira, explained that cattle theft used to occur between ethnic groups as a method of intimidation and revenge, while also proving one's strength to a family and community. Yet, stealing cattle has now become a business of fulfilling exportation contracts. To pose a hypothetical example, a Malagasy man starts a commercial relationship with a company in Mauritius and the business owner asks for ten zebu. This first time, the man purchases ten zebu and sells them to the businessman at a higher price. After fulfilling this and other contracts, the businessman trusts the

Malagasy man and asks for increasingly larger orders. Bosco then explained that as the order amount increases, the Malagasy man becomes encouraged to steal the cattle instead of buying them in an effort to make a larger profit. Under the auspices of this commercial patronage, *dabalo* bribe gendarme officials to not pursue these thefts, after giving them notice of their plans to steal a certain number of cattle.²⁷

Though cattle thieves by definition, *dabalo* also have recently taken on the general term of “bandit” and threaten security on the roads at night. Taxi brousse – a large van that uncomfortably fits about 18 passengers – transport people throughout the country, but *dabalo* have made nighttime voyages unsafe, particularly when traveling without a caravan. Though rare, *dabalo* act out against people in violent efforts to make money. At the end of last October, bandits attacked and robbed four tourists at the Window of Isalo.²⁸ Additionally, during my time at Isalo, a *dabalo* allegedly killed a gendarme officer at night. These instances show that cattle thieves can be more than a just problem to zebu.

Along with their new role as bandits and villains of the night, the *dabalo*’s shift in motivation for stealing zebu from a cultural practice to a business agreement has also marked a change in citizens’ mentalities concerning these thieves, and has given rise to more efforts to stop the problem. According to the mayor, the *dabalo* problem is better now than it was “before.”²⁹ With the help of funding from the park, the *kalony* serve as an “auto-defensive” system in each village, composed of people 18-45 years

old from each village. Organized initially on the level of the commune, the *kalony* are equipped with telephones to call the gendarme if they witness any *dabalo* or other threats, along with guns, to monitor and control the village perimeter.³⁰ Additionally, Ranohira exhibits a larger presence of gendarme and police than I have observed in other Malagasy villages. Over the past three years, park money funded the construction of a new police station, and gendarme posts stand on Route Nationale 7 at the two ends of town. However, this significant focus on security may partly be due to *dabalo* threats, but also Isalo’s role in ecotourism as one of the most visited national parks in Madagascar. Furthermore, the Malagasy government is more harshly prosecuting cattle thieves. Just as the punishment for killing a gendarme is death by fire squad, similarly is the sentence for captured *dabalo*.³¹ While I cannot claim to believe that these two crimes deserve equal penalties, it further reflects the societal importance of zebu and the increasing reality of theft as a major security issue.

I find political undertones in the overlap between the current threats of *dabalo* and brush fires, though several park staff and government officials told me that brush fires were not set for political reasons. The recent increase in instability has correlated to the increase in *dabalo*, general insecurity, and economic woes. Anecdotally at least, this insecurity has encouraged more crime, which stands out in an already *dabalo*-heavy region such as the South. Lack of government funding and financial difficulties for families throughout Madagascar have put more of a burden on

agricultural and pastoral success.

In this region, brush fires alight the plains for different reasons. Lightning strikes trees, villagers set fires to clean agricultural and cattle-grazing land, *dabalo* hide their tracks as they seek refuge in the park, and passers-by traveling on RN7 throw a cigarette out the window.³² Yet, the most dangerous are those set by *dabalo*, while others, like those caused by lightning strikes, occur rarely.³³ However, before a Malagasy person can set a fire for agricultural or pastoral purposes, he must request authorization by the Ministry of Water and Forest. The allowance for people living around Isalo National Park rests on a condition. The village in which the requesting person lives must dig a firebreak at the park limit within their village boundaries before they can set fires. Due to the importance of cattle-raising in the Southwest region of Madagascar, each village builds a fire break and effectively an entire firebreak surrounds the park at the peak of slash-and-burn practices, before the rainy season.³⁴ This conditionality ensures a mutually beneficial and collaborative existence between villagers and the park, particularly over such an important matter as fire management.

According to the Conservation Management Plan from 2007, indirect causes of fire damage within the park included lack of coordination between ANGAP (MNP) and local and regional authorities, the absence of a zone of protection between the park and the villages in the periphery zone, lack of concern by the people living in the periphery zone, and defiance of the law. Direct causes include *dabalo* setting

fires on their tracks and paths—hiding places that are difficult to find and thus allows fire to spread without the park management’s knowledge—the abundance of combustibles, renew of pastoral land, fires to clean agricultural land and walking paths, the presence of RN7, and the village of Andohan’-Ilakaka.³⁵ I found the “abundance of combustibles” a very questionable cause. Never did I observe anything that could be considered combustible; gas may be the one exception but due to the high prices of gasoline, I highly doubt that it would be spilt hap hazardously or for a malicious reason, since the grass and land is usually very dry. This alleged cause of fires seems to directly contradict the claim that cigarettes from RN7 also start prairie fires. According to park personnel, the severe fire in September that burned roughly one-eighth of Isalo National Park resulted from a poorly controlled fire set for agricultural purposes, but allegedly spread wildly due to strong winds.³⁶ The burned area lies in the Southeastern tourist sector, forcing the closure of the Namaza circuit.

Despite persistent answers from park management and government officials that political discontent does not cause intentional fires, one park agent was under the opinion that fires are sometimes set voluntarily for the sake of watching them and due to a lack of respect for the rules. Nonetheless, he said that the number of fires has diminished now because those who set

them are caught, arrested, and sent to a tribunal to be prosecuted.³⁷ While legal punishment may have removed those who set the fire in September,³⁸ MNP and the central government need to consider the underlying economic reasons for villagers’ needs to set fires. Slash-and-burn practices provide quick, short-term benefits since they allow fresh grass to grow quickly once the rainy season starts; however, long-term continuance of such practices lead to erosion since no plants hold the soil in place as the initial rains fall, washing away the fertile top layer of soil. In the Ihosy district, seven fires are set on average per day. This “epidemic” regenerates grass but causes herds of cattle to have upset stomachs as they consume ash. In turn, zebus’ poor health results in a lesser quality of meat and a higher price per head of cattle.³⁹ I can only imagine that ultimately this domino effect reaches the human population and perhaps causes sickness or poorer nutrition correlated with the lesser quality of meat. I hypothesize that if the government can create stability and promote economic growth, farmers can more sustainably practice agricultural and pastoral techniques.

Apart from the factors of erosion and poor quality zebu meat, brush fires also naturally affect Isalo and the park management’s conservation efforts. Brush fires primarily impact the park by causing a loss of animal and plant species, a disruption of plant

regeneration, and vertical a structure destruction of the sclerophyllous formations. Secondary impacts include the incompatibility of a denatured, unnatural landscape to ecotourism, and the elimination of non-fire resistant species. The strategies for fires were to raise the consciousness of villagers, create a protection zone as permitted and established in the decree, strengthen collaboration between PNM and other organizations, reinforce the surveillance and control of sensitive zones, improve the system of fire prevention, relocate the zebu from the northern part of the park, assure the application of COAP (Code de Gestion des Aires Protégées, or Management Code of the Protected Areas) and other laws, implicate and involve local authorities and populations in the periphery zone in conservation, and install vigilance committees.⁴⁰ According to my own observations, it seemed that the park management had instated some of these strategies, but could have improved others. For example, the zone of protection seemed to be well enforced. As I left Ranohira Bas, having conducted interviews with the villagers, a brush fire had spread within the limits of the park. The park agent, M. Brilliant, had called the main Isalo office to begin necessary efforts to put out the fire. He also explained that usually local park agents would call; therefore, this system seems to function effectively for this park.

Though admittedly my time in Ranohira was not truly substantial enough for me to qualify and evaluate the park's system of management to utmost certainty, villagers' reactions to the vigilance committees seemed positive but somewhat uninterested or blasé. Overall, it is important that the park continue to work with surrounding communities and strengthen its efforts there.

The application and actuality of development theory in Ranohira

First, one must consider the process through which development money flows. Coming initially from tourists, both internal and external, the Isalo park management directs half to the inter-regional office in Fianarantsoa and the other half to the Madagascar National Park headquarters in Antananarivo. Any portion of private sector funding, such as the World Bank or other donors, funnels through the headquarters to the inter-regional level. Then, after this circuit, funds return to Isalo's management to pour back into the communities. Once the funds return to Ranohira, a committee called COSAP (Comission d'Orientation et Soutiens des Aires Protégées) determines which proposed projects receive park funding and then distributes funds.⁴¹ The committee is comprised of the *raiamandreny*, the president of services in Ranohira, and the *fokotany* president.⁴² A Bara custom, the *raiamandreny* is the oldest person in the village and merits the respect of a king

or father in a family. The *raiamandreny* welcomes visitors into the village and also serves as a representative and leader of the community. Each village additionally selects a representative to COSAP during its bi-yearly meetings in which villagers also collect ideas for projects and evaluate old ones. The proposal process involves a written document signed by the village that the representative presents to COSAP.⁴³

This year, nine projects have been funded: a dentistry, a gate and fence for the hospital, a building for the touristic guides, lodging for the *chef d'arrondissement*, lodging for the hospitalized, a gendarmerie post all in Ranohira; a primary school in Berantsy; and a gendarmerie office in Ilemby. A particular amount of park funding is directed toward security through the gendarme and the police. Since the mayor is running for reelection, he readily explained the forty-four development projects that have been realized during his term in office. Projects range from infrastructure improvement, such as health, public security, and culture and communication, and also include more miscellaneous things such as the purchase of a camera for the [mayor's] office to the acquisition of a fire truck for the protection of the park. Given the layout of the area and cliffs of the park, I found this latter development project quite perplexing and unnecessary; it would be impossible for

it to penetrate past the park's peripheral massif.⁴⁴ From my conversation with the mayor, and from the development projects hand-out, it seemed to me that local politics are intertwined in development. Development has seemingly become just as important as usual government functions, thus encouraging political figures to involve themselves in development funding and projects. However, when examining the list of projects, few seemed to have any real substantial benefit to the commune of Ranohira. Therefore, for my consideration of how the park's development projects affect the local community, I visited the market place on the Eastern end of Ranohira and the basic health center (*Centre de Santé de Bas II* or CSB II).

As Route Nationale 7 leaves town, one can find a market place delineated by three larger pavilions and several vending booths, and a sign that marks it as a PNM-ANGAP initiative. The space is visibly centered around the pavilions, constructed by PNM-ANGAP, and the other vending stands stand on the periphery of the central pavilion. When I visited the market, about eight women sat in the central pavilion with their goods laid out on a cloth over the concrete floor. This market place provided people with a designated space to buy household goods, *lamba oany* and other fabric, and potentially some fresh produce. On this Thursday, the market place did not seem to have as many vendors as it could hold;

yet, I observed the following day that substantially more vendors and villagers visited the market. My past experience in Anosy outside Tsiroanomandidy showed me that some villages have market days once a week, and perhaps Friday is Ranohira's market day. Nonetheless, at a first glance, it did not seem to me that the villagers regularly bought goods at this market. In addition, other vendors continue to sell goods and fresh produce on the street, possibly right outside of their homes.

Located behind some open communal space next to the Ranohira mayor's office, the CSB II is the only public medical facility in the village of Ranohira. In the greater Ranohira commune, Ilakaka is the only other village with a medical facility, also a CSB II. A brick fence surrounds the open-air campus of medical buildings and a hand-drawn map depicts the layout from north to south. It labeled the guardian's house, the outdoor shower, the main medical center's building, the toilet, the doctor's house, a lodging facility for people accompanying patients, the personnel's house, and the dentistry. Upon entry into the campus, I was surprised that the buildings within the space designated for medical facilities were still separated by a considerable distance.

The main CSB building had on the inner-facing side an emergency room, family planning, a birthing room, and a maternity ward. The presence of a maternity facility is what differentiates a CSB II from a CSB I. On the opposite side, patients waited for a consultation with the chief of medicine, Dr. Radesy Dauphin. Consultations are typically

free, though some people pay a small amount (100-200 Ariary) depending on their capability to do so; however, it costs 1000 Ariary to be hospitalized and stay at the CSB II facilities. On average, there are about 280 patients who visit per month; however, the beginning of the year saw 392 incoming patients, which was followed by a significant dip due to a hospital strike in the summer and a gradual increase again to 282 in October. The most common ailments include diarrhea, bilharzias, and amoeba, but in general, intestinal illnesses.⁴⁵

Partnerships that exist with this CSB II are primarily a French organization of doctors, ASPS, and the park. ASPS funded the purchase of the ambulance, and provided personnel to work in dentistry while simultaneously training local doctors. Starting in 2006, ASPS took interest in Ranohira because of its importance as a touristic site; therefore, their objectives were not solely to improve the local community. The public health ministry paid medical personnel's salaries, but seemingly funded relatively little else.⁴⁶ Therefore, the improvement of medical facilities in Ranohira – the construction of a fence and the purchase of an ambulance – has been largely funded by independent groups as development projects. However, the real usefulness of these development projects may be another story. During my time in Ranohira, I am doubtful that the ambulance is used frequently because I never saw the ambulance driven on the roads, perhaps because of the bad rural roads or the distance from which patients may come.

Ranohira Bas as a village case study

A small village lies north of Ranohira and east of the canyons. It appears to be not unlike every other village I have yet to visit in Madagascar. Children play together, traverse the village like a playground, and sport dusty, torn clothes. Predominantly inhabited by the Bara people, Ranohira Bas takes its name from being geographically lower than nearby Ranohira, and due to a Bara story about the last king, Ramieba. The story says that Ramieba came to live in Ranohira Bas and was pleased by the water and the rice patties. However, he would not bathe with the population so he found another place upstream. Lemurs, called *hira* in the Bara dialect, would meet at the spot each half hour of his bath. *Rano* means water in Malagasy, so Ranohira signifies the place with water and lemurs. After the naming of the village, a war against French foreigners led to Ramieba's capture and assassination. After negotiating with the victorious foreigners, a general moved Ranohira Bas residents to what is now Ranohira, establishing two villages of residence.⁴⁷ Even from this story alone, one can easily understand the role that the park plays historically and spiritually for surrounding people, particularly the Bara people in Ranohira Bas.

Whether due in part to this historical linkage or simply the management structure of Madagascar National Parks, Ranohira Bas residents have a unique relationship with the park for a variety of reasons. Though

admittedly numerous other villages closely surround the park, Ranohira Bas has capitalized on its proximity to the canyons, which are one of the most visited tourist attractions in the park. As tourists wind their way around rice fields toward the canyons, local children sell small, pocket-sized statues of zebu and other animals. Furthermore, a nearby campground awards them 5000 Ariary per tent,⁴⁸ a small amount for a Western tourist but a more substantial quantity for a Malagasy villager. On some occasions, tourists also hire a Malagasy troop to perform a cabaret. In the parking space, women can sell produce such as tapia, mangos, and bananas. Additionally, foreigners might bring school supplies and clothing for village children.⁴⁹

Alfred, a resident and also the localized park agent in Ranohira Bas, educates villagers and farmers on techniques to master and control fires, as well as what resources the park management permits them to collect. Through this didactic role, the park management seeks to control and eliminate hunting and unsustainable practices that might occur in the park limits. These meetings occur four times a year at familial events such as circumcision, *famadibana* or the practice of second burial, and traditional marriages. They principally concern mastery techniques for fires because of their importance to agricultural and pastoral practices. Alfred credited the effectiveness of ANGAP's approach to environmental education and asserts that hunting

has decreased under the association compared to the park's previous management under the Ministry of Water and Forest.⁵⁰

Alfred spoke on behalf of the Ranohira Bas village and claimed that the current system of development disbursement, using COSAP, works at this point in time. Ranohira Bas has received funding for three projects so far: a dam, a house for the *raiamandreny*, and lodging for the village's school teacher. However, the first two projects were destroyed by a cyclone two years ago, when the *raiamandreny's* house was not yet well-constructed.⁵¹

Any relationship touts its pleasantries, but after a lengthy informal interview with villagers, some of their complaints and problems with Madagascar National Parks began to surface. In addition to the camping fee that the community collects from overnight guests, the villagers submitted a request to MNP for a parking tax on the canyon's daytime visitors; however, this request was made four months ago at the time of our conversation in mid-November, but still no one had received an answer.⁵² As M. Alfred told me about this proposed tax, the other villagers seemed to express frustration along with him over the delay. Given the system of government and the general emphasis on centralization of power, I attributed this delay in response to the immense chain of "decentralization" that really functions more as a chain of command. Moreover, Zaeary, a village resident, explained that the

sector chief comes several times to Ranohira Bas but the Director of MNP-Isalo only comes to meetings twice a year. While the presence of the team has created a sense of collective conservation efforts within the community, Zaeary felt that this sign of respect came late and too infrequently.⁵³

Conclusion

Though my research in Ranohira focused primarily on park management, bureaucracy surrounding the park, challenges to conservation, and villagers' perceptions of the park, I left with many unanswered and penetrating questions about development. In this particular community, a handful of organizations had partnered with the park and the local health facility; however, despite the available funds and physical improvements, the greater population seemed uninterested or unaware of the new resources in their community. Based on my conversations with villagers in Ranohira and Ranohira Bas, there remains a gap between the allocations of development funding and the needs of each individual community. One resident of Ranohira mused about the insufficient number of teachers while schools continue to be built.⁵⁴ Though the appropriation of half the park's revenue back to the communities shows a positive effort, the Isalo branch of Madagascar National Parks, along with COSAP, need to advocate more strongly for the needs of the people. Local government officials are not in need of more money.

Within the politics of resource

management, the government has created theoretical replacements of any income that would potentially be lost due to the restriction of property for the sake of conservation. Though the majority of residents practice agriculture or cattle raising, about 80 people work as touristic guides; it is mandatory for non-resident park visitors to hire a guide for the length of their time within the park limits. I see this obligation, along with development funding, as the two principal examples of incentivizing villagers to respect the national park and the limitations park management generates. However, in a population between five and twelve thousand, the employment of 80 individuals and misguided development projects do little to create a fair trade-off between the local population and a bureaucratic conservationist institution. Throughout my time in Madagascar, I found that the central government, which is designed to protect and aid its citizens, often ignores them. Therefore, I charge bureaucratic institutions such as Madagascar National Parks to take up the loose ends and effectively, not nominally, help local populations.

For others interested in studying Ranohira, I highly encourage them to further explore the bureaucracy of the development projects. I also suggest that one should dedicate a larger timeframe to field study in such an environment, as to allow the opportunity to visit every village

surrounding the park and to talk with more people affected by this form of conservation management. In a more in-depth study, one should also consider more heavily the roles of the *raiamandreny* and *fokotany* president in villages. Lastly, the influence of the Ministry of the Environment and Forests has on Madagascar National Parks, particularly at the national administrative level, is in need of additional investigation. I acknowledge that, as an individual impacted by a Western mindset, I cannot truly understand the benefits and possible costs of resource management in Madagascar; nonetheless, it is an institution worth further inquiry.

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The Relationship between Regime Type and Sustainable Development. A Comparative Analysis of India and China

by Sunil Damle

Does the nature of a country's political institutions impact its ability to develop sustainably? Recently, scholars have begun to seek the answer to this question. In available theoretical literature, on the one hand, democratic theorists argue that institutions of democracy promote effective environmental governance. On the other hand, an opposing group of theorists contends that democracy is bad for

the environment. Existing quantitative data regarding this relationship also remains diverse and inconclusive. This paper seeks to address this debate by engaging in a qualitative comparison of India, the world's largest participatory democracy, and China, the world's largest authoritarian regime. Through using the theoretical framework provided by Payne (1995) to assess case studies in each country, this paper demonstrates that India's democratic framework is more conducive to the development of sustainable policies because of their protection of "counter forces" to environmental degradation. This comparative analysis confirms the theoretical expectation that democracies are more likely to produce sustainable outcomes and adds reason to believe that China's slow movement towards liberal democracy is not only good for their people, but also the environment.

In 1992, former Vice President and Nobel Prize recipient Al Gore argued in his book, *Earth in Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit*, "I have therefore come to believe that an essential prerequisite for saving the environment is the spread of democratic governance to more nations of the world."¹ In the time since Gore wrote this influential book, scholars have begun to explore the link between a country's domestic political processes and their ability to produce sustainable policy outcomes. This linkage becomes particularly salient when one considers the grave implications that climate change and resource degradation have on the future of our world. Given this context, it is becoming increasingly important, if not necessary, to question the extent to which regime type, or government structure, affects a country's ability to engage in sustainable development.

Although findings with this issue remain relatively mixed, this paper maintains the hypothesis of Li and

Reuvany,² Payne,³ Menegat⁴ and Sen⁵: participatory democracies are more likely to develop policies leading to more environmentally friendly economic growth because of their ability to mobilize and maintain opposition to policies which negatively affect the environment. This paper seeks to build on this conclusion by undertaking a qualitative comparison of India, the world's most populous participatory democracy, and China, the world's most populous authoritarian state. In addition to possessing different regime types, both countries are experiencing similar growth trajectories and will face many of the same negative side-effects of rapid growth – namely, and most importantly with respects to this analysis, environmental degradation. The necessity of developing policies to effectively manage their natural environment will become essential for both countries if they seek to increase



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their people's standard of living and gain international prominence.

This paper will begin with a synthesis of recent scholarship, first regarding existing theoretical literature, then quantitative data, on the relationship between regime type and sustainable development. Next, it will move on to a comparative analysis of India and China, examining how environmental movements interact with their domestic political processes by assessing the ability of NGOs, grassroots organizations and civil

because democratically elected leaders are held accountable to their people through elections.⁶ Sen's analysis draws on the mutually reinforcing relationship between the participants and those who serve them in positions of power. In participatory democracies, elected leaders must rely on their people to maintain power and, as a result, are forced to enact policies which are at least partially in line with their people's preference in order to avoid losing power. To the extent that citizens in a democratic nation prioritize

fellow citizens until their views are either rejected or become more widely accepted. What follows next, according to Payne, is "regime responsiveness."⁸ People are more likely to have their voice heard in democracies because, as discussed earlier, elected leaders must be responsive to public opinion or they risk losing power. If citizens in a democracy truly prioritize sustainable development, they have both the power and tools to ensure their leaders produce policies which effectively manage their environment. On the flip side, if only a minority support sustainable development, they have the means to freely form an opposition to the majority's policies hoping that their policy prescriptions will eventually gain more popular appeal. This theoretical framework will be returned to later as it provides a helpful template to assess the interaction of environmental movements with political systems in both India and China. Clearly, there is a strong theoretical basis to contend that democracies are generally good for the environment.

On the other hand, the political theory of neo-authoritarianism counters the idea that democracies are more likely to produce more sustainable policies. In summarizing this theory, Daniel Goh has observed that a neo-authoritarian regime consists of the following characteristics; first, the economy is largely liberalized. Second, the state still participates in the capitalist economy through decentralized, profit oriented firms. Third, the public sphere is tightly regulated through the government (i.e authoritarianism).⁹ Many Asian nations, including Singapore and South Korea, used a neo-authoritarian

effective environmental management, this will be the likely outcome.

Also applying concepts of democratic theory to this discussion, Roger Payne argues individual freedoms will result in increased environmental protection. Payne provides a two-level framework of analysis. First, Payne suggests that individual rights found within democracies lead to a "marketplace of ideas."⁷ Citizens in democracies are free to collect and disseminate information to their fellow citizens, creating greater public awareness. Even if a majority of the public does not prioritize sustainable development, the minority that does can still engage in this "marketplace of ideas" and lobby

societies to impact positive change. Finally, it will analyze China's slow movement towards the proliferation of political freedoms, a progression that will prove to be beneficial not only to the people of China but also the environment.

Theoretical Considerations

Through the application of democratic theory, scholars have been able to theorize a link between the presence of participatory democracy and sustainable policy outcomes. Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen has observed that democratic societies have long been able to avoid environmental disasters, such as famine,

"In many ways, the dynamic between corporations operating in a free market and their consumers is not unlike the relationship we observe between politicians and their constituents."

ruling model to spur their rapid economic growth during the 1980s and 1990s. A neo-authoritarian model is said to be more effective because the ruling elite does not have to navigate the same conflicting interests and bureaucratic structures inherent to democracies. With respects to the environment, this political system would aid in facilitating effective environmental management because leaders could make decisions and enact policies quickly while ignoring special interest groups or a population who does not prioritize sustainable development.

Midlarsky draws heavily on these theoretical assumptions, contending that "Corporations and environmental groups can fight each other to a standstill, leaving a decision making vacuum instead of a direct impact of democracy on the environment."¹⁰ This argument is rooted in the notion that conflicting interests, often times present in democracies, will invariably slow down the process of producing sustainable policies. Special interest groups that represent corporations that prioritize securing profits over environmental sustainability can also "capture" their own environmental regulations through lobbying public officials, an oft occurring tactic in democracies as Dryzek observes.¹¹ While these arguments related to the political economy of this relationship deserve strong consideration, it is also important to discuss the myriad of incentives that could push corporations

to value sustainable practices. In many ways, the dynamic between corporations operating in a free market and their consumers is not unlike the relationship we observe between politicians and their constituents. If environmentalism is reflected in the public's interest, corporations may also enact practices that are sustainable in order to become more attractive to consumers who value sustainability. This dynamic explains why a company like Intel would tie bonuses to how well their employees meet their sustainability goals, or why Wal-Mart would introduce a comprehensive sustainability index to their products in order to guide consumers.¹² Nonetheless, the vast political power of corporate lobbies does not always negate the impact of environmental activism within participatory democracies. Ultimately, it is the aggregated preferences lobbies, voters and policy makers that create public policy.

Prior Empirical Research

Current quantitative data exploring the link between regime type and sustainable development is diverse in its findings. On the one hand, Li and Reuvany, through examining human actions which directly harm the environment, have concluded that higher levels of democracy lead to lower levels of CO₂ emissions per capita, NO_x emissions per capita, less land degradation, lower levels of organic pollution and minimal deforestation.¹³ In another study, Barrett and Graddy,

after collecting data from over 90 countries during the 1980s, simply concluded, "more freedom is good for the environment."¹⁴ Finally, Gleditsch and Sverdrup have concluded, through the collection of data from over 100 countries, that democratic regimes have both overcome environmental degradation and found cooperative solutions to international environmental disasters more effectively than authoritarian regimes.¹⁵ Interestingly, Gleditsch and Sverdrup also observe that although democracies have sacrificed the environment at the expense of increasing economic growth, it is their ability to produce "counter-forces" to such degradation that ultimately account for the causality of their findings.¹⁶ In other words, it is not that democracies inherently prioritize environmental protection in the first place but, rather, the fact that voices of opposition to environmental degradation have the ability to impact change – a finding sympathetic to Payne's theoretical expectations. In sum, this body of research supports the conclusion that democracies can internalize the environmental costs of their growth more effectively than authoritarian regimes.


On the other hand, however, there is a contradictory set of data. Exploring the impact human activities have on the environment, Midlarsky found that there is a negative relationship between the presence of democracy and beneficial environmental outcomes.¹⁷

Midlarsky's research found democracies do not demonstrate lower levels of CO2 emissions and less soil erosion and deforestation. While agreeing there is a strong link between democracies and environmental commitment, Neumayer qualifies his argument, observing that there is still a weak link between democracy and positive environmental outcomes.¹⁸ It is important to note that Neumayer focuses specifically on environmental commitment with respects to the ratification and signing of international environmental agreements, participation in environmental intergovernmental organizations and compliance with existing environmental agreements.¹⁹ As Li and Reuveny have concluded, "It is safe to say that extant empirical evidence on human actions that directly degrade the environment is mixed."²⁰ Undoubtedly, differences in methodology (sample size, measurements

of democracy, statistical modeling, etc.) play into the variations found within these findings, but they still remain helpful in providing us with a broad, multi-country assessment of the relationship between regime type and sustainable development.

This discussion of theory and empirical data has been neither exhaustive nor conclusive with respect to the relationship between regime type and sustainable development.²¹ Despite the inconclusive evidence, this collection of literature sheds light on the reasons why a particular regime type might be more effective in managing the environment or, on the other hand, why it might not. This paper engages in a qualitative comparison between India and China on the relationship between their regime type and their commitment to sustainable development, hoping this empirical approach might better illuminate the differences between competing theories and empirical results.²²

FIGURE 1



Measurements and Metrics

With respects to measuring outcomes, this paper maintains the classic definition of sustainable development as coined by the Bundtland Commission in 1983. This commission considered sustainable development to be: 'paths of progress which meet the needs and aspirations of the present generation without compromising the future generations to meet their needs.'²³ More specifically, this paper views outcomes that demonstrate an emphasis on the reduction of harmful pollutants and emissions, the protection of land from deforestation and other forms of degradation, the conservation of finite resources and the reduction of environmental marginalization and racism to be sustainable. These criteria will provide a sufficient template for assessing policy outcomes in both India and China.

In order to quantify the differences in their regime types, this paper will turn towards both their Freedom in the World 2010 scores and Polity IV data. According to Freedom House, India is considered to be a "free" country scoring a 2 on political rights and a 3 on civil liberties (Scored on a scale of 1-10, with 1 being most free and 10 being least free).²⁴ According to Polity data, India scored an 8 on competitive elections and a 9 on political participation (Based on an inverse scale from Freedom House).²⁵ On the other hand, China is considered

to be "not free" by Freedom House, scoring a 7 on political rights and 6 on civil liberties.²⁶ Polity data shows China scoring a 3 on competitive elections and 1 on political participation.²⁷ Overall, the Polity IV country report on China concluded, "All independent voices of political and social reform are muzzled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)."²⁸

Although both nations display a measurable difference in the nature of their regime type, there are a few key variables that can be held constant between them. First, both nations are currently growing at impressive rates and are predicted to continue demonstrating strong growth rates over the next several decades. In 2050, India and China will represent two of the world's largest three economies and, as a result, consumption and growth will continue at a rapid rate during this time period.²⁹ Figure (1) compares the projected GDP growth rates of both India and China between 2015 and 2050.³⁰ Second, these steep growth trajectories present a distinct set of environmentally related problems. Over this time period both countries will face the negative environmental side-effects of their growth – from the overuse of key resources to significant air pollution. As of 2007, China was the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide while India ranked third.³¹ These circumstances present policy makers in both India and China with a significant challenge- how to account for the environmental externalities of this growth while, at the same time, not sacrificing economic development. These shared tensions make India and China ideal for comparison.

India and Sustainable Development

Indian democracy is complex, fractious and overtly bureaucratic. Despite this, it has managed to work effectively since they gained independence from British rule in the 1940s. Following the October 1999 elections, the New York Times provided the following assessment of Indian democracy:

As 360 million Indians voted over the last month, the world's largest and most fractious democracy once again set a stirring example for all nations... India's rich diversity sometimes looks like an obstacle to unity. But the latest election has proved that a commitment to resolving differences peacefully and democratically can transform diversity into a sense of strength.³²

This endorsement of Indian democracy is evidence that the world's largest democracy has been successful by holding true to its democratic foundations. Kohli argues Indian democracy has been successful for two primary reasons. First, India has been able to maintain a healthy balance between centralization and de-centralization, allowing for effective policy implementation. Second, Kohli contends that, unlike many other democracies, India has been able to protect the interests of those who are traditionally left out of the political process.³³ Kohli further notes the balance Indian democracy has maintained, "The powerful in society feel well served by the system but weaker groups do not feel

totally excluded or hopeless."³⁴ Although widespread corruption remains a reality, Indian democracy has arrived upon a healthy equilibrium in which the states power is not too decentralized and the views of weaker groups are incorporated into policy-making decisions.

When environmental movements interact with India's domestic political process, these movements are often successful. The most pertinent example of this is the broader movement against the proliferation of dams. According to the Indian Times, the construction of dams has grave environmental consequences, resulting in the displacement of one million people and the loss of 350,000 hectares of forest land and 250,000 hectares of agricultural pastures.³⁵ Working within the framework of Indian democracy, thousands of citizens over the past several decades have assembled to fight the construction of these dams. Most of the opposition has resulted from grass-roots activism. Karan notes, "Both young and old participate in the movement...they bridge an often difficult gap of age, class, region, and social experiences as they join in a common cause...likewise the save the Narmada movements and Silent Valley movements have drawn grassroots support among urban intelligentsia and through linkages with like minded groups in India."³⁶ The ability of these movements to organize and establish a broad base of membership was possible mainly because Indian democracy protected the political rights of these groups, rather than working to suppress their cause.

Ultimately, the proliferation of

these environmental movements led to sustainable government policies which protected the environment. One particular group, the 'Krishna Valley Water Movement,' has been successful in lobbying the government for the equitable allocation of water resources in areas where dams were still built. A 1992 article entitled "New Victories for Dam Evictees" in The Hindu, India's national newspaper, highlighted the effects grassroots organizations had on the government. The article observed:

In southern Maharashtra, the movements (Krishna Valley Water Movement among others) have resulted in a new gain: until the Irrigation water actually is provided for these new lands, the oustees will get Rs. 600 a month as compensation money. The Government as usual has been slow about paying this, and the result has been in many cases renewed struggle - but both rehabilitation and the new "water allowance" are now accepted gains of the struggle. The Government has also accepted in principle some of the demands for restructuring water on a basis of equitable distribution, and will take drought-prone Atpadi taluka in Sangli district as a pilot project for this.³⁷

In this case, because the movement gained a vast amount of public support the Indian government was responsive to their demands. This governmental action provides a good example of the mutually reinforcing relationship between the Indian people and their government. Had the government not been accountable to the people of India, they would have likely ignored their demands.

Another environmental movement

which has been successful working within the framework of Indian democracy is the Silent Valley Movement. The movement is comprised of the Kerala People's Science Movement (Kerala Sastra Sahitya Parishad). This movement is built upon a network of local citizens and school teachers. Eventually, a government commission was created to examine the environmental consequences of a dam project the group was opposing, the end result of years of grass-roots organizing and activism. After an extensive investigation, the commission withdrew the plan to build the dam.³⁸ From these movements, government action which either decreased environmental marginalization or stopped the building of dams emerged.

Yet another example of a successful Indian environmental movement due to the democratic context it operated within was the Chipko movement against commercial logging. After the government of India allotted acres of forest land to sporting goods companies, a group of local women - with the encouragement of various NGOs - circled the trees, preventing them from being cut down.³⁹ This grass-roots opposition against an unsustainable Indian policy was recognized by the Indian government. Vandana Shiva and J. Bandyopadhyay, writing shortly after the end of this movement in 1986, argued that the collective impact of this environmental movement was a reassessment of the government's policy on commercial logging in the region and, in the end, a 15 year ban on commercial logging in the region.⁴⁰ Ultimately, they concluded that this movement was

"recognized at the highest policy making level."⁴¹ It was, once again, made possible because the women who comprised the opposition could freely mobilize and demonstrate their dissatisfaction with a policy that would harm their local environment without being subject to suppression.

The progression and success of these large movements work within the theoretical framework that Payne provides. First, Indian citizens used their democratic freedoms to collect and disseminate information regarding these injustices, effectively creating a "marketplace of ideas." This, in effect, spurred grass-roots activism. Because Indian government officials are accountable to their citizens, the awareness created by this movement resulted in "regime responsiveness." Thus, the strength of these movements facilitated by the protection of their political rights created policy changes that resulted in sustainable outcomes. In this case, either the construction of dams was stopped or the government agreed to extend compensation to marginalized farmers and allocate water resources equitably. Through analyzing these movements using the theoretical lens Payne provides, we find that democratic institutions in India allowed for both the proliferation of these movements and created an environment in which the policy prescriptions of the movements were acted upon by the government.

China and Sustainable Development

In comparison to India, China's government has traditionally suppressed

many political rights and civil liberties. The communist government, established by Mao Zedong in 1949, has constricted the political liberties of its citizens through limiting their ability to actively participate in government affairs. These constraints on political rights have been extended to environmental movements. Ross has observed that restrictions on political participation have limited discourse on environmental issues, limiting their political saliency.⁴² Furthermore, Elizabeth Economy observes in the interaction between environmental movements and the domestic political processes, "Beijing continues to exercise control over NGOs through a range of regulations and restrictions, remaining wary of the potential of environmental activism in China to transform into a force for much broader political change."⁴³ Restrictions on political participation have inhibited progress within the environmental movement, decreasing the chance that issues surrounding sustainability are brought to the forefront of the government's agenda.

To be sure, over the past decade China's government has maintained a surface level commitment to environmentalism. Today, there are about 20 laws, 40 regulations, 500 standards and approximately 1,000 local environmental regulations in China. Additionally, China has signed roughly 80 environmental treaties⁴⁴ The problem, however, is that a lack of civic participation in China

has diminished the effect of any law, regulation or standard imposed. Bretell argues in respect to environmentalism in China, "Authorities need participation to achieve policy goals; however this need is in constant challenge with the desire to control it. While political opportunities have allowed for greater participation, they remain limiting factors to the emergence of traditional movements."⁴⁵ Although China has expressed concern over environmental degradation, a lack of participation has hindered policy goals. Additionally, as Elizabeth Economy further argues, local governments fail to implement any of the above regulations.⁴⁶ A lack of public pressure appears to be a big reason why local governments haven't implemented sustainable policies. Because politicians are not accountable to the people, but rather to the Chinese Communist Party

authoritarianism has on environmentalism and their ability to develop sustainability. First, China imposes strict limits on the proliferation of grass-roots oriented NGOs. In China, NGOs have to register with the government and find a comparative government agency to oversee their actions. As a result of this and other government restrictions, very few potent NGOs are registered.⁴⁷ Second, when local citizens do speak out to educate citizens about environmental degradation and lobby the government to take action, they are often times subject to suppression. For example, Wu Lihong, an influential environmental activist, was jailed and beaten by Chinese authorities after spending 16 years crusading against the proliferation of chemical plants in his local city of Tai Hu.⁴⁸ With regards to his detention, an October of 2007 New York Times article noted, "He lost

"...the strength of these movements facilitated by the protection of their political rights created policy changes that resulted in sustainable outcomes."

(CCP) in Beijing (mandates the leaders of local municipalities to meet certain growth rates) they have no incentive to implement policies that protect the environment.

There are several examples which are endemic of the negative effect Chinese

his job. His wife lost hers. The police summoned, detained and interrogated him."⁴⁹ Later in the article, the NY Times cites an interview a local newspaper had with Lihong. In the interview he noted, "Our society lacks the right atmosphere for environmental protection...even in

areas where pollution is most severe, I still have a hard time winning people's support."⁵⁰ In another example, grass-roots environmentalist Yu Xiaogang was banned from traveling after educating villagers about the perils of a proposed dam in the Yunnan Province.⁵¹ Over the past several years, China has a record of limiting the ability of environmental activists to disseminate information regarding environmental degradation, a byproduct of China's economic miracle.

When examined through the theoretical lens that Payne provides, we find the suppression of political rights troubling for China's prospects of developing sustainably. Regulations and restrictions imposed upon environmental NGOs and activists prevent a "marketplace of ideas" from being formed. For example, the jailing or suppression of both Wu Lihong and Yu Xiaogang, two prominent grass-roots environmental activists, created a scenario in which less information was being disseminated to local citizens. Furthermore, because there is a lack of public pressure towards the government (largely the result of government suppression), the Chinese regime is not responsive. The end results are government outcomes that do not prioritize sustainable development. In the case of Lake Tai, although the government claims to have reduced the number of chemical plants in half from its 1990 level of 2,800, Kahn contends the city was far more preoccupied in

changing its public perception rather than cleaning up the environment.⁵² Today, the city still receives the lowest grade from the State Environmental Protection Administration.⁵³ Although pollution has reached critical levels in many of the country's lakes and rivers, the Chinese government has yet to respond.

Comparative Analysis: India & China

When comparing outcomes in India and China, we find that India has been able to internalize the environmental costs of its growth more effectively because of its democratic institutions. Although the people in both India and China seek policy outcomes to protect their local environment, it is India's ability to produce and protect opposition, or "counter movements" as Gleditsch and Sverdrup argue, that has led to more sustainability. On the one hand, the framework of Indian democracy has allowed for the proliferation of NGOs and grass-roots activists who continue to disseminate information to the public regarding the environmental consequences of governmental policy and economic growth. The dissemination of this information has resulted in beneficial government policy outcomes, namely, the creation of government commissions that reconsider environmental policies and the allocation of government compensation. On the other hand, the suppression of NGOs and grass-

roots activists in China has proved to be problematic. Without a cascade of public pressure, government policies that lead to environmental degradation have gone uncontested in many areas. While Indian citizens who participated in either the Kerala People's Science Movement, the Chipko Movement or the Krishna Valley Water Movement were able to voice their concerns and lobby their fellow citizens without the threat of suppression, activists and NGOs in China are either completely suppressed or limited in educating their fellow citizens about the negative environmental consequence of a specific government policy. Through restrictions and flat out suppression, Chinese citizens have trouble establishing these vital "counter forces" to environmental degradation.

In sum, when comparing India and China, we find the presence of protected, widespread environmental movements and grass-roots activism to be directly connected to sustainable outcomes. This finding is not only sympathetic to the theoretical expectations outlined by both Payne and Sen, but it also demonstrates that a nation's ability to produce "counter-forces" to environmental degradation is paramount. After all, it was not that India's environmental policies were sustainable in the first place but, rather, their protection of opposition forces led to a rethinking of policy. These observations are not only true in respect to both India and China, they also support Rualdo Menegat's

analysis pertaining to his similar case study of Brazil that "No environmental management plan will be effective without the participation of citizens."⁵⁴ Because India does not suppress the participation of their citizens, they demonstrate stronger environmental management. The same, however, cannot be said about China.

China's Move Towards Political Freedom

There have been some indications China is beginning to move towards the proliferation of political freedoms which would allow for increased environmental activism. Keping has argued that, along with widespread economic liberalization, China has recently extended more political freedoms to its citizens.⁵⁵ Ogden argues there are three factors which are pushing liberal democracy in China. First, she points out that China is looking to increase its respect in the international community, and is extending more political freedoms in order to do so. Second, Ogden contends the Chinese central government has realized that one of the best ways to stay in power is to become more open and transparent. Doing so will quell internal political tensions. Finally, economic development, resulting in an emboldened middle class, has led to the slow democratization of China.⁵⁶ As China continues to grow at a rapid pace it is likely that these trends will continue, and China will continue to progress towards liberal democracy.

This slow democratization is beneficial for the prospects of sustainable development in China. There have already been the proliferation of more

environmentally oriented NGOs over the past several years. By one account, the number of student run environmental NGOs increased from 22 in 1997 to 176 across 26 provinces only six years later.⁵⁷ This explosion of environmental NGOs is a promising sign that the government will begin to face more public pressure to address widespread environmental degradation. As more NGOs are created, the public will begin to pressure government officials and more sustainable policy outcomes are likely to emerge. The question remains, however, the extent to which these NGOs actually have any "teeth" in impacting change. Nonetheless, the continued democratization of China is welcome and should continue to be encouraged because a democratic China will only be beneficial for the environment.

Conclusions

This paper has addressed the debate regarding the relationship between a country's regime type and its ability to develop sustainably by comparing India and China. India and China were selected for comparison because of their different regime types (India being the world's largest democracy, China being the world's largest authoritarian state) and their similar development trajectories. Through examining how environmental movements in each country interact with their domestic political process, we can conclude that the democratic framework established in India is more conducive to the institutionalization of sustainable practices because of the protection of opposition to government policies. Using the framework Payne established, we find

that because Indian democracy allows for the creation of a "marketplace of ideas," and because their system ensures "regime responsiveness," policy outcomes in India have been far more sustainable than in China. In China, through the suppression of NGOs and individual environmental activists, there is neither a "marketplace of ideas" nor any semblance of "regime responsiveness." To be sure, this qualitative analysis lacks universality and is quite limited in its scope. Nonetheless, this comparison provides case study support and analysis for several empirical studies (e.g. Li & Reuveny, Graddy & Barrett and Gleditsch & Sverdrup) and fits within the previously discussed theoretical framework.

Resource degradation and climate change are perhaps two of the most significant challenges facing the global community in the 21st century. Rising water levels could potentially submerge a majority of the world's major cities, displacing billions of people and creating an unprecedented crisis. The possibility of widespread resource-wars is also very real as the world continues consuming finite resources as if their supply was infinite. As the effects of climate change and environmental degradation continue to become more perverse, it appears as if the international community should heed the observation of Al Gore; democracy is an essential condition for environmental protection. Once this idea becomes widely accepted, not only will a new point of discussion be added in discourse surrounding the value of participatory democracy, but the environment will be better off.

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The Compassionate Release of the Lockerbie Bomber.

Changing Ideas of Justice in the Western World.

by Emily Strong

The 1980s showcased an exceptionally tumultuous period of terrorist activity aimed heavily at transnational airlines. The popular use of IEDs (Improvised Explosive Device) as well as the exploitation of inconsistent baggage policies employed during this time reached a deadly peak on December 21st, 1988 when extremists targeted Pan Am Flight 103.¹ The attack on the U.S.-bound flight took the lives

of 243 passengers, 16 crew members, and 11 residents of Lockerbie, Scotland. The investigation which followed led American, Scottish, and other U.K. authorities through a myriad of shrapnel evidence to Libyan Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi, and twenty years later, the tried and convicted Lockerbie Bomber would be released on compassionate grounds due a terminal illness. In this analysis, I examine the compassionate release of Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi by considering the international pressures, as well as the internal judicial processes, which contributed to the decision to release the bomber by the Scottish Government. Can a nation caught precariously between self-determination and Unionist ties effectively administer jurisprudence on a global scale? What message can be imparted from Scotland's challenge to the Western world's model of justice? In order to consider this matter in its

entirety, I will illustrate the inquiries and international criticism which followed the Scottish Government's decision in an endeavor to disassociate Scotland's foreign policy from that of Westminster (an entity highly in-tune with American hegemony) and emphasize the administration of Scot's Law and measure how these aspects culminated in Al-Megrahi's release. Upon close examination, these factors lead to the conclusion that the Scottish Government's decisive action on an international issue clearly demonstrates to the dominant Western nations Scotland's capacity to effectively change accepted social norms on the international stage.

Compassionate Release

In October 2008, nearly twenty years after the downfall of Pan Am Flight 103, it was announced that the man convicted of orchestrating and executing the atrocities on Pan Am 103 had been

diagnosed with terminal prostate cancer.² Later, in August 2009, following three months of consultations with medical personnel, prison staff, and social workers, Scottish Minister for Justice Kenny MacAskill announced that the Scottish Government would be releasing Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi on compassionate grounds whereupon he would be returned to Libya to die. The Minister's statement sent shockwaves into the international community; not only had a small nation dealt an unprecedented verdict on a matter of international jurisprudence, but it had done so in the face of overwhelming condemnation from hegemonic giants, such as the United States. With the announcement that the Lockerbie Bomber would go free, Scotland introduced a paradigm shift in the world of Western justice, but the decision to compassionately release Al-Megrahi did not come to fruition overnight, nor did it leave Scotland's image on the international

stage unscathed. These and other relevant topics will be considered firstly by scrutinizing Cabinet Secretary for Justice Kenny MacAskill's process of evaluating and investigating initial applications for Prisoner Transfer Agreements and later appeals for compassionate release.

The Pursuit of Due Process

When Cabinet Secretary MacAskill declared that Al-Megrahi would be freed, he articulated the mechanics of his decision with a timeline, which included applications received from both Al-Megrahi and the Libyan government, and ensuing inquiries made by Mr. MacAskill once these applications were submitted.

In May 2009, three months before Al-Megrahi applied for compassionate release, the Libyan Government submitted an application for a Prisoner Transfer Agreement (PTA). Since the Lockerbie Bombing was an incident involving citizens of several nationalities, primarily those from Great Britain and the United States, Mr. MacAskill invited officials from both nations to make representations on the possibility of a PTA between the Scottish and Libyan governments.

The response from the U.S. government was explicit: No PTA.³ After speaking with Attorney General Eric Holder, as well as Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, it became apparent to the Cabinet Secretary for Justice that American family members of the Lockerbie victims had the understanding that Al-Megrahi would live out the

remainder of his life on Scottish soil. In fact, in pre-trial negotiations with Libya, these families were "assured that anyone convicted would serve his sentence in Scotland."⁴ At this juncture, it must be noted that when MacAskill encouraged representations from his counterpart in Westminster, U.K. Cabinet Secretary for Justice Jack Straw, the latter replied that "... they saw no legal barrier to transfer and that they gave no assurances to the US Government at the time."⁵ Soon after Al-Megrahi's release, questions of British Petroleum lobbying U.K. officials to include Al-Megrahi in Whitehall's ratification of PTA Treaty arose. These and other inquiries will be addressed at length at a later point.

When Mr. MacAskill completed his survey of representations, he reasoned that since assurances had been made to the families of the Lockerbie victims, no PTA would ever transpire. Consequently, he rejected the Libyan government's application for a PTA.⁶ With the door to a PTA firmly closed, Al-Megrahi sought release from incarceration on compassionate grounds and submitted his application to the Scottish Government on July 24th, 2009.

Scotland is one of several countries that actively implements compassionate release of prisoners in the criminal justice system (other countries with similar processes include the United States, Wales, and New Zealand). Section A of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act of 1993 stipulates that the

Cabinet Secretary for Justice has license to release prisoners on compassionate release.⁷

As Cabinet Secretary for Justice, Mr. MacAskill is obligated to field inquiries from individuals who petition him with issues pertaining to Scot's law and jurisprudence. In order to field Al-Megrahi's request, Mr. MacAskill was required to obtain suitable evidence that Al-Megrahi's health was severe enough to warrant early release. As per the requirements of his title, Mr. MacAskill submitted the aforementioned application to the proper authorities that could accurately divulge matters pertaining to the prisoner's health. According to the Scottish Government:

In accordance with normal procedure, the application was forwarded to the Scottish Prison Service, where the Prison Governor, Social Work, and medical staff provide advice on the application. Each report supported that Mr. Al-Megrahi was suitable for compassionate release.⁸

When he obtained the necessary testimonies and evidence that Al-Megrahi qualified for compassionate release, the Cabinet Secretary had the difficult task of balancing the wishes of bereaved family members with Scottish ideals of justice that he was duty-bound to uphold and protect. On August 20th, 2009, the Cabinet Secretary for Justice stood before Scottish Parliament and announced his decision:



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Our justice system demands that judgment be imposed but compassion be available. Our beliefs dictate that justice be served, but mercy be shown. Compassion and mercy are about upholding the beliefs that we seek to live by, remaining true to our values as a people. No matter the severity of the provocation or the atrocity perpetrated. For these reasons - and these reasons alone - it is my decision that Mr Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed Al-Megrahi, convicted in 2001 for the Lockerbie bombing, now terminally ill with prostate cancer, be released on compassionate grounds and allowed to return to Libya to die.⁹

Though Mr. MacAskill was resolute in his decision, his judgment on a highly emotional issue did not go on unnoticed in the international community, particularly when a power such as the United States had so vehemently opposed a PTA. In the coming months, the Scottish Government would have to stand up to harsh criticism from the international community regarding its decision to release the Lockerbie bomber, particularly from the United States.

Inquiries

When the Cabinet Secretary announced his decision, the public feedback from both domestic and international communities varied from outrage to an outpouring of support. For the most part, however, the world was incensed. During the last decade, countries such as the United States had sought to build a coalition of nations who, as their defining feature, took firm positions against terrorism

as well as those states sympathetic to terrorist activities. In terms of foreign policy, the U.S. assumption was that Scotland, despite having a Nationalist administration, would align itself with the strong anti-terror stance of other Western states. When the Scottish Government instead supported the release of a terrorist who had murdered hundreds of people, the U.S. voiced its strong condemnation:

The interests of justice have not been served by this decision.

There is simply no justification for releasing this convicted terrorist whose actions took the lives of 270 individuals, including 189 Americans.¹⁰

The U.K. seemed equally disappointed by the decision, and Prime Minister David Cameron cited the decision of the Scottish Executive as “wholly wrong.”¹¹

The situation seemed clear cut. Scotland had released Al-Megrahi and the U.S. and U.K. governments had strongly opposed the decision. However, the outrage and suspicion of a group of U.S. politicians and surviving family members led inquiries to be made into the underlying circumstances that surrounded the release of the Lockerbie Bomber. In 2010, leaked documents from 2007 revealed that British Petroleum had lobbied Westminster to ratify a PTA treaty with Libya that would allow a prisoner to be transferred and complete their sentence in Libya.¹² The reason for such lobbying was simple: In May 2007, BP and Libyan diplomats had an oil exploration agreement on the table, one that was “potentially worth up to £15 billion.”¹³ When negotiations were

stalled, BP began nudging Whitehall officials to *include* Al-Megrahi under the umbrella of the PTA Treaty.¹⁴ Knowing Scotland was sensitive to the notion of a PTA with Al-Megrahi, Cabinet Secretary Straw remained adamant toward the idea; however, when talks between BP and Libya continued to stall, he changed his mind. In a letter to Cabinet Secretary MacAskill, dated December 17th, 2007, Cabinet Secretary Straw stated:

I had previously accepted the importance of the al-Megrahi issue to Scotland and said I would try to get an exclusion for him on the face of the agreement. I have not been able to secure an explicit exclusion. . . . The wider negotiations with the Libyans are reaching a critical stage and, in view of the overwhelming interests for the United Kingdom, I have agreed that in this instance the (prisoner transfer agreement) should be in the standard form and not mention any individual.¹⁵

The Westminster Cabinet Secretary’s letter was a noticeable contrast from the one he had sent his Scottish counterpart earlier that July in which he “favoured an option to leave out Megrahi by stipulating that any prisoners convicted before a specified date would not be considered for transfer.”¹⁶ Without listing specifics (names or dates), the treaty would allow Al-Megrahi eligibility for a transfer and permit BP to further the interests of the United Kingdom abroad. Several months later, BP finalized its negotiations with Libya. In April 2009, Westminster ratified the treaty, “paving the way for Libya to formally apply for a PTA the next month.”¹⁷

A number of Whitehall officials have denied that the trade negotiations were linked with the eventual release of Al-Megrahi, stating that trade was a consideration, but not a decisive issue.¹⁸ Other Westminster affiliates have added that the Treaty was part of a larger effort to “normalize ties,” and included a range of issues, including trade.¹⁹ Westminster’s ratification of a PTA with Libya may have been used to clear the path for BP to go about their oil exploration deal in Libya or it may have been a show of good faith to ease the troubled relations between the two world powers. The U.S. congressional committee, which recently began looking into the matter, believes the former is true and has declared that Al-Megrahi was released “for oil.”²⁰ However, the U.S. committees inquiring about this issue, as well as a great number of other people, do not see the illogical nature of this conclusion. The laws and regulations that Westminster employs in the framework of its criminal justice system are separate from Scotland and subsequently have little clout in this Scottish context.²¹ Westminster’s decision to open a PTA agreement with Libya is relevant only to Westminster since the Scottish Government could ultimately veto the law. As such, it was factored in by Cabinet Secretary MacAskill as a representation from the U.K. government, not as a decree by which the Scottish Government must abide.

Here, the differentiating approaches of Westminster and the Scottish Executive, in handling questions and issues arising from a potential PTA agreement, become markedly clear. Scotland, a nation lacking in self-determination, emerged a giant in empathetic common sense, while the U.K. took the route most sensible to the interests of state. Without official diplomatic ties to other nations, Scotland is without vested interests in other nations, unlike the U.K. and Libya where the former has a strong commercial interest in the resources of the latter. When external political interests are absent and there is no need for guard-dog behavior, pragmatism flourishes. This was demonstrated by Cabinet Secretary for Justice MacAskill when he denied Libya and Al-Megrahi a PTA because assurances were made previously to family members that such an arrangement was out of the question.

In Westminster, on the other hand, Cabinet Secretary Straw stated that no such assurances were made and that “no legal barriers”²² were in place to prevent a PTA, but not before he mentioned it was in the greater interests of the U.K. to forego specifics in the PTA Treaty with Libya. The Westminster Cabinet Secretary’s vagueness showcases an expert high-wire walk which all powerful nations must tread, one where absolutes are avoided at all costs in order to best

promote the interests of state. In this case, it was the best interest of the U.K. to be vague and maintain civil diplomatic ties with Libya, lest a multi-million pound oil exploration deal be lost.

During the Mr. MacAskill’s speech to Scottish Parliament, he expressed his disappointment on Cabinet Secretary Straw’s “regrettable” lack of further clarification regarding the controversy of a PTA.²³ This was an extraordinary way for the Scottish Cabinet Secretary to slip in a barb regarding Westminster’s handling of controversial issues while simultaneously highlighting the ability of his own Nationalist government to tackle thorny matters such as these and excel. Mr. MacAskill then went on detail the Scottish Government’s resolution to release Al-Megrahi on compassionate grounds with great emphasis on Scotland’s inherent good and clemency. With his decision made, Mr. MacAskill offered to make representations to any in the international community who might have concerns regarding the Scottish Government’s decision. To this day, he has answered to sharp criticism on a monthly, if not weekly basis during Ministerial Q&As at Scottish Parliament and has not publicly expressed any regret over his decision.²⁴

Scotland on the International Stage

A hallmark of a mature nation is its capacity to take accountability for executive decisions. The Cabinet Secretary for Justice claimed on

“The adage, ‘an eye for an eye leaves the whole world blind,’ may be trite, but it hardly resonates in the laws and societies that govern the majority of the post-modern world.”

several occasions that he strictly adhered to due process when he investigated both the Libyan government’s request for a PTA as well as Al-Megrahi’s application for compassionate release. These claims were substantiated by the Scottish Parliament’s Justice Committee’s inquiry into the issue.²⁵ Questions of the Cabinet Secretary’s handling of Al-Megrahi’s release may one day be put to rest, but the attention Scotland received because of this issue will forever keep the small nation in the memory of the international community.

As a protectorate of the U.K., Scotland is both enabled and limited by its devolved powers. While Scotland’s legal system, educational system, and healthcare services differ widely from the U.K. as a result of devolution, its presence on the

international stage is limited by its ultimate status as British territory.²⁶ Scotland does not have the faculty to establish diplomatic ties, and thus cannot be recognized as a sovereign nation by an outside state; as a

result, it does not delve into matters of foreign policy.

Tactically speaking, the Scottish Executive’s decision was an excellent way of capturing the attention of the international community. This is not to say Al-Megrahi’s release was a calculated strategy to bolster support for the Scottish National Party (SNP) and its platform of independence, but rather to point out that Scotland *alone* enacted the enormous decision to release a convicted criminal on compassionate grounds. Arguably, there are some (self-determined) nations that would struggle with such a daunting task. Thus, for a small government with devolved powers to take the lead role on an issue of international security and justice under the resolute leadership of its top authority on criminal justice was unprecedented.

Not only was Scotland’s leadership on the release of Al-Megrahi remarkable, it indicates a nation unapologetic for its mercy and confident in its pursuit of justice. With this decision, the Scottish Government has made it abundantly clear that to a people “who pride themselves on their humanity,”²⁷ justice and mercy are not mutually exclusive. Whether or not Scotland will gain its independence is uncertain, but political pursuits of autonomy pale in comparison to the impact the Scottish Government’s decision has made on the Western sense of justice: the world will not forget the footprint Scotland has made on the international stage, nor their choice to bestow clemency on a dying terrorist.

Defining Justice

Through the examination of Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Justice, Kenny MacAskill’s, pursuit of due process during the review of Al-Megrahi’s appeal for compassionate release, Scot’s law directed the Scottish Government’s ultimate decision towards the release of the aforementioned on compassionate grounds. In turn, the inquiries and international pressures that followed the announcement have been detailed at length and have included the representations received by the Scottish Government on behalf of U.S. and U.K. officials. These representations discussed earlier reveal

a strong contrast between the Scottish government’s *modus operandi* and Westminster’s. Specifically, the Scottish Government’s adherence to the wishes of the U.S. family members who lost loved ones in the Lockerbie tragedy shows that when a government lacks in self-determination, the interests of state do not necessarily step to the forefront, but rather here pragmatism becomes the essence of good diplomacy.

The adage, “an eye for an eye leaves the whole world blind,” may be trite, but it hardly resonates in the laws and societies that govern the majority of the post-modern world. In the Western industrialized world, punishment befits crime and, traditionally, punishment is equivalent to justice. However, Cabinet Secretary MacAskill did not see Scotland’s criminal justice system being akin to the post-modern world:

In Scotland, we are a people who pride ourselves on our humanity. It is viewed as a defining characteristic of Scotland and the Scottish people. The perpetration of an atrocity and outrage cannot and should not be a basis for losing sight of who we are, the values we seek to uphold, and the faith and beliefs by which we seek to live.

Mr. Al-Megrahi did not show his victims any comfort or compassion. They were not allowed to return to the bosom of their families to see out their lives, let alone their dying days.

No compassion was shown by him to them. But, that alone is not a reason for us to deny compassion to him and his family in his final days.²⁸

By unapologetically and candidly executing the decision to release a convicted terrorist on the basis of “humanity,” the Scottish Government not only challenged conventional Western ideas of justice, but highlighted Scotland’s core societal values. Scotland’s unwavering challenge to the Western model of justice is not an indication of whether or not the decision to release Al-Megrahi was correct. It does, however, give the international community at large a clear representation of how Scotland defines itself as a nation and as a people.

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'Aid as Autobiography'. The Norwegian Case.

by Martin McGloin

W

hy do countries give aid? And, more importantly, why have aid transfers perpetuated and increased despite the increasing criticism and internal realisation that 60 years of attempted development has not provided results? This essay attempts to understand this situation through the study of the most 'generous' aid donor, Norway. Aid is a peculiar phenomenon, with its prominence hard to explain

within the traditional IR-frameworks of idealism and realism, especially amongst the Western middle powers. A primary reason for this is their lack of attention to the domestic political realm. Thus, that is the primary focus of this essay. Two projects that were instrumental in the establishment of the Norwegian aid project and whose influence are still apparent today are analysed in relation to the hypothesis that aid can be seen as an 'autobiography' of a nation. Aid is never purely a response to international structural pressure, thus understanding it requires one to appreciate the concerns of the domestic public. The Norwegian aid project, as seen through these two case studies, is not primarily a reaction to concerns in the developing world, but is used as a projection of Norwegian identity. This is proposed as one explanation for why, despite the flourishing criticism, aid transfers are continuing and even increasing: it is primarily more about 'us' than 'them'.

Of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid.

Hans Morgenthau (1962: 301)

Introduction

What factors shape a donor country's development aid policy?¹ It might be assumed that the best interests of the recipient country would be at the core; to save lives, contribute to growth and development or the eradication of poverty. Thus, a natural vantage point to approach this question and to study the efficacy of aid to Africa would be from the perspective of the developing countries. However, official development assistance (ODA) is a product of political decisions, and it does not take more than a quick glance at the wide

diversity of governmental aid agencies operating in Africa to realise that these political decisions are not based solely on the absolute needs of the developing country. From the birth of aid with the Marshall Plan, to Soviet aid to Ethiopia during the Cold War, Sweden's extensive involvement with Nyerere in Tanzania during the 1970s, Chinese increasing aid involvement in and the US's enormous Iraqi development budget today, it is easy to discern other factors and motives than purely local considerations. This essay, therefore, will instead take the donor country as its starting point in approaching the question.

To attempt to understand the motives behind a country's aid program is a complex endeavour as Morgenthau, quoted above, suggests. In the academic literature, the question is often framed between the polar views of realism and internationalism. The realists explain the foreign aid-programs as "shaped with



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the interest of the aid-giving countries primarily in mind" (Veen, 2000: 2); aid is essentially a means towards self-interested political and economical goals. On the other extreme, aid is explained as being driven by idealism and humanitarian ideals: "aid cannot be accounted for on the basis of economic and political interests alone: the essential causes lay in the humanitarian and egalitarian principles of the donor countries" (Lumsdaine, 1996: 30).

However, both of these perspectives are inadequate analytical tools for understanding the behaviour of aid donors, as aid policies often contain mixed and indistinguishable elements from both views (Selbervik, 1999: 30). In fact, significant divergence between officially expressed motives, internal reasoning and final action outcomes are often evident. Therefore such an approach is not useful in trying to determine whether different motives in aid policies create beneficial or detrimental aid policies.

This article is an attempt to understand why governments distribute parts of their national resources to developing countries. As has already been alluded to, there is no single unified Western aid project. Although there are clear international trends within the donor arena and increasing co-operation (for example through the OECD DAC-group) aid policies are primarily the products of political decisions made in domestic isolation. Yet, since this essay cannot consider the motives of every single Western donor, selection is inevitable. The Nordic countries are

praised for being the most generous and altruistic donors. The 'Nordic model' has become branded as "exceptional" within the aid literature (Riddell, 2007: 91). In recent years, Norway has topped the international rankings by allocating the largest share of its Gross National Income (GNI) to ODA. Although Norway is only a 'small state', it is now the fourth largest absolute contributor to the United Nations (OECD, 2007: 175). Norwegian aid has also been commended for its lack of hidden agendas, as it does not attach conditions on its aid beneficiaries and legally forbids its aid agency from favouring Norwegian commercial interests (Harden, 1990: 203). Thus, Norway is a prime example of the Lumsdaine internationalist extreme of the aid motivation-spectrum.

It might be expected that a study of the Norwegian aid policies would reveal that policies are predominantly determined by local considerations from within the developing countries. Although this is how Norwegian aid is often presented, it is not necessarily the case. In 2002, David Williams wrote a review article in which he articulated a theory that ODA did not have the interests of the beneficiaries at its centre, but could instead be seen as an 'autobiography' of the donor country. In this essay I want to appropriate, adapt and attempt to develop this theory to explain aspects of the Norwegian aid programme and discuss whether such a motivation causes aid policies which are more part of the problem rather than part of the solution for Africa.

My argument is: Norwegian aid can be understood as a projection of an image of Norwegian identity intended for a domestic and international audience. This creates an ODA which is not primarily concerned with its impact on African development.

This argument will be presented by first discussing and developing Williams' 'autobiography' theory. Second, an overview of the general features of the Norwegian aid policy and its relation to Norwegian society will be discussed. Following this, two Norwegian case projects will be analysed: the Kerala fisheries project and the Turkana Program. Although the first project was not located in Africa, it is an important project to study as it was Norway's first aid project and laid the foundations for the creation of the Norwegian development agency. The second was Norway's first major aid project in Africa.

Theoretical Framework

Williams (2002) proposes that development aid can be seen as an autobiographical expression of the donor country, making "aid to Africa more about 'us', than 'them'" (Williams, 2002: 158). His argument is that aid policies are not directly shaped by the needs or wishes of the beneficiaries, but rather formed by domestic considerations of the donor country and international factors that do not directly relate to the developing country's situation. For example, the "heavy emphasis on women's liberation and the 'alleviation of poverty' are the product of a highly patriarchal and achievement-oriented

cultural history. These concerns are not given equal importance by Third World societies, in spite [sic] of lip-service statements at international conferences" (Reusse, 1999: 83-84 quoted in Williams, 2002: 160). The poor countries have very little say over how the aid agencies are organised and run because the agencies are accountable to the donor country and its domestic electorate.


More directly, autobiographical aid policies can be used as a projection of a country's self-perception (Williams, 2002: 161). Lancaster argues that the Swedish aid program has been shaped by "the values of Swedish society ... [and] the projection abroad of the "Swedish model" (Lancaster, 1999: 159). Juhani Koponen (2005) applies a similar, but more in-depth, analysis of how the Finnish aid program has been used to construct a state identity. Situated in the northernmost corner of Europe, ethnically and linguistically different, it is forced to carefully straddle the dividing line of the Germanic West and the Slavonic East (Koponen, 2005: 239). Koponen argues that from the beginning of the Finnish aid program, based on the Swedish and Norwegian model, was actively used as a means of identifying Finland with the other Nordic countries: by "engaging in development co-operation Finland was underlining its independence and Western orientation and demonstrating that it was not a Soviet satellite" (Koponen, 2005: 240).

Terje Tvedt (1990) makes a related analysis when he describes how development aid becomes a state-subsidised export of the donor country's values. The donor agencies and especially its 'experts' are conveyors of a set of values originating from the donor country. The organisational form of the agency, the method of distributing aid, the aid-agents' perception of development and the developing country are all formed and based on a value scheme originating in the donor country (Tvedt, 1990: 28-36).

The central core of this analysis predicts that political aid decisions are primarily not determined by local factors in the developing country. Instead, it predicts that since the policies are responses to domestic or international forces it will consciously or unconsciously become an autobiographical projection of the donor country.

The nature of this study encounters considerable ontological problems in approaching and judging an organisation's or a country's actions and reasoning. Each is made up of a number of individuals and representing any of them on a collective level involves aggregation and simplification. Although one can identify physical manifestations of a nation's 'actions,' i.e. white papers or aid policies, it is a harder task to uncover the collective reasoning and 'thinking' producing these actions. It is the factors that influence this reasoning that this autobiography argument attempts to study. It is important to be aware of these shortcomings, but it is beyond the scope of this article to deal with them satisfactorily and one is bound to accept certain simplifications in order to conduct any social science research (see Nustad, 2007; Neumann, 2005).

FIGURE 1: Public Support for Norwegian Aid Transfers



Norway: A Humanitarian Superpower?

In 2010 Norway spent NOK 27.4 billion (approx. US\$ 4.6 billion) on foreign aid, constituting 1.09% of GNI, making Norway the largest DAC-donor (Norwegian MFA, 2009: 30). This has given Norway a reputation internationally as being an altruistic and “exceptional donor” who is “setting an example for the DAC” (OECD, 2005: 10). Yet, this international brand is also a dominant theme in the Norwegian self-identity: Norway as generously sharing its wealth, Norway as the UN’s best friend, Norway as a moral force in the corrupt sphere of international power-politics; a brand that has collectively been coined: “Norway as a humanitarian superpower” (NUPI, 2007: 10). Norwegian foreign policy has developed into a curious form of identity politics, where international engagement in development issues, peace resolutions and poverty eradication play a significant part in the Norwegian self-identity.

The Norwegian development project has become a national *dugnad*, a Norwegian word meaning a community volunteer project, engaging nearly the whole population. Most Norwegians are members of several voluntary organisations, and they are a salient feature of Norwegian social life. In 2005, there were more than 200 Norwegian aid organisations receiving NOK 3 billion in project support from the MFA, constituting more than

50% of all bilateral aid (Tvedt, 2007: 616). These are not only mainstream organisations like the Norwegian Red Cross, Save the Children and Refugee Aid, but constitutes the wide diversity of interests in Norwegian civil society with organisations like the Norwegian Athletics Federation, Norwegian Federation of Women and Families, the Norwegian Association of Disabled, the Norwegian Trade Union Congress and other similarly varied bodies that are used to distribute the Norwegian ODA. Even the political parties have offices that receive funding from the MFA to engage their members in aid projects abroad. Through these organisations, a significant proportion of the population has become directly involved in the services of the Norwegian aid programme around the world. In no other OECD nation have so many organisations been given such a large proportion of the aid budget as in Norway: international development has become a national project for Norwegians (Tvedt, 2007: 630).

Thus, development and peace policy in Norway should not be regarded as marginal to Norwegian society. In the 1996 OECD peer-review of Norway, it is stated that the “commitment of the Norwegian people to the alleviation of poverty and suffering in developing countries is a distinguishing feature of their national identity” (OECD, 1996). Statistics Norway’s triennial report on support towards development aid has found that public support for aid has

risen consistently since the 1970s, with 91% responding that they are supportive in 2006 (see fig 1). Such consistently high support is unique amongst the OECD donor countries, and even amongst the Nordic countries. For example, Swedish support for aid dropped significantly during the late 1980s and early 1990s, from a high of 85% to 44% in 1996. This decline has been attributed to the financial crisis of the 1980s (Lancaster, 1999: 157). Interestingly, although Norway also experienced severe economic stress in the period, there was only a slight decrease in support of 7% in 1990 (see fig 1). An explanation of this can be found in how Norwegian aid has increasingly become ingrained in the Norwegian self-perception. An extensive 2005 study to determine the Norwegians’ self-image found a dominant self-perception statement, with 92% respondent agreement: “Norway is a rich nation who altruistically shares its resources with others through humanitarian activities and peace work”. Additionally, 82% believe that Norway is a society dominated by egalitarian and democratic values; and 62% concur that Norway is doing all it can to foster development and peace in the world (Hundrearsmarkeringen, 2005).

Stokke argues that a country’s aid policies are formed in “response to the dominant socio-political norms and the overarching interests of the society” (Stokke, 1989: 160). Stokke identifies two main sources for the ethos of

Norwegian aid: the extensive Norwegian missionary network, and the welfare state ideology. One can clearly discern the influence of a Christian value system of universal brotherhood of man and solidarity with the poor in the language of the Norwegian aid discourse (Stokke, 1989: 161). The welfare state solidarity ideology has been central in Norwegian politics, but, as the Labour Party expressed in 1975, this solidarity “does not stop at national boundaries ...[we have a] moral obligation to alleviate distress in distant parts of the world” (Stokke, 1989: 169). The prominence of these value systems will become apparent in the case studies.

The notion that Norway has a moral obligation towards less developed countries is a dominant theme in the aid discourse, fuelled by the fortunate discovery of oil that made Norway one of the world’s wealthiest countries. Some have discerned the aid program as arising from a collective guilt for possessing such wealth in a world with so much poverty; one anthropologist describes it as “self-flagellation as development” (Harden, 1990: 205). An interesting feature of this is how reaching the “magical number” of “1% of GNI” has become a national endeavour; the aid budget is perceived as “a measure of the nation’s ability to care, i.e. as a thermometer of the country’s moral status” (Tvedt, 2007: 629). The political parties have vied with each other to be the most generous, which Tamnes suggests has been the main force in driving up the Norwegian aid levels from less than 0.2% of GNI in 1970 until Norway became one of the first countries to exceed the 1% mark in 1998 (Tamnes, 1997: 385). During this period,

the Norwegian aid budget grew such that Norwegians identified themselves as being generous and projected Norwegian altruism internationally. In other words, although the growth was not a response to developing countries’ needs, it does show how autobiographical forces can influence aid policies positively by increasing the aid transfers.

A peculiar feature of aid policies and its inherent goodness is a strong immunity to criticism. Many of the critics of Norwegian aid referenced here complain that they are treated as academic outcasts and labelled advocates of ‘*Fremskrittsparti-myter*’ [Progress Party Myths], a derogatory term making reference to an extreme right-wing political party (Kristiansen, 2007). Tvedt introduces the concept of the ‘do-gooder regime’ to explain this aversion to criticism (Tvedt, 2007: 8). The Norwegian aid project has gained a considerable legitimising force; aid is essentially giving, and thus inherently ‘good’. Thus, any criticism is labelled as disapproval of the will to do good and the giver himself. This causes the focus to shift towards intentions rather than outcomes, resulting in aid debates that “tend to focus on target for aid levels as percentage of GNI” and “where the purity of motive is much more important than the effects of an act” (Borchgrevink, 2004: 177).

Kerala: An Aid Program is Born

Norway began its aid endeavours in the Indian region of Kerala. Analysis of its conception is useful for our current investigation, as the principles employed

have remained part of the Norwegian aid philosophy and subsequently applied in Africa. This case also offers a particularly explicit articulation of the notion of aid as autobiography and can only be understood within a local historical context.

In the early 1950s, there was increasing opposition and dissatisfaction from the left-wing of the ruling Labour Party concerning Norway’s increasing military expansion and especially the decision to join NATO. The pro-NATO party leadership initiated the development aid program as a ‘project’ for those “who had lost the fight on the NATO issue, in a deliberate effort to keep them busy with what might be perceived as a positive way of building peace” (Stokke, 1989: 163). When Parliament established the Aid Committee in 1951, the scheme was justified by reference to Christian and social democratic values of solidarity, yet it is clear from internal memos and minutes from meetings that the main intention was to divert the attention of the dissenting party members, but more importantly an increasingly critical general public (Pharo, 2003: 534). In the same year, committee member Boysen wrote in an internal memo to Minister Engen that “this project will in some ways be more significant for ourselves ... then for those receiving our help” (Pharo, 1986: 44). The importance of domestic considerations in the shaping of the project was also reiterated when committee chairman Halvard Lange opened the first meeting in October 1952 by stating that “the importance of our work lies as much domestically as abroad” (Pharo 1986: 77).

These factors were key in shaping the project. A primary reason India was chosen to be the first beneficiary of Norwegian aid was its recent independence and colonial past. Norway was also still a young nation, only being liberated from 400 years of Swedish and Danish colonial rule in 1905. This shared past was used as means to create an identity-bond between the small Norwegian population and the distant giant of India. It was also seen as a good way for Norway to assert itself internationally as a country with a colonial-free past and innocent intentions in its foreign policy (Simensen, 2003: 273). Norway was still receiving Marshall aid until the early 1950s and the planners were keen on using the Kerala project to express Norway's increasing independence. In fact, Norway was one of the first non-colonial countries to initiate an aid programme. Thus, international considerations were of equal importance; the program became a way for Norway to distance itself from the former Western colonial empires, and express an identity as a humanitarian and virtuous state in the international arena (Veen, 2000: 466). In this initial policy, one can discern origins of the altruistic aid-brand Norway would later acquire.

As the project's allocated budget of only NOK 10 million would be dwarfed by India's current NOK 2 billion 5-year agricultural development plan, an important task for the committee was to combine these seemingly contrasting countries in such a way that the modest Norwegian contribution could create a noticeable effect (Nustad, 2003: 60). Their first visit to India aimed to find a

local project with which the Norwegian people could easily identify. The importance of this consideration can be found in the correspondence from the preparatory committee back to the MFA: "this is going to be very difficult, today they had invited us to the mountain district of Himachal Pradesh. Here we were met by unforeseen primitive conditions; there is no electricity or any form of communication. However, the forests and mountains are reminiscent of the Norwegian landscape, which would make it easily identifiable, though the population don't look typically Indian as they are half Mongolian" (Quoted in Pahro 1986: 87). This last quotation aptly illustrates how determined the project was to project an image of Norway in the world (Nustad, 2006: 237). The aim was to associate Norway's colonial past with India's, and in that way Mongolian primitive tribes didn't suffice. The project they eventually found in the south-eastern province of Kerala was a perfect fit: two poor Hindu fishermen villages which were being exploited by Muslim and Catholic merchants; using 'primitive' fishing technology - a field in which Norway had considerable expertise.

Extending the welfare state values of solidarity and equality, central to the Norwegians' perception of themselves, became central to the Kerala Fisheries project through the empowerment of the poorest of society, the Hindu fishermen (Galtung, 1980: 343). The project had two primary means to reach this goal: technological modernisation but especially through organising fishermen-cooperatives.

The cooperative-movement is a strong feature of the Norwegian social democratic model. The Norwegian fishermen liberated themselves from the exploiting city-merchants by organising themselves, and nearly all farming in Norway is organised through cooperatives. The fish distribution network in Kerala was also very representative of the Indian social structure at the time - close kin received their share of the catch first, then the sick and elderly, before the rest was sold to the Muslim or Catholic fish-merchants (Simensen, 2003: 68). The Hindu fishermen were completely dependent on these middlemen, who determined the prices but also functioned as the local banks. By helping the Kerala fishermen into the footsteps of the Norwegian fishermen, the project planners hoped that they could circumnavigate the exploiting middlemen. In 1961, the "Number One Fishermen Sales Organisation" was established (Simense, 2003: 69). However, the fishermen were very sceptical and reluctant to join this egalitarian structure, hence it quickly failed. Instead, the processing facilities built for the cooperative ended up being rented out to the fish merchants who employed the village-women at very meagre wages, which only exacerbate the social stratification (Galtung, 1980: 350).

The project received considerable criticism, especially from the sociologist Johan Galtung and the anthropologist Arne Martin Klausen. Galtung's criticism focused on the excessive technological modernisation which was detrimental to the livelihood of the poorest canoe fishermen who could not afford to operate the motorised fishing vessels and

the unnecessary deep-freezing of the fish caused local fish prices to increase by 300% (Galtung, 1980: 358). Klausen criticised the cooperative model for not taking consideration for the Indian inegalitarian caste society (Klausen, 1968: 183). Nonetheless, Indian social scientist John Kurien has argued that the social and technological developments in the villages had already begun before the Norwegians arrived, and would have continued regardless of the intervention (Ofstad, 1987: 93). Simensen agrees that the Kerala project has received disproportionate amount of criticism (Simensen, 2003: 77).

The Kerala project is a very clear example of how 'autobiographical' factors played a significant role in shaping aid programs. The political decisions were primarily informed by domestic and international considerations with surprisingly little consideration for the values and interests of the local beneficiaries. The Norwegian domestic political arena spurred the initial proposal, but the shaping of the project was equally influenced by international policy considerations. Anne Veen found that in parliamentary debates more than 1/5 of the speakers referred to the capacity of the project to create an identity for Norway as a humanitarian state (Veen, 2000: 479).

Turkana: The Desert That Wouldn't Bloom

The Kerala-project remained Norway's only bilateral-aid project until the 1960s.

In 1961, the Engen Committee published a white paper establishing the Norwegian development agencies. The policy was rooted in Christian and social democratic values: our aid policy "is based on the principle of equality of man and a feeling of solidarity with all countries and races" (Engen-report quoted in Veen, 2000: 468). Concern for Norway's reputation was not explicitly stated in the policy, but was repeatedly voiced in parliament discussions: "Our contribution should not be proportional to that of others, but it should be greater and thus set a powerful example... an initiative on Norway's part will strongly contribute to other countries feeling that they have to follow our example" (MP Moy, Veen, 2000: 469). Kenya would be one of the first African countries in which the new agency, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), would commence operation. With the arrival of the first Norwegian petrodollars in the early 1970s, Norway entered a period of grandiose and expensive projects; the Turkana Rural Development Project (TRDP) in North-Western Kenya was the largest single project in the history of Norwegian aid when it was signed, costing over NOK 300 million (Tostensen & Scott: 1987: 170).

Turkana is a poor desert province inhabited mainly by the Turkana nomads. The TRDP aimed to provide the undernourished pastoral cattle farmers with an alternative way of life: fishing. The project is an interesting example of how a donor agency's agenda takes dominance

whenever it is at odds with that of the beneficiary country or the local population, and how cultural ignorance creates bad aid. Eva H. Østbye has done an extensive historical study on the development of the fisheries project, focusing especially on the context in which the project arose. She found that despite the Norwegian policy of 'ownership,' the project was primarily designed to meet a need felt by the aid agencies instead of responding to Kenyan wishes. Kenya had initially sent a request to NORAD to fund a market study on the development of a fish-flour (for animal fodder) processing facility by the Turkana lake. However, the NORAD consultants sent to conduct the survey shifted the whole focus of the report and instead investigated the possibility of introducing fishing as an alternative to pastoralism for the nomadic Turkana.

At times, Kenyan and Norwegian priorities for the region were at odds, but active Norwegian pressure pushed through the Norwegian agenda. One very informative incident, which also shaped the whole fisheries project, was the encounter with the Greek entrepreneur Mamatas. Prior to signing the TRDP, NORAD officials were made aware of an exclusivity-agreement to Turkana fishing being given to Apostolos Mamatas in exchange for investments in a fish-flour processing facility (Ruud & Kjerland, 2003: 117). Fearing that this foreign "capitalist" would exploit the population and their natural resources, NORAD reacted by forcing the Kenyan government to revoke

the agreement with threats of pulling their funding for the TRDP (Østbye, 1994: 54). In exchange, NORAD promised to develop a fisheries program for the Turkana. Thus, the fisheries project arose as a protective response against what NORAD perceived as a danger for the Turkana, not a request from the Kenyans.

Another interesting feature of the Fisheries-project is a similar allegiance to the cooperative model as seen in Kerala. The Turkana Fishermen's Cooperative Society was initiated because NORAD saw it as the only way to "protect the indigenous people in the area from exploitation from foreign developed and economically strong people" (Quoted in Østbye, 1994: 137). However, despite NORAD's good intentions, the cooperative model was too distant from the Turkana society. The anthropologist George Henriksen criticised the project for taking too many Norwegian-centric cultural assumptions: "The fishermen have no clear idea about what the cooperative is all about. Only very few have understood that the profits the cooperative makes through selling the fish is channelled back to the fishermen by more and better services. Most people seem to think that the profits are pocketed by the cooperative staff" (Henriksen, 1974: 48). Norway prides itself as being a society where every citizen has equal say, but the inherent democratic nature of the cooperative was at odds with tribal Turkana society, which resulted in the village elders monopolising the co-op committee: "there is little doubt

that the elections of Committee Members taking place each year are very much a question of formality and that members have very little influence on the results" (Consultant quoted in Østbye, 1994: 133).

When the NOK 15 million facility was completed in the late 1970s, it turned out that the costs of freezing the fish from 50° to -18° far surpassed the sales value. Two days later it was closed down, never to re-open and now nicknamed as the "Norwegian White Elephant" (Harden, 1990: 200). Østbye notes that it is evident that the "project arose from NORAD's strong wish to commence a project of this kind" and completely disregarded the interests of the Kenyan and Turkana governments and the sociocultural conditions: imposing a Norwegian ideal took precedence. Although the TRDP was by far not as conscious nor explicit in 'exporting' Norwegianess as the Kerala project had been, NORAD's actions were based on many Norwegian centric assumption, and the belief that what was good for Norwegians must be good for the Turkana. Although fish is a Norwegian staple and delicacy, the Turkana had a different view: "They consider as beneath contempt those unfortunate who are forced to survive as fishermen without livestock" (Harden, 1990: 181).

Conclusion

The underling motives of Norwegian development project in Africa is not primarily concerned with being part of the problem nor part of the solution for Africa. It would be beyond the scope of this essay to make a comprehensive judgment of the efficacy of Norwegian aid, but our analysis of the country's aid policy and the two cases studies has revealed a peculiar segregation between aid and the concern for its efficiency. Interestingly, although staggeringly 91% of Norwegians support the aid programme, 51% of respondents think that NORAD's development aid is not efficient in promoting development (Statistics Norway, 2007: 19). These seemingly contradictory opinions highlight how aid is not necessarily linked to effects in the recipient country, but is rather judged on other criteria. The autobiography argument is a way of understanding these contradictions.

This can also help explain why, despite the flourishing of aid-critical studies, with even the aid agencies themselves partially admitting defeat, the traditional aid transfers are continuing and even increasing (Easterly, 2006; Moyo, 2010; NORAD, 2008; OECD, 2009). It becomes difficult to appropriate Dambisa Moyo's proposal to scrap all Western foreign aid when one has invested so much of one's identity in being a generous 'giver' as has Norway.

Aid has often been seen, cynically,

as a realist-tool in pursuing diplomatic, commercial or ideological objectives or optimistically viewed as arising from humanitarian selfless obligation. This autobiographical analysis of Norwegian aid depicts a situation where these opposite views become merged into a symbiosis of both willingness to do good but also a craving to be perceived to be good domestically and internationally. Though this makes one ask: how pure are the intentions when aid giving becomes a generosity competition?

However, this essay does not concern itself with making such moral judgements. Instead, our interest lies in uncovering whether these causes relate to the development efficacy of aid. The Kerala and Turkana aid projects examined in this essay failed in achieving their development objectives, and in the case of Turkana the project was even detrimental as it excluded a potentially more beneficial fish-flour project. However, the author cannot claim that these cases are representative for the whole of Norwegian aid's history and they must be considered in light of a selection bias. Norwegian aid is considered "exceptional" because of its altruism, but also its efficacy: "a dollar of aid from Norway has about 50% more poverty impact than a dollar of aid from the average DAC donor" (Dollar & Collier, 2001: 8). These cases were not meant to counter this achievement, but rather illustrate how permeating a Norwegian self-identity can be in the creation and execution of aid policies. There is nothing inherently 'wrong' with this occurring; the cooperative model was efficient in liberating the Norwegian farmers but had hardly any basis for repeating the success

for the Indian fishermen. The value framework inherent in the cooperative model wasn't compatible with the Kerala society. Although the Norwegians had good intentions in 'exporting' their successful history to the Indian fishermen, their interference in Kerala actually resulted in the fish-merchants consolidating their power. Similarly, we see in Turkana that the successful Norwegian democratic organisation form is not understood in an hierarchical context.

The impulse for action towards the developing world does not arise from within the African countries, but rather from the concerns of a domestic Western population and their craving to 'help'. In this sense, ODA has become an autobiographical humanitarian product, consumed by Norwegians as an identity-commodity. This does not necessarily result in 'bad' aid, but results in aid policies that are not primarily sensitive to its effect on African development.

Endnotes

1. Aid, foreign aid, ODA, and development aid will be used interchangeable throughout this essay and refers to: "transaction which meets the following tests: a) it is administered with the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and b) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25%" (OECD, 1985: 17).
2. Parts of Østbye's study were later confirmed by Kalberg, 2000.

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The Developmental State and Economic Growth. The Case of Singapore.

by Alexander Horn

Development theory dictating the role of governments in society and economy is split predominantly into two camps: neoliberalism and the developmental state model. Focusing on the case of Singapore, the article analyzes the nation's first 25 years of development under the highly statist People's Action Party and how the developmental state was properly applied

to rapidly develop Singapore into one of the world's most advanced nations. In comparing the case of Singapore to the development of the other successful Asian Tigers -South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong--the study identifies common characteristics between developmental states that produced sustained economic development.

Introduction

Over the past 50 years, the predominant view on the role of government in economic development has shifted from government as a key agent of development to an impending threat to economic growth. Anti-statist neoliberal ideology has been ubiquitous in development organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund since the 1980s, and formed the basis of development strategies implemented throughout the world. Despite neo-liberalism's severe distrust of government, the

developmental state was the major contributor to the rapid rise of the four Asian Tigers, particularly in the case of Singapore. While the public sector downsized across the globe in the name of development, the government's rigorous market support transformed Singapore from an impoverished city-state with a stagnating economy into one of the world's wealthiest nations, boasting the 5th highest GDP per capita.

The case of Singaporean development is chosen for this study because of the relative lack of existing literature. Scholars have tended to neglect Singapore because of its small size and instead focused research on the development success stories of larger South Korea and Taiwan. Nevertheless, the Singaporean state distinctively developed its economy through foreign direct investment as prescribed by neoliberalism, in contrast with protectionist strategies common to highly statist countries. Especially given Singapore's lack of natural resources and initially nonexistent domestic industrial capabilities, its development provides an additional framework for understanding alternative ways in which a developmental state can successfully facilitate economic growth. By analyzing Singapore's initial period of development, this article hopes to address the following questions: How did the Singaporean government successfully guide the economy through sustained high growth despite neoliberal arguments against the state? Is there an ideal framework for government intervention in the private sector? And, based upon comparisons between Singapore and the other three Asian Tigers—Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea—are there common characteristics required for a successful developmental state? This article first presents dominant development theories on



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neoliberalism and the developmental state. With this theoretical base to interpret Singaporean development policy, the article conducts a case study of Singapore's critical first 25 years of economic development, beginning in 1959. The case study will divide the time period from 1959 to 1984 into three chronological sections based on

seeking motives can generate and utilize detailed market data accurately enough to coordinate an economy. Therefore, state action and misguided policies, despite their potential benevolent intent, will most often lead to poor economic outcomes.¹

The perceived threat of a 'predatory state' led neoliberal theorists to develop

the capitalist system to create enhanced social outcomes.

The infant industry theory has been the most widely practiced developmental state theory. It argues for the protection of young industries from aggressive foreign competition in order to create a solid industrial base upon which the domestic economy can grow. Government-provided subsidies, tariffs and common import substitution policies help domestic companies acquire information and technology, and grow to a level where they are capable of competing globally. Many scholars, notably Paul Baran, attribute the underdevelopment of poor nations to the lack of a strong developmental state to guide domestic industry through early stages of development.²

In addition to temporarily shielding infant industries from outside competition, a strong, 'hard' state is considered crucial for mediating conflicts between winners and losers and overcoming interest groups in rapidly changing economies. A hard state is required to override impediments to development created by powerful conservative interests and maintain social order caused by shifting class dynamics. Therefore a hard state, dedicated to national and social reform, is required to change the status quo and ensure a stable social environment conducive to economic growth.³

While neoliberalism regards state involvement in markets as a predatory vicious circle, developmental theory views government involvement as a potential virtuous circle. Governments can provide critical supportive roles

the counterrevolution to state-led competition. They advocated the total depoliticization of the economy by compelling states to deregulate domestic markets and open the economy to unrestricted international trade. At most, government should build the basic infrastructure necessary for private sector activities, and leave economic development to unrestrained market forces—the most reliable mechanism capable of objectively reacting to changing markets.

Developmental State

Unlike neoliberal arguments that focus on depoliticizing the market and promoting free trade, developmental state theories address the ways in which governments can facilitate the development process. They are far from the antithesis of market capitalism; rather, they argue that the state can nurture economic growth and

the stage of Singapore's development and the predominant theme of the government's strategy in each industrial era. Following a comparative analysis of the development of all four Asian Tigers, the article will conclude with the implications of the case study on the broader development literature and how characteristics of Singapore's successful state-market partnerships can be applied to current development projects.

Development Theory and Models

Neoliberalism

Neoliberals argue that the state should have a minimal role in economic development, acting as what Rowthorn calls a 'night watchman.' States are to ensure law, order, security, and to provide certain forms of infrastructure, leaving the rest of development to liberalized markets and private actors. Only rivalry and profit-

"Highly aware of potential ethnic conflicts that could divide the fragile nation and derail the development process, the PAP made strong efforts to ensure national cohesion over ethnic solidarity."

to promote sustained development, for example, by directly assisting the private sector's entrance into new industries or indirectly creating a pro-business environment to facilitate commerce. Developmental state theory asserts that the state, rather than being a liability to development, can be a valuable promoter of economic growth and a guardian against market failure.⁴ As the next section will describe, the Singaporean state internalized the theoretical logic of the developmental state and used its influence to promote a virtuous circle of development.

Singaporean Economic Development

The Singapore case study is split into four sections. The first three sections describe three chronologically ordered and distinct industrial eras each possessing a unique, overarching state development goal. Combined, these sections provide an analysis of the first 25 years of Singapore's development after the People's Action Party (PAP) came to power and contrast the PAP's implementation of developmental state and neoliberal theories in development strategies. The fourth section is a critical analysis of the key attributes of the Singaporean developmental state that made Singapore's exceptional economic growth possible.

1959-1965: Social Development, Infrastructure and Manufacturing

The establishment of the People's Action Party in 1959, Singapore's first fully independent government headed by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, marked a critical turning point in Singapore's development process. The PAP came to power in an era of deep uncertainty. Citizens suffered from double-digit unemployment, poor housing conditions, weak social benefits and high poverty rates. The added pressure of skyrocketing fertility rates and the country's fragile religious and ethnic composition of Chinese, Malays, and Indians further fueled social unrest throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Union worker strikes and industrial stoppages were commonplace, often hundreds per year involving tens of thousands of workers.⁵ Additionally, the Singaporean economy had stagnated from its lack of natural resources, a tiny domestic market and an overwhelming reliance on the low-growth trade industry.⁶ Further exacerbating the social and economic crisis, the Federation of Malaysia collapsed in 1965 after only two years and left the city-state surrounded by larger, aggressive neighbors vying

for power in post-colonial Southeast Asia. Rivalry with Malaysia, bombings instigated by Indonesia, and the menacing threat of communist expansion in the region made the possibility of Singapore's destruction very real. The dire situation compelled the government to take drastic and immediate action to develop Singapore into a strong, viable nation.

For the PAP and Singaporeans as a whole, economic development was as much a social good as a national security strategy. The foreign threat and a shared sense of nationalism led the Singaporean government and citizenry to form a tacit agreement: For the PAP to gain long-term institutional legitimacy as a hard state, it had to first deliver the basic needs to the majority of the population and construct the *social* foundations for an efficient and competitive economy.⁷ The government began by providing Singaporeans with housing to replace the slums and shantytowns, increasing their access to healthcare and improving the education system. These policies improved the material lives of

"Dedication to economic growth for national interests was at the very core of the PAP's development policies up to the present day and transformed the bureaucracy into a flexible and powerful development mechanism."

Singaporeans and the more educated, healthy, and politically stable state organized labor force was crucial for Singapore's long-term economic growth.

While the PAP legitimized its control and pacified the overall population through benevolent public residential projects, it also took rapid action to reduce the threat of ethnically-based social disorder. Quotas were set on the quantity of people of each ethnic group that could reside in a housing complex. The government claimed to implement the policy in order to maintain equal housing opportunities for all Singaporean ethnic groups. However, it served the ulterior purpose of limiting the ability of ethnic groups to organize in mass and instigate political unrest.⁸ Highly aware of potential ethnic conflicts that could divide the fragile nation and derail the development process, the PAP made strong efforts to ensure national cohesion over ethnic solidarity.

With long-run social policies in effect, the PAP attacked the immediate unemployment problem by attempting to attract labor-intensive manufacturing industries. In 1961, the government created the well-funded and highly powerful Economic Development Board (EDB), which centralized all industrialization activities, created investment and fiscal incentives, and acquired land to construct industrial estates. The EDB also provided venture capital and consulting services, and oversaw the construction of

infrastructure necessary for industrial private sector growth, such as power, gas, roads, railways, and seaports.⁹

Despite initial low returns on investment, early government investments in infrastructure and social projects would pay noticeable dividends in the coming industrial era. The revamped education system produced semi-skilled workers sought by foreign firms and the EDB's industrial parks provided ideal spaces for foreign and domestic corporations at subsidized rates.

The industrialization era was significant because the PAP established itself as a major and legitimate player in society and the economy. Lee Kuan Yew's hard state became the custodian of national welfare, and in its duty to ensure the prosperity of the majority began the process of creating a disciplined, achievement-oriented workforce and society through motivation and coercion when necessary.¹⁰ However, while the government possessed enormous power, the PAP recognized early that without significant gains in social and material conditions, no amount of repression would legitimize the PAP's authoritarian control.¹¹ Therefore, while the tacit social contract gave the government great power to intervene in all aspects of the private sector, it compelled the government to perform efficiently and remain committed to economic development for the greater good of Singapore. Dedication to

economic growth for national interests was at the very core of the PAP's development policies up to the present day and transformed the bureaucracy into a flexible and powerful development mechanism.

1966-1973: Labor Intensive Export Manufacturing

Following the legitimization of a hard state, the PAP focused its efforts on creating a thriving haven for multinational corporations. Lee Kuan Yew's development philosophy envisioned an autonomous, private sector driving Singapore's modernization process, while the strong visible hand of government would act as a stable guiding force.

The government began nurturing the free enterprise system by sponsoring aggressive incentives for foreign direct investment. Singapore offered fiscal incentives more generous than those proposed by rival developing nations, which specifically incentivized capital investment. The PAP created additional government organizations and subsidiaries of the EDB that specifically aided corporations in earning long-term profits. Public enterprises, the most powerful tool of Singapore's developmental state, helped corporations overcome critical business problems when Singapore's private sector was too young to provide the necessary services. The low-cost government-provided services greatly reduced the risk of

conducting business in Singapore and garnered the confidence of foreign investors that would have otherwise moved elsewhere.

The government also took direct control of labor issues, which had previously threatened the Singapore's business environment. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew appealed to Singaporeans to end the unions' role as "a combat organization...for class war" and compelled workers to act in the best interest of the nation.¹² The National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) supported the Prime Minister's Employment and Industrial Relations Acts in 1968, with minimal opposition.¹³ This legislation transferred bargaining power to employers and clearly outlined the rights of employees and general terms of employment.

The PAP's hard state played a critical role in reconciling this power transition. As a paternalistic authority whose actions were motivated exclusively by long-term nationalist goals and loyalty to the population over interest groups, the state assured that losses of labor rights would be properly compensated by long-term economic gains of labor reform. The PAP's invasive labor control, more intrusive than a depoliticized neoliberal state would support, proved critical in raising Singapore's national competitiveness and ultimately fostered a symbiotic relationship between the state and unions that boosted efficiency and virtually eliminated work stoppages.¹⁴

Next, the PAP proceeded to take direct control over wages. Throughout

the 1960s wage costs in Singapore were approximately 20-30% above the global market level. To increase national competitiveness, the PAP created the National Wages Council (NWC) in 1972, to establish salary guidelines. As neoliberal theory suggests, wages would have equalized to market levels naturally, but immediate government wage corrections stimulated demand in foreign investment far more rapidly than the neoliberal free wage approach.¹⁵

The effects of the PAP's market intervention proved greatly different than the neoliberal assumption of a subversive predatory state. The Singaporean developmental state adroitly mediated labor and private business interests and successfully raised labor productivity, which stimulated high levels of foreign direct investment. From 1965-1973, investment skyrocketed to \$2.3 billion, an astonishing 147,500 new jobs were created in the manufacturing sector, and GDP raised a hefty average annual rate of 13%.¹⁶ Moreover, government intervention in labor markets helped decrease unemployment rates from 8.9% in 1966 to 4.5% in 1973, achieving effective full employment.¹⁷ The PAP's early success laid the foundation for Singapore's later economic diversification into advanced industries.

1974-1984: Economic Diversification

While the previous industrialization era emphasized attaining full employment, this development time period was defined by the PAP's efficient and flexible forward-looking strategies, which propelled the

economy into more advanced stages of industrialization. During the 1970s and 1980s, many lesser-developed countries throughout the world implemented neoliberal market depoliticization policies and experienced short-term high levels of growth by specializing in certain labor-intensive industries. However, once global competition responded or consumer countries implemented protectionist policies, those specialized economies stagnated and fell into economic crisis.¹⁸ The PAP took a different approach by seeking to guide Singapore's industrial transition from a low-skill, low-wage labor manufacturing economy highly vulnerable to global market changes to a diversified economy based on higher value-added goods and services.

The PAP shifted its emphasis from job creation to overall economic growth and diversification. The first transformative efforts were spearheaded by then Finance Minister Hon Sui Sen. He planned to move Singapore up the technological ladder through his *10-Point Program*. The initiative sought to upgrade worker skills, equipment and technology in existing industries, and steadily divert labor to new incoming high skilled manufacturers.¹⁹

Nevertheless, by the late 1970s, the PAP feared Singapore was lagging behind competition—particularly the other Asian Tigers—in upgrading their economy to higher skilled, capital-intensive manufacturing. While Singapore had substantial finance and trade industries, the economy was far too reliant on labor-intensive manufacturing. Fears of economic stagnation led to immediate development and implementation of the *Economic*

Development Plan for the Eighties, which focused primarily on developing what the government identified as the “five pillars of economic growth”: manufacturing, trade, tourism, transport and communication and brain services—computer, financial, medical and consulting services.²⁰

In addition to the standard tax and fiscal incentives, the PAP took several steps to meet its ambitious goals for upgrading the manufacturing sector. First, the EDB intensified its overseas investment promotion by opening twenty-two offices in the United States, Europe, and Japan.²¹ Understanding the protectionist political pressure facing governments of targeted industrialized nations, the EDB focused on manufacturing sophisticated component parts, which “are less visible than end-products and are less prone to protectionism,” and left cheap assembly to more labor-abundant nations.²²

Second, realizing Singapore’s enormous dependence on foreign MNCs, the state took steps to promote domestic firms in the manufacturing sector in both local and international markets. The government’s use of public funding to launch domestic high-tech and sophisticated manufacturing companies was in direct contradiction of neoliberal theory, which typically categorizes such investments as wasteful spending likely to be misallocated by bureaucrats. While the critique was acknowledged by government officials, the development of advanced domestic industry was considered critical to Singapore’s long-term economic security and young domestic venture capital firms lacked the funding to make the necessary investments. Consequently, the Singaporean developmental state’s market interventions

paid off and established an important milestone in Singapore’s economic development: Singapore was beginning to acquire the advanced technical know-how to compete with foreign corporations.

Third, the PAP eliminated the National Wages Council’s policy of below-market wages. In a fully employed free market economy, below market wages compel firms to hoard cheap labor rather than invest in more costly, but more efficient capital. Therefore, while the low wages of the 1970s attracted foreign corporations, it reduced long-term productivity and higher value-added industrial growth. Between 1980 and 1983, the NWC placed higher, corrective wages and let them float accordingly with the market, which discouraged labor hoarding.²³ Higher labor costs, resulting from increased wages and a smaller labor force, incentivized firms to either invest in labor-reducing high-tech machinery or, in some cases, leave the market in search of low wage labor elsewhere.

The NWC’s policy changes were important steps in transforming Singapore’s manufacturing sector into a highly skilled, capital-intensive industry. The results of these policy changes were immediately visible in the manufacturing sector’s plummeting share of the economy, as reorganization of capital within firms initially decreased productivity and labor-intensive companies left Singapore. Nevertheless, the NWC’s policies successfully induced rapid capital accumulation, upgrading Singapore’s technological level without significantly affecting economic growth.²⁴

Part of Singapore’s stable growth during periods of industrial transformation

was due to its enormous savings rate. Orchestrated by the Central Provident Fund (CPF), a government controlled social security scheme, the national savings rate reached 42% of GDP in the mid-1980s, the highest savings rate in the world. High public savings allowed the government to invest capital overseas, stabilizing government revenue during changing business cycles, and ensuring funds for strategic investments.²⁵

The PAP’s stable revenue allowed for simultaneous investment in the other four pillars of economic growth. As part of the diversification strategy, the PAP established high growth goals for the four remaining pillars. The government planned to expand the tourism industry by 12% annually, hoping to turn Singapore into a travel hub for the rest of Southeast Asia. For the trade sector, which has historically always had a major presence in the Singaporean economy, the government used tax and fiscal incentive schemes to further exploit Singapore’s strategic location at the center of shipping routes and develop Singapore into the major warehousing and distribution center for the region.²⁶

For brain services, the *Development Plan for the Eighties* put particular emphasis on construction consultancy, medical services and finance. Singapore had built a strong reputation for being highly knowledgeable in construction and land development projects, which enabled it to effectively sell construction consultancy services to other developing countries. Additionally, due to rapid economic growth and a strong education system, Singapore provided the best medical services in Southeast Asia by the 1980s. Government investment in

medical equipment and hospitals, as well as incentives for the establishment of private hospitals, turned Singapore into the medical center for the region, without sacrificing quality healthcare to its citizens.

Finally, Singapore, which already had a substantial financial sector, solidified its financial position by becoming a ‘Financial Supermarket.’ The government encouraged reputable foreign corporations to list on the Singaporean stock exchange and created a gold and futures market based on the Chicago Mercantile exchange in the United States.²⁷

For the development of each pillar of economic growth, the developmental state took a leading role in coordinating investments, providing strong corporate incentives, and supplying the necessary infrastructure and access to education. Contrary to neoliberal ideals, without the PAP’s heavy initial investments in the 5 pillars of growth and lowering the barriers of entry for those industries, it is doubtful that the economy would have diversified so quickly and widely across business sectors.

This era of diversification marked the beginning of Singapore’s transformation into a modern industrialized economy. With careful government guidance, the economy shifted out of labor-intensive manufacturing characteristic of the early 1970s and successfully attracted a wide range of sophisticated industries, while nurturing domestic innovators that would later compete globally. At the same time, Singapore developed powerful trade,

transport, tourism, and high-skill brain services, which enormously increased economic output and strengthened the economy’s foundation. As a result, from 1980-1984, investment grew annually at approximately \$1.7 billion and GDP grew steadily by an annual average of 8.5%. Over the same time period, manufacturing increased a modest 5.1%, while the construction and financial sectors jumped an impressive 21.6% and 11.3% respectively.²⁸

Other Policies for Overcoming the Neoliberal Predatory State

The Singaporean government formed a bureaucracy that overcame the pitfalls of the notorious neoliberal predatory state. As described earlier, the central neoliberal critique of government involvement in the market is that 1) self-motivated officials create corruption and rent seeking and 2) the state is incapable of effectively processing market information. The bureaucracy’s internalization of the PAP’s nationalist logic of achieving security through economic growth was highly effective in disciplining self-motivated officials. While corruption results in short-term monetary gains for officials, an underdeveloped Singapore could presumably lead to the destruction of the nation. Furthermore, the PAP made civil service an elite career that paid more than equivalent private sector positions. High government salaries disincentivized the temptation to accept bribes, stemmed the brain drain common

to many governments and established a meritocratic professional bureaucracy.²⁹

With the PAP’s hard, disciplined state and devotion to long-term industrialization, the Singaporean government became adept at forming flexible social and economic policies that assisted the Singaporean economy in outperforming international competitors. While underdeveloped countries guided by neoliberal policies stagnated following changes in international markets, the Singaporean developmental state took immediate actions to help the private sector circumvent those challenges. Understanding the cyclical nature of business and the impossibility of forecasting long-term trends, the PAP focused on factors it could control: infrastructure, training labor, stabilizing the economy through strategic investments and closely monitoring international markets to implement reactionary policies.³⁰ Therefore, when global protectionism proliferated in the 1980s, the PAP was able to identify the threat to the Singaporean economy and readjust its development strategy accordingly.

Comparison of the Four Asian Tigers

In comparing Singapore to the other three Asian Tigers, the four economies appear enormously different and the nations’ paths to modernization divergent. Singapore was built predominantly on foreign direct investment, with foreign MNCs as the primary private sector

driver responsible for production and exporting. South Korea and Taiwan, the most extensively studied Asian NICs, industrialized by first protecting infant industries through import substitution strategies. Only after domestic market demand was saturated did they open their economies and concentrate on global exporting. South Korea entered global markets through the government-induced merging of domestic firms into several large, globally competitive conglomerates called *chaebol*, whereas in Taiwan, thousands of small private manufacturers subcontracted their services to foreign multinationals. Meanwhile, in Hong Kong, small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) dominated the private sector and reached overseas markets via thousands of domestic import/export SMEs.³¹ Despite these major differences among their economy, there are clear similarities in the development of each nation, most prominently the existence of a developmental state.

First, each state was born under pressure of survival from an external threat. Singapore received independence surrounded by large aggressive neighbors and the threat of communist expansionism. South Korea remains, to this day, at war with its northern counterpart, while Taiwan faced the People's Republic of China's determination to annex the island nation. Even in Hong Kong, the last colony of the dissolved British Empire, the public had fundamental doubts about

China's willingness to let the colony live outside of Chinese control and the fate of the city after the British lease expired. Consequently, each state was founded on the ideology of ensuring the physical, social and institutional viability of each society.³² Fear of being conquered compelled the states to function on the principle of rapid modernization to enhance national security via industrial power, and attain political and military protection by joining the club of advanced western nations.³³

With the exception of Hong Kong, the politics of survival legitimized a hard state. These nationalistic and competitive societies were more willing to entrust the state with national welfare, even when that meant at times tolerating repression. The PAP in Singapore crushed small communist factions in the early 1960s, took control over labor unions, and created a highly punitive legal system. In South Korea and Taiwan, the government eliminated the landed bourgeoisie class, altogether banned labor unions and ruthlessly arrested and killed communist dissidents. Even in non-interventionist Hong Kong, British troops forcefully quelled riots in the 1960s and without hesitation deported threats to China.³⁴ Despite the bloodshed, the aggressive politics of survival largely persuaded each population to accept hard states as a necessity to ensure national security and economic growth for the greater good of the majority. While not as peaceful as the Singaporean government, these hard

states were instrumental in mobilizing hardworking labor forces necessary for private sector growth.

Survival politics and nationalist goals also helped establish effective developmental bureaucracies. With governments more focused on maintaining national security through economic development, hard states were less influenced by special interest groups and more adept at mediating between short-term social and economic losses and long-term industrial gains. Moreover, the bureaucracies' ability to overcome conservative interests allowed the state to implement immediate, uncontested development strategies that facilitated economic transformation.

While each state began developing its economy on a different platform—South Korea and Taiwan adopted import substitution strategies, while Singapore and Hong Kong chose open markets—each nation prospered only after developing outward-oriented economies based on various forms of export manufacturing. The principle driver of domestic production and economic growth was trade with vast global markets, be it through foreign MNCs, conglomerates or SMEs.

A critical characteristic of the East Asian developmental states has been their keen ability to adapt to changing global markets. Each state effectively reacted to the sudden increase in global protectionism and helped the private sector make necessary adjustments to

manufacturing and production capabilities. The PAP facilitated shifting manufacturing to less protected component parts. The South Korean and Taiwanese governments both heavily emphasized production of less protected high value goods and promoted high-tech manufacturing predominantly through government funded research institutes and technology parks. The 'positive non-interventionist' colonial government of Hong Kong attacked global protectionism by establishing global trade development offices to promote business overseas and implementing social welfare programs to minimize entrepreneurial risk at home.³⁵ Overall, the existence of flexible government policies in all four states, rather than fully depoliticized markets proposed by neoliberalism, greatly assisted the private sector in quickly adapting to market changes, reorganizing capital, reducing market risks, and fostering growth.

The most unique characteristic shared by the Asian Tigers was their ability to lead their economies to new levels of industrialization and help the private sector generate higher value. Each state realized early that their comparative advantage in low-skill, low wage labor was neither sustainable nor desirable for long-term economic growth. While low wage labor was an effective launching pad in initial development phases, in order to achieve consistent growth, the state promoted upgrading to higher value-added industries ahead of international competitors. The NICs achieved modernization by heavily emphasizing technology acquisition. The developmental states of Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan induced industrial

upgrading to varying degrees through education and infrastructure projects, fiscal incentives, government-imposed low wage policies and investment in domestic innovation from public enterprises and government-sponsored venture capital. The Asian Tigers' liberalized markets, combined with government leadership, produced sustainable high growth economies.

The additional examples of South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong add greater validity to development lessons learned from the case study of Singapore. There are, in fact, strong commonalities between all four developmental states and the way they supported economic growth, revealing the effectiveness of specific government characteristics: stable political control, export oriented strategies, flexible policy implementation and guidance through industrial upgrading. However, the fundamental commonality, in direct contradiction to the neoliberal ideal, is the oversight of the state to mobilize social and economic forces towards long-term development goals.

Conclusion and Implications for Development Strategies

Given the various factors that influence nations, there are significant variations on developmental states and policy options. In comparing all four Asian Tigers, each state employed a different level of state intervention and repression to implement their development design, Singapore being the most statist yet least repressive. In terms of market development ideologies, South Korea and Taiwan's early import substitution strategies are in stark contrast to Singapore and

Hong Kong's open markets. Singapore's foreign MNC private sector base greatly differed from South Korea's *chaebol*, Taiwan's manufacturing subcontractors or Hong Kong's SMEs. Nevertheless, through various development trajectories directed by nationally and culturally specific strategies, distinct developmental states guided their countries to similarly successful economic ends.

While there are numerous takes on the developmental state and policy models, the general Singaporean model could prove most applicable to modern development projects. Developing countries seeking foreign aid must now be highly accountable to global trade and governance standards. The international community would be unlikely to tolerate either the early protectionist policies or the social controls used by South Korea and Taiwan. Therefore, embracing Singapore's open market, corporate haven approach followed later by the development of domestic industry is a more realistic strategy. Furthermore, foreign direct investment is the quickest means of acquiring capital and technology for a country that lacks domestic industry. Singapore's model of open markets with a vigilant state would not only encourage private sector growth, but also help developing economies better circumvent the stagnation caused by turbulent global markets or foreign divestment that neoliberal-inspired non-interventionist states often fail to mediate. While there are obviously many additional factors to consider when making Singapore a development model, including how to create a disciplined bureaucracy, Singapore's free trade, MNC friendly and

statist approach effectively negotiates between the trade requirements imposed by international organizations and the need for a developmental state to guide the development process.

In working towards replicating the successful developmental states of Singapore and its Asian Tiger counterparts elsewhere, the lessons from survival politics are critical. For the East Asian NICs, economic development was not merely a goal, but a means to an end: national security. However, this end can be any long-term national agenda, be it breaking free of colonial dominance or restoring national power. The end consequence of modernization must be a strong motivational force in creating a driven, competitive population that is willing to sacrifice short-term gains for the long-term ones. A nationalistic body of citizens is more likely to legitimize a hard developmental state that can better react to global market forces. Moreover, commitment to a nationalist goal beyond development itself helps to create a more dedicated and less corrupt bureaucracy, whose self-interest is invested in the country's long-term success rather than in short-term compensation from special-interest groups. Development as a means to an end better disciplines society and the state.

In analyzing the initial 25 years of Singapore's development and comparing the development case to South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, it becomes evident that economic development is not as simple as either neoliberal or

developmental state theories propose.

According to neoliberalism, the predatory state is a hazard to the market that must be contained. However, the case of Singapore clearly demonstrated that a statist approach to development can be supportive of the market and, in fact, accelerate the process of modernization more rapidly than prescribed neoliberal models alone—especially given neoliberalism's false assumption that all global market players follow the same laissez-faire rules. Similarly, developmental state theories have their own limitations. While Singapore and the East Asian NICs experienced phenomenal growth with the oversight of supportive states, unique factors, such as survival politics and the Cold War, had crucial implications for those states' ability to become developmental. Without external threats to national security, which fueled the PAP's steadfast devotion to economic development and the Singaporean population's willingness to accept a paternalistic government, it is uncertain whether Singapore's hard, disciplined state would have gained legitimacy. While both camps of development theory attempt to create broadly applicable development strategies, a one-size-fits-all model is unrealistic.

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Silent Resistance.

Jewish Art and Poetry in Concentration and Extermination Camps.

by Shaina Semiatin

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his paper examines Jewish poetry and art created within concentration and extermination camps, and the relative values of these creations as forms of spiritual and cultural resistance. Using the framework established by Yehuda Bauer in his book *Rethinking the Holocaust*, these artistic works are analyzed based upon their success in maintaining the spiritual, cultural,

and individual strength of European Jewry during World War II (i.e. Jewish *amidab*). This paper argues that the creation of Jewish art and poetry not only served as a means of spiritual and cultural resistance, but also was in fact just as significant as physical Jewish resistance and rebellion during the Holocaust.

When the Nazi Party came to power in January 1933, it immediately instituted a campaign fueled by propaganda, eugenics, and persecution to deplete Germany of its Jewish population. The primary aim of the party until 1939 was isolationist in nature and emphasized policies of forced emigration. These policies remained fairly steadfast until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, when the Nazis began instituting mass killings of European Jews. At the Wannsee Conference in January of the following year, the destructive machinery that effectuated the systematic slaughter of European

Jewry was formally implemented, with the ultimate goals of liquidation and extermination. The Jews of Europe were not ignorant of this fact, and many of them resisted their destruction using whatever means available to them. They resisted loudly and violently in Warsaw, Cracow, Vilna, and Kovno. They resisted quietly and secretly within Jewish homes by maintaining cultural, religious, and educational activities; strengthening morale and enabling survival. But what of the silent resisters—the ones who perished in the concentration and extermination camps, but whose art and poetry remain as resounding proof of their existence? Their creations are humble and silent, but the spiritual and cultural power of their work ensures that, in many ways, their legacy speaks the loudest.

When analyzing the significance of Jewish art and poetry created before and during the Holocaust, it is logical to begin with the Jewish ghettos, where

creative materials were more readily available, and spare time was arguably more abundant. However, significant scholarly work has already been done on analyzing the legacies of prominent ghetto artists like Josef Nassy and Mendel Grossman, whose creations were oft-deemed ‘horror propaganda’ by the Nazi regime. Therefore, this analysis will focus solely upon the artwork and poetry of Jews interned in concentration camps and extermination camps. The poetic and artistic productions of these prisoners were often less refined and stylistically imbued with an underlying sense of urgency. However, the atmosphere within which these creations were produced highlights their spiritual and cultural significance and thus establishes them as an essential form of Jewish resistance during the Holocaust.

In order to more effectively determine what should and should not be considered Jewish resistance,

it is helpful to examine the argument made by Yehuda Bauer in his eloquent work, *Rethinking the Holocaust*. In his book, Bauer breaks down the concept of Jewish resistance into two separate spheres: *amidab* and ‘sanctification of life.’ Sanctification of life, according to the author, denotes “meaningful Jewish survival...but not armed resistance or the use of force.”¹ Notable examples of this type of resistance include the smuggling of children out of some of the larger ghettos (e.g. Warsaw, Vilna, and Tribunaliski); thievery of food by necessity; and the complex systems of bartering that existed within almost all of the Jewish ghettos.

Bauer’s definition of *amidab* is more delineated and refers to “armed and unarmed actions,” as well as “cultural, educational, religious, and political activities taken to strengthen morale... and enable individual and group survival.”² *Amidab* was therefore a key component in a wide array of Jewish wartime activities, including: Ringelblum’s “Oneg Shabbat” operation; the armed ghetto uprisings in Warsaw, Bedzin, Bialystok, and elsewhere; and the proliferation of underground Jewish schools, study sessions, and musical performances. These activities fundamentally sought to “preserve morale against the threat of annihilation,”³ and, in doing so, ensure the physical and ideological survival of the Jewish people. *Amidab*, therefore, inherently argues that cultural and spiritual forms of resistance during the war were just as influential

and significant as armed Jewish uprisings. Thus, by creating poetry and art in camps, interned Jews “refused to give in to despair and acted out their *amidab*—their resistance—by turning inward and discovering aspects of their Jewish heritage, whether religious or secular or antireligious.”⁴

The richest sources of Jewish artistic and poetic creations were the Nazi concentration camps. The first major camp, Dachau, was established in 1933 and “served as the model for the SS-controlled concentration camps” through the remainder of Hitler’s rule.⁵ Beginning in 1936, the Nazi regime established larger, more permanent camps, including Buchenwald, Auschwitz III-Monowitz, and Theresienstadt (Terezín). Following the German invasion of Poland, concentration camps increasingly became dumping grounds for the regime’s designated ‘undesirables,’ namely Jews, Soviet P.O.W.s, communists, Gypsies, Polish intelligentsia, and political enemies. The conditions of the camps were dire, and artists and writers were forced to barter for paper, ink, pencils, and paints. As the war progressed and

the camp conditions deteriorated, Jewish artists began to utilize “cardboard boxes, paper bags, graph paper from German production offices, backs of official notices and posters, even remnants of flour sacks and burlap bags.”⁶

The surviving visual art of the concentration camps is primarily diaristic and mimetic in nature. The artists represent a wide range of experiences and talents, but all of their works address some sort of Holocaust narrative or theme. Ultimately, their art was created for the sake of history, and they sought to document the atrocities that camp prisoners were forced to endure. Jewish inmates were acutely aware of the risks that they were taking by producing drawings, paintings, and poetry, but they nonetheless continued to do so to maintain their spiritual strength and to communicate “across the abyss of experience.”⁷ In a sense, then, poetry and art served not only as a means of resisting against the Nazi regime, but also as a vehicle for maintaining inter-Jewish connectedness. Much of the work that has survived the camps has come down to historians by happenstance, but

" In a sense, then, poetry and art served not only as a means of resisting against the Nazi regime, but also as a vehicle for maintaining inter-Jewish connectedness."



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some artists took specific precautions to safeguard their creations by hiding them or attempting to have them smuggled out. Nonetheless, the artistic and poetic legacy of the Holocaust is fragmentary at best and must be pieced together from a constellation of distinctive sources.

The largest single collection of these works comes out of Theresienstadt (Terezín), a small town on the outskirts of Prague. Theresienstadt was taken over by the Gestapo in June 1940 and was presented to the outside world as a model Jewish settlement. In reality, however, it was a glorified concentration and transit camp that funneled primarily Czechoslovakian Jews into Auschwitz and Sobibor. During its operation, nearly 150,000 Jews passed through Terezín's gates, and, of that number, 90,000 were subsequently shipped to extermination camps. Due to the camp's location, it attracted an unusually large number of Jewish scientists, musicians, writers, artists, and scholars. This concentration of Jewish intelligentsia led to an intra-camp emphasis upon education, and

children and adults alike attempted to maintain cultural and artistic activities by performing plays and musicals and producing drawings, paintings, and poetry. In 1944, as the war neared its end, a substantial collection of Jewish artwork was gathered and hidden underground. Following the war's conclusion, the collection was recovered by Leo Haas, one of the few Jewish artists to survive Terezín. This hidden collection of art and poetry not only documents the horrors of camp life, but also illustrates the prisoner's individual attempts to maintain hope in the face of utter desolation

Leo Haas was born in Opava in 1901 to Czechoslovakian parents. He studied art extensively at the Berlin Art Academy, and drew inspiration from the works of Francisco de Goya, as well as Toulouse-Lautrec. In 1942 he was deported to Theresienstadt, where he was recruited to produce propaganda for the German army. The Nazi utilization of Jewish artists for propaganda production was not an uncommon phenomenon and illustrates the Reich's attempts to direct

all available Jewish skills towards German war making. When he wasn't working, Haas spent the majority of his free time teaching art to prisoners and also secretly producing his own drawings. In 1944, his works were discovered, and he was arrested and deported to Auschwitz. He was liberated by American soldiers in 1945 and returned to Theresienstadt to retrieve prisoner artwork hidden throughout the camp.

Haas' work within the camp was composed using primarily pencil, charcoal, and ink on paper. The availability of materials at Terezín was relatively high compared to that of other camps, and Haas' work therefore reflects consistency in quality and form. The majority of his pieces focus on depicting the experiences of Jews within the camp—from arrival to death—and the relative verisimilitude of his compositions is striking. In his 1942 piece *Transport from Vienna*, Haas depicts newly-arrived Jews, utterly replete with exhaustion, spilling out of their cattle car into the camp (Figure I). The scene is overlaid with falling rain, and the coldness of the image seems to be echoed by the SS guard who passively observes the prisoners on the far right side of the frame. During his time in Terezín, Haas created a large body of work that depicted every aspect of Jewish camp life, including the morgue, living quarters, and free time activities. His work is not overtly laden with symbols of Jewish culture or depictions of Jewish heroism, but his subtle use of the Magen David powerfully evokes a sense of communal and ubiquitous suffering. Haas' work, therefore, is best viewed as a form of

FIGURE 1: Leo Haas, *Transport from Vienna*, 1942, Wash and ink on paper, 14 3/4 x 19 1/4 in.⁸



individual spiritual resistance; a means of self-expression and personal catharsis. This catharsis proved to be a source of strength for Haas, and he was one of few prisoners lucky enough to outlive his art. Countless others were not as lucky and are only able to speak to us through the legacy of their surviving work.

Karel Fleischmann, another inmate of Theresienstadt, was born in Czechoslovakia in 1897 and died in Auschwitz-Birkenau in October 1944. He was a student of medicine who produced art and poetry in his spare time, and in 1942 he was transported to Terezín, where he worked as a medical physician for internees. Two years later, Fleischmann and his wife were both deported to Auschwitz and perished in the gas chambers. After the war, over 600 of Fleischmann's works were recovered and stored. Like Haas, the majority of Fleischmann's drawings were done on paper with pencil or ink. Fleischmann's style however, is distinctly more abstract, and depicts human subjects in warbled, obscure forms (Figure II). This obscuration of human figures is quite possibly a direct result of the impact of the Nazi regime upon Jewish culture and Jewish identity. Camp prisoners, uprooted from everything familiar to them and subjected to unimaginable cruelties, were thus forced to reevaluate their cultural and spiritual identities, as well as their beliefs about the nature of humanity. This artistic obscuration could thus represent the utter confusion and disorientation felt by Jewish inmates. Fleischmann's work

is also distinctive in its subject matter, which devotes an equal amount of artistic attention to internees and inanimate objects (e.g. bikes, buildings, trees). This emphasis upon ordinary objects is incredibly significant, as it represents a continued artistic belief in the value and inherent beauty of the world. Fleischmann's work, therefore, is exemplary of Jewish *amidab* in its truest form. It is simultaneously representative of the continuous Jewish search for cultural and spiritual meaning during the Holocaust, as well as an intellectual refusal to acquiesce to the destructive aims of the Final Solution.

Due to the intellectual and artistic inclinations of the Jewish population of Terezín, children were also encouraged to learn, write, paint, and draw. Between 1942 and 1944, over 15,000 children were interned in Theresienstadt, and only about 100 survived to the war's end. The poetry of Terezín's children is particularly expressive, and demonstrates a poignant mixture of realism and optimism, imagination and despondence. In Miroslav Kosek's poem "It All Depends on How You Look at It," he describes the beauty of his surroundings, but also reflects upon the nature of his internment:

"Terezín is full of beauty.
It's in your eyes now clear
And through the street the tramp
Of many marching feet I hear.
In the ghetto at Terezín,
It looks that way to me,
Is a square kilometer of earth

FIGURE 11: Karel Fleischmann, *Sitting for a Meal*, 1944, Ink and wash on paper, 10 5/8 x 13 3/8 in.⁹



Cut off from the world that's free."¹⁰

Kosek, although only twelve when he composed this piece, displays a remarkable understanding of the restrictions placed upon his existence but nonetheless retains a spiritual belief in the beauty of the world. The existence of cultural and spiritual *amidab* in Jewish children is further highlighted by the poem "Homesick," which was composed in a children's barrack in 1943 by an anonymous author. In the poem, the writer pleads: "There's little to eat and much to want, / Where bit by bit it's horror to live. / But no one must give up! / The world turns and times change."¹¹ The poet of "Homesick" calls not only for the continuation of Jewish unity and strength, but also for the continuation of collective optimism in a time of utmost despair.

Poetry also served as a means of resistance and self-expression for Jewish adults in concentration camps throughout Europe. Unlike drawings and paintings, poetic compositions within camps were

not as restricted by tangible barriers, and therefore the functions that they served in the lives of Jewish inmates were exceptionally multifarious. Some Holocaust poems display extremely abstract imagery and seem to serve primarily as vehicles of emotional release. In Józef Bau's 1944 poem, "Camp Hospital," he writes: "...in the nearby / chimney, lightly roasted souls / dance a spectral minuet with the black smoke."¹² Bau's poetry, which was composed in the Gross-Rosen concentration camp, exhibits modernist language forms that utilize the breakdown of form and function. This breakdown of the language is perhaps symbolic—in the same stylistic manner as Fleischmann's work—of the breakdown of the European shtetl and Jewish culture *in toto*. "Camp Hospital," therefore, should be seen not as a Jewish call to arms, but rather as one man's attempt to address his experiences and losses during the Holocaust.

Other Holocaust poets utilized their compositions as a way of displaying Jewish cultural and spiritual pride while simultaneously resisting Nazi rule. The poet Joshua Zendorf, while in Petivka concentration camp, composed "Our Spirit Is Not Broken" to express this sense

of personal and collective *amidah*:

"No, our spirit is not broken,
and the earth's a lovely place.
Victory has been bespoken
over everything that's base."¹³

Throughout the poem, Zendorf appeals to the inherent unity of the Jewish people as a source of power and resistance. He utilizes the metaphors of spring and renewal to argue that the Jewish people should join together to emerge from their collective darkness. Zendorf's work also shirks personal and subtle diction, in favor of a more grandiose and collective call to action.

The artistic and poetic works that emerged from the concentration camps were intended to serve a wide variety of functions. Some creations were primarily methods of personal expression, and catharsis, a way for inmates to cleanse their souls and motivate themselves to simply continue living. Other works sought to record the daily lives and experiences of camp prisoners in order to ensure that history would possess an accurate record of German atrocities. Still other creations sought to emphasize Jewish unity and strength and, by doing so, resist the Nazi

juggernaut both spiritually and culturally. Arguably, the artists and poets who created works within concentration camps were motivated by some glimmer of hope and sought life, even on the brink of death. In extermination camps, however, there was no life, and the prisoners who created art did so primarily to bear witness to their own existence.

The creation of art and poetry in Nazi death camps was extremely limited and was essentially nonexistent in Sobibor, Belzec, Chelmno, and Treblinka due to their systematic short-term killing infrastructures. The bulk of substantial extermination camp artwork was created in Auschwitz I, the base camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau. From May 1940 to January 1945, almost two million prisoners—90 percent of whom were Jewish—perished in the destructive machinery of this death camp. However, regardless of this staggering statistic, the walls of Auschwitz-Birkenau nonetheless contain poems, murals, slogans, inscriptions, paintings, and initials. Proof that, "despite the degradation and dehumanization that the camps imposed, the process of making art still functioned in a vital way as a means of recovering and reclaiming the rites of life and of death."¹⁴

Many of the Jewish inmates who created these works remain unknown, but their art bears witness to their presence and speaks loudly of their suffering. On the lintel of a cellar door, an inmate inscribed a highly religious poem that

includes the auspicious lines:

"Some stumble and fall, rise again,
And shake off the dust.
The wounds heal quickly,
And all is well again."¹⁵

The walls of Auschwitz-Birkenau are also infrequently bedecked with darkly humorous murals of chimney sweeps, horseback riders, and simulated bathroom mirrors (Figure III). Inmates drew numerous hurried sketches of nude women, landscapes, ballerinas, camels, deserts, and cupid hearts. Prisoners carved their own names into the brick walls of their cell blocks, on ceilings, on the backs of doors, and inside water wells.

Moreover, all of these artistic works cannot be judged by their aesthetic merit, but rather by their mere existence, because "in the death camps...the concept of choice was simply not available to the camp inmates."¹⁷ In Auschwitz, then, the mere creation of art and poetry, regardless of its purpose, was inherently an incarnation of *amidah*. Jewish resistance in death camps did not take the form of cultural or spiritual retention, but rather mere survival and the continuation of human dignity. This concept is perhaps most poignantly elucidated by the poetry of prisoner Bernard Swierczyna, written shortly before his execution at Auschwitz:

"I only wanted to be a man
Not a soul-less collection of numbers
To link my being with future ages
To know the code of future histories
Force took me by betrayal
And put me behind bars
But did not break my honor
Even the executioner cannot do that—
How sweet it is to die for the

FIGURE III: Washroom Painting Simulating Bathroom Mirror, Birkenau, 40 x 62 in.¹⁶



"They wrote of their pride, their fears, their pain;
they sketched their nightmares
and painted their dreams."

fatherland."¹⁸

The Nazi implementation of the Final Solution began a course of destruction that would result in the genocide of nearly six million Jews. The Jews of Europe, suddenly faced with annihilation, reacted to this reality in a variety of ways. Some refused to accept the existence of the Reich's destructive machinery until they were fully consumed by it. Others sought to continue performing cultural, religious, and educational activities in secret, in the hopes of maintaining their spiritual morale and personal identity. Some took up arms and physically rebelled, preferring a death of glory to one of quiet acquiescence. And yet others, in a time marked by sheer chaos, sought

to ideologically combat destruction with creation. They gathered materials and bartered for pencils, pens, paints, and papers. They wrote of their pride, their fears, their pain; they sketched their nightmares and painted their dreams. The majority of the artists and poets within the concentration camps and death camps failed to outlive their creations, and many of their names are lost to the historical record. But their creations stand as a testament to Jewish *amidah* and illustrate inmates' attempts to maintain identity, culture, spiritual strength, and, above all, dignity. Their creations are silent, but their legacy speaks the loudest, urging all of us to remember their struggles—to never forget.

"In extermination camps, however, there was no life, and the prisoners who created art did so primarily to bear witness to their own existence."

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America's Push for Democratization in Egypt.

A Case Study in the Application of the Bush Doctrine.

by Michael Kremer

Between 2001 and 2005, the United States pursued an aggressive democratization policy in Egypt. President Bush and members of his administration publicly called on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to implement sweeping political reforms, and the U.S. established a number of policy initiatives aimed at strengthening opposition groups. The U.S. did succeed in pressuring Mubarak

to hold competitive presidential and parliamentary elections in 2005. As it became clear that Islamist groups (led by the Muslim Brotherhood) enjoyed a great deal of electoral success, however, the Bush Administration's enthusiasm for democracy promotion faded. When the Egyptian government carried out a severe crackdown against opposition groups after the elections, the U.S. withheld criticism. Despite five years of intense efforts, the Bush Administration's democratization policy in Egypt achieved no tangible strategic gains, while at the same time straining the U.S. relationship with Egypt. That experience casts doubt on the efficacy, strategic value, and practicality of a foreign policy based on promoting democracy and freedom.

A wave of popular uprisings has swept through the Middle East in 2011. Protestors throughout the region have taken to the streets, calling for authoritarian leaders to step down

in favor of democratically elected governments. In the U.S., these events have inspired commentators on both sides of the political spectrum to call for a shift in U.S. policy in the Middle East. In the *New York Times*, Nicholas Kristof declared, "Let's live our values. We pursued a Middle East realpolitik that failed us."¹ The *Wall Street Journal's* editorial page concurred, arguing that the U.S. has an obligation to "press its political values, and [do] what it can to tilt the direction of these revolutionary upheavals in a genuinely liberal direction." Going forward, the editorial argued, "it's time [for the Obama Administration to] recognize that...the best foundation for U.S. interests is freedom."²

While Kristof and the *Wall Street Journal's* editorial board advocate noble values, questions remain about how the U.S. might shape its foreign policy to reflect them. Perhaps the best example of such a policy is the "freedom agenda"

of former President George W. Bush. In order to inform the debate over the future of U.S. policy in the Middle East, this paper will review and analyze the implementation of Bush's freedom agenda in the region through its approach to Egypt. Egypt's status as a vital U.S. ally and a key player in regional politics, as well as its U.S.-backed authoritarian regime, made it a central focus in the Bush Administration's efforts to advance its goals in the Middle East. For all of its efforts, however, the administration achieved no tangible strategic gains, while at the same time straining its relationship with the Egyptian government. The U.S. experience in Egypt between 2001 and 2005 casts doubt on the efficacy, strategic value, and practicality of a foreign policy based on promoting democracy and freedom.

In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush declared his support for democratization



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in the Middle East. He focused on Egypt in particular, remarking, “the great and proud nation of Egypt has shown the way toward peace in the Middle East, and now should show the way toward democracy.”³ Prior to September 11th, however, the Egyptian government had shown no commitment to democratization and had a history of systematically repressing opposition groups. Furthermore, the main opposition group that would presumably benefit from a democratic opening was the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), an Islamist political organization that the U.S. viewed as a threat to its interests in the region. Nevertheless, the U.S. pressed forward with its freedom agenda, publicly calling on the Egyptian government to carry out domestic political reform. Aside from the rhetoric, however, none of the U.S.’s high profile democratization programs launched in Egypt received adequate funding, while the U.S. continued to funnel billions in economic and military aid to support the government of Hosni Mubarak. The U.S. did succeed in pressuring Mubarak to hold competitive presidential and parliamentary elections in 2005. However, when it became clear that Islamist groups, led by the MB, enjoyed a great deal of electoral success, U.S. enthusiasm for democracy promotion faded. Amplifying the failure of U.S. democratization policy, the Egyptian government then proceeded to crack down even harder than before on opposition groups in the country.

The Framework of the Bush Doctrine

The attacks of September 11, 2001 stunned America. In response, President

Bush created an all-encompassing framework – the “Bush Doctrine” – to fight terrorism by shaping the world in America’s image. He called this framework a “single, sustainable model for national success” and promoted it abroad, basing it upon three pillars: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.⁴ From the administration’s point of view, promoting these universal values was the best way to triumph over global terrorism and to achieve a comprehensive, international peace.

The Bush Doctrine did not emerge from a vacuum. Instead, most of the ideas it contained have deep roots in the history of American foreign policy and, specifically, in a strain of thought known as “liberal internationalism.” Woodrow Wilson shaped it around four tenets: an international community dominated by democratic states; liberal trade regimes and open economic relations between those states; strong multilateral institutions that would bind those states together in peace and economic freedom; and undisputed American leadership in the international system. Wilson’s ultimate hope was that these four factors would combine to lead to a new, peaceful world order, thereby guaranteeing American national security.⁵

In the wake of September 11th, the architects of the Bush Doctrine linked Wilsonian ideas about the importance of democracy and freedom with counterterrorism. The belief that authoritarian regimes bred terrorism and were inherently unstable provided the basis for the Bush Doctrine’s focus on democratization. Wilson once remarked that “only free peoples can hold their

purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.”⁶ For his part, President Bush’s declaration that “stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder” echoed Wilson’s sentiments while placing them in a post-9/11 context.⁷ Therefore, the Bush Doctrine held that the long-term solution to terrorism was to replace authoritarian regimes with democratic systems of governance. Gregory Gause lays out the rationale for that theory:

Underlying the assertion that democracy will reduce terrorism is the belief that, able to participate openly in competitive politics and have their voices heard in the public square, potential terrorists and terrorist sympathizers would not need to resort to violence to achieve their goals. Even if they lost in one round of elections, the confidence that they could win in the future would inhibit the temptation to resort to extra-democratic means. The habits of democracy would ameliorate extremism and focus the anger of the Arab publics at their own governments, not at the United States.⁸

Armed with the conviction that undemocratic nations posed a security risk to the United States and that “the advance of freedom leads to peace,”⁹ the Bush Doctrine justified America’s mission to spread freedom from both a national security and a moral perspective. With the understanding that a democratic peace was in America’s national security interest, the Bush Doctrine called for America to go beyond financial support and rhetoric in promoting democracy. It outlined an activist strategy, calling

for “opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.”¹⁰

For someone studying the Bush Doctrine with no knowledge of the political leanings of its supporters or the actions taken in its name, the sustained focus on freedom, democracy, and economic development through liberalization of global markets – the idea of “champion[ing] aspirations for human dignity” – seems decidedly idealistic.¹¹ For all its idealism, the Bush Doctrine also contained a more pragmatic, “with-us-or-against-us” dimension that effectively divided the countries of the world into two distinct camps in the battle against terrorism. The U.S. employed a mixture of coercion and force against countries deemed undemocratic state sponsors of terror in an effort to dismantle terrorist networks and promote democracy (in line with the principle of “opening societies”). The countries in the U.S. camp, however, were not all democratic. In the Middle East, no country better embodies this incongruity than Egypt: a crucial American ally in a key region of the world, but a country with an internal political system that was neither free nor democratic.

The State of Affairs in Egypt before September 11, 2001

Until his resignation in February 2011, the Egyptian state revolved around one central figure: President Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak came into power after the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. As president and leader of the

ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), he cemented his iron grip over the government and the military in a manner best described as personal authoritarian rule. Maye Kassem writes that Mubarak utilized a “legal-constitutional framework to curtail the influence and powers of institutions, groupings, and individuals, the distribution of state patronage to create a clientelist network, the presence of electoral malpractice, and the use of state coercion to control perceived challengers...”¹² Furthermore, Mubarak had absolute control over the composition of his cabinet, and he personally appointed the governors of all 26 Egyptian provinces. Just as importantly, he wielded power over the military. Mubarak’s relationship with his senior Army officers involved constant promotion, demotion, post-changing, and, if he thought someone was accruing too much power, relief of duties.¹³

Another enduring symbol of Mubarak’s reign – and one that also served a pragmatic purpose in perpetuating the Mubarak government’s hold on power – is the State of Emergency (also called the “Emergency Laws”) that has been in effect in Egypt since the assassination of former President Anwar Sadat in 1981. The government claimed that the Emergency Laws existed to combat terrorism and ensure domestic security.¹⁴ Credible estimates in the late 1990s, however, placed the number of political detainees between 15,000 and 20,000.¹⁵ The State

of Emergency gave the government the power of “administrative detention,” restricted public assemblies, and enabled it to maintain strict control over all political organizations.

Political opposition in Egypt emerges from both religious and secular sources. Political Islam in Egypt falls largely under the domain of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Although the members of the MB espouse different viewpoints on political, social, and religious issues, the group’s core mission centers upon the establishment of an Islamic state under Quranic (Sharia) law.¹⁶ Despite its popularity (or perhaps because of it), successive Egyptian governments have officially banned the MB since 1966. There is also a small cohort of secular opposition parties, but an array of National Democratic Party-backed gatekeepers effectively limited any of these parties’ ability to oppose Mubarak.¹⁷ Furthermore, internal divisions have dampened their effectiveness. The dictatorial leadership styles of senior opposition figures, internal fractionalization, inability to collaborate with fellow parties, and the lack of a connection to the grassroots inhibited these parties just as much as government repression.¹⁸ Perhaps the most accurate description of the state of the Egyptian political system at the end of the 1990s exists in a popular Egyptian saying: *Misr Mubarak na Mubarak Misr* (Egypt is Mubarak and Mubarak is Egypt).

The Strategic Significance of the U.S.-Egypt Relationship

It is also important to examine the state of U.S.-Egypt relations in the same period. The 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel came with the guarantee that the United States would divide a \$7.3 billion foreign aid package between

systematic violations of human rights, rigged elections, and evidence of a persistent culture of torture, U.S. aid has continued to flow.²⁰ Simply put, the idea of a serious and publicized push for democratic reform was anathema to U.S. strategy in the Middle East before September 11, 2001.

upon the government's fulfillment of specific governance and human rights benchmarks. American democracy promotion programs sought to strengthen the secular opposition and civil society by widening their political base and giving them a platform to promote their views. The Islamist issue, however, presented a conundrum that the Bush administration was not able to solve. The administration's refusal to engage the Muslim Brotherhood damaged its credibility and dangerously jeopardized U.S. interests in Egypt.

U.S. diplomats and politicians applied strong public pressure on Mubarak's government in an effort to goad it into implementing political reform. In his speech before the National Endowment for Democracy, President Bush singled out Egypt, declaring, "the great and proud nation of Egypt has shown the way toward peace in the Middle East, and now should show the way toward democracy in the Middle East."²¹ Condoleezza Rice also played a very public role in calling for Egyptian reform. She delivered the clarion call for Egyptian democracy in a 2005 speech at the American University of Cairo:

The Egyptian government must fulfill the promise it has made to its people -- and to the entire world -- by giving its citizens the freedom to choose. Egypt's elections, including the Parliamentary elections, must meet objective standards that define every free election. Opposition

groups must be free to assemble, and participate, and speak to the media. Voting should occur without violence or intimidation. And international election monitors and observers must have unrestricted access to do their jobs... Throughout the Middle East, the fear of free choices can no longer justify the denial of liberty. It is time to abandon the excuses that are made to avoid the hard work of democracy.²²

Given the U.S. government's history of indifference to Egyptian internal politics, Rice's comments are remarkable. These ten lines, delivered by the top American diplomat in the heart of Cairo, are the sharpest encapsulation of the Bush democratization agenda in the Middle East.

Bush, Rice, and other administration officials were not the only ones putting pressure on Mubarak. With its power of the purse, Congress used its yearly appropriations bills to simultaneously take aid money away from Mubarak's government and direct it towards democracy and governance programs to benefit Mubarak's opponents. In its FY 2004 appropriations bill, Congress stipulated that, on top of the \$575 million in economic assistance that the U.S. was to provide to Egypt that year, a portion of an \$11.5 million fund for democracy promotion had to go to Egypt to "support civil society organizations working for democracy in Egypt."²³ In the appropriations bill for FY 2005, Congress stepped up its push for democracy. It included a provision in the bill directly following its appropriation of \$535 million in economic assistance

to Egypt that stated, "with respect to the provision of assistance for Egypt for democracy and governance activities, the organizations implementing such assistance and the specific nature of that assistance shall not be subject to the prior approval by the Government of Egypt."²⁴ This provision was a direct reaction to the Egyptian government's implementation of strict laws governing NGO activities earlier in the decade.²⁵ The State Department was continually frustrated with government foot-dragging or outright refusal to allow the U.S. to fund civil society organizations that the government perceived as threatening. In FY 2006, however, the Congress went beyond its modest provisions for democracy promotion in FY 2004 and FY 2005. Whereas past Congresses had kept Egypt's economic assistance separate from any funds allocated for democracy promotion, it decided in FY 2006 to earmark \$135 of the \$495 million it allocated for economic assistance for "project assistance."²⁶ It specified that "not less than" \$50 million from the project assistance allocation should go to "democracy, human rights, and governance programs."²⁷ The steady escalation in allocations targeted for democracy programs and the increasingly direct language that legislators employed between 2001 and 2005 indicates the pressure that the Bush Administration and some lawmakers strove to place on Egypt.

Despite Congress' more confrontational tone towards Egypt, it is important to consider two factors that cast doubt upon the extent to which Congress was prepared to test America's alliance with Egypt: the continued

provision of military aid and a reticence to cut aid as a punishment for falling short of expectations for democratic reform. Egypt receives \$1.3 billion in military aid every year from the United States. That figure held steady throughout the Bush Administration.²⁸ Compared to the amount of annual military assistance, the relatively paltry \$206.4 million that went toward "Democracy and Governance" in Egypt between FY 2004 and FY 2009 (an average of \$34.4 million per year) reflects the United States' refusal to completely shift the focus of its relationship with Egypt to democracy promotion.²⁹ In Congress, Senators Patrick Leahy and Mitch McConnell led a drive to tie Egypt's future aid to political reform.³⁰ Neither they nor other members of Congress succeeded in their attempts to cut aid or institute stricter conditionality measures in 2004, 2005, or 2006.³¹ Thus, despite the strong rhetoric in favor of democracy promotion, the ostensible changes in the nature of U.S. aid to Egypt designed to promote internal reforms ended up having little chance for success.

In addition to Congress' efforts, the Bush Administration sought to reform Egypt's political sphere through a variety of State Department initiatives. The most prominent of these programs was the State Department's "Middle East Partnership Initiative" (MEPI). In a 2002 speech at the Heritage Foundation, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell called MEPI a "bridge between the United States and the Middle East, between our governments and our peoples," and outlined the three main pillars of the initiative: economic reform, closing

"Active promotion of the three pillars of the Bush doctrine – freedom, democracy, and free enterprise – came to define American foreign policy. "

Changes in the U.S.-Egypt Relationship after September 11, 2001

The attacks of September 11th fundamentally altered the Bush Administration's view of the United States' position in the world. Active promotion of the three pillars of the Bush doctrine – freedom, democracy, and free enterprise – came to define American foreign policy. U.S. democracy promotion in Egypt had to address three distinct sectors of country's political sphere: the Mubarak regime, the secular opposition and civil society groups, and Islamist groups (led by the Muslim Brotherhood). The U.S. attempted to push the Egyptian government toward implementing political reforms through a mix of public pressure and a push to make U.S. foreign aid conditional

the two countries. Since 1979, Egypt has received an average of almost \$2 billion per year from the United States, making it the second largest recipient of U.S. aid in that time period.¹⁹ That bevy of foreign aid has cemented Egypt as one of the United States' most important allies in the Middle East.

Egypt's key role in supporting U.S. interests in the region led America to place a premium on stability and reliability in the relationship between the two countries. Whether Republicans or Democrats were in power, U.S. support for President Mubarak remained constant between 1981 and 2001. The United States decided that its "long-term interests are best served by maintaining Mubarak in power, even if he shows scant respect for civil liberties. Despite

the “freedom gap,” and expanding opportunities for higher education.³² Powell went on to say that MEPI recognized that “open economies, to be successful, require open political systems,” and to that end he declared, through MEPI, the U.S. intended to “support citizens across the region who are claiming their political voices.”³³ A 2004 Brookings Institution report about MEPI described the program more succinctly:

Inherent in [the approach of MEPI] was a judgment that Arab governments had not sufficiently recognized their looming demographic and economic challenges, and had not fully embraced the need for political, economic, and social reform. Instead, the thinking went, they would need to be goaded toward change by a combination of independent American assistance and grassroots activism.³⁴

This idea of American-inspired political, economic, and social reform dovetails with the liberal internationalist ideology of the Bush Administration. MEPI's success in the region would lead to democratization and, as Powell said, a strengthening of the “bridge” (read: American influence) between the U.S. and the Middle East.

Nevertheless, MEPI did not succeed. Despite its strong public support of the program, the Bush Administration did not endow it with the financial resources that would have enabled it to have a serious impact. Furthermore, the framework of MEPI inhibited its ability to effect any serious change; instead of funding opposition groups, a vast

majority of the program's funds ended up benefitting the Mubarak government. The authors of the 2004 Brookings report (which was quite critical of the program) argue that the MEPI's lack of tangible successes was due to a “scatter-shot approach to promoting reform; an overemphasis on government-directed assistance that repeats instead of repairs the errors of our past assistance in the region; and... a lack of support at higher policy levels for its goals and projects.”³⁵ Examining the specifics of the program's funding allocations, the authors found that 70.8% of the money disbursed by MEPI went to “programs that either directly benefitted Arab government agencies...or provided training programs and seminars for Arab government officials” whereas only 18% supported American or Arab NGOs in the region and 5% went to “build the Arab private sector and promote U.S.-Arab business ties.”³⁶ MEPI was touted as “adding hope to the U.S.-Middle East agenda.”³⁷ In reality, however, its admittedly small presence and disproportional focus on working through government channels nullified any serious impact that the program might have had in Egypt.

In addition to programs like MEPI, the U.S. strongly spoke out against the Mubarak government's mistreatment of opposition figures. In 2002, for example, the Mubarak government jailed prominent dissident Saad Edin Ibrahim. In a “notable shift” in U.S.-Egypt policy, President Bush declared that the U.S. would not be able to honor Egypt's request for an additional \$200 million in economic assistance so long as Ibrahim remained in jail.³⁸ Cairo swiftly

retorted. Ahmed Maher, Egypt's Foreign Minister at the time, said “Egypt does not accept pressure and will not bow to pressure, and everyone knows that.”³⁹ Nevertheless, Ibrahim was released in December 2002 and fully acquitted in March 2003.⁴⁰ In January of 2005, Ayman Nour, the founder of the Al-Ghad party and a presidential hopeful, was arrested and jailed on trumped up charges.⁴¹ Then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice condemned the arrest and even canceled a trip to a meeting between G-8 foreign ministers and the Arab League in Cairo.⁴² The government subsequently released Nour. In contrast to the failings of MEPI and HRDF to assist Egyptian opposition groups, U.S. calls for the Egyptian government to cease its mistreatment of major opposition figures were successful.

The U.S. engaged the Egyptian government and secular opposition groups, but it failed to devise a strategy to address the Muslim Brotherhood. American officials refused to engage with the MB, and there is no evidence that any administration official seriously considered the possibility that the democratization process would strengthen the MB's political power. After Condoleezza Rice's rousing speech at the American University of Cairo in 2005, a member of the audience asked her if there had been “any sort of contacts between your administration and the Muslim Brotherhood here in Egypt?” Rice responded directly:

We have not had contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood. Our goal here is to encourage the Egyptian Government, within its own laws

and hopefully within a process and a context that is ever more reforming, to engage with civil society, with the people of Egypt for elections that can be free and fair. But we have not engaged the Muslim Brotherhood and we don't -- we won't.⁴³

In Rice's defense, the Egyptian government explicitly bans any direct contact between foreign governments and the Muslim Brotherhood.⁴⁴ Even if the United States had contacts with the MB, it may have been inappropriate for Rice, as a diplomat, to admit as much. However, Rice had just delivered a speech that contained a scathing critique of the Egyptian government's lack of commitment to democratization. She and other administration officials had shown a willingness to set aside diplomatic propriety in their direct calls for reform in Egypt. Thus, Rice's words must be taken at face value: the U.S. did not have any strategy for engaging with the Muslim Brotherhood.

That lack of a strategy was a mistake that reflects poorly on the ability of the Bush Administration to consider the political realities in the country. As noted earlier, the MB is a major political force. It enjoys large bases of support among a myriad of influential societal groups including trade unions, professional syndicates and student unions.⁴⁵ Furthermore, from a pragmatic perspective, the MB argued for many of the reforms that U.S. wanted to see. As Mohammed Zahid observes, the MB

[sought] the repeal of the Emergency Law and of all other laws which constrain public and individual freedoms. It also [sought] constitutional reforms that would allow direct election of the president and vice-presidents from among several candidates, as well as limiting their period in office to two terms, freedom of association and freedom of the press.⁴⁶

Even if the U.S. disagreed with the Muslim Brotherhood because of the group's religious underpinnings, their shared goal of opening up political space could have at least led to a dialogue between the two parties. Instead, the U.S. acted as if the MB did not exist. The U.S. democratization strategy completely failed to include the political group that, as the country's largest and most organized opposition movement, was poised to reap the biggest gains from that strategy's success.⁴⁷

Instead of directly engaging with the MB, the U.S. continued to give the Egyptian government free rein to address the issue as it saw fit. In contrast to its strong condemnation of the arrests of secular opposition leaders, the U.S. ignored continued government repression of the MB. Soon after Ayman Nour was imprisoned in 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood organized protests calling for greater freedoms and constitutional reform.⁴⁸ As Shadi Hamid writes: “when the inevitable clash [between the MB and the government] came,

thousands of Muslim Brothers were arrested in one of the most extensive government crackdowns in decades.”⁴⁹ Hamid then describes the American response: “the Bush administration refused to criticize the regime, expressing instead ‘disagreement with many of the things the Muslim Brotherhood stands for.’”⁵⁰ The clear double standards that characterized the U.S. relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood – engaging with secular opposition groups who held the same views as the MB but refusing to talk to the MB, condemning arrests of secular opposition figures but willfully refusing to speak out against arrests of MB political activists – dealt a serious blow to American credibility in Egypt.⁵¹

Changes in Egyptian Politics between 2001 and 2005

The United States' democratization policy in Egypt proved to be more rhetorical than substantive. In Egypt, however, a groundswell of opposition to Mubarak rose between 2001 and the 2005 elections, and a number of newly formed parties called for political and electoral reform. In an effort to appease external and internal pressure, Mubarak assented. One of the most publicized reforms was his decision to allow openly contested elections for president, which invigorated opposition movements throughout Egypt. In 2005, Egypt held its first competitive presidential election in the Mubarak era. Although Mubarak

won the election easily, the Muslim Brotherhood won a surprisingly large number of seats in the corresponding parliamentary elections. The MB's success led to a reorganization of American priorities in Egypt – a return to emphasizing stability over serious political reform. After Mubarak saw this change in U.S. policy, he swiftly engaged in a political crackdown that erased any gains the opposition had made in the past few years.

While President Bush and other top officials in his administration often spoke in near-reverent terms about the power of freedom and democracy and their desire to see through the U.S. democratization agenda in the Middle East, Arab leaders and the press, especially in Egypt, were just as bitter in rejecting those calls. The Egyptian press was particularly acrimonious after President Bush's 2003 address at the National Endowment for Democracy. The government-backed Al-Ahram newspaper angrily observed:

Recently, voices have arisen in the American government demanding direct intervention in order to impose democracy on the peoples and on the governments, as if the peoples were minors or mentally retarded and needed their hands held! These demands... are in themselves a violation of the rules of democracy. This intervention is reminiscent of the abhorrent idea of previous centuries regarding the

white man's responsibility for the other peoples, for liberating them from ignorance and backwardness.⁵²

At the same time, the opposition Al-Wafd Party's daily paper declared:

We will never accept a message from [Bush], a tyrant who understands only force and whose use of weapons is the only way of spreading his message. In contrast, we live on the land of the Arabs who understand the truth regarding [Bush's] greedy aspirations in our region.⁵³

The fact that the negative reaction to Bush's speech cut across party lines suggests that any U.S.-led democracy promotion initiatives were futile from the start.

Condemnation of U.S. democratization policy was not limited to the press. Religious figures and the Egyptian government often tried to smear opposition groups in a position to receive U.S. funding. In a 2004 *Wall Street Journal* article, Neil King wrote about imams at two "big mosques" who described the recipients of MEPI grants as "servants of the American infidel."⁵⁴ He also pointed to a parliamentary investigation into "U.S. collusion with the grants' beneficiaries" as evidence of the politically toxic nature of the MEPI grants.⁵⁵ Thus, many opposition groups who might have otherwise qualified for funding from MEPI decided to forego the opportunity because they feared losing political legitimacy or saw the money as tainted.⁵⁶ Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon occurred after the previously described U.S.

condemnation of the arrest of Ayman Nour in January 2005 and Condoleezza Rice's decision to cancel a trip to an international summit in Cairo in protest. After news broke of Rice's response, Nour's Al-Ghad party went to great lengths in a public statement to declare that Rice's support was "not sought by the party."⁵⁷ The party's deputy chairman added that Al-Ghad had "never received a penny" from any foreign body.⁵⁸

Although President Mubarak and the rest of his ministers chafed at American calls for domestic political reform, they did realize the importance of appearing to address the issue. In reality, however, Mubarak's "reforms" lacked any serious impact, by design. While he often spoke of "modernizing" or "strengthening" political institutions, Mubarak never suggested that he would actually take concrete actions such as ending the State of Emergency, lifting restrictions on civil society groups, or permitting truly free and fair elections.⁵⁹ The most significant reform item came in 2005 when President Mubarak suddenly declared that he would be open to holding competitive elections for the presidency. Mubarak's decision to amend Article 76 of the constitution – which had previously stipulated that the president would have to stand only for a "yes or no" referendum every six years – took Egypt and the international community by surprise. Jacky Angus speculates that Mubarak's "capitulation to constitutional reform in 2005... [was] a pre-emptive

strike against the wave of opposition that has slowly been mounting for years, and now threatens to sweep him away."⁶⁰ Many in Egypt, however, remained skeptical. Hisham Kassem, a member of the Al-Ghad opposition party, said, "It's the most important thing he has done in 24 years in power. But there's plenty more to be done. You can't jail political leaders on false charges and hold so-called free elections."⁶¹ Kassem's skepticism proved well founded. The newly amended constitution still fell short of giving any candidate the right to stand in the election. It contained provisions stipulating that any candidate had to have been on the executive council of his party for at least a year (limiting the field of potential candidates to a small cohort of well-known political veterans), and it established high barriers for unregistered parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood that effectively prevented their chances of fielding a candidate.⁶²

Serious opposition to Mubarak had been growing since 2004, but the announcement that he would amend the constitution to allow openly contested presidential elections set off an unforeseen flurry of opposition activity throughout the country. The most prominent opposition group during this time was *Kefaya* (Arabic for "enough"). *Kefaya* was a coalition of various opposition groups (including the Muslim Brotherhood) united by the common goal of ending the reign of President Mubarak.⁶³ In their minds, the leaders of *Kefaya* considered the movement's greatest accomplishment to be the "breaking down of obstacles to direct confrontation of regime policies."⁶⁴

The *Kefaya* movement swept over the entire country, prompting talk of a "Cairo Spring" that would usher in the long-awaited democratic transformation in Egypt.⁶⁵

The 2005 presidential elections occurred on September 7th, and parliamentary elections followed soon after. While certain electoral outcomes were surprising and portended positively

"The MB's success led to a reorganization of American priorities in Egypt – a return to emphasizing stability over serious political reform."

for future political opening, the overall result of the elections was that Mubarak strengthened his authoritarian grip on the country. The sense of anticipation leading into the elections was palpable – one commentator observed "issues that were hitherto considered taboo have been addressed head on" and that Egyptians "have never enjoyed as much freedom of expression."⁶⁶ The results of the presidential election, however, were never in serious doubt. President Mubarak won with an overwhelming 88% of the vote. Estimates of voter turnout ranged from 15-23%.⁶⁷ Those low figures indicate that, despite the relatively more robust debate that had occurred before the election, Egyptians still felt apathetic toward politics and viewed the political process as generally corrupt.⁶⁸ Giving credence to those attitudes, Mubarak's constitutional machinations before the election tilted any future elections

strongly in his favor.^{69 70} In the words of Kristen Stilt, the 2005 presidential election "[was] not progress. It [was] not even as benign as the failure of progress. It [was] authoritarian entrenchment."⁷¹

The Parliamentary elections, on the other hand, yielded an ostensible triumph for the Muslim Brotherhood. The MB fielded 88 winning candidates, thereby gaining control of 19.4% of the seats in

parliament. While the Muslim Brotherhood's success made headlines, Jason Brownlee observes that "numeric success [for the MB] concealed qualitative setbacks" as Egypt's state police managed to prevent most of the MB's leaders from winning their individual elections.⁷² In Parliament itself, NDP members still controlled nearly 75% of the seats, thus negating the MB's ability to affect legislation.⁷³

At the completion of the electoral process, with the presidency and control of parliament still firmly within his grasp, President Mubarak was able to claim that he had helped to advance the democratic process in Egypt. The American response gave credence to those claims. Despite voter apathy and clear evidence of vote rigging, President Bush called President Mubarak to congratulate him on his victory, and a statement from the White House Press Secretary declared, "This election represents an

important step toward holding fully free and fair competitive multi-party elections.”⁷⁴ However, after Egyptian officials “signaled...that U.S. pressure had eased and that recent reforms had gone far enough,” Mubarak extended the controversial Emergency Laws for two years on April 30, 2006.⁷⁵ At the same time, Mubarak’s government engaged in a systematic crackdown on the Kefaya movement and began “mass arrests” of Muslim Brotherhood members.⁷⁶

The United States effectively condoned Mubarak’s post-electoral reassertion of absolute power. Shibley Telhami observes that the success of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas at the polls in Egypt in 2005 and Gaza in 2006, respectively, “applied the brakes on the U.S. push for rapid electoral change in the region.”⁷⁸ David Schenker wrote of the White House’s mere “perfunctory condemnation” in response to the beating of “hundreds of anti-Mubarak demonstrators” in Egypt in May 2006.⁷⁹ The response to those beatings was evidence, in Schenker’s eyes, of the Bush administration

shifting away from its heady rhetoric and strong action in support of democratic transformation throughout the Middle East – and back to a cold realism that counsels warm relations with dictators in exchange for their help on counterterrorism and other strategic matters.⁸⁰

Former-Secretary of State Rice herself provided perhaps the best evidence of the wholesale transformation in U.S. rhetoric and policy focus in Egypt. When she traveled to Egypt in 2007, the nature of her statements stood in stark contrast to her 2005 speech at

the American University of Cairo. Rice focused on praising the United States’ “important strategic relationship” with Mubarak, and she expressed her hope that Egypt would stand with the U.S. and Israel against Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas – the “extremists.”⁸¹ She never publicly uttered the words “democracy and reform.”⁸²

Conclusion: The Failings of a Liberal Internationalist Approach to Egypt

From the aftermath of September 11, 2001 until the 2005 presidential elections in Egypt, the Bush administration vehemently advocated for democratization in Egypt. The Egyptian government, which had no history of openness to serious political reform, suddenly became the target of a pitched rhetorical campaign calling for increased freedom and comprehensive democratic overhaul. This approach deviated from the longstanding U.S. practice of favoring stability and a solid alliance with Egypt over internal political reform. In practice, the new policy failed, as the Egypt of 2006 proved to be no more democratic than the Egypt of 2001. If anything, President Mubarak had found ways to strengthen his hold on power. While the U.S. managed to improve relations with the Mubarak government, strained by the Americans’ direct insistence on political reform, U.S. credibility suffered in Egypt and the international community.

Part of the reason for the failure of the Bush Doctrine

policy in Egypt was its execution. The glaring inconsistency of the Bush administration’s insistence on comprehensive political reform and democracy was its continued, unabashed financial support for the Mubarak government. While the Bush administration and Congress tweaked the annual aid package slightly to encourage political reform and democratization, the bulk of economic and military aid remained untouched. The few democratization initiatives that the U.S. did implement tended to have a minimal impact; usually funneling money to recipients in or connected to the government.

Even if the administration had executed its policy perfectly, it would not have been able to overcome several endemic flaws in liberal internationalist theory. First, while liberal internationalists support the idea of a U.S.-led democracy promotion push throughout the world, the U.S. experience in Egypt demonstrates the practical difficulties that foreign actors face in trying to effect domestic change. The U.S. could put rhetorical pressure on Egypt to democratize and even fund some democratic initiatives among civil society groups. It could not write new laws or directly implement reforms. Furthermore, the appearance of any connection to the U.S. became a political smear tactic that President Mubarak and his allies used to tarnish their opponents. Secondly, it is very hard to maintain an alliance with an authoritarian government while pursuing liberal internationalist

policies that aim to undermine that government’s established hold on power. Egypt’s key role as a U.S. ally in the American strategy to make peace between Israel and Palestine tempered the U.S.’s ability (and desire) to call for full-scale reforms. Finally, the U.S. experience in Egypt challenges Bush’s assertion that “the world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values.” When it embarked on its democracy promotion policy in Egypt, the administration certainly did not intend for the Muslim Brotherhood to increase its power. The MB, after all, publicly stated that it “rejects all shapes of foreign hegemony, and denounces foreign interference in the affairs of Egypt or any other Arab country.”⁸³ Bush’s democratization drive, however, was one of the main reasons that the MB was able to succeed at the polls.

The Bush administration had a noble vision of trying to foster a moderate, secular democracy in Egypt. The U.S. experience in trying to achieve that goal proved that America had neither the will nor the ability to effect that type of domestic change in Egypt. Furthermore, in the course of its efforts, the U.S. constantly strained relations with one of its most important allies in a key region of the world. Emerging from the 2005 elections, the most discernible product of the U.S.’s efforts was a strengthened Islamist element in Egyptian politics.

At that point, the U.S. decided to effectively disengage from democracy promotion altogether. When President Bush left office in 2009, President Mubarak remained entrenched in power with the organized opposition firmly under his thumb.

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The Resurgence of China in the 21st Century Makes Hegemonic Wars with the USA Inevitable. What's Your Opinion?

by Yihao Li

This paper examines whether China's resurgence will lead to hegemonic wars with the USA, as historical patterns would suggest. Yet Sino-US relations today are anything but a simple hegemonic rivalry, for China has enmeshed itself into an intricate web of economic interdependence with the rest of the world, submitted itself to a rules-based international political system,

and, above all, derived its political legitimacy at home from opening up in the first place. Insofar as these systemic and domestic factors constrain China's foreign policy, this paper will argue that as a strategic stakeholder of the current international system, China is rising within the system, not without the system. Hence, a war between China and the US is highly unlikely for as long as the current international system best represents China's interests.

Introduction

The inexorable resurgence of China in the 21st century has profoundly transformed the global balance of power. Powered by over three decades of double-digit economic growth, a confident, assertive Middle Kingdom has emerged, eager to project its newfound economic power in political, cultural and military arenas.

Political realists, alarmed by the concurrent rise of China and relative decline of the U.S., particularly in the wake of the Great Recession, argue that hegemonic war between the two is inevitable. Yet a closer examination of today's context suggests otherwise. Unlike Great Britain, Germany and the United States in the past, China has enmeshed itself into an intricate web of economic interdependence with the rest of the world, submitted itself to a rules-based international political system, and, above all, derived its political legitimacy at home from opening up in the first place. This paper will argue that being a strategic stakeholder of the current international system, China is rising *within* the system, not *without* the system. Hence a war between China and the U.S. is unlikely for as long as the current system best represents China's interests.

The paper will examine both the systemic and domestic constraints pertinent to the rise of China today but which were nonetheless absent from past power transitions, arguing that Sino-U.S. relations today barely meet those conditions of war. It will then identify key variables such as nationalism that might derail China's current pacifist trajectory and bring the two onto a collision course.

Why Sino-U.S. Hegemonic Wars Are Unlikely Systemic Constraints – economic, political and military

Realists argue that, historically, the emergence of new poles of power in the international system has been geopolitically destabilizing, and that China is just another state caught in a power transition, which would tragically end with war – most likely with the current hegemon – the United States.


Such arguments grossly overlook the changing dynamics of international politics today – the establishment of and general conformity to a rules-based international order that constrains military aggression and fosters economic, political and military cooperation. True, sovereign states are still primary agents in the international system, but structural constraints are becoming increasingly important in shaping states' calculation of their interest by reducing the uncertainty in states' intentions and by increasing the cost of war. Granted, statesmen still think in terms of power, but the changing dynamics today mean that the very perception of power has changed dramatically. As Leslie Gelb reckons, "[t]oday, the prevailing idea is that economic strength should be applied primarily toward achieving economic – not military – ends." Joseph Nye further argues that power consists not only of hard power, but also of soft power. Hence, international relations have evolved to the point where major states no longer compete with each other on the battlefield, but on market shares and economic efficiency. To be sure, today's international system remains largely anarchic (with the notable exception of the EU), where considerations of security subordinate economic gains to political interest, but the interdependence between major powers also means that, in order

to achieve political interest, economic gains have to come first.


This leads us to the first systemic constraint – economic interdependence between China and America. That China has achieved incredible economic success since its 1978 "reform and opening up policy" is well known and thus requires no further illustration. What underpins China's economic success, however, is its close integration into the world economy. Quantitatively, China's economic openness and interdependence with the U.S. can best be illustrated by its trade-GDP ratio and Sino-U.S. trade volume. A comparison between these and China's GDP growth suggests a strong correlation between growth and the economic openness/degree of economic interdependence with the U.S.

The extent of China's economic integration into the world is underscored by China's economic slowdown in 2008-2009 as a result of the Global Financial Crisis. Despite talks about Sino-U.S. economic "decoupling," which predicted that Chinese growth would not be affected by American recession, China's 2009 GDP growth dipped to 9.1%, the lowest since 2001. Moreover, China is America's biggest creditor for its post-recession recovery, holding nearly one trillion dollars of Treasury Bonds, and America remains one of China's top export markets, accounting for more than 20% of all Chinese exports.⁶ Prominent figures such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Fred Bergsten even coined the term "G-2" to reflect such a symbiotic partnership.

FIGURE 1:



Source: WTO, The World Bank, U.S. Census Bureau



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Given such complex interdependence between China and the rest of the world in general--and the U.S. in particular--it is clear that China has become a major stakeholder in the current economic order and is likely to remain so for as long as pursuing economic openness delivers economic growth that is needed to bolster the ruling Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) legitimacy. Extensive economic interdependence thus allows China and the U.S. to gain by trade the wealth that they would otherwise seek through wars.

Critics would argue that economic factors alone do not guarantee hegemonic peace, as economic interdependence between Britain and Germany in pre-1914 did not prevent them from going to war. Such arguments are wrong to assume that political and security context is the same now as it was a century ago. Three characteristics distinguish the current international order from the past. First, the current order is much more institutionalized, with denser and more complex governance and rules. Second, postwar global institutions were constructed in a way that makes them easier to join and harder to overturn. Third, China has become an active contributor to the existing multilateral institutions.

That China has readily enmeshed itself in an intricate web of multilateral institutions in recent years makes its rise an intra-system one. Also, as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), China and the U.S. both have a vested interest in maintaining stability of the current system so as to

project their respective influence therein. China's unprecedented wave of political activism in multilateral organizations can be seen through the fact that China now contributes more United Nations peacekeepers than any other UNSC Permanent Five country; that it initiated an Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and security framework with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN); and that it has played a central role in the Six-Party Talks. In addition to multilateral arrangements, with the U.S. alone there are more than 60 bilateral mechanisms in existence, including the high-level Economic and Strategic Dialogue.

To be sure, insofar as the status quo is concerned, China in its global ascendance is a revisionist power, seeking to capitalize on its newfound economic prowess to make changes in the international system. For instance, at the G-20 summit last October, China pushed through major reforms of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that would better reflect a shift in global power from industrialized countries to emerging one. While revisionist in nature, the reforms underscore the capacity of the postwar institutions to accommodate rising powers. As Robert Gilpin contends, "a precondition for political changes lies in a disjuncture between existing social system and the redistribution of power toward those actors who would benefit most from a change in the system." Therefore, such institutional self-renewals amid dynamic changes, far from eroding the relative power of the U.S., in fact give legitimacy to the institutions built by the U.S. itself and help reinforce the current international system. Indeed,

some incremental adjustments are inevitable -- and necessary -- but radical transformations are not; systemic constraints like this greatly reduce the likelihood of war.

Reinforcing such peace-inducing trends is the perception that both countries enjoy a relative high degree of security vis-à-vis one another, in part due to the restraining effects of nuclear deterrence and the certainty about mutually assured destruction. The lessons from the Cold War have been that mutual possession of nuclear arms worked to prevent wars, or at least prevent escalation of wars. In addition, unlike the geographical proximity between Britain and Germany, China and the U.S. are so far away from each other that security threats are minimal. Besides, the rise of non-conventional threats from non-state actors is more likely to unite China and the U.S. than to divide them, as evident in their anti-piracy co-operations in the Gulf of Aden in an effort to maintain maritime security along strategic Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC).

Moreover, too aggressive a Chinese military posture would, according to the theory of balancing and bandwagoning, produce a countervailing coalition among China's neighbors that would encircle China. The prospect of facing not just the U.S. but also its allies balancing against it means that it is in China's best interest to rise peacefully and avoid military confrontation with the U.S.

China's Domestic Constraints: Intentions and Capabilities

Past hegemonic wars were almost

always triggered by security dilemmas, which caused dominant powers to respond by launching preemptive wars. As of yet, there has been little sign of security dilemma at work between China and the U.S., primarily because China has neither the intentions nor the military capabilities to challenge American supremacy in East Asia, let alone the world.

To understand China's intentions, one must identify its core interests. Given its authoritarian nature, China's ruling CCP must justify its political legitimacy. One major source of legitimacy has been its ability to deliver high economic growth to improve the standard of living. A crucial prerequisite to achieve growth is stability, both internally and externally. Yet China's drastic socio-economic transformations from a centrally planned economy to a market economy have made maintaining internal stability, and by extension economic growth, all the more challenging. Numerous by-products of high growth, such as pronounced income disparity, rampant corruption, environmental degradations and increasing demand for political reforms have rendered China fundamentally inward-looking. Such pre-occupations with domestic problems explain China's overarching foreign policy strategy of "peaceful development" to achieve a "harmonious world"-- a peaceful external environment conducive for China's domestic development. Therefore, there is a real need for China to assuage fears of a "China Threat" and reassure the world that its expanding global role will

not come at the expense of the security and well-being of others -- a process that James Steinberg termed "strategic reassurance". Given such a unique domestic constraint, it is no wonder that Chinese leaders have acknowledged U.S. hegemony and accepted its leadership in maintaining stability in the world.

The rationale for China's peaceful development notwithstanding, some realists argue that it is difficult to ensure that China's current pacifist strategy will last into the future -- Beijing is pursuing a peaceful policy today in order to strengthen itself to confront the U.S. tomorrow. The argument states that China is practicing realpolitik strategy similar to what Bismarck's German Empire did on its ascendance: buying time to grow its economy so as to openly balance against the U.S. and establish its own regional hegemony in East Asia.

However, if history is any useful guide, the Middle Kingdom never sought foreign expansion or colonization even when it was the strongest power. The Seven Expeditions of Chinese mariner Zheng He in the Yuan Dynasty is a case in point. Granted, China had long established a Sino-centric tributary system in East and South East Asia, and some argue that China is now trying to restore that system, but that only points to ever closer regional integration that fosters trade and cultural exchanges. It can then be concluded that the Chinese culture, influenced by Confucianism, is harmony-seeking; and

such mentality should continue to shape China's foreign policy thinking in the future.

But there is one notable exception -- China's foreign policy can be confrontational when its territorial integrity is at stake. There is no doubt that Taiwan is the single most contentious flashpoint that may lead China to war, possibly with the U.S. Should the island declare de jure independence, China, under the 2006 Anti-Secession Law, would employ "all necessary means -- including non-peaceful ones..." to ensure its territorial integrity, and the U.S., under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, is obliged to defend Taiwan. That China and the U.S. fell short of a direct military confrontation in the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis demonstrates that neither China nor the U.S. has an interest in fighting each other because cost-benefit calculations simply work in favor of peace. Moreover, the Crisis has a positive legacy in that it jolted Beijing and Washington to recognizing the dire cost of war and prompted them, with a sense of urgency, to establish institutions and communication channels to prevent future miscalculations, misunderstandings and misperceptions. Furthermore, improved cross-strait relations in recent years point to a reduced threat to the U.S., with the mainland and Taiwan deepening economic interdependence and cultural exchanges, culminating in the signing of Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in June this year. With time and luck, such cooperation may well "spill over" to political or even military

arenas, rendering the Taiwan issue less of a flashpoint in Sino-U.S. relations.

Even if challenging the U.S. militarily is China's intention, it is doubtful that China will have the military capability to make this possible anytime soon. With the notable exception of the anti-satellite missile test in 2007, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is still decades away from being able to project force – and sustain it – beyond its borders and waters, despite the oft-quoted military modernization and double-digit growth in military expenditure. Even the Pentagon acknowledges that China does not pose a serious threat to U.S. security. Given such military power disposition of the U.S. vis-à-vis China, it is therefore clear that the defense has the advantage, and that a preemptive war to check China's rise is unlikely. The security dilemma – one of the most powerful historic triggers of war – is thus removed in Sino-U.S. relations.

Concluding Remarks

Having discussed systemic constraints on economic, political and military fronts and China's domestic constraints in terms of intentions and capabilities, I have arrived at the conclusion that the resurgence of China is fundamentally an intra-system one. As such, both China and the U.S. have a vested interest in maintaining and improving the current international system. Indeed, the broadness and depth of Sino-U.S. relations today render hegemonic wars *not*

inevitable. The peaceful track, however, does not by any means imply the absence of political and economic competitions, though such competitions will likewise be held within the system and be peaceful. What it does mean is that, unlike past hegemonic wars, the conditions are in place today for war to be a low probability event.

Yet, some reservations must be made. A key variable that could derail China's current pacifist trajectory would be a resurgence of nationalism in China. China's ability to keep nationalism in check would also alter the peaceful outcome anticipated in this paper. Indeed, the CCP has shown a tendency to pander to nationalist fever to strengthen its rule at times when economic growth is sluggish. Since it is almost certain that such rapid economic growth cannot be sustained infinitely, will the CCP seek to deflect domestic criticism through external aggression? The question is yet to be answered. The only certainty we have is that there exist many uncertainties. Another key variable is America's response to China's rise; constructive engagement will produce a more favorable outcome than destructive containment.

Overall, given the numerous constraints against Sino-U.S. hegemonic wars, I am cautiously optimistic that Sino-U.S. hegemonic wars will be unlikely for as long as China continues to rise within the current international system.

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Should Partition Be The Policy Preference for Ethnic Conflict?

by John Tyler Gazetos

S

ince the end of the Cold War, ethnic civil wars and secessionist conflicts have been the most prevalent form of conflict as interstate wars have declined. There have been very few conventional invasions by great powers within the last ten years, and they have usually targeted failed or failing states. This trend has led researchers to focus on civil wars. Over half of civil wars since 1945 have had an ethnic component.¹

Recent international attention has focused on an outbreak of ethnic bloodshed in the Balkans, India, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey, Georgia, Northern Ireland, Sudan, Indonesia, Iraq, and Burma, to name just a few countries. Foreign policy debate has focused on how to resolve these incidents of inter-communal violence since they became widely publicized in the 1990s. The assumption has been that the more militarily and economically powerful countries should intervene as humanitarian groups in order to reduce the suffering of noncombatants and loss of life by mediating or imposing peace through brokering ceasefires and deploying peacekeepers. This assumption ignores the selfish nature of states and the inefficiency of the United Nations, which in practice leads to an ad hoc analysis of every conflict with no real norm developing. Taking this into consideration, policy proponents can still suggest strategies with the idea that, in some cases, actors will be willing to act. Two competing strategies have emerged: partition to form a new state or autonomous region

and power sharing in order to maintain state boundaries. The purpose of this paper is to identify the flaws with establishing partition as a policy norm and to suggest that there is no way to alter the ad hoc basis with which ethnic conflicts are currently addressed. The paper will be organized into five sections. The first section will define the stance of leading partition advocates Chaim Kaufmann, Carter Johnson, Philip Roeder, and Thomas Chapman and contrast it with the positions of partition opponents Nicholas Sambanis, Jonah Schulhoferwohl, Michael C. Horowitz and Alex Weisgier. The second section will use the ethnic conflicts of Israel 1948, Bosnia 1991-1995, and Cyprus 1974 to show that the cases partition advocates cite as successes are in fact scenes of ethnic cleansing and political impasse. The third section will expose some of the limitations and contradictions of both the theoretical and the empirical basis of the argument for dividing states. The fourth section will conclude by forecasting that Fearon's ad hoc basis will continue to be the

norm and suggest why partition should not be implemented as the preferred policy to resolve inter-communal civil conflict.

Literature in Review: In Favor of Partition

Chaim Kaufmann clarifies and updates his conception of what he calls "the ethnic security dilemma" in his 2007 publication "Living Together After Ethnic Killing: In Theory, In History, and In Iraq Today."² There are four central characteristics of the ethnic security dilemma. The first states that ethnic civil wars create security dilemmas that escalate fighting and prevent de-escalation; once strife reaches a certain threshold, all individuals and groups embroiled in the conflict have legitimate reasons to fear competing groups. This leaves very few alternatives that can alleviate security concerns besides offensive action against opposing ethnic groups. Demographic situations that include intermixed populations intensify this impasse, as every faction has

incentives to cleanse the mixed areas and establish defensible enclaves. The second characteristic is that ethnic wars separate communities. This division results from the impact of population heterogeneity on the intensity of security dilemmas. Third, Kaufmann describes a hardening of group identities, dissolution of trust, and bolstering of hard line arguments that occur as a result of communal killings. The final piece of this theory is that dynamics created by the war itself—atrocities, security concerns, and hardened identities—reduce possibility of de-escalation or resolution.² In addition to this definition of his theory, Kaufmann also addresses three points of contention that he wishes to clarify. The ethnic security dilemma is a theory of escalation and de-escalation, so it does not claim to explain the sources of conflict. It can only explain behavior under conditions of mutual threat. The intensity of the dilemma, which is fueled by people living where they are both threatening and vulnerable, is not determined by population geography alone.

The central policy recommendation of Kaufmann's theory is that "after communal wars, solutions short of partition—power sharing, federalism, or regional autonomy—are usually politically unworkable within the damaged state because they do not satisfy the nationalist ambitions and security demands induced or intensified by the war, and are likely to relapse into more war." Kaufmann goes into more detail in one of his previous works; specifically, he says populations have to be physically separated

and that partition without separation increases violence. He adds that violence declines whether this demographic divide is achieved by ethnic cleansing or planned transfers.³ Kaufmann uses the cases of Northern Ireland, Cyprus, India, and Palestine to show the relation of partition to a decrease in casualties.

Carter Johnson, who also proposes partition to resolve ethnic civil war, devised the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index, which is a mathematical formula that is able to quantify the amount of demographic separation of warring groups after a partition. Johnson primarily did this to refute Nicholas Sambanis' cross-national analysis in "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature," which was critical of partition. This allows Johnson to differentiate between complete and incomplete partitions (an important distinction to make for those who advise partition because only complete partitions reduce violence). This distinction complements Kaufmann's work well, and Kaufmann actually refers readers to Johnson in his 2007 work mentioned above.⁴

In a 2007 study of 72 nationalist wars, Thomas Chapman and Philip Roeder find partition de jure to be superior to de facto separation, unitary government, and autonomous regions. They are credited with assisting the partition camp, but their cases do not exclusively provide support for the physical separation of embattled

factions as well as the two discussed above. Their focus on nationalist as opposed to ethnic activities also makes questionable how comparable their study is to Johnson and Kaufmann's more security based theory. Chapman and Roeder's article is more concerned with the sustainability and effects of institutions after civil war than on their ethnic unmixing function. They also found de jure partition to increase democratic rule in relation to the other three political arrangements.⁵

Critics of Partition

Nicholas Sambanis and Jonah Schulhoferwohl produced an article in 2009 that tries to take into consideration all the arguments for and against partition up to that point and expose the fragile nature of the pro-partition empirical evidence. Methodological and coding discrepancies between academics are also analyzed and discussed. They mention that Chapman and Roeder used a different dependent variable than previous studies. The variable in question is survival of peace instead of war recurrence. Chapman and Roeder only have seven cases of de jure independence (one returned to war), and of the 72 ethnic conflicts analyzed, only 39 are nationalist wars, so the rest should be excluded. Taking this last point into consideration, Sambanis and Schulhoferwohl find that the coefficient for partition in Chapman and Roeder's data analysis, when limited to these 39 cases, is no longer significant.



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Sambanis and Schulhoferwohl also find problems with Chapman and Roeder's coding, specifically in three cases. They believe Croatia should be coded as two partitions: one in 1991 at independence from Yugoslavia when other countries recognized Croatia and another in 1995 when the Serbs of the Krajina region were defeated. This distinction is valid because the international persona and origin of the adversaries changed. Also, in 1991, the recognition of various international organizations and other countries legitimated the self-declared borders of Croatia as distinct, thereby sanctioning its self-proclaimed partition from Yugoslavia. This development means that a new government was formed, and thus another war could be added to the data set.⁶ Sambanis and Schulhoferwohl also want to know why Chapman and Roeder removed Turkey and the Philippines from their cases even though these countries fit their coding criteria.

In addition to analyzing some of the quantitative studies by partition advocates, Sambanis and Schulhoferwohl find theoretical inconsistencies within the theoretical basis of the version of the ethnic security dilemma used by those in the Kaufmann camp. In particular, they look at the factor of nearby brethren in a powerful state, which Posen mentions, and demonstrate how it applies to Cyprus, which has typically been viewed by partition supporters as a successful incident of ethnic separation.⁷ Here, Sambanis and Schulhoferwohl are showing how ethnic power sharing is not always the cause of escalation but that outside intervention can play a

vital role. They continue to contest the ethnic security dilemma's assumption that ethnic conflicts allow opposition to recognize each other on sight, making identities easier to distinguish than in non-ethnic wars. This is supposed to make ethnic cleansing simpler and make it more difficult for individuals to switch sides. Sambanis and Schulhoferwohl contend violence is not based on group identity but rather individual political allegiance. This leads them to question why partition should only be applicable to ethnic wars. Partition has worked well in ideological conflicts, including the division of the Korean peninsula. Sambanis and Schulhoferwohl conclude their criticism of the ethnic security dilemma by cautioning that it lacks the level of specification and data necessary for an adequate empirical test and suggest some concerns for future research. They find that, empirically, the issue is not yet settled, but the best available proof does not reveal a robust relationship between partition and postwar outcomes. Beneficial postwar outcomes are defined as a decreased chance of return to armed conflict. Sambanis and Schulhoferwohl also caution against extrapolating partition under ideal conditions to ethnic conflict in general, considering the reality of historical outcomes.⁸

One of the more interactive contributions to the dispute on ethnic separation has been the dialogue that Johnson has conducted with Michael C. Horowitz and Alex Weisiger in response to an editorial the two wrote about his "Partitioning to Peace: Sovereignty, Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars."

Horowitz and Weisiger contend that Johnson only identifies six partitions as complete, and, of these six, fighting resumed in three. They cite this as a statistical weakness in Johnson's argument and emphasize the fact that Sambanis' data, which Carter Johnson bases his dataset on, shows 31 cases that avoided resumption of even low-level conflict for the first five years. Horowitz and Weisiger elaborate this point, stating that genuine partitions are rare because factors besides the ethnic security dilemma instigate conflict, and even successful partitions do not guarantee peace. They conclude their criticism of Johnson's empirical evidence with the remark that one should "recognize what Johnson's evidence really shows--that partition is truly an option of last resort."⁹ Johnson responds to the allegation that his few complete partitions broke into renewed violence by stating that conflict only truly occurred in two of his six complete partitions, as only one soldier died in Abkhazia in the outbreak of hostility in 2008. He adds that one can extend his statements from complete partition to largely partitioned and include another four cases in which conflicts remained dormant.¹⁰ Johnson contends that partition as a policy tool should be considered as often as possible, including for controversies such as Israel, Sri Lanka, and Sudan.

Case Studies

This section is intended to analyze the partitions that are usually used as evidence for the success of ethnic separation. The act of partition through population transfers that pro-partition authors advocate is

a violation of international law. This section seeks to highlight the legitimating influence of the international community on three incidents of ethnic cleansing. According to the United Nations: "ethnic cleansing means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area. 'Ethnic cleansing' is contrary to international law."¹¹ The three cases of ethnic conflict this paper examines are the ethnic cleansings of Palestine in 1948, Bosnia in 1991-1995, and Cyprus in 1974. The objective is to frame the groups engaged in warfare and some of the external influences in a broader context. The narrow perspective of how many died and whether the conflict recurred within five years prevents one from achieving qualitative insight into some examples of the ethnic security dilemma. These violations of international law and any other humanitarian arguments are based on rules that states or international organizations have made. They will be broken if there are no penalties. In the international system, states can only be punished by other states. If there is no state or coalition of states that are feared, then states make their own law ad hoc as it suits them.³²

Palestine and Israel 1948

By 1946, the Jewish population was in a state of rebellion that the British did not have the will to crush, and they had set their withdrawal date for 1947. The native Arab population did not want the Jewish colonists there, and they would not agree to a power sharing arrangement. The Zionists also did not want to be part of a majority Arab state. These political demands were irreconcilable without a third party to mediate. The withdrawal of the colonial power allowed the Zionist movement to implement its own de facto partition through demographic engineering and destruction of Palestine's cultural landscape. This transformation is described in detail by Ghazi Falah's 1996 publication entitled "The 1948 Israeli-Palestinian war and its aftermath: The transformation and de-signification of Palestine's cultural landscape." Hostilities began December 1947, but no Arab military forces entered Palestine until May 18, 1948. In the first six months, the fighting consisted of the Israeli military targeting the Palestinian civilian population by perpetrating massacres, depopulating villages, and committing rape. These actions were intended to cause massive evacuations, though the Arab radio stations urged the Palestinians to stay.¹² From 1948 to 1949, during the course of fighting between the fledgling country of Israel and forces from Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, six thousand Jews and more than ten thousand Arabs lost their lives. Throughout the conventional

conflict, Israeli forces systematically destroyed 531 villages and emptied 11 urban neighborhoods of their Palestinian residents, according to Plan Dalet (Plan D), created on March 10, 1946. Over 750,000 people, more than fifty percent of the indigenous population of the formerly British Palestine, were intentionally driven from the country according to Plan D. This plan was created by David Ben-Gurion, a Zionist leader and the first Prime Minister of Israel, and his associates with information on the geography, economy, population, defense, and other characteristics of every village in Palestine. The names of individuals who were members of the Palestinian national movement or suspected of being a threat were also recorded in a comprehensive collection of data known as the Village Files in advance of this operation for the purpose of execution or imprisonment. The results of the 1948 war were not a byproduct of ethnic strife but were a premeditated land grab by one ethnic inter-communal group against another for political-ideological motives. The Palestinians were unable to defend themselves as a result of the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939, during which the British annihilated their military and leadership capacities. The Israelis knew they were militarily more powerful and better organized than the Palestinians residing with them in the British territory of Palestine and thus did not fear them. The Israeli armed forces meticulously planned for the departure of the British

so that when it happened they could systematically ethnically cleanse the Palestinian population and declare independence. The tactics they used were identical to those used by Serbians against their opponents in the former Yugoslavia.¹³ The primary objective was not a resolution of the ethnic security dilemma so much as it was land seizure and a desire to operate a monopoly on the machinery of whatever state emerged out of the British mandate. In May 1948, the Zionist movement possessed less than seven percent of the land in Palestine when it unilaterally declared the creation of Israel. If the Jewish paramilitary and political organization had been content to help implement the generous U.N. partition plan of 1947, it would still increase its proportion of Palestine to approximately fifty-six percent. The offensive of 1948 garnered Israeli forces seventy-eight percent of the British Mandate and conformed to the Jewish Agency map of 1946 almost completely. This map was what the Jewish Agency had decided it would like to acquire for the foundation of an Israeli nation. The fact that it ended up with what it planned two years prior shows that the chaos of civil war, which apologists use as a defense, was really a premeditated affair. The aggression of the Israeli forces in 1947-1948 was at least tacitly approved of by the U.N. Security Council because it refused to authorize the intervention of the Arab League, and Israel joined the U.N. in 1949.¹⁴

This case shares with Bosnia the same tactics that were used to move civilians and destroy residences in order to prevent returns. Even though no intervening power constructed an agreement or institution as elaborate as the Dayton Peace Accords, Israeli forces rejected the U.N. partition plan and attacked civilians before the British withdrew in order to create their own government. Similar to the situation of the Muslims in Bosnia under an arms embargo, the U.N. opposed the intervention of the surrounding Arab states, preventing the Palestinians from getting assistance. Compared to the other two cases, an occupied, unrecognized area and a sub-national federation Israel is the most blatantly legitimated use of demographic engineering, as it is a widely recognized self-sufficient nation state.

This analysis disagrees with Chaim Kaufmann's interpretation of *The War of Israeli Independence* for a number of reasons.¹⁵ It was not an internal ethnic security dilemma because Arab villages with friendly relations with Jewish settlements were not exempt from expulsion. Armed Jews conducted civilian massacres during ceasefires. The care taken to destroy villages in order to prevent Palestinian return did not serve an immediate military function.¹⁶ Kaufmann claims that the war's conclusion in 1949 was a result of the security dilemma being ameliorated. This does not take into account the expulsion of an additional twenty to thirty

thousand natives from Palestine between 1948 and 1951, including cases in which housing was appropriated to immigrants or Bedouins were relocated from fertile land.¹⁷ Kaufmann also oversimplifies the controversy by claiming partition had no influence on the international conflicts Israel was involved in and that the mere existence of the Jewish state was responsible. Israel provoked violence by annexing the northern demilitarized areas on the border with Syria, seizing the Latrun demilitarized area on the border with Jordan, and snatching portions of east Jerusalem that were earmarked for internationalization by the U.N. Kaufmann acknowledges the expansionist and colonial dimension of Israeli policy only when he explains the first intifada as a result of ethnic unmixing caused by Jewish settlements. Kaufmann recommends expanding the border of Israel to include the settlements. I agree with Kaufmann regarding a lack of major internal violence, but some unrest was revealed when Palestinians within Israel protested the suppression in solidarity with the Second or Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000. I vehemently disagree with his policy endorsement of colonization at the expense of what he calls "equity or law."

Bosnia 1992-1995 and the Dayton Accords

In 1991, Croatia and Slovenia seceded from Yugoslavia. This event led to armed conflict between the newly independent

states and the Serb dominated federal institutions and Yugoslavian army. As a result of the breakdown of central government, the three major ethnic groups of Bosnian Serbs, Moslems, and Croats politically mobilized through nationalist parties. There was much debate over some sort of ethno-federalist solution and potentially a partitioning of Sarajevo. Serb and Croatian leaders met and tried to discuss where the different boundaries of the various ethnic regions would be. In January 1992, the Serbian Democratic Party, Srpska Demokratska Stranka (SDS), declared a Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, urged Serbs to boycott the referendum on independence, and obstructed the electoral process. In February, the European Community tried to forge some sort of agreement that would create ethnic cantons in Bosnia in an effort to prevent civil war from breaking out. The European community and the United States recognized an independent Bosnia after an overwhelming vote in favor of independence on April 6, 1992.¹⁸ The reason Bosnia's ethno-federal negotiations fell apart was that the Muslim leadership of Bosnia split. Those in favor of a unitary Bosnia despite the credible threat of Serbian violence and those who feared ethnic cleansing by Croats and Serbs would divide the republic joined forces to block an agreement based on ethnic cantons. The Bosnians wanted to maintain a unitary state, and they were optimistic that the Western powers would intervene to protect them from aggression. Following this line of reasoning, they did not raid Yugoslavian

weapons depots or secede when Serbia was engaged with Croatia. The Bosnian government pursued negotiations in good faith and did not provoke the Central government in Belgrade. Recent interventions in the Middle East and a U.N. mission in response to Croatia's secession gave credibility to the beliefs of the Bosnian political elites. The U.N. force in Sarajevo and U.S. assurances also added feasibility to their rationale. The Serb forces immediately unleashed a massive offensive and started occupying Bosnia, taking seventy percent of it. Fighting also occurred between the Muslims and Croats. Approximately one-hundred thousand Bosnians died; the majority of them were Muslim.¹⁹ Nearly 4.5 million people, over fifty percent of the prewar population, fled from their homes, and three quarters of the country's housing was destroyed. Over one million refugees went abroad, and slightly less than one million were displaced internally. Much of the country's infrastructure was also destroyed.²⁰

In November 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) ended three and a half years of war and were enforced by a NATO force of 60,000, which has since been withdrawn and replaced by a smaller European Union force. The internationally brokered agreement split the country nearly in half between two sub-national entities: the Republika Srpska and the Bosnian Federation. The two new districts preserve the animosity of the conflict, the former being composed of Serbs and the latter a Croat and Bosniak mixture. The result is a negative peace with the ethnic divisions, and the bloodshed sharpened, being institutionalized both politically

and demographically. However, the imposition of foreign troops ended the fighting, and international interlocutors have had some success implementing Annex VII, which guarantees refugees the right to return to their pre-conflict residences. The United Nations Refugee Agency has reported one million returns, nearly half of displaced persons.²¹ The Office of the High Representative worked hard to try to establish transparency and gain the capacity to combat local intransigence to DPA directives. The rate of property repossession was higher than the rate at which refugees were returning. Eighty-one percent of property was restored by May 2005. Many obstacles to returning are still preventing sustainable returns.²²

The DPA is thus an improvement over some previous settlements because it has managed to return property, and in some cases people, to an acceptable or actual prewar position. However, it is also a tremendous failure in that it encourages the practice of demographic engineering by radical nationalists through giving the Republika Srpska territory, institutions, and its own armed forces. In this way it shows the limitations of the international community in reconstructing a multinational state and sets a bad precedent. The partition of Bosnia into two ethno-federal states authorizes forces to use ethnic cleansing for future projects. When the international force withdraws, the durability of the power sharing arrangement will be in question.

Cyprus 1974

Advocates of territorial division cite Cyprus as a successful case of partition.

Cyprus was a British colony in which the divide and rule policy of London politicized ethnic groups to the extreme. Divide and rule is when a colonial power gives jobs, education, and other benefits to a minority group and uses this against a majority group. It was the colonial administration who came up with the term Greek and Turkish Cypriot; before that, the British called them Christian and Muslim Cypriots. Anti-colonial and ethnic conflict intensified in 1955 as the Greek Cypriot EOKA paramilitary organization battled British and Turkish security forces. Its goals were self-determination and a possible union with Greece. There also existed the Turkish-supported Turkish Cypriot paramilitary organization, called the TMT, which enjoyed support from the British. In 1960, Cyprus was granted independence with the signing of the London Zurich Accords under the supervision of Britain, Turkey, and Greece as guarantor powers. The constitution mandated a certain ratio in the army and the civil service. It also granted veto powers to the Turkish Cypriots, required a two-thirds majority for the passage of certain items, and made some portions of the document immutable. This highly restrictive document imposed by the British did not improve intergroup relations already strained by colonial antagonisms. A nationalist radical organization, the EOKA-B, was supported by Athens to achieve union with Greece. It attacked those who supported negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots. In 1964, the Cypriot president Makarios abrogated the constitution, which led to a civil war. The Turkish Air Force had to intervene to defend some Turkish areas in

the north of the island. In 1967, another conflict broke out after Makarios sent police into Turkish Cypriot communities. The U.S. and the U.N. brokered a deal to end hostilities. In July 1974, a bloody coup sponsored by the nationalist military regime in Athens overthrew President Makarios. This was after three attempts at his assassination.²³ A large Turkish force intervened timidly at first, but once no great powers came forward to mediate, it broke the U.N. ceasefire and launched a major offensive. The Turkish occupational forces partitioned the island into homogeneous zones through population transfers, occupying approximately thirty-seven percent. In violation of the Geneva Convention, the Turkish government brought its poor citizens from Anatolia as colonists. The international community has been somewhat responsible in this instance, as no nation except Turkey recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The whole island has joined the EU, but the division remains. The European Union has taken no action other than a rather useless linking of withdrawal to Turkish EU membership accompanied by rulings and proclamations by the European Court of Human Rights.

This is not a good illustration of a pro-partition type of ethnic security dilemma because too many of the political developments were determined by external actors. Sambanis mentions this in *What's in a Line*. The mobilization of radical nationalist parties supported by Greece and Turkey fueled conflict built upon colonial policy. The actions or inactions of the U.S., Great Britain, Turkey, Greece, and the U.N. had many more ramifications than those of the

actual Cypriots themselves. The Cypriots did not get to choose their constitution at independence, and now the settlers from Turkey have made the Turkish Cypriots politically insignificant in their own de facto state. Throughout this conflict, high-level negotiations in capitals other than Nicosia fanned or put out the fires of escalation. Recently, in 2004, the U.S. tried to force the Anon Plan on the Greek Cypriots through the U.N. The plan was based off of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and was to form a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with a single international personality, mono-ethnic security forces, and Turkish guarantor or military presence.²⁴ This is very similar to the bi-zonal, tri-communal formula in Bosnia. It would also reward aggression and population transfers if implemented.

What is constant between these three cases? They are all in Carter Johnson's top ten largely complete partitions. The conclusion of all three of these partitions halted armed conflict for five years. They all involved the aggressor, who is a perpetrator of demographic engineering, getting rewarded, whether it is a de facto state such as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Republika Srpska, or a de jure state such as Israel. All three cases involve the paradox of territory being gained by breaking international law, with the results being legitimated by the international community either blatantly or tacitly. Examples of approval exist in all three cases and include the U.N. recognition of the state of Israel, NATO's Dayton Peace Accords, and the Anon Plan. All three require a large military presence for suppression and an ethnic citizenship or ethno-

federal arrangement in which political significance is attached to ethnicity. Cyprus and Bosnia have seen no conflict since their occupations, but the occupation forces remain. Israel has never needed an international occupation force to intervene in its internal affairs since its creation. Only Cyprus abides by Kaufmann's definition of physical separation of ethnic groups. The Israeli settlements and the returns of Bosnia contradict the unmixing principle that division supporters advocate. All three cases have an intractable issue, such as right of return or impossibility of reintegration, lasting decades.

Contradictions within a Partition Policy

The advocates of separating states make many claims that give their theory appeal and encourage its application to unresolved conflicts. However, they often contradict themselves or fail to fully address the concerns of their adversaries in policy debate. Carter Johnson describes partition as an option "...without the need for long-term commitments of international troops."²⁵ If one goes through Johnson's ten largely partitioned countries, which are his handpicked examples, one finds the majority of them have large number of foreign troops deployed for many years. Post-1995 Bosnia had 11,900 NATO troops until 2004, and now, 15 years later, it still has 7,000 EU troops. Cyprus had 1,270 U.N. troops as part of United Nations Peacekeeping Force in 1964. A U.N.

presence consisting of 860 troops still exists along with 43,000 Turkish soldiers. Georgia had 500 U.N. personnel stationed there in 1994. In South Ossetia there have been 1,500 Russian troops since 1992, and in Abkhazia there have been 2,000 Russian troops since 1994.²⁶ Four of Johnson's ten best cases exemplifying division have had significant troop commitments for 15-36 years with no end in sight. Furthermore, since Bangladesh is not contiguous with Pakistan, the Indian armed forces have, in practice, been stationed there since it declared independence. Taking this into consideration, half of the most successful cases of partition cited by one of its chief advocates fail to measure up to the illusion of an inexpensive and effortless strategy. In his response to Horowitz and Weisiger, Johnson seems to contradict himself again when he cites Downes as well as Chapman and Roeder and writes about establishing separate states as part of the theoretical foundation of partition. Johnson's view that de jure independence is necessary to prevent conflict recurrence would seem to clarify his theory at the expense of his data. His data has only 17 partitions (including failed partitions); if all the partitions that did not result in separate states are removed, then he is left with six examples again.²⁷ It seems that if Johnson chooses to tighten the theory he loses empirical robustness, and if he does not he is forced to sanction de facto partitions. If Johnson includes de facto partitions, his criteria will be incompatible with that of Kaufmann, Downes, Chapman, and

Roeder, all of whom are in favor of de jure partition as necessary for a peaceful resolution to an ethnic security dilemma.²⁸ Another problem is Bosnia, which Johnson includes as a largely complete partition in his dataset, while Downes uses it as one of his cases against the feasibility of negotiated settlements. This coding discrepancy weakens both of their arguments.

Another inconsistency is the threshold, which Kaufmann describes rather vaguely in a footnote as the point at which the most likely cause of death is from a hostile ethnic group. If the international community was to listen to Kaufmann, it would have to either partition or at least intervene diplomatically if this threshold was reached. This would create the perception of revolt being less costly. This precedent would lead to what is called the moral hazard theory, in which a commitment to intervene under certain conditions emboldens rebels to provoke government reprisals. An example of provocation would be the attacks on Serbian policemen in Kosovo before independence. Kaufmann claims individual separatist movements are not aware of other movements, and there is no data on them being contagious. Alan J. Kuperman shows in his work on the moral hazard of humanitarian intervention that Bosnia was motivated by Croatia and other interventions within two years of its independence referendum. Kosovo's terrorist group, the KLA, also used other

independent republics of the former Yugoslavia and the intervention against Serbian atrocities in its calculations to escalate violence. Kosovo was rewarded in 1999 with a U.S. intervention and eventual recognition.²⁹ Kuperman believes Sudan's behavior is in expectance of intervention in the form of sanctions or diplomatic pressure. If international expectations can motivate a rebel group, they can also influence government retaliation policy. If a world power or organization has bluffed before or their domestic political will is not strong enough for a foreign operation, an oppressive regime may take advantage of this bluff to commit atrocities. The atmosphere of domestic politics in the United States probably encouraged the genocidaires in Rwanda in that the U.S. would not intervene on the behalf of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. It also probably motivated the Hutu extremists to attack the Belgian peacekeepers.

Conclusion

Partition is based on a set of "one size fits all" criterion. If an ethnic conflict reaches a certain threshold of violence, is already largely separated, and appears to be experiencing a security dilemma, a third party should intervene according to the theoretical argument of physically separating groups, ending killing, and limiting war recurrence for five years. This theory puts deaths and demographics above international law, as this paper demonstrates through ethnic cleansing

understood as a byproduct of state creation in three case studies. The ethnic security dilemma, when modified from its original 1993 Barry Posen form, does not include outside influences or spoilers. In this context, a spoiler is referring to one who intentionally tries to disrupt a peace process. This oversimplification does not consider the impact of foreign-influenced radical nationalist organizations on Cyprus or the effects of Palestinian refugees on the domestic politics of Arab countries bordering Israel. This school of thought lacks empirical evidence to justify the policy recommendations it entails. If one uses the most recent and refined statistical analysis of ethnic separation in fourteen partitioned countries, analyzed with Johnson's Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index, it is apparent that six returned to war. India returned to war with Pakistan three times and elicited the possibility of a nuclear exchange in the early 1990s.³⁰ Ethiopia and Eritrea returned to war for two years, and 100,000 people were killed. Of the eight that did not, six are characterized by a heavy military presence or occupation. While Johnson and Kaufmann advocate partition, some alternative responses to ethnic conflict should also be mentioned. Besides intervening, states can show their disapproval diplomatically through either a lack of interest or the strength of the state involved, make an effort to help negotiate power sharing arrangements, and try to preserve minority rights

through "carrot and stick" motivation. Fearon bemoans ad hoc responses and overreacts to what he perceives as an attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states in the ethnic separation argument.³¹ This does not seem rational, as international relations has always been conducted according to who has power. Arman Grigoryan describes the reality of partition recommendations, the right to protect, and the effect of international law on interventions and international relations. There will never be a set of coherent parameters to govern interventions. Third party interaction only occurs when the motive and capabilities are present. States intervene or oppose intervention as a result of their interests. Humanitarian norms do not enter their calculations. An example would be the Democratic Republic of Congo or Sudan; both are probably reaching Kaufmann's threshold, but no nation will intervene. States will align themselves opposite their rivals unless some sort of economic or national interest is vitally affected.³² This selfish concern, combined with the fact that power projection capabilities are only possessed by a few states, can only lead to a dismal outlook. The number of conflicts greatly exceeds the number of possible and willing mediators. This collective action problem is regrettable, but partition is not a helpful suggestion.³³

Endnotes

- In his work on civil war duration James D. Fearon codes his cases as ethnic, not ethnic, and ambiguous. Fifty-five percent of all civil wars between 1945 and 1999 consisted of ethnic wars. See: James D. Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41.3 (2004): 275-301.
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- Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35.1 (1993): 27-47. Sambanis and Schulhoferwohl cite the quotation: "have large numbers of nearby brethren who form a powerful state, which could rescue them in the event of trouble."
- Sambanis and Schulhoferwohl, 93-116.
- Michael C. Horowitz, Alex Weisiger, and Carter Johnson, "The Limits to Partition," *International Security* 33.4 (2009): 203-210.
- Ibid.*, 203-210. These four cases are: Bosnia 1995, Yugoslavia-Croatia 1995, Israel 1948, and India 1948.
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- See: Radha Kumar, *Divide and Fall?: Bosnia in the Annals of Partition* (New York: Verso, 1997).
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