Dear Reader,

Welcome to the Fall 2012 issue of the University of Wisconsin-Madison’s Journal of Undergraduate International Studies. Once again, we received a record number of submissions from around the world and are proud to present eight outstanding articles on a wide range of international topics. Our featured article is titled “Duverger’s Law and the Case of Great Britain,” written by Abigail Heller of Franklin and Marshall College. Our editors were especially impressed by this piece, and you can find it on page 10.

I would like to thank the JUIS staff for their dedication to creating an exceptional undergraduate journal. Each editor made important contributions to this issue, as well as ideas for the future directions of JUIS. I am glad to have had the opportunity to work with such a talented and committed group.

Each semester, it becomes increasingly difficult for us to choose from among the many brilliant submissions we receive. I would like to thank our authors, as well as all those who submitted their work. I hope you enjoy reading this issue.

Sincerely,
Laurel Mills
Editor-In-Chief
The views expressed in JUIS are those of the authors alone, and do not express an editorial consensus. The authors are responsible for all information contained in articles. The editors do not assume responsibility for the validity of the facts expressed in the articles.

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The cover photograph was taken by Kristy Willard, University of Pennsylvania.

Larabanga Mosque, the oldest mud and stick mosque in West Africa. While working in West Africa this summer, I had the opportunity to travel extensively throughout Ghana. On my journey throughout the northern region, I stopped in the village of Larabanga to explore its famed mud and stick mosque, the longtime pride of the community. The village collectively watches and curates over the mosque, claimed to be the oldest in West Africa, and children often play on its ancient architecture. I greatly enjoyed photographing this historic gem.

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Journal of Undergraduate International Studies
Table of Contents

pages 10-22 1. Duverger’s Law and the Case of Great Britain  
by Abigail Heller

pages 23-32 2. CEDAW and Reproductive Health: The Changing View of Abortion  
by Kimberly Rose

pages 33-44 3. A Complicated Relationship: Unemployment Insurance and the  
Formation of Skills in Developing Economies  
by Minh Trinh

pages 45-58 4. Knowledge for Long Life Meets Treatment for Quick Relief:  
The Interaction of Ayurvedic and Allopathic Medicine in Dehradum,   
Uttarakhand  
by Rebecca Harburg

pages 59-68 5. Poles in Ireland  
by Grace Afsari-Mamagani

pages 69-80 6. United States Role in Re-Establishing the Iraqi Educational System  
by Irene Gibson

pages 81-92 7. Fightin’ Words: America’s Rhetoric and Policies Against Iran —  
Comparing the Bush and Obama Administrations  
by Jay Friedel

pages 93-97 8. Will History Repeat Itself? The Devolpment of the South-North Water  
Transfer Project in China  
by Nicole Nolan
Duverger's Law and the Case of Great Britain

by Abigail Heller

In the 1950’s Maurice Duverger formulated what has become known as Duverger’s Law. Widely accepted and taught, it states that plurality electoral systems favor two-party systems. However, exceptions or challenges to the law have been noted. One such challenge is the case of Britain, particularly following the 2010 General Elections that resulted in a hung parliament. I explore whether Britain may be seen as adhering to Duverger’s Law at the national or constituency levels. After determining that Britain presents a serious challenge to Duverger, I investigate why Britain is an exception.

One of the most commonly cited theories in political science is Duverger’s Law. The “Law,” originally formulated by Maurice Duverger in the early 1950s, states that the plurality method of elections favors or tends to lead to two-party systems. While this is a widely accepted theory (with some hesitation on the part of some scholars), there are notable empirical exceptions. At first glance, it would seem that the United Kingdom is just such an exception. In recent years, the Liberal Democrats and other minor parties have been increasingly successful in general elections. This trend culminated in a hung parliament (in which no party attains a majority of seats) after the 2010 general election, and a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government.

But does the United Kingdom’s multi-party system actually challenge Duverger’s Law, and if so, why is it an exception? If, in fact, it does, the UK would present a prominent counterexample to a widely accepted theory. While other such exceptions have been noted, their significance has generally been marginalized. However, these challenges to the theory should not be dismissed too quickly. If Britain, the archetypal majoritarian system, does not adhere to Duverger’s Law, the theory may be in need of serious revision and reevaluation.

I will begin with an examination and critique of the extant literature on Duverger’s Law. A short history of the United Kingdom’s party system will then be presented, as the UK has been a challenging case for Duverger’s theory for a number of years. I will then analyze general election results from 1945, focusing specifically on the period between 1987 and 2010. The effective number of parties at both the electoral and Parliamentary levels will be discussed, in addition to party competition at the constituency level in an effort to determine if there is any way in which Britain can be seen as adhering to Duverger’s Law. I argue that Britain does not adhere to the Law on any level and therefore presents a significant challenge. Further, I conclude that the UK is an exception due to the geographical distribution of the vote. And finally, I will recommend some possible revisions to Duverger’s Law and suggest areas for future research.

Literature Review

In 1954, the first English-language version of Maurice Duverger’s Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity

Abigail Heller. Abigail L. Heller is currently studying for an MSc in the Politics and Government in the European Union at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the United Kingdom. She recently earned her B.A. in Government with Departmental Honors from Franklin & Marshall College in Lancaster, PA. She is particularly interested in British politics and plans to study for a Ph.D. in comparative politics in the future.
in the Modern State was published. In it, Duverger attempts to formulate a theory of party organization, membership, leadership, and party systems inductively. However, his most long-lasting contribution, or at least the argument that many scholars associate with him, is his theory of party systems and how they relate to electoral systems.

Duverger begins by stating, “the forms and modes of [the several parties’] coexistence define the ‘party system’ of the particular country being considered.” The relationships between the number of parties, geographical localization, respective size of the parties, and political distribution all define the party system. Party systems are a result of many factors such as history, economic structure, social structure, racial composition, religious beliefs, and the electoral regime. The last is the factor that Duverger particularly focuses on. He argues that the general influence of the electoral system is such that:

1. Proportional representation encourages a system of parties that are multiple, rigid, independent, and stable...
2. The majority system with two ballots encourages a system of parties that are multiple, flexible, dependent, and relatively stable...
3. The simple-majority single-ballot system encourages a two-party system with alternation of power between major independent parties.

When he refers to the “simple majority single-ballot system,” Duverger means a plurality system. Put more succinctly, what has become known as Duverger’s Law is his statement that “the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system.” Conversely, “the simple-majority system with second ballot and proportional representation favour[s] multi-partism [sic].” Duverger himself never called either statement a law, but said that the first “approaches the most nearly perhaps to a true sociological law” because of the “almost complete correlation...observable between the simple-majority single-ballot system and the two-party system.”

Duverger provides two reasons that single-member plurality tends toward a two-party system. First is the “mechanical effect,” which refers to the fact that all but the two strongest parties are underrepresented in parliament because the smaller parties tend not to win districts outright. Second, there is a “psychological effect” that reinforces the mechanical effect. Specifically, “electors soon realize that their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to the third party: whence their natural tendency to transfer their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries in order to prevent the success of the greater evil.”

Because of the mechanical effect, third parties are unlikely to win representation. Therefore voters chose not to vote for them and waste their vote (the psychological effect). The critique that is most frequently made of Duverger is that he argues a causal relationship when only a correlation exists between the electoral and party systems. Douglas Rae restates the law as “plurality formulae cause two-party systems” before rejecting it (emphasis added). Giovanni Sartori accuses Duverger of assuming “a causal relation can be warranted by a correlation.” He goes on to formulate a set of laws that he believes truly warrant the name—specifying the necessary and sufficient causes of two-party and multi-party systems. William Riker is perhaps the most generous to Duverger, arguing that his terminology implies both causal and probabilistic relationships because Duverger himself was unsure. Riker goes on to revise the law to read “plurality election rules bring about and maintain two-party competition, except in countries where third parties nationally are continually one of two parties locally and except for countries where one party among several is almost always the Condorcet winner in elections.” Gary Cox, in stark contrast to Riker, argues that Duverger had the causal arrow pointing in the wrong direction—it is party systems, in fact, that determine the electoral system and not the other way around.

While all of these scholars revise Duverger’s Law in slightly different ways, they share the belief that Duverger alleged the relationship between electoral systems and party systems was a causal relationship rather than, as Riker notes, a probabilistic one. This is, I believe, an unfair and overly critical reading. Duverger
uses the terms “encourages” and “favours” when making his argument. These terms do not imply causality. Duverger also includes other factors that determine the party system (see above), but does not go into as much detail. I believe that Duverger was arguing that the electoral system was one factor, perhaps even the most important factor that contributes to the party system. My reading is supported by Duverger himself who sought to correct certain “errors of interpretation” in 1986. He reminds the reader that each of his propositions state “merely that a particular electoral system ‘tends’ to lead to a particular party system, thus emphasizing that the former does not necessarily produce the later.”

In fact, the effect of the electoral system can be counterbalanced by factors such as social forces and national traditions. Despite the fact that by no means do all scholars agree with Duverger, his Law is still widely used and taught in classes. This is probably because the general trend he explains (A) makes intuitive sense and (B) is fairly widely observed despite exceptions. Therefore I seek to show that Britain challenges his theory as he originally intended it, rather than attempting to show that the case of Britain challenges Riker’s or Sartori’s reformulation. Just because Duverger did not argue a strictly causal relationship does not mean that his formulation is immune to challenges. Duverger himself observes apparent challenges and attempts to explain them, including that presented by the case of Britain.

The revisions and clarifications of Duverger and his critics, though less widely cited or accepted, do present some possible explanations for persistent third party existence in plurality systems. In 1976, Riker argued that a nation as a whole might have “more than two parties because the pair of parties offering candidates varies from constituency to constituency.” This is how he explains the persistence of third parties in the UK: “most constituencies usually have serious candidates from only two parties (and strong third parties in England have typically been one of the two major parties in some geographic area.”

In 1986, Duverger provided another possible explanation when he argued that the continued existence of a third party in Britain was due to the “aberrant behavior of the English Conservatives and Labourites.” According to Duverger, the two main parties forgot that in order to win, they must appeal to the “floating voters who are prevented by the electoral system from voting for the center” but must not resemble each other too much. In 1974, the two main parties modernized too much and resembled one another too much so dissatisfied voters turned to the Liberals, producing a hung parliament. When the Conservatives and Labourites moved too far to the right and left respectively in 1981 (note this was not an election year), moderates looked for an alternative, provided by the Alliance of the Liberals and Social Democrats (SDP). However, the Alliance was too weak to satisfy moderates and the third party was once again crushed. Either way, according to Duverger, the success (limited as it was) of the Liberals and Alliance was due to the aberrant behavior of the Conservative and Labour parties. The explanations of both Riker and Duverger will, however, need to be tested against the 2010 election results to determine if Britain now presents a more significant challenge—one that cannot be explained away so easily.

**Historical Background**

As the preceding section exemplifies, Britain has been an interesting case study for Duverger’s Law for some time. Brian Humes argues, “Britain has had a multi-party system for most of its electoral history.” While this is overstating the point, it is worth briefly examining the history of the party system in Britain. At the turn of the twentieth century, the two major parties in Britain were the Conservatives and Liberals. Each had their origins in the Tories and Whigs of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, respectively. The Tories and Whigs were less political parties in the modern sense of the word and closer to factions. In other words, they were “elite parliamentary groups, with little in the way of formal organization, either at Westminster or in constituencies across Britain.” However, they were the precursor to the modern parties. The Liberals and Conservatives developed in the second half of the nineteenth century as the franchise was extended and the Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867 took hold.

The Labour Party was, in fact, the latecomer to the British political scene. Officially formed in 1900, the Labour Party is rooted in the socialist activity of the nineteenth century and the growing power of trade unions. Between 1914 and the 1920s there were three fairly strong parties coexisting in the British
system. At the 1922 general election, Labour overtook the Liberals as the main opposition to the Conservatives and the main center-left party.

Duverger attempted to come to terms with this history in his Political Parties. He argued that although for a short period of time in the early twentieth century Britain was a three-party system, the overall tendency was for a two-party system. Prior to 1906, and since 1922, Britain has had a two-party system (of course, recently this appears to be changing, but more on this below). Duverger argues that after 1922, when the Liberals became the third party, the process of elimination (the way bipartisanship is restored) worked and the Liberals were all but destroyed (at the time of Duverger’s writing, it did indeed appear that the Liberals were on the brink of disappearing). Duverger believed that the only way for a third party to survive was to secure a foothold in a local area and become the second party. The party displaced from second place would then disappear. He did not, however, foresee the continued existence of a third party.

The Liberal Democrats were originally an alliance between the Liberals and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP was formed in 1981 when the so-called “Gang of Four” MPs exited Labour due to the party’s recent leftward shift. The Liberals and SDP formed an alliance for the 1983 and 1987 elections before finally merging in 1988 into what would eventually be called the Liberal Democrats in 1989.

The final piece of the puzzle is the nationalist parties. Plaid Cymru in Wales and the Scottish National Party or SNP in Scotland (two examples of fairly successful nationalist parties) emerged in the 1960’s due to “ethno-nationalist cleavages.” As Driver explains, “by contrast to socio-economic cleavages concerned with the distribution of wealth and power between different social groups, ethno-nationalist cleavages are territorially bounded, rooted in questions of culture and identity and concerned with the spatial distribution of wealth and power.” Thus, it is now clear how the two-party Conservative and Liberal party system of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century developed into the system that we see today.

**Five Days in May:**

*The 2010 General Election*

The 2010 election was a landmark election in multiple ways. First, it resulted in the first hung parliament since 1974. Second, it produced the first coalition government in peacetime since the 1930s. Finally, the Liberal Democrats attained power for the first time since the party was formed from the Liberals and SDP (the old Liberal Party was last in power in the early 1920s).

The election results may be found in Appendix One. With 23 percent of the vote, the Liberal Democrats trailed the second place Labour Party by only six percent. In addition, the other minor parties (including the nationalist parties) won over 10 percent of the vote. Following the election, members of parties other than Conservative and Labour occupied 85 seats (out of 650) in the House of Commons. This does not sound like the election result one would expect in a two-party system. Thus the 2010 results, more than any contest before, appears to present the most significant challenge to Duverger’s Law.

**Testing Duverger**

So just how significant a challenge does Britain pose to Duverger’s Law? We can evaluate this by analyzing the two-party vote—the proportion of the vote cast for the two main parties (Conservative and Labour) combined. This data is presented in Table One. The 1922 elections are the first listed because that was the first election in which the Labour Party replaced the Liberals as the principal opposition to the Conservatives. In that first election of its kind, the two-party vote was just over two-thirds of the total vote. From 1931 to 1970, the two-party vote was near 90 percent and by the early 1950s, the two-party vote was 96 percent. As John Curtice points out, it is no surprise that this is when Duverger was formulating and publishing his “Law.” The Liberal party truly was near extinction at that time; between approximately 1931 and 1970, no one would argue that Britain was anything except a two-party system.
The diminishing two-party support since 1970 has provided a challenge to Duverger’s conclusions.
should not be considered a two-party system at the national or aggregate level. However, before exploring the reasons for this, it is worth noting that I have not yet shown that the UK presents a significant challenge to Duverger. There is still a possibility that Britain adheres to Duverger’s Law at the constituency level. Recall that Riker argues third parties might persist nationally because they are one of the two main parties competing locally. In other words, in each constituency there are two parties competing, but because which two parties compete varies from constituency to constituency, at the national level, a multi-party system exists rather than a two-party system. As Riker says, this scenario would perhaps not adhere to the exact language of Duverger’s Law, but would certainly fit the spirit of Duverger’s argument. Duverger seems to agree that a two-party division at the local level hidden by a multi-party division at the national level would still be in accordance with his theory. Duverger argued that this was precisely what was happening in England in the 1970s.

In order to test if Duverger’s Law is working at the constituency (or district) level, I created a unique data set. Using the British General Election book series, general election results were compiled for each constituency since 1987. These were then coded according to party competition. More specifically, results were coded according to which parties competed in a given constituency and won 15 percent of the vote or more (this should not be confused with competitive districts, which are sometimes defined such that the gap between the two top performing parties is less than 10 percent). The reason 15 percent is used is because a 20 percent threshold would be too high; for a number of years, Liberal Democrat support has been near that level. An analysis of the data suggests that raising this threshold would not produce significantly different results.

As stated, the results were coded according to party competition. A constituency in which the main competition was between the Conservative and Labour Parties (in which these were the only two parties receiving 15 percent or more of the vote) was coded as a numeral one. A constituency in which the parties winning 15 percent or more were the Conservative and Liberal Democrats was coded as a two. A three was assigned to those constituencies with Labour-Liberal Democrat competition. A constituency in which the three main parties (Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Democrats) all attained 15 percent or above was assigned a four. A five was given to those districts in which there was multi-party competition (defined as three or more parties winning at least 15 percent of the vote), but not just between the three main parties. For example, a constituency coded as a five could have been one in which Labour, the Liberal Democrats, and the SNP were competitive. A constituency in which only one party (most often Labour) won more than 15 percent of the vote was assigned a six. A seven was given to any constituency in which there was two-party competition that did not fit into the other categories (i.e., one of the parties was one of the three main parties, and another was a minor third party). Finally, a code of eight was assigned to all other cases. Such cases are constituencies in which more than one candidate labeled as “other” in the election data acquired 15 percent or more. This is not, however, necessarily a vote of more than 15 percent for one party, as it could have been two independents who collectively won above 15 percent (the results may be found in Appendix Two). The results for England, Wales, and Scotland were separated so that the success of the nationalist parties (Plaid Cymru in Wales and the Scottish Nationalist Party in Scotland) would not be confused with other third party competition in England. I also excluded the election results for Northern Ireland given that region’s comparatively different party-system since 1970. The raw data was then employed to determine the percentage of constituencies with each respective type of party competition (determined by the total number of parliamentary seats/constituencies in the given region rather than the national total).

Table Three indicates the party competition in England from 1987 to 2010. Several significant trends emerge from this data. First is the trend in Conservative-Labour competition (one). After peaking in 1997, the percentage of constituencies in which the two main parties were competing against each other in England (without a significant third party presence) has fallen. At 13.88 percent, 2010 was a record low for this type of two-party competition. Simultaneously, 2010 was a record high in terms of the percentage of constituencies in which the Liberal Democrats were the main opposition
to either the Conservatives or Labour Party (combining codes two and three, about 30 percent of party competition was of this type). Note also that there were consistently greater percentages of constituencies in which the Liberal Democrats competed against the Conservative party rather than Labour. This is consistent with the argument that a large number of Liberal Democrat supporters are Conservative defectors rather than Labour defectors. Finally, note the large percentage, over 50 percent in 2005 and 2010, of constituencies in which the three main parties were all competing.\textsuperscript{53}

Table 3. Party competition in England 1987-2010 as percentage of total number of constituencies in England.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1-party</th>
<th>2-party</th>
<th>Multi-party</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>38.09</td>
<td>61.57</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>65.64</td>
<td>32.62</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>60.30</td>
<td>34.22</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>57.65</td>
<td>37.81</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>38.94</td>
<td>59.74</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>43.72</td>
<td>54.79</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data compiled from: The British General Election Series. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1945-2010.\textsuperscript{54}

The comparable data for Wales is presented in Table Five. Generally speaking, the data is fairly similar to that observed in England. Competition between the Conservative and Labour Parties alone was extremely low in 2010 (the continuation of a trend since 1992). Meanwhile, the percentage of constituencies with competition between the three main parties is quite substantial at 45 percent in 2010. As would be expected, the percentage of constituencies that fit into the “multi-party other” (five) and “two-party other” (seven) categories is quite a bit higher than in England. This is because the success of Plaid Cymru is recorded in these two categories and there is no comparable minor third party (e.g., not Liberal Democrats) that is as successful

Table 5. Party competition in Wales 1987-2010 as percentage of total number of constituencies in Wales.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1-party</th>
<th>2-party</th>
<th>Multi-party</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>13.16</td>
<td>23.58</td>
<td>63.36</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>15.79</td>
<td>57.89</td>
<td>26.32</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>52.50</td>
<td>17.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>17.50</td>
<td>52.50</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>47.50</td>
<td>42.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>36.00</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data compiled from: The British General Election Series. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1945-2010.\textsuperscript{55}

Finally, the party competition data for Scotland is shown in Table Seven. Notice that the percentage of constituencies with Conservative-Labour competition and Conservative-Liberal Democrat competition is extremely low. This is to be expected because the Conservatives do particularly poorly in Scotland (and Northern England). As in

Table 6. Party competition in Wales 1987-2010 as percentage of total number of constituencies in Wales—collapsed.
Wales, the “multi-party other” (five) and “two-party other” (seven) categories are relatively high and have been since 2001. This is because the success of the Scottish National Party (SNP) falls under these categories. Generally, there has been an increase in the percentage of constituencies that fall into these categories since 1997 (there was a similar, although less consistent trend in Wales). This too, is to be expected since devolution took place in 1997 and we would expect the SNP (equivalent to Plaid in Wales) to be as successful or more so since devolution.

Table 7. Party competition in Scotland 1987-2010 as percentage of total number of constituencies in Scotland.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1-party</th>
<th>2-party</th>
<th>Multi-party</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>15.28</td>
<td>40.28</td>
<td>44.44</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>37.50</td>
<td>62.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>61.11</td>
<td>37.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>56.95</td>
<td>37.49</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>96.98</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5.08</td>
<td>46.75</td>
<td>49.15</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data compiled from: The British General Election Series. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1945-2010.54

Thus far, the empirical data has ruled out two explanations for party competition in Britain. The first is that there is really only a two-party system at the national level. The data on the two-party competition between Labour and the Conservatives and on the effective number of parties shows that this is not the case. At the very least, there is a two and a half-party system at the national level (ENPP); this goes up to nearly a four-party system (ENEP) in terms of votes. But, as Riker and Duverger argue, this perhaps masks two-party competition at the local level. My data shows that this is not the case either. In each region, nearly 50 percent or more of the party competition is between three or more parties. Clearly, Britain presents a significant challenge to Duverger’s Law.

Why is Duverger wrong in 2010?

As explained previously, in 1986 Duverger observed that the United Kingdom seemed to present a problem for his theory. At the time, he argued that the success of the Liberal-SDP Alliance was due to the “aberrant behavior of the English Conservatives and Labourites.”54 At various times, the Conservatives and Labour had either moved too close to the middle (thus resembling each other too much) (the February 1974 election); or had moved to the extremes and moderate voters were “antagonized” (according to the 1981 opinion polls and the 1983 election).55 But can 2010 also be explained by the aberrant behavior of the main parties?

It does not appear so. As leader of the Conservative party, David Cameron made a concerted effort to “decontaminat[e] the Tory brand” prior to 2010.56 He successfully moved the Conservative Party “back to the centre ground of British politics” and away from the policies of Margaret Thatcher.57 This would seem to indicate that the two main parties have not moved to the extremes and alienated moderates as Duverger argued happened in 1981. However, my hunch is that the Conservatives and Labour have also avoided excessive moderation (another aberration Duverger notes). As Driver shows, the Liberal Democrats are the party of the center, between (and overlapping slightly with) both Labour and the Conservatives.58 It seems unlikely that in reaction to the moderation of the two main parties (if, indeed, this has occurred to an unacceptable level as Duverger hypothesizes) voters would turn to a party of the center with a specifically (if questionable) equidistant policy platform. Further research into the voters’ perceptions of the distance between the
two main parties would help confirm that excessive moderation does not explain Lib Dem success in 2010. Regardless, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that Duverger’s explanation applies to Britain in 2010.

So why is it that Duverger’s Law (and his explanations for apparent exceptions) don’t apply in 2010? More precisely, what happened in 2010 and the preceding years that explains why Britain no longer adheres to Duverger’s Law? The answer lies in the rise of the Liberal Democrat party. We can explain this rise by examining ideological differences and the geographic distribution of third party votes.

The Liberal Democrats are the party of the ideological center in Britain (although it should be noted that at times, some of their policies have been to the left of Labour). This supports the explanation that the Liberal Democrats have been successful because they have been able to secure an ideological foothold. In districts in which one of the major parties is unlikely to win, those who might prefer to vote for that party are likely to vote tactically for the centrist Liberal Democrats. For example, Bath is a constituency unlikely to be won by Labour (in the 2010 election, Labour won only 6.9 percent of the vote there). This means that voters who do not wish to vote Conservative may opt for the Liberal Democrat candidate. This type of tactical voting does, in fact, partially explain what has happened.

Russell notes that the Liberal Democrats’ success has come at the expense of the Conservatives, and as Allen and Bartle write, “the Liberal Democrats [are] more often in contention in middle-class Conservative areas than in working-class Labour ones.” This is supported by my dataset presented earlier—two of the best years for the Liberal Democrats (1987 and 2010) had a particularly high percentage of constituencies in which the Liberal Democrats were the main opposition to the Conservatives (see Table Three, column labeled “two”). Voters seem to have been particularly inclined to vote tactically against the Conservatives. This helps explain how the Liberal Democrats have secured a foothold in British politics—voters dissatisfied with the Tories have been willing to vote tactically for the centrist Liberal Democrats if they appear better placed to win in a given constituency.

This, however, is only part of the story. The Liberal Democrats have struggled to make headway in constituencies in which Labour is strong. Further, the success of the Liberal Democrats at the expense of the Conservatives can explain some of their success. However, we have already seen that David Cameron worked to modernize his party and, given the state of the economy, Labour has become more unpopular in recent years. Therefore Liberal Democrat success in 2010 (in which the Conservatives were more popular than in previous years) cannot be fully explained by the ideological foothold they have gained against the Conservatives.

The second part of the puzzle is the geographical distribution of support for the parties. The Liberal Democrats have historically lacked the geographically concentrated support that is essential under SMP and enjoyed by the two main parties. Rather, the Liberal Democrat vote has typically been very evenly spread across the country meaning that they came in second or third place almost everywhere instead of first in some locations. However, the old Liberal party did enjoy fairly concentrated support in the “Celtic fringes” including Scotland, Wales, Cornwall, and Devon. In contrast to the Liberal Democrat vote, the Conservative and Labour votes have been fairly concentrated; Labour does better in the north while the Conservatives are much more successful in the south. Similarly, the support of Plaid Cymru and the SNP has been fairly geographically concentrated (in Wales and Scotland respectively). Despite this historical trend, in recent years the Liberal Democrat vote has become less evenly spread geographically. As this has happened, the Liberal Democrats have become more likely to win constituencies outright rather than coming in second or third place. Therefore, their share of parliamentary seats has better reflected the electoral support they receive (although the system remains disproportional). It should be noted that the more concentrated Liberal Democrat support does not mean that they are only competing against one of the major parties. Recall that my data indicates there is a significant amount of multi-party competition. The Green Party, the British National Party (BNP), and the United Kingdom Independence
Party (UKIP) have been able to fight in more constituencies in recent years, increasing the likelihood of a third-party victory. Additionally, the Conservatives have rather the opposite problem of the historical Liberal Democrats. Their vote has been geographically concentrated, but they have tended to win more seats with relatively large majorities or narrowly lost seats.

The growing support for the Liberal Democrats and nationalist parties, in addition to a greater presence of minor third parties and inefficiently distributed votes for the Conservatives, makes multi-party competition at the national level more likely. This, in turn, makes a hung parliament more likely. In combination, these ideological and geographical factors explain why Duverger’s Law no longer effectively predicts party competition in Britain.

Conclusion

Appendix 1: Election Results 1945–2010.


<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Scottish Nationalist</th>
<th>Other</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Party competition in this case is defined as those parties securing greater than or equal to 15% of the vote in a given constituency (not to be confused with competitive districts).

The codes refer to the following categories:
1. Conservative-Labour competition
2. Conservative-Liberal Democrat competition
3. Labour-Liberal Democrat competition
4. Three-party competition: Conservative-Labour-Liberal Democrat
5. Multi-party competition other than that between the three main parties
6. One-party
7. Two-party competition other than those categories listed above
8. Other: cases in which more than one candidate classified as “other” collectively won greater than or equal to 15%

Source of general election results by constituency: The British General Election book series (please see endnotes). All coding and calculations are the author’s own.

The 2010 British general election results indicate that at the national level, the British party system no longer adheres to Duverger’s Law. The hung parliament and formation of a coalition government between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats supports this conclusion. What this analysis has shown is that not only is Britain’s party system at the national level something other than a two-party system, Britain is not a two-party system at the constituency level either. In short, Britain does present a very real and significant challenge to Duverger’s theory.

But why is it that Duverger no longer successfully predicts and explains the party system in Britain? The answer lies in a combination of ideological and geographical factors. The Liberal Democrats have been able to successfully stake out a distinct ideological position, which seems to
primarily benefit them in competition against the Conservatives. However, they are less successful in competition with Labour, so the ideological explanation cannot be the whole story. The other key is a change over time in the geographical distribution of Liberal Democrat support. Their vote has become more geographically concentrated making them more likely to win certain constituencies rather than come in second or third broadly.

What does this mean for Duverger’s Law? While the temptation to rely on the law is great, more caution than ever before is warranted. If the model majoritarian system (after all, these are also called “Westminster systems”) does not adhere to the Law, its usefulness is limited at best. Others have suggested revisions to account for various exceptions, but have had little success. While more comparative research is warranted, at this time, it seems the most useful revision of Duverger would take into account the geographical distribution of votes.

This analysis has raised several questions that merit further exploration. First, extending this analysis over a greater period of time would be beneficial (specifically, examining constituency results and coding party competition back to 1970 would be valuable). This would help us understand the trend in two-party competition, not just between the two main parties, which is well documented, but also between one large party and a minor party. Further, it would prove useful to reanalyze the data with a vote threshold of 20 percent to compare results with the data compiled using a 15 percent threshold. Finally, why is it that certain parties are competitive in certain districts and not others? An explanation was perhaps hinted at with the examination of ideological and geographic factors in Britain, but merits further systematic assessment.

Endnotes

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 203-4.
4. Ibid., 204-5.
5. Ibid., 217.
6. Ibid., 239.
7. Ibid., 217.
11. Rae, Political Consequences, 92
13. Ibid., 63-4.
15. Ibid., 32.
17. Duverger, Political Parties, 204, 217.
19. Ibid., 70.
20. Ibid., 71.
21. See, for example, Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy.
Duverger’s Law and the Case of Great Britain / Abigail Heller

55. Driver, Understanding, 77.
56. Driver, Understanding, 78.
57. Driver, Understanding, 80.
60. Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 2010, 413.
63. Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 2010, 413.
64. Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 2010, 413.
68. Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 2010, 413.
70. Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 2010, 413.
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Liphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in


any international human rights treaties recognize the “right to health,” including the right to reproductive health. This leads to the contentious issue of abortion, and the question of whether it falls under the purview of a woman’s right to reproductive health. In this paper, I argue that the international women’s rights treaty—the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)—represents a transformative change in the way abortion is viewed on the international stage by reframing women’s reproductive rights in the context of discrimination.

The international human rights regime was founded in the aftermath of World War II with the signing of the UN charter. Since then, human rights have been affirmed and implemented through various international human rights treaties. Many treaties recognize the “right to health” in various forms, including the right to reproductive health. This leads to the contentious issue of abortion, and the question of whether it falls under the purview of a woman’s right to reproductive health. Abortion is often criminalized through strict domestic laws and stigmatized socially. According to Ngwena, although “UN human rights instruments do not address abortion directly, they consciously leave open sufficient windows of opportunity for the recognition of abortion rights as unenumerated rights.” In this paper, I argue that the international women’s rights treaty—the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)—represents a transformative change in the way abortion is viewed on the international stage by reframing women’s reproductive rights in the context of discrimination.

CEDAW is unique in that it obligates states to take action to eliminate de facto as well as de jure discrimination against women in both the public and private spheres. As Cook puts it, CEDAW goes “beyond the goal of nondiscrimination” required by the United Nations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to actually address the unique disadvantages women face. Furthermore, CEDAW appeals to the right to equality to legitimize abortion rights as opposed to the right to privacy. In doing so, the Convention establishes that the “human right of equal access to health services is not only a negative right, which individuals can enjoy by their own means and initiatives, but that it is also a positive right that states have a legal duty to provide.”

Due to the lack of empirical studies concerning the impact of international human rights treaties on abortion rights, I take a normative approach to illustrate the importance of guaranteeing women the right to abortion, and how CEDAW plays a pivotal role in validating this right. I will analyze the way in which CEDAW changes the context in which abortion is viewed, how the CEDAW Committee has interpreted the Convention with respect to abortion, and the implications of legitimizing abortion on the international stage.

Kimberly Rose. Kim Rose is a senior Government major at Dartmouth College. Originally from Seaford, New York, her primary concentration of study is Political Theory and Public Law. Kim is also the captain of the Dartmouth Women’s Soccer team and enjoys coaching kids in soccer in her spare time.
First, it is essential to establish why access to abortion needs to be placed in the context of women’s rights. Various scholars note the negative consequences of denying women this service and illustrate the importance of guaranteed access to abortion in securing the basic rights of women. I then describe and analyze CEDAW with a view toward its distinctive ability to interpret a state’s denial of abortion rights within a larger framework of discrimination against women. I will then draw on the insights of the CEDAW Committee evident in the Committee’s Concluding Observations and General Recommendations. In particular, the Committee’s interpretation of Articles 12 and 16 of CEDAW and the 1999 General Recommendation 24: Women and Health provide insights directly relevant to abortion. I will look at the Committee’s concluding observations of specific States Parties’ periodic reports, noting recommendations made with respect to a State’s domestic abortion laws and policies. Finally, I will conclude with the implications of the legitimization of abortion through CEDAW on an international level.

I. Abortion

Currently, only about forty percent of the world’s women are able to access therapeutic and elective abortions within gestational limits. According to Cook and Howard, fetal protection, often articulated in the form of religious obligations, is the “most frequently used modern justification for restricting access to abortion.” However, the severe consequences of restrictive abortion legislation on the lives of women are often overlooked. In reality, criminalizing abortion and stigmatizing those seeking it often proves fatal for women who are forced to turn to unsafe, clandestine abortions. According to Cook and Howard, each year an estimated nineteen million women turn to unsafe abortion, resulting in the premature deaths of 68,000 of them due to the complications of abortion procedures. Unsafe abortion currently accounts for 13 percent of global maternal mortality, and millions of others are left with serious injuries resulting from these procedures. According to Shaw, laws that criminalize abortion do not in fact reduce the overall number of abortions that occur because women turn to clandestine abortion instead. The vast majority of unsafe abortions occur in developing countries, most of which contain restrictive abortion legislation. Brazil has one of the highest abortion rates in the developing world, for example, despite laws that define abortion as a criminal offense. There, federal regulations require hospitals to formally identify the cause of pregnancy as either rape or incest before performing abortions. On the other hand, the lowest abortion rates in the world are in Western and Northern Europe, where abortion laws are more liberal. Sweden has a fairly low abortion rate, despite the fact that abortion has been legal there since 1974 in all circumstances within the first 18 weeks of pregnancy. However, even in many developing countries with more liberal abortion policies, women must often meet onerous requirements to obtain abortions, including spousal authorization, “excessive certification requirements for facilities…and bureaucratic approval procedures, such as multi-specialist therapeutic abortion committees.”

II. Discrimination Against Women

Preventing women from obtaining safe abortions inhibits them from maintaining reproductive health and discriminates on the basis of sex. Cook and Howard support this view, defining the abortion problem as “societies’ inability to accommodate women’s biological differences and to redress the social discrimination women face based on those differences.” The neglect of women’s specific reproductive needs also violates their basic rights articulated in other human rights treaties. The most obvious of these rights is the right to life. Article 6.1 of the ICCPR maintains: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” Restrictive abortion laws represent a grave threat to the lives of women, either because they cannot have abortions even for therapeutic reasons, or because they must resort to dangerous, clandestine abortion. Neglecting women’s reproductive needs also violates a women’s right to liberty.
and security. This right prohibits state interference in an individual’s “pursuit of means to limit, or to promote, fertility.” Furthermore, denying access to abortion also violates a woman’s right to health care as enumerated in Article 12.1 in the ICESCR. This is not only applicable in terms of women’s physical health, but mental and social health as well. Cook argues, “unwanted pregnancy that endangers mental or social well-being is as much a threat to women’s health as is pregnancy that endangers survival, longevity, or physical health.” Various other rights—including the right to marry and found a family, the right to private and family life, and the right to the benefits of scientific progress—are violated when a State denies access to abortion.

Denying women the ability to regulate their pregnancies diminishes the control they have over their lives and places that control in the hands of legislators and religious leaders, who are very often men. Exerting control over women’s bodies is a way of controlling women themselves. In a powerful analogy, Cook and Howard compare forcing women to continue unwanted pregnancies to rape. In both instances, women are forced against their will to use their bodies to serve the interests of those who are able to exercise power of them. Both practices, Cook and Howard posit, reinforce “attitudes that minimize women’s agency” and “instrumentalize women’s bodies to further the objectives of others.” Women are also denied autonomy when they are required to obtain authorizations from their husbands or male family members to obtain abortions. Furthermore, denying access to abortion perpetuates the stereotype of defining women solely by their capacity to bear children. It fuels the view that women shall only be seen as a means of reproduction, even if it means sacrificing their health or even their lives.

Women also face harsh stigmatization when they seek abortions, regardless of whether abortion is legal or not. Cook and Howard claim that women who have abortions either by legal or illegal means are regarded as criminals: Countries that have liberalized their abortion law, sometimes to the point of permitting abortion de facto on request, do so by creating exceptions from criminal punishment, not affirming human rights. The effect is to keep abortion under the shadow of criminal stigma, fostering a culture of silence that inhibits women’s agency and promotes harassment of providers. Often this “harassment” is particularly cruel. Cook and Howard provide some shocking examples of “punitive care,” such as denying anesthesia to women undergoing pervasive procedures, or performing abortion only on the condition that the women are afterwards “sterilized” (an operation that prevents women from becoming impregnated again). Unmarried women often find themselves in an impossible situation when they are impregnated. If they have an abortion, they face punishment and social condemnation; but if they have child out of wedlock, they face social stigmatization and marginalization. This stigma can have serious consequences on a woman’s life, affecting her standing in society as well as her access to education and employment. Lastly, the underlying reasons why women to turn to unsafe abortions in the first place also reflect forms of discrimination against women. In many countries for example, unwanted pregnancies in young women are often the result of gender-based violence and sexual coercion. These women are forced into situations of which they are denied the opportunity to escape.

III. CEDAW

The UN adopted the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979 in order to combat extensive discrimination against women. After its adoption, CEDAW was widely accepted and is currently ratified by 187 nations. These nations are expected to submit national reports every four years demonstrating their compliance with the Convention. The reports are submitted to a Committee consisting of 23 women’s rights experts, who review the reports at biannual sessions and engage in dialogue with delegations of the States Parties. Ultimately, the Committee prepares Concluding Observations to each state’s party, recognizing the measures taken that demonstrate treaty compliance as well as suggestions for future action. Additionally, the Committee makes
CEDAW and Reproductive Health: The Changing View of Abortion / Kimberly Rose

General Recommendations to the States Parties as a whole on issues related to further advancing women’s rights and eliminating discrimination. On its face, CEDAW looks and operates much like the other nine international human rights treaties. Yet CEDAW is unique in the wide range of obligations it requires of the States Parties. The Convention defines “discrimination” in Article 1 as: any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.27

This broad definition of discrimination allows much room for interpretation by the CEDAW Committee on a state-by-state basis. Also, as noted by Shalev the phrase “effect or purpose” is very significant for issues related to health. This phrase shows that CEDAW aims at eliminating discrimination that may not be purposeful, such as the differing health statuses of men and women due to “certain attitudes and patterns of behavior that are considered ‘natural,’ given the biological differences between women and men.”28 The Convention also requires States Parties to take “all appropriate measures…to ensure the full development and advancement of women.”29 The phrase “all appropriate measures” means that ensuring legal or de facto equality under the law is not sufficient. Rather, States Parties must implement measures to eliminate de jure discrimination in both the public and private spheres. The notion of “equality in practice” espoused by CEDAW therefore requires the elimination of discrimination based on social and cultural stereotypes as well as the accommodation of women’s differences.

Notably, CEDAW is the only human rights treaty that affirms the reproductive rights of women. The two articles of CEDAW that deal with women’s reproductive health are Article 12: Health and Article 16: Marriage and Family Life.

Article 12.1 calls for the elimination of discrimination “in the field of health care in order to ensure, on the basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning.” “Health care services… related to family planning” can be interpreted to include abortion. Article 12.2 states that “States Parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy…granting free services where necessary.” Article 16 also implicitly refers to a woman’s right to abortion. Article 16.e holds that men and women should be afforded “the same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights.” Although abortion is not explicitly defined within these two articles, the language used in the text leaves room for abortion to be understood as an unenumerated right.

IV. Women’s Differences and Equality

CEDAW has the distinctive ability to address the problems resulting from unsafe abortion by constructing abortion as a human right and chastising restrictive abortion laws as a form of sex discrimination. Its broad language and goal to ensure de facto equality makes it well suited to interpret abortion laws that negatively impact women as discriminatory and in violation of women’s rights as defined by the Convention. CEDAW, Cook argues, “frames its objective as the prohibition of all forms of discrimination against women, as distinct form the norm of sexual nondiscrimination.”30 In
other words, unlike other UN treaties that call for the equal treatment of men and women, CEDAW aims to achieve equality between the sexes by addressing the unique discrimination that women evidently face. In doing so: the Convention develops the legal norm from a sex-neutral norm that requires equal treatment of men and women, usually measured by the scale of how men are treated, to recognize that the particular nature of discrimination against women and their distinctive characteristics is worthy of a legal response.31

Thus, CEDAW acknowledges that achieving de facto equality requires “both the acknowledgment and accommodation of women’s actual differences.”32 This is particularly significant in terms of health because women’s reproductive needs differ from men’s due to biological differences. Also, since women “carry the exclusive health burden of contraceptive failure,” they are the ones who are disproportionately affected by restrictive abortion legislation.33 CEDAW can redress this because it takes a view towards equal health outcomes between men and women, and seeks to eliminate that which prevents women from achieving maximum reproductive health.

CEDAW is also unique in that it legitimizes abortion by appealing to the right to equality rather than the right to privacy. Other international bodies, notes Shaw, have upheld a woman’s right to have an abortion based on her right to private life. Cook & Howard also cite various lawsuits attempting to prevent lawful abortions have been “consistently resolved in favor of the woman’s right to privacy.”34 In the United States for example, the Supreme Court ruled in Roe v. Wade that a woman’s decision to have an abortion falls under the right to privacy under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.35 However, appealing to the right to privacy leaves room for women to face discrimination in the private sphere and even within their own homes, as husbands or fathers may ultimately make the decision regarding abortion. CEDAW, on the other hand, appeals more strongly to the right to equality, affirming that women, like men, are the autonomous decision makers over their own bodies. Furthermore, Ngwena understands Roe v. Wade as a failure to provide a “substantive equality dimension that requires the state to provide the woman with the means, in terms of health care facilities, to realize her right to abortion.”36 Instead, CEDAW's appeal to equality offers “a more comprehensive conceptual clarification not only implicating the wrongness of laws that compel women to be mothers, but also how to move forward and construct a remedial framework” to redress this discrimination.37 In this way, CEDAW establishes that equal access to health care services, including abortion, is actually a positive right that the State has a duty to provide. This is especially relevant for underprivileged women who are unable to obtain an abortion by their own means.

V. General Recommendations

The CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendations and Concluding Observations provide insights into their interpretation of CEDAW in regards to abortion. In 1999, CEDAW elaborated the content and meaning of Article 12 in General Recommendation 24: Women and Health, aiming to “address measures to eliminate discrimination in order to realize the right of women to the highest attainable standard of health.”38 The Recommendation begins with the affirmation that “access to health care, including reproductive health is a basic right under [CEDAW].” The Committee then gives a comprehensive account of the States Parties’ obligations under Article 12. Cook and Dickens note the comprehensive nature of the Recommendation, which requires states to take into account specific characteristics of health that differ between men and women. This includes “biological factors,” including different reproductive health needs; “socioeconomic factors,” such as unequal access to health services; and “health system factors,” such as the lack of patient confidentiality that often deters women from seeking needed health care.39

First, the Committee implicitly speaks to restrictive abortion laws in their comment: “barriers to women’s access to appropriate health care include laws that criminalize medical
procedures only needed by women and that punish women who undergo those procedures." This comment clarifies to States Parties that denying women-specific health care services and punishing women who must resort to illegal care is a form of discrimination against women. The Committee also addresses the issue of third-party male authorization that is often required for women to have an abortion. The Committee states that access to health services should not be restricted on that grounds that “women do not have the authorization of husbands, partners, parents or health authorities, because they are unmarried or because they are women.” Later, the Committee speaks directly to abortion in its recommendations for government action, by suggesting, “when possible, legislation criminalizing abortion could be amended to remove punitive provisions imposed on women who undergo abortion.” This section is particularly significant because it marks the end of the ambiguity of Article 12 and the Committee’s stance on abortion. The Committee finally names laws that criminalize abortion as discriminatory, and calls for States Parties to redress this issue. The Committee’s comments fuel the notion that women who have abortions should not be punished, and, in effect, legitimizes abortion itself.

Other General Recommendations issued by the Committee also provide potential grounds for legitimizing abortion. For instance, General Recommendation 5: Special Temporary Measures elaborates on the view that men and women cannot be treated the same in terms of health dues to “biological as well as socially and culturally constructed differences.” Rather, the Committee insists that States Parties make better use of special temporary measures, including “positive action” or “preferential treatment” to women. Providing women access to abortion is an example of this positive action that would mitigate the gap in health outcomes between men and women. Through General Recommendation 12: Violence Against Women, the Committee obliges States Parties to ensure that “women are not forced to seek unsafe procedures such as illegal abortion because of lack of appropriate services in regard to fertility control.” These “appropriate services” can be taken to mean birth control, contraception, education on fertility, and safe abortion. Lastly, General Recommendation 21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations explicates the consequences of forcing women to have children. The Committee notes that women’s responsibility to raise children can “affect their right of access to education, employment and other activities related to their personal development.” This reiterates the point about forced pregnancy obstructing women from enjoying their other rights. These three recommendations, along with Recommendation 24, elucidate the Committee’s understanding of restricting access to abortion as discrimination against women.

VI. Concluding Observations

The Committee also provided insights into its interpretation of CEDAW with regards to abortion in the Concluding Observations generated in response to the States Parties’ Periodic Reports. After reviewing many recent Observations, several themes are evident. First of all, comments with regards to abortion are almost exclusively directed at states where the consequences of strict abortion legislation have a negative impact on women (or where the Committee cannot determine this due to a lack of data). For example, the Committee did not mention abortion in their Concluding Observations made to Sweden in 2008 and Norway in 2007. These two countries have liberal abortion policies, although their laws contain differing stipulations such as gestational limits. Turkey also has fairly liberal abortion laws, although parental and/or spousal-consent is required under many circumstances to obtain an abortion. Yet, the CEDAW Committee did not make any reference to abortion during Turkey’s latest reporting process in 2010. On the other hand, in its comments to Mexico in 2006, the Committee noted “with concern that abortion remains one of the leading causes of maternal deaths and that…women do not have access to safe abortion services.” In response to Kenya’s report in 2011, the Committee was concerned that “illegal abortion remains one of the leading
causes of the high maternal mortality rate” and that “restrictive abortion law further leads women to seek unsafe and illegal abortions.” 445 This illustrates that the CEDAW Committee does not aim to ensure that all domestic abortion policies reflect the exact same level liberalization, but rather it seeks to mitigate those laws that result in harm to women in concrete ways.

A noticeable theme regarding the content of the Concluding Observations is that states are often urged to remove punitive measures associated with abortion. For instance, in their comments to Brazil in 2012, the Committee recommended to “expedite the review of its legislation criminalizing abortion in order to remove punitive provisions imposed on women.” 446 Similarly, the Committee recommended in 2011 to the Republic of Korea to “consider reviewing the laws relating to abortion with a view to removing punitive provisions imposed on women who have abortion.” 447 Another content pattern is the recommendation to allow women access to abortion at least in cases of rape or incest, or for therapeutic reasons. In 2012, the Committee urged Algeria to “adopt medical standards and provide for implementation mechanisms establishing that rape and incest constitute grounds for abortion.” 448 The Committee made similar recommendations to Nepal in 1999, Jordan in 2000, and Honduras in 2007. One other theme worth noting is the type of language the CEDAW Committee uses when making its recommendations to States Parties. The language is usually weak and broad. The Committee often uses the phrase “consider reviewing legislation” with “a view toward their amendment.” Even in General Recommendation 24, the Committee feebly states that laws criminalizing abortion “could be” amended “when possible.” Although this is a bit unsatisfying, it is essential to appreciate that the Committee members make these observations under difficult circumstances.

CEDAW, like other human rights treaties, lacks powerful enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, the Committee cannot force States Parties to comply by imposing sanctions or punishing those who are unresponsive to the Convention’s goals. They must indicate the shortcomings of a States Party and offer concrete suggestions while simultaneously ensuring not to overreach and impose on national sovereignty. If the Committee used more pointed language it would risk appearing too demanding, thus alienating those States Parties who may question the legitimacy of the Committee in the first place.

The overarching theme that encompasses all of these is that the issuance of General Recommendations and Concluding Observations is a process. In other words, the Committee cannot eliminate the discrimination women face concerning abortion by simply demanding that all States Parties provide women with access to it unconditionally. This is neither feasible nor beneficial to the Convention’s success. Rather, the Committee seems to apply a step-by-step process based on an individual States Party’s domestic abortion laws and women’s health outcomes. The Committee must identify where the lack of abortion services has a negative impact on women, and to do this, it first needs statistical data regarding maternal mortality, unsafe abortions, access to health services, etc. States Parties that have not collected such data are urged to do so by the Committee. For States Parties with very strict abortion laws, the Committee usually first recommends facilitating national dialogue addressing the problems associated with restricting abortion. The next step the Committee takes is to recommend the removal of punitive measures imposed on women who have clandestine abortions. This is followed by the recommendation to allow abortion in particularly egregious circumstances, such as in the cases of rape or incest, or for therapeutic reasons. Lastly, the Committee might refer to particular group of women who are disadvantaged by a States Party’s abortions laws, such as unmarried, young, or underprivileged women.

By analyzing this process, it also clear that the Committee does not advance abortion as form of birth control. The Committee explains in General Recommendation 24 that a States Party’s goal first and foremost is to “prevent unwanted pregnancies.” 449 In fact, the Committee often expresses concern to States Parties where legal abortion rates are
particularly high, or where abortion is used as birth control. For instance in 2007, the Committee articulated its concern to Greece that “abortion is often used by women and adolescent girls as a method of birth control.” In response to this issue, the Committee recommended that the government implement policies “aimed at providing effective access for women…to health-care information, contraceptives, and to family planning services, thus avoiding the need for women to resort to abortion as a form of birth control.” The Committee almost always supplements its recommendations with regards to abortion by urging States Parties to promote sexual health and rights through education. On a side note, the Committee also accounts for religious obligations. In General Recommendation 24, the Committee emphasized that “if health service providers refuse to perform such services based on conscientious objection, measures should be introduced to ensure that women are referred to alternative health providers.” This demonstrates the Committee’s willingness to accommodate for those who do not support abortion on religious grounds.

VII. Implications and Considerations

It is evident in the General Recommendations and Concluding Observations that the Committee interprets CEDAW in a way that validates a women’s right to abortion. In light of this, there are several considerations to take into account. First of all, CEDAW does not address the implications of abortion on the rights of fetus. The issue of “fetal rights” is yet another highly controversial topic; however, since many oppose abortion on these grounds, a response is warranted. Cook and Howard offer several alternative ways to protect newborn and fetal life that are also consistent with women’s rights. For instance, they suggest the implementation of health system measures to reduce maternal mortality and morbidity, which contribute to roughly 4 million neonatal deaths per year. They also suggest “clinical interventions to reduce miscarriages,” and “measures that address underlying socioeconomic and sociocultural conditions” which contribute to unwanted pregnancies. They also call for increasing the “availability of access to intrapartum care,” which encompasses care before, during and after birth. These policies, Cook and Howard argue, protect fetal life better than restrictive abortion laws; rather than guaranteeing the birth of children “irrespective of their condition and their prospect for survival,” these measures aim at improving the intrapartum conditions for women and fetus alike.

Another consideration is whether the CEDAW Committee’s view on abortion will affect the ratification of CEDAW by the United States. One of most obvious shortcomings of CEDAW is that it does not have the support of the United States - an important leader in the international human rights regime. Many anti-abortion conservative groups in the U.S point to the Committee’s view on abortion as a reason for the U.S. not to ratify CEDAW. However, their claims are often widely exaggerated and drenched with inflammatory rhetoric. These groups publicize the claim that the Committee promotes abortion, but there is an important difference between promoting abortion and legitimizing abortion. The Committee has not interpreted CEDAW in a way that promotes abortion in all circumstances or as a form of birth control. Rather, the Committee legitimizes abortion with the aim of eliminating the stigmatization and discrimination of women who seek this procedure for a variety of reasons. Furthermore, as the U.S. already has fairly liberal domestic abortion laws, the CEDAW Committee might not take issue with the United States in regard to abortion.

Recently, there has been a worldwide trend towards the liberalization of abortion laws. In their study, Boland and Katzive note this trend over a 22 year period (1976-1998), during which 36 countries dramatically liberalized their abortion laws. Boland and Katzive argue, “an important impetus for many of these changes...has been the expansion of the use of human rights principles to support a woman’s right to abortion.” It is difficult to determine whether CEDAW specifically played a role in this trend, for this would require empirical research that is currently lacking. Whether or not CEDAW has played a role in this trend, it is evident that at the very least, CEDAW legitimizes a woman’s right to abortion on the
international stage in a new, powerful way.

Endnotes

17. Cook, "International Human Rights" Pg 77.
35. Roe v. Wade
38. "General recommendations made by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.
40. See General Recommendation 24: Section 14.
41. See General Recommendation 24: Section 31(e).
42. All “Concluding Observations" made by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women can be found at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/sessions.htm
43. Abortion Laws Around the World.
44. Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Mexico
45. Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Kenya
46. Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Brazil
47. Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Korea
48. Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Algeria
49. See General Recommendation 24: Section 31(c).
50. See General Recommendation 24: Section 11.
52. Cook and Howard, "Accommodating Women’s Differences," 1051.

Bibliography


CEDAW and Reproductive Health: The Changing View of Abortion / Kimberly Rose

recommendations/recomm.htm.


The concept of institutional complementarity has contributed significantly to the Varieties of Capitalism literature, but has yet been found to apply to developing economies and thus has not benefited research on these political economies. I seek to test whether institutional complementarity, in particular between the provision of unemployment insurance and training in industry-specific skills, also applies to developing economies. Bi-directional, controlled regressions with robust standard errors have found strong, significant, and robust evidence of such a relationship. Importantly, in the developing economy context the strength and relevance of this relationship is significantly influenced by the informal economy and the country’s regime.

Ever since the ground-breaking work of Hall and Soskice, the concept of institutional complementarity has entered the study of political economy and contributed significantly to the ever expanding Varieties of Capitalism literature. Institutional complementarity explains the polarization of economies into different clusters of complimentary institutions – the “varieties” of capitalism.

Interesting as it is, existing literature on institutional complementarity has only focused on OECD countries and has neglected the developing world. There have also been very few attempts at classifying developing economies into groups with common characteristics, while the possibility of developing economies diverging to form clusters is simply neglected. This indeed is a gap that begs to be filled. Among the causes of this gap is the lack of reliable cross-country data, often because developing countries have yet to develop an efficient standardized system to record and archive data. This problem still exists even as of today, and it continues to hinder attempts at conducting any comprehensive study on the developing world’s political economy. The flip side of the coin is, however, that future research on this area remains an interesting challenge yet to be dealt with. This challenge accompanies the current gap in literature in motivating this study.

This study will attempt to test whether institutional complementarity in developing economies works in the same way it does in developed economies. In particular, it will look at the relationship between training and social protection, and will ask whether unemployment insurance complements training in industry-specific skills in developing economies. An answer to this question will not only contribute to existing literature, but will also shed light on the scope for policy action, which is of particular importance for developing countries.

To address this question, I use several multivariate linear regression analyses with robust standard errors, using multiple measurements of each country’s national training profile to
overcome the scarcity of data. This paper begins by summarizing the theoretical foundations behind the approach. The next section describes its methodology. I then present and discuss the results, which indicate that a statistically significant, robust, and positive relationship between unemployment insurance and training in industry-specific skills also exists in developing economies just like in developed economies. However, I also show that this relationship is weaker and less relevant in the developing economy context and that political regimes and the informal economy are important factors which interfere in the relationship between training and social protection in the developing world. Following this, I suggest using qualitative evidence specific to countries and regions as possible explanations for why these two variables may have such an effect in the developing economy context. Before concluding, I evaluate the paper's shortcomings and suggest directions for future studies.

**Theoretical Foundations**

Hall and Soskice were the first to put forward the concept of institutional complementarity and lay down its implications. By their definition, “two institutions are said to be complementary if the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the return from (or efficiency of) the other.” Institutional complementarity is best understood when institutions are perceived as resting on a unit-dimensional scale with two ends, having the tendency to gravitate toward one of those ends. For example, training institutions could gravitate toward producing either general or specific skills, while inter-firm relations could be either competitive or coordinated. Because institutions complement each other, the development of institutions in an area in one direction will encourage institutions in other areas to gravitate toward a similar direction. As a result, institutions across different areas will converge in a similar direction. As firms are embedded in a system of institutional frameworks with constraints and incentives, this has an effect on the behavior of all the firms in the economy and brings about the polarization of economies into either a Coordinated Market Economy (CME) or a Liberal Market Economy (LME).

Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice add to existing literature by noting another area of institutional spillover: social protection. In particular, they find the provision of social insurance complementary to training institutions. This observation builds on the idea by Alt et al. that an asset specific to a firm or an industry can expose its owner to risks, which then prompt them to seek nonmarket protection. Iversen and Soskice point out that human capital is similar to most other assets in this regard; investment in specific skills also exposes workers to the risk of being unemployed and not being able to earn income from these specific skills in subsequent jobs. Because insurance protects workers against the possibility of unemployment, it reduces the risk often associated with investment in highly specific skills and thus allows workers to train in these skills. This creates a relative abundance of workers with specific skills, which in turn has an influence on firms’ strategies. Workers who have invested in specific skills also have more interest in social protection, because of that they create electoral pressure that may result in expansion of social protection policies, resulting in a feedback loop.

Estevez-Abe et al. also differentiate between unemployment protection and employment protection. Employment protection protects workers from being laid off and allows them to invest in firm-specific skills that would become worthless in such event. Unemployment protection, on the other hand, protects workers from reduction in income due to unemployment. When taking the form of unemployment insurance, it is a transfer to the unemployed worker to replace his or her lost income. Workers
investing in industry-specific skills may also be employed by other firms in the industry and thus depend less on employment protection. Instead, they need unemployment insurance to protect their "skilled" income regardless of employment status. In short, employment protection is tied to training in firm-specific skills, while unemployment insurance complements training in industry-specific skills. For methodological reason, this paper will focus only on unemployment insurance and its relationship with industry-specific skills.

Methodology

This paper will employ a statistical toolbox that includes multivariate linear regression analyses with robust standard errors to test whether a relationship exists between the two study variables unemployment insurance and training in industry-specific skills. Regressions with robust standard errors are preferable as there is strong suspicion of heteroscedasticity (indeed, several preliminary regressions have been found to be heteroscedastic with p=0.000). Because the relationship between the two variables is bi-directional, they will alternate as dependent and independent variables in the models. I will also compare results across a sample with only developing countries and another with only developed countries to check for internal consistency. The subject of this study is restricted to unemployment insurance and industry-specific skills because data is not available for employment insurance and no reliable measurement could be developed for firm-specific skills.

To measure unemployment insurance, I rely on the Unemployment Benefits Generosity score as calculated in a World Bank study. This score, measured on a scale of 0 to 100, indicates how good a country’s unemployment insurance policies are at substituting a worker’s income when he or she becomes unemployed. A score of 100 means that the country’s policies can replace as much as 100% of the lost income while a score of 0 means that the country does not have any unemployment insurance policy. My measurement does not go over the coverage and eligibility of these policies as well as it has been done in other works because the source of such data – the Social Security Programs around the World report – is not specifically reliable for developing countries, given the large departure between official statements regarding social policy programs and these programs’ actual implementations.

Because training in industry-specific skills primarily occurs in formal education, measurements of this variable are often based on data on national education systems. Large-N analyses of national training profiles for developing economies are often haunted by a scarcity of data. To sidestep this problem, I employ two different measurements for training in industry-specific skills. The first is Incidence of Vocational Training, calculated with data from UNESCO as the share of the eligible age cohort enrolled in vocational/technical training as opposed to more general formal tertiary education. This measurement has been used in combination with other measurements in Estevez-Abes et al. The second measurement is Tertiary Enrollment Rates, data which also comes from UNESCO. As explained by Estevez-Abe et al., although this measurement does not shed light on the content of university education, it also indicates the extent to which countries that invest in higher education compensate for their low stock of specific skills. That trends from Tertiary Enrollment Rates strongly correlate (r=0.6890, p=0.000) with Incidence of Vocational Training further supports the use of this measurement. (UNESCO)

Because each of the measurements covers a different set of countries, I refrain from creating comprehensive indices, but instead run two separate regressions, one with Incidence of Vocational Training and the other with Tertiary Enrollment Rates as the study variable. The separate use of two measurements allows for an analysis that covers 187 out of 227 countries and territories (76 out of 85 developing economies), instead of a more limited one that applies only for where data are available for both.
Furthermore, this method enables testing for robustness and consistency by cross-checking for agreement between results produced with one measurement and those produced with the other.

In my regression analyses I control for three important variables. The first is level of economic development. As suggested by Wagner’s Law and empirically confirmed in a study of OECD nations, economic development determines the ability to provide social insurance and is directly linked to the volume of social spending and social transfers of an economy. To measure this control variable, I use an average of GNI per capita covering the period 2006-2010.

The second control variable is political regime, which may have an impact on whether electoral pressure actually results in policies that expand unemployment protection. Since most authoritarian regimes belong to the developing world, political regime could very possibly be a confounding variable. This variable is measured using the average value over the 1980-2010 period of the POLITY variable from the Polity IV dataset. The measurement ranges from -10 to 10, with negative values indicating authoritarianism and positive values indicating democracy. This incremental measurement takes into account the different levels of authoritarianism and democracy and is believed to be a better measurement than a simple dummy variable. The last control variable is size of the informal economy, measured as share of GNP and calculated by Schneider. Because the informal sector is not covered by social protection policies, formal unemployment insurance may not have an effect on the training profile of workers in this sector. At the same time, informal jobs can also act as a safety net and serve an insurance function for those currently employed in the formal sector. These two mechanisms could potentially interfere with the relationship between the two study variables. It is also important to note that developing countries are generally expected to have bigger informal economies, making this variable a potential confound.

Results and Discussion

Figure 2: Scatterplot showing the relationship found from a sample of every country in the world between:

a. Unemployment Benefits Generosity and Incidence of Vocational Training

b. Unemployment Benefits Generosity and Tertiary Enrollment Rates

Basic Findings

Table 1. Unemployment Benefits Generosity and Incidence of Vocational Training for Developing Countries

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Table 1 reports different regression models of Unemployment Benefits Generosity on Incidence of Vocational Training for a sample consisting only of developing countries. Model (1) is a simple regression line without control, while models (2) to (6) feature different combinations of the control variables. Consistent across all the columns is a statistically significant and positive coefficient estimate for the independent variable. This result is largely in accord with Table 1a, which reports regression coefficient estimates for the same regression models, but for a sample that consists of only developed countries, as well as with Figure 2a, which is a plot of Unemployment Benefits Generosity on Incidence of Vocational Training for all the countries of the world.
The above regression models have so far confirmed that in developing economies training in industry-specific skills does have a positive impact on the level of unemployment insurance. To test whether the reverse direction of the relationship also holds true (i.e. whether the level of unemployment insurance influences training in industry-specific skills) I switch the two variables’ position and regress the measurements of training in industry-specific skills on the level of unemployment insurance. I show in Table 3 regression models that use Incidence of Vocational Training as dependent variable, and in Table 4 models that use Tertiary Enrollment Rates. Similar to Tables 1, 1a, and 2, model (1) represents a simple regression line, while the rest feature various combinations of the control variables.

The same conclusion follows when enrolment rates in tertiary education are used to measure training in industry-specific skills. As seen in Table 2, the regression coefficients for Tertiary Enrollment Rates are also consistently significant and positive across all six models. Again, this result is in accord with what would be found if the same regression models are run over a sample consisting of only developed countries (not shown here) and also with Figure 1b. All in all, the robust, statistically significant, and positive regression coefficient estimates for both measurements suggest that variation in training in industry-specific skills explains variation in unemployment insurance in developing economies just like in developed countries.

### Table 1: Unemployment Benefits Generosity and Incidence of Vocational Training for Developing Countries

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<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Incidence of Vocational Training</th>
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<td>Gravity Share of Informal Sector</td>
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| F-statistics                                         | 24.85*** | 12.29*** | 10.86*** | 12.33*** | 17.56*** | 11.32*** |
| Note: Standard Errors in brackets                    |          |          |          |          |          |          |

### Table 2: Unemployment Benefits Generosity and Tertiary Enrolment Rates for Developing Countries

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<th>Dependent Variable: Tertiary Enrolment Rate</th>
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| F-statistics                                   | 6.89*** | 4.61** | 2.44* | 2.10 | 2.16 | 2.86* |
| Note: Standard Errors in brackets              |          |          |          |      |      |      |

### Table 3: Unemployment Benefits Generosity and Incidence of Vocational Training

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<th>Dependent Variable: Incidence of Vocational Training</th>
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| F-statistics                                         | 1.779*** | 1.628*** | 1.805** | 2.891*** | 2.437** | 2.126*** |
| Note: Standard Errors in brackets                    |          |          |          |          |          |          |

### Table 4: Tertiary Enrolment Rates and Unemployment Benefits Generosity for Developing Countries

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| F-statistics                                   | 2.344*** | 3.318* | 8.009  | 1.299* | 2.782** | 3.318* |
| Note: Standard Errors in brackets              |          |          |          |          |          |          |

### Interesting Patterns

Besides confirming the existence of institutional complementarity between unemployment insurance and training in industry-specific skills, the regression models also offer many other interesting insights into this relationship. To begin with, while both show a significant, positive, and bi-directional relationship, the regressions over the developing countries sample show a much weaker effect of training on unemployment insurance than those that are run over countries and developed countries samples. This evidence clearly supports the reverse direction of the relationship, and suggests that in the context of the developing economy, variation in training in industry-specific skills also explains variation in levels of unemployment insurance. With strong evidence supporting both directions of the relationship, it is possible to claim that institutional complementarity between unemployment and training in industry-specific skills exists as well in developing, non-OECD countries.

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A Complicated Relationship: Unemployment Insurance and the Formation of Skills in Developing Economies / Minh Trinh

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Fall 2012 37
the developed countries sample. As can be seen by comparing the results from comparable columns of Table 1 and 1a, the coefficient estimate for Incidence of Vocational Training is always smaller in models that cover only developing countries. The value of R-squared, which indicates how good the regression model is at estimating variation of the dependent variable, is also smaller. The same disparity can also be observed when comparing results from Table 2 with those produced by the same regression models but run over a sample of developed countries (not shown). This suggests that for developing economies compared to developed economies, training in industry-specific skills has less influence over, and is a less reliable predictor of, the level of unemployment insurance.

The same conclusion also stems from an analysis of the usefulness of the control variables. In general, how useful a set of control variables is to a regression model is indicated by the increase in R-squared that the inclusion of such control variables brings about. Useful control variables add more explaining power to the model, and thus result in a significant increase in the value of R-squared. Less useful control variables, on the other hand, burden the model and either increase R-squared insignificantly or even decrease it. In short, a set of useful control variables would contribute to a high R-squared for the model. Table 5 lists for each regression model the iteration with the highest R-squared and the control variables used in that iteration of the model. It shows unanimously that regressions run over a sample of developed countries need many fewer control variables to achieve an acceptable R-squared. As the relationship between economic development and Unemployment Benefits Generosity (hence the importance of the former as a control) is rather unsurprising, the political regime and size of informal sector are important control variables for developing economies but not for developed economies is an intriguing observation that requires a closer examination. Also interesting is the fact that economic development is always significant in regressions over developed countries, but is rarely so in regressions over developing countries. These observations allow a tentative deduction that for developing economies, political regime and size of the informal sector play a much more important role in how much influence training in industry-specific skills has on the level of unemployment insurance.

Regarding these two variables, two additional observations can be made. Firstly, the set of useful control variables for regressions run over the developing countries sample always contains the size of the informal sector.
The variable is not a useful control in all the other regressions that are run over the developed countries sample. That the size of the informal sector is a useful control variable only in models which cover developing economies is even more interesting in light of the fact that this variable is not a significant predictor in any of those models. This implies that the informal economy has an important but complex influence on institutional complementarity in developing countries.

The second interesting observation is also one of similarity: the regression coefficient estimate for political regime is significant for almost every single regression model that uses training as the dependent variable and that controls for this variable, and this variable is also part of the set of useful control variables. On the other hand, for regressions that use unemployment insurance as the dependent variable, this variable is significant only in models with Incidence of Vocational Training that are run over the developing countries sample (shown in Table 1) and is not significant in any other models. This may suggest that political regime has an effect that applies specifically to the reverse direction of the unemployment insurance – training in an industry-specific skills relationship, where it is also a significant predictor of level of insurance. The next section will revisit this and the last two observations, and will propose, through citing specific empirics, ways in which size of the informal sector and political regime may complicate the interaction between complementary institutions in developing economies.

### Informal Economy, Authoritarianism and Institutional Complementarity in Developing Economies

#### Informal Economy

One does not need to look beyond the importance of the informal sector to be convinced of its importance to developing economies. Indeed, as measured by its share of national income, the informal sector even dwarfs the formal sector in many developing countries, such as Zimbabwe (59.4%), Tanzania (58.3%), and Nigeria (57.9%) in Africa, Bolivia (67.1%), Panama (64.1%), and Peru (59.9%) in Latin America, or Thailand (52.6%) in Asia. Its particular relevance to the focus of this paper is also demonstrated by the fact that, on average, developing countries have an informal sector that is 13.5 percentage points larger (p=0.000) than developed economies. In light of this difference, the importance of size of informal sector in the regressions is no longer unimaginable.

The informal sector can disrupt institutional complementarity between training and social protection firstly because workers employed in informal jobs by definition do not appear in official records, and therefore are not covered by unemployment insurance programs. Unemployment insurance fails to serve current and potential workers in the informal sector, and therefore does not provide them with the security needed to invest in specific skills. As a result, where the informal economy is large, extra unemployment insurance will not induce more training in industry-specific skills.

At the same time, the informal sector does not simply dissuade training. As has been observed in many Latin American countries, developing countries’ low administrative capacity often leaves room for fraud, in which recently unemployed workers file for unemployment just as they begin informal, unrecorded jobs, thereby earning both insurance payments and job income. Although most informal jobs require few skills, the sheer size of the informal sector means that in many countries it also offers many high-skilled jobs. Unemployment insurance in this case works only as an extra source of income, while the possibility of getting an informal skilled job substitutes for it in providing the security needed for investment in skills. This allows workers to train even in spite of low
unemployment insurance.

Through these two mechanisms, the informal economy may exert opposite influences on the level of training in specific skills. The important point, however, is not about which mechanism dominates, but that through these influences the informal economy dissociates the two institutional parameters of training and social protection and weakens the link between training in industry-specific skills and unemployment insurance. This interference of the informal economy suggests why size of informal sector is an important control variable in studying complementarity between these two institutions in developing economies.

Still, it must be pointed out that although size of informal sector is a useful control variable for regressions that are run over the developing economy sample, the coefficient estimate for it is rarely significant. In other words, although it is important to control for it when assessing the partial institutional complementarity effect of training on social protection, the informal economy is not a rival predictor of the level of unemployment insurance.

This lack of predictive power is first attributable to the presence of two opposite mechanisms through which the informal economy influences the level of unemployment insurance. To compound the problem, scholars are still disputing whether the latter really does have an effect on the former: The influential work of Harris and Tadaro suggests that it does, but some recent evidence from Latin America disputes the possibility. Lastly, researchers still encounter many methodological challenges in reconciling different methods of measuring the informal economy to arrive at a consistent, standardized measurement usable for cross-national analyses. Although such a tentative account of the informal sector’s influence as proposed above suffices for the purpose of this paper, further research would not be fruitful until these methodological challenges have been solved and more is known about the interaction between the informal economy and the other institutions of the economy.

Authoritarianism

Although the particulars of the link between political regime and economic performance remain unclear, it is reasonable to assume that the regime governing a country has a certain influence over its political economy. Moreover, there is also a vast difference between regimes in developing countries and regimes in developed countries: the average Polity IV score of developed countries is higher by 4.37 points (p=0.000), and as many as 49% of developing countries are under authoritarian regimes, comparing to the 16% of developed countries. A closer look into political regimes is thus expected to benefit the analysis in this paper.

The intuitive effect of political regime – in particular, of authoritarianism – on institutional complementarity is best captured by the fact that an authoritarian government would be less dependent on electoral support than a democratic one. It will therefore be able to set up institutions that relatively contradict electoral demand. In regard to the training-social protection complementarity, an authoritarian regime may, for example, introduce “unpopular” reforms aimed to push through an unemployment insurance system that does not line up with the skill-specificity of the labor force, or to promote a training system that is unsupported by appropriate insurance.

The former has actually been attempted and accomplished in Chile under the dictatorship of Pinochet. In less than a decade, the welfare regime of the country shifted towards a liberal regime, with lower benefits and narrower coverage for almost every policy. At the same time, the country retained its emphasis on specific skills: Chile’s Incidence of Vocational Training is approximately 56.6 and its Tertiary Enrolment Rate is 39.0%, much higher than the world average of 31.9 and 27.0%. Under democracies such a discrepancy between the training and social protection systems would have had been corrected by electoral demand pressing for increases in
insurance provision, but under Pinochet such pressure was simply muted. Indeed, when democratic governance returned following the fall of Pinochet, many of the reforms were quickly rolled back. During its lifetime, however, the reform had shown how authoritarianism can sever the connection between complementary institutions in general and between unemployment insurance and training in industry-specific skills in particular. Chile’s social policy reform was also hardly an isolated incident: Although he did it in a less dramatic manner, President Menem of Argentina was also able to use economic emergency powers to push through similar reforms. An even more extreme example would be the East Asian nations labeled “productivist welfare regimes.” In these states, weak civil society and strong authoritarianism allow the governments to do away with social policy and subject it to other goals such as economic growth.

Altogether, the above examples showcase one way authoritarianism may allow social policy to change independently of electoral pressure from other complimentary institutions, and explain why political regime is such an important variable in understanding the reverse relationship from training in industry-specific skills to unemployment insurance. Still, it must be noted that, while this variable is both a useful control and a significant predictor, its actual effect remains disputable. Indeed, while the coefficient estimates of political regime for regressions that use training as dependent variable are all significant, their directions differ greatly. In particular, the coefficient estimates of the regression on Incidence of Vocational Training over the developing countries sample (Table 3) are negative while all other coefficient estimates are positive.

To understand this conflicting result, it must be firstly noted that although the lack of electoral constraint may allow governments to lower unemployment policy regardless of the national training profile like Chile’s and Argentina’s did, there is just no good evidence that governments should or want to do that. Indeed, reforms such as those under Pinochet and Menem are far from commonplace. Moreover, authoritarianism does not mean that the government is absolutely and consistently free from public constraints. Various other factors, for example the strength of the civil society, or the organization of political opposition, may come into play as well.

Indeed, Mares and Carnes point out that, regarding social policy, an authoritarian government may choose from at least three strategies to best suit its situation. Firstly, it might choose to prey on the public and withhold social provision as much as possible. Secondly, it might also offer generous benefits to some strategic targets to “rent” their support. Lastly, it might follow the “organizational multiplication logic” and increase spending so as to encourage the proliferation of competing organizations, which will then intensify the collective action problem and make it harder for opposition to consolidate power. Each of these strategies can be associated with its own welfare outcome, and, it follows, its own unemployment insurance equilibrium: the first with low or none, the second with generous benefits but narrow coverage, and the last with generous benefits and broad coverage much similar to those in CMEs. This description of the diverse welfare outcomes that authoritarianism may lead to explains why the impact of political regime on my regression analyses has been significant but does not have a consistent direction. Again, while a tentative recognition of political regime’s role is sufficient for the purpose of this paper, further studies would certainly call for a more comprehensive treatment of both it and other relevant variables. Most importantly, and I quote Mares and Carnes, “theories linking regime type and social policy […] need to be grounded in an explanation of the internal political dynamics of these regimes.”

**Conclusion**

The large literature on Varieties of Capitalism has confirmed that training and social protection are institutions belonging to a network
of complementary chains that reinforce each other and lead to the convergence of welfare regimes into opposing clusters. An understanding of institutional complementarity underscores the importance of studying institutions not as stand-alone determinants of political economy outcomes, but as parts of a complex system in which institutions do not only determine, but are also determined by each other. In particular regard to training and social protection, institutional complementarity offers an explanation for the development of each institution in terms of the other, and sheds light on the mechanisms through which these institutions affect redistribution or the international competitiveness of welfare-producing states.

Although the concept is so helpful for the study of political economy, institutional complementarity has never entered the literature on developing economies, leaving the field with only broad and ad hoc benchmarks to categorize countries, such as region or level of economic development. This leaves a weak framework for understanding the development of welfare institutions. This paper attempts to fill in this gap by testing whether a specific element of the concept could be applied to the study of developing countries. In particular, it uses multiple controlled regression models with robust standard errors to test whether training in industry-specific skills and unemployment insurance also complement each other in developing countries like they do in developed economies. It finds that a robust and significant complimentary relationship exists between the two institutions, but also that the relationship is weaker and dependent on at least two exogenous variables – the informal economy and the political regime of the country. It has also explored some of the ways in which these two variables can influence the relationship between the study variables, and discussed the difficulty in comprehensively understanding these influences.

The findings of this paper suggest that an institutional complementarity perspective may indeed benefit the study of developing countries’ economies. Among its implications is the possibility of categorizing developing economies into “peer groups,” similar to the varieties of capitalism approach to developed economies. Knowing that institutions in developing economies have the same reinforcing interaction would also open up alternative approaches to research on the development and/or the lack thereof of institutions in these economies. Policy makers would also be able to rely on this knowledge to prescribe and promote the set of institutions that would fit best with a country’s other institutions.

However, as this paper focuses only on one limited element of institutional complementarity, tests that focus on other elements also need to be carried out before its implications can be taken as conclusive. In particular, future study could focus on the relationship between employment insurance and training firm-specific skills so as to complete the picture of social protection-training complementarity in developing countries. Research into trends at the individual level such as that done by Iversen and Soskice may also prove helpful. As suggested in the last section of this paper, it is also important for further studies to look more closely into the effects of the informal economy and authoritarianism on institutional complementarity, and to identify the determinants of these important variables. Once these have been done, literature on the political economy of developing countries would be able to make important progresses.

This paper itself could benefit from some improvements. To begin with, better sources of data could provide it with more reliable measurements of the study variables. For instance, the measurement of unemployment insurance could be supported by data on the coverage and eligibility of unemployment insurance policy, while the measurements of training could be reinforced with data on tenure rates. In general, greater availability of data would allow more observations to include and increase the robustness of the regression models. Yet, in light of both the stifling lack of reliable data, the robust results my regression models have nevertheless arrived at do deserve some credit.
Endnotes


14. UNESCO, "Unesco Data Centre."


21. Ibid.


25. Mares and Carnes, "Social Policy in Developing Countries.


29. Ibid.


31. Mares and Carnes, "Social Policy in Developing Countries.

32. Ibid.

33. Rudra, "Welfare States in Developing Countries: Unique or Universal?"

34. Iversen and Soskice, "An Asset Theory of Social Preferences."

Bibliography


his study examines how allopathic medicine’s presence in India has affected the practice of Ayurvedic medicine and, to some extent, homeopathy in Dehradun, Uttarakhand. It examines integrative medicine, in this case the interaction of allopathy with Ayurveda and homeopathy, at all three levels of the Indian healthcare system: the public sector, the private for-profit sector, and the private non-profit sector. Ayurvedic and homeopathic practitioners recognize which situations they handle best and which ones require them to call upon the assistance of allopathic doctors. Their education programs also include some allopathic teachings. This study does not investigate how allopathic doctors incorporate Ayurveda into their practices, providing a potential avenue for further study.

Introduction

When one culture implements its dominion and practices in another, the indigenous traditions face three possible fates: extinction, coexistence, or symbiosis. Traditional medicine in India—which includes Ayurveda, Yoga, and Siddha—has flirted promisingly with the final path. However, it still falls under the demeaning classification of complementary or alternative medicine, ignorantly assigned the acronym AYUSH along with the Indian-adopted medical systems of Naturopathy (grouped with Yoga), Unani, and Homeopathy. This study’s main objective consists of investigating how the introduction of allopathic medicine into India has affected the practice of Ayurveda, with some attention to homeopathy for comparative purposes, in Dehradun, Uttarakhand, at all three levels of the Indian healthcare system: the public sector, the private for-profit sector and the private non-profit sector. The one-month period spent in Dehradun allowed for two days’ observation and semi-structured interviewing at a government Ayurvedic hospital; one day at another public sector institution; one day at a healthcare center with teaching facilities; a single-session, in-depth interview with each of the doctors from the private for-profit sector; and two business days with an NGO in a rural area. To protect the identity of those interviewed, this paper uses pseudonyms.

This study’s main question assumed the foundational and institutional separation of Ayurvedic and allopathic medicine in India, reflected in the hypotheses: 1) Ayurvedic medicine has suffered due to the introduction of allopathic medicine into India because the British colonial regime promoted the latter, and 2) class may influence the decision to use Ayurvedic versus allopathic medicine in that the poor, overwhelmingly from rural villages, utilize Ayurvedic medicine because they have access to its teachings, disseminated through the generations, and to medicinal plants. Homeopathy has no hypotheses devoted specifically to it because of the assumption that the previously listed hypotheses would hold true for it as well, based in turn on the

Rebecca Harburg. Rebecca Harburg will graduate from Colorado College in May 2013 with an Anthropology major and a Spanish minor. She hopes to become an Oriental medicine practitioner in an integrative medicine setting. She enjoys writing, running, cooking, and singing in the shower.
assumption that homeopathy classifies as a form of Indian traditional medicine, when in fact it came to India after allopathy did.

Misleading Terminology

The AYUSH acronym, as previously mentioned, reflects a lack of appreciation for the diversity between the medicine systems it groups together. This inappropriate umbrella label ignores its components’ different origins and beliefs while emphasizing one quality they do share: namely, that they do not fall under the category of allopathic medicine, leading to their branding as complementary or alternative medical options. These terms come with their own misleading characteristics; complementary implies incompleteness (without allopathy) and alternative implies a standard (of allopathy). Silvia Waisse Priven writes that the “concept, and as such…construction,” of “‘alternative’ medicine…emerged in the last 200 years in dialectic opposition to the emergence of ‘official’ medicine.” The conception of this opposition changed significantly during that time period, including “‘quackery’ as opposed to ‘proper’ medicine—a notion evolving since the foundation of medical faculties in the middle ages”—and “‘homeopathy’ versus ‘allopathy’, from the 1810s-50s onwards.”

Even the 2002 National Policy on Indian Systems of Medicine and Homoeopathy (ISM&H), which uses its title’s much more progressive and knowledgeable terminology, still refers to traditional medicine as “Complementary and Alternative Medicine” in section 1.3. For these reasons, this paper will use the term “integrative” or “integrated medicine” where appropriate and will treat homeopathy separately from Ayurveda. Because homeopathy has Western origins, it will also use the term allopathic medicine instead of Western medicine.

Ayurveda:
The “Knowledge for a Long Life”

Recognition of and appreciation for the interaction between Ayurvedic and allopathic medicine require at least a passing familiarity with the methods unique to Ayurveda. Any Ayurvedic physician will assert that allopathic medicine focuses on prescribing medication to treat symptoms for quick relief but does not address their root causes, while Ayurveda looks to lifestyle choices first—hence its reputation for providing preventive medicine. Ayurveda uses the concept of prakriti, or nature, to describe the different exercise, diet, and herbal needs of individuals. Each individual classifies as a body type or combination thereof composed of different doshas, or elements. Panchakarma, the five-step process composing the main treatment of Ayurveda, consists of vamana (medicated emesis), virechana (medicated purgation), basti with an enema that either contains oil (the third step) or an herbal decoction (the fourth step), and nasyam (nose treatment). Other Ayurvedic methods include shiodhara, the streaming of medicated oil onto the head, and abhyanga, or medicated oil massage.

Homeopathy:
Helping the Body Help Itself, or “Like Cures Like”

While the main treatment of Ayurveda consists of a five-step process, homeopathic remedies essentially involve just two steps: a brief consultation and/or examination followed by prescription of the appropriate highly diluted medication. The available literature on homeopathy deals primarily with the effectiveness of this type of medicine, but an interview with Dr. Iravat Nayar revealed that his patients come to him as “diehard fans” of homeopathy or to use it as a last resort for a recurring disease. He normally advises patients to take an integrated approach—to use the diagnostic tools and emergency services offered in an allopathic center and to otherwise only turn to allopathy if homeopathic remedies do not yield results within a few days.

The influence of allopathy on homeopathy in India, as seen in Dr. Nayar’s willingness to refer his patients to allopathic doctors despite
his subtle hostility towards allopathic medicine, illuminates the scope of the allopathic agenda established by the British colonial government, especially considering that homeopathy actually came to India after allopathy. Dr. Nayar believes that homeopathy should have its own governmental department, just as it has its own doctors working alongside Ayurvedic and allopathic practitioners in some village PHCs and district hospitals. He also foresees a growing awareness about homeopathy despite the government’s lack of knowledge about it.

How the Field Sites Fit into the Indian Healthcare System

Brijesh C. Purohit summarizes the three main players of the Indian healthcare system: the public sector, consisting of central, state, and local governments and their institutions and further divided into primary care provided by sub-centers and primary health centers (PHCs), secondary care provided by community health centers (CHCs) and district hospitals, and tertiary care provided by teaching and specialty hospitals; the private for-profit sector; and the private not-for-profit sector, such as NGOs.

In Dehradun, the Government Ayurvedic Hospital and Panchakarma Center (Majara) classifies as a primary health center and the Doon Hospital as a district hospital. A homeopathic doctor and an Ayurvedic practitioner offer perspectives from the private for-profit sector. The NGO Community Family Health International (CFHI) and the institution Himalayan Institute Hospital Trust (HIHT) operate in the private not-for-profit sector, but this paper will focus more on the latter’s teaching hospital classification rather than its independence from the government to provide an example from the tertiary care subdivision.

According to the Indian Constitution, the states carry the primary responsibility of healthcare. This helps explain the large inter-state variation in health indicators, enumerated by Tarun Seem. South India fares best in terms of health according to Seem. Jugnu Nathawat, an AYUSH doctor at the Doon Hospital, qualifies this statement by pointing out that Uttarakhand, home to Dehradun, fares better than the Eastern and other North Indian states, especially with respect to integrative medicine efforts. The government has tried to develop AYUSH medical tourism in Uttarakhand as in Kerala—rich in health and AYUSH, especially Ayurveda. South Indian soil also provided the birthing grounds for Ayurveda. In addition, the government has declared Uttarakhand an “AYUSH state” because of its likeness to Kerala in size, wealth of natural resources for AYUSH medicines, and abundance of panchakarma centers. Dr. Raju Mishra of one such center at HIHT says that more than 75 percent of the people who come for the panchakarma program there come from abroad, including the United States, where allopathic medicine does not have the opportunity to work together with the Ayurvedic tradition.

Education

Homeopathic education involves 4.5 years of study at a school specializing in homeopathy and a one-year internship at the school’s hospital. Students of homeopathy don’t receive instruction about allopathic pharmacology, but they do learn allopathic anatomy during their schooling. The requirements to become a vaidya, the Sanskrit word for “doctor,” engage allopathic medicine to a slightly greater degree: a Bachelor of Ayurvedic Medicine and Surgery (BAMS) degree requires 4.5 years of study at an Ayurvedic institution and one year of internships broken down into three months at the aspiring vaidya’s college facilities, three months at an Ayurvedic PHC, and six months at an allopathic clinic, says Vaidya Sana Pandey, an intern at the Government Ayurvedic Hospital and Panchakarma Center (Majara). Some schools even offer Ayurvedic and allopathic training, licensing graduates to practice both types of medicine. Uday Pai, the CFHI doctor in the rural village Patti outside of Dehradun, went through this sort of program. It required five years of study and one year of residency. If he had
wanted to specialize, Dr. Pai says, he would have studied for three more years.

Perceptions of the extent to which Ayurvedic educational institutions prepare each graduate to become a vaidya vary over the years. Vaidya Pandey says she has gained “quite a lot of experience” along the path to earning her BAMS. Vaidya Sutara Kapoor, who runs the out-patient department (OPD) at the hospital where Vaidya Pandey interns, says that Ayurvedic education has improved from when she received her Ayurvedic training and the internship period lasted only six months, three in an allopathic clinic and three at her college hospital. She expects improvements in Ayurvedic facilities as well, referring to now as the “time of Ayurveda” as the number of people accepting this tradition increases.

However, an earlier study of the quality of Indian Ayurvedic education conducted by Kishor Patwardhan et al. from September 2005 to October 2008 warned against equating increasing quantity and increasing quality. It distributed a mail-in questionnaire by random cluster sampling to students and professors at 10 percent of institutions from each geographical zone of India, studying a total of 32 Ayurvedic colleges from the 242 spread over 28 states and seven union territories. The study found that while the quantity of Ayurvedic colleges may show an increasing trend, poor infrastructure and facilities due to a lack of financial support have led to a setback in the quality of clinical training. One can only assume a delay between the written reporting of this study’s findings and their publishing (2011) because Patwardhan et al. state that “India follows the…‘parallel approach’” segregating traditional and modern systems of medicine within the national health system and advocate the “integrated approach” to address the “serious flaws in the existing system of…graduate level Ayurvedic education.” However, Dr. Mishra says the Indian government upholds medical pluralism, recognizing more than six systems of medicine. While Patwardhan et al. suggest that only increased coordination with allopathic medicine services can provide the necessary exposure to basic clinical skills during medical education, Vaidya Pandey, Vaidya Kapoor, and Dr. Mishra all seem to feel that the current education requirements not only prepare vaidyas for the medical field, but for its integrated environment as well.

Though Indian medical pluralism permeates Ayurvedic and to some extent homeopathic education in that both curricula include allopathic principles such as modern anatomy, it does not follow that allopathic education systems cover Ayurvedic or homeopathic methods. Even HIHT, founded in 1989 ahead of its time by Swami Rama for the purpose of providing integrated medicine, offers only allopathic medical education. Although the university has a wide variety of specialties but no Ayurvedic, homeopathic, or yogic teaching facilities despite providing these services at the care level, Allopathic education does not necessarily need to reciprocate Ayurvedic and homeopathic education’s initiative to teach some of its tools, but this would support the vision of an establishment like HIHT, which otherwise represents integrated medicine in practice but not in education.

**Funding**

If the quality of Ayurvedic education does lag, it has most likely resulted from the root problem of inadequate funding. According to the 2002 National Policy on Indian Systems of Medicine and Homoeopathy, ISM&H receives only two percent of India’s total health budget, while the remainder goes toward allopathic medicine. Furthermore, the different components of ISM&H show a funding disparity—Ayurveda, because of its native origins, receives a bigger portion than homeopathy of the monetary crumbs awarded to these “non-allopathic” systems. Though the overall public sector spending on health in India comes to just 0.9 percent of the GDP, traditional and Indian-adopted medicine systems bear the brunt of the deficit, visible in their small and in some cases poorly maintained public facilities.

For example, Vaidya Kapoor acknowledges that the Ayurvedic PHC
where she works cannot offer many services. It provides panchakarma for five rupees and an Ayurvedic medicine dispensary included in the base fee but must refer to allopathic hospitals for diagnostic tests such as ultrasounds. Vaidya Kapoor implies that because of the few services that the Government Ayurvedic Hospital and Panchakarma Center (Majara) can offer, the government has determined a meager two rupees’ charge for an OPD consultation there (1 Indian rupee=0.0181 U.S. dollars). Although this low base fee means that even those less well-off can afford to go to the PHC, it also means that the PHC cannot afford to invest in the technologies that would deem it worthy of a higher base fee from the perspective of the government. This perpetuates the need for patients to travel between healthcare providers in cases of referral, putting a damper on the potential for integrative medicine to function under one roof.

History

How did a practice that once garnered so much respect end up on the backburner in terms of financial priority? Efforts to marginalize Ayurveda began when allopathic medicine came to India with the British colonial regime in the eighteenth century. According to Tej Ram Jat, this poses a penetrating historical challenge to the evolving reputation of Ayurveda because when introduced into India, allopathic medicine catered to English and urban elite interests, ignoring Indian systems of medicine. In the late nineteenth century, the colonial state sought to remove Ayurveda from cantonments, governmental hospitals, and medical colleges, writes Madhulika Banerjee. Appointed in 1943, the Health Survey and Development Committee, commonly referred to as the Bhore Committee, set a tone of hostility towards indigenous systems of medicine in post-war India.

However, Ayurveda did not disappear from the government’s conscience completely. The Chopra Committee (On Indigenous Systems of Medicine) 1948 report argued for integrated education of traditional and allopathic medicine systems, standardized research and production parameters to serve the modern needs of commercial drug manufacturing, and catalyzed specialization in the traditional medicine systems as provided by exposure to biomedical techniques. In essence, this committee did not believe in separating Indian and allopathic medicine.

The institutionalization of Ayurvedic education and the professionalization of its practice followed in the next 25 years or so. The Udapa Committee then addressed the issue of pharmaceutical products, arguing that modernization of this sector for Ayurveda would require mass-production. The Indian government established a separate department for ISM&H, now known as AYUSH, in 1995, but Patwardhan et al. see this as a move both “[t]o patronize and promote” these systems. Most recently, the 2002 National Policy on Indian Systems of Medicine & Homeopathy stressed the importance of integrative medicine. The basic objectives of the policy include expanding the reach, development, and affordability of traditional Indian medicine by such strategies as regulating traditional medicine educational institutions, encouraging each PHC to have an ISM&H wing, and increasing funding to the corresponding portion of the health budget. Based on the policy’s draft stages, Banerjee opines that it “appears to balance dominant market concerns with smaller forces, but only time will tell if the apparent equal consideration of multiple stakeholders plays out.”

Indian & Allopathic Medicine: Too Different at the Roots to Share Common Ground?

The likelihood of integrative medicine becoming a widespread reality in India depends in part upon the reconcilability of allopathic and traditional Indian medicine practices, in which their roots and foundational principles play a significant role. Allopathic medicine developed simultaneously with the European capitalist system in the eighteenth century, creating a social rather than an “individually-oriented biomedicine... because it socialised the body as a function of both the labour force and
the productive forces,” according to Carlos J. Moreno Leguizamon. It grew out of a non-religious environment characterized by the “increasing secularisation of society against the dominance of Protestant and Catholic ethics” and the Enlightenment, “a period of truth, rationality, and scientific reason.” Allopathic medicine defined health as the absence of illness in the body, underlining “material, physical, and visible dimensions.” It “medicalised the notion of health,” visible in the scientific steps of diagnosis and autopsy and the creation of the hospital. René Descartes’ separation of body and mind influenced allopathic medicine as well, and the anatomical body became the blueprint for locating and diagnosing disease.

Ayurveda, on the other hand, comprises “the wholeness of life’s harmony and balance, addressing the dimensions of an individual’s physical, emotional, and spiritual” coexistence and taking a holistic approach. It does not separate the functioning of the body “from the greater whole of the other parts of” individuals “nor from the world around” including “socio-cultural arenas.” In other words, Ayurveda sees the body and its environment as inextricably linked. Drawn from a cosmology reflecting aspects of Hinduism, Ayurveda relates health and environment and operates through the notion of prevention.

The Ayurvedic body consists of a compound of channels with substances flowing through them, kept open through eating primarily and medication secondarily.

Yet even students of Ayurvedic medicine study the anatomy and physiology of modern medicine in the first segment of their education program, providing just one example of how various medical perspectives can overlook their different backgrounds. This development shows that Ayurvedic and allopathic medicine have accepted the challenge of reconciling their two different foundations and theories, a step whose undertaking Banerjee viewed with a skeptical eye following the Chopra Committee’s proposal to integrate Ayurvedic and allopathic medicine education. At the extreme, advocates of “pure Ayurveda,” led by Pandit Shiv Sharma, look down upon any sort of adoption of allopathic methodology in Ayurvedic practices, writes Charles Leslie. However, they have dropped off the radar (and Sharma dropped dead) amidst growing acceptance of the methodology behind the “integrationist argument” first voiced by Dr. Lenora. Lenora argued that Ayurvedic practitioners must “give up their erroneous ideas” by learning from allopathic medicine’s new and evidence-based findings so that Ayurveda can progress.

Differences aside, allopathic and Ayurvedic medicine share an empirical character in that they rely upon observation and consultation. Contrary to the belief that the modernization of Asian medicine has relied upon “a one-way process in which Ayurvedic and [Unani] physicians have borrowed ideas and institutional forms from… Western [allopathic] medicine”, each has shaped the other. Orientalists, who argued against contemporary Indian civilization’s inferiority to the West, “provided the ideological platform for an indigenous movement that has transformed traditional medical learning in modern South Asia” and “adopted technology, ideas, and institutional forms from the evolving cosmopolitan system,” engraining in Indian society “the syncretism between Ayurveda and cosmopolitan medicine…first noted in rural India in the 1950s.” While Darshan Shankar and Ram Manohar concede that “[t]he foundational theories, principles, concepts[,] and categories” providing the basis for allopathic and traditional Indian medicine differ, they believe that “both approaches undoubtedly have their uses.” In a similar vein, Banerjee stresses the need to integrate traditional medicine into the overall healthcare delivery system, specifically “in regard to the preventive…health objectives.”

A Niche for Slow-Brewing Ayurveda in “the Age of Instant Coffee”

The idea to have the preventive aspects of Ayurveda—which includes the relevant specialized areas of Pathyapathya (dietetics) and Svasthavrtta (preventive medicine)—serve as its primary function in the
broader healthcare system has received significant support. All of the Ayurvedic practitioners interviewed stated that they have not tried allopathic treatments because of their faith in Ayurveda and because they have experienced the effectiveness of Ayurvedic medicine. However, one child with muscular dystrophy receiving a medicated oil massage had sought allopathic treatment at the highly renowned All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) in New Delhi, with no luck. Similarly, Mandaar Johar sought his first greeva basti treatment for cervical spondylosis at Doon Hospital because painkillers and physiotherapy had only temporarily quelled his symptoms.

The Ayurvedic Center at HIHT has the benefit of residential facilities, allowing it to regulate the diet and exercise of its patients as well. Visitors eat specially prepared meals and participate in yoga sessions three times a day. Dr. Mishra says that both the healthy and the sick come for treatment; for the latter, the practitioners simply follow a slightly different procedure, providing detoxification before the panchakarma therapy itself and prescribing Ayurvedic medicine to complement its effects.

Ayurveda’s attention to preventive medicine, an area that allopathic medicine has developed to a much lesser degree, coupled with the changing face of disease in India make a strong argument for a greater investment in its role in the Indian healthcare system in general and in its aptitude for preventive medicine specifically. Seem argues that traditional medicine’s most useful purpose lies in the prevention and treatment of non-communicable diseases rather than urgent issues. Meanwhile, Jayanti Singh points out that chronic diseases account for 60 percent of deaths worldwide, 80 percent of which take place in developing countries. The nature of the diseases responsible for the majority of deaths among the Indian population has switched from communicable to non-communicable, prompting Singh to argue that as a middle-income country, India should focus more on the latter. In “the age of instant coffee,” as Dr. Nayar says, lifestyle changes have caused people to opt for the quick relief provided by allopathic drugs—and, though he may not have noticed this second meaning, for unhealthier diet choices (like instant coffee) leading to certain so-called lifestyle diseases. In addition to the prevalence of these diseases, Singh emphasizes that preventive methods of healthcare, which could include those offered by Ayurveda, cost less than allopathic medicine’s pharmaceutical drugs.
The Architecture of Integrative Medicine

Though integrative medicine still occurs when a patient has to visit two different institutions for his or her allopathic and Ayurvedic medicine treatments, the burden it puts on the patient before he or she can see the benefits decreases with the availability of a holistic hospital, offering wings for different kinds of medicine. According to Barun Mukhopadhyay, it has become a regular practice for each community of the Sikkim-Darjeeling Himalayas “to adopt pluralistic health care regimen[s] in combating illness episodes,” employing a “mix of both traditional and modern medical practices...for different kinds of diseases.” This provides an example of integration at the medical level alone, while it can also occur at the structural level; the Doon Hospital, for example, offers Ayurveda, yoga, homeopathy, and allopathy. Dr. Nathawat, an AYUSH practitioner at the Doon Hospital, points out that while each wing maintains its own infrastructure, inter-wing traffic occurs when necessary, i.e. when he and his colleagues refer trauma patients to allopathic care or when allopathic doctors see patients needing treatment for lifestyle, chronic, autoimmune, or degenerative diseases.

By a government mandate issued two to three years ago, Dr. Nathawat estimates, each government allopathic hospital must offer an AYUSH wing. However, this has not occurred at all levels of the healthcare system. From the district to the village levels, the infrastructure remains separate for ISM&H and allopathy, yet even some private hospitals have begun to open AYUSH and/or homeopathic wings. This initiative to physically pair ISM&H with allopathic medicine may suggest a practical and philosophical marriage of the two as well. Jean Langford argues that “medical institutions play an important role in the construction of core medical categories.” In other words, the floor plan of these institutions largely reflects the ideologies of medicine put into practice within them. As Michel Foucault argues, “the technologies and organization of the modern hospital allow” disease’s separation “from the larger context of the social environment” and its location within bodies, construed as passive. Thus, some hospitals as currently constructed hinder the growth efforts of holistic and preventive medicine.

The construction of the Government Ayurvedic Hospital and Panchakarma Center (Majara) helps remind the majority of its visitors for what purpose they came—to receive preventive treatment and continue on their merry way—but it does not help those with more urgent problems. The hospital has various features: the OPD consultation room at the front and the medicine dispensary open to the street; the panchakarma treatment rooms, which don’t have hospital beds, along the right side of the main hallway; and a small room with just two beds off to the left of this hallway, with the lights kept off, indicating that patients do not usually stay there. However, for those patients whom Kapoor referred to the Doon Hospital because they had issues that required allopathic treatment or services offered in a more well-equipped healthcare center, the hospital’s construction presented an inconvenience. For this reason, Vachan Ghantasala, who uses allopathic medicine primarily and Ayurveda for chronic diseases, would much prefer Ayurveda and allopathy to work together under one roof.

Same Roof, Same Shelf: Integrated Medicine, CFHI-Style

CFHI places health science students in underserved communities to provide free healthcare and distributes medical supplies. The associated clinic in Patti, a somewhat treacherous jeep ride from Dehradun, runs Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays from nine to one and three to five. On Tuesdays and Thursdays, the clinic packs out and sets up a medical camp in different villages, the farthest of which requires a 10-hour walk round-trip through the mountains in order to reach it. Both the Patti clinic and the medical camp based there rely upon the combined use of Ayurvedic and allopathic medicine, says Dr. Pai, who has worked in rural areas since 1982 and with CFHI since 2000, having transferred to Patti three years ago.
ago. The National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), a government program, also operates in Patti, but the Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) working for it often come to the CFHI clinic for help, Dr. Pai notes, as these village women have limited training and focus primarily on maternal and child health while CFHI has the resources of Ayurveda and allopathy at its fingertips.

How or whether to combine these two systems depends upon the type of disease and to some extent patient preference, Dr. Pai says. For chronic illness, Dr. Pai tends to rely primarily upon Ayurvedic medicine; for acute illness he generally prescribes allopathic drugs. Dr. Pai sees a fair number of hemorrhoids cases, for example, for which Ayurveda can offer a treatment while allopathy provides only a surgical solution. Dr. Pai refers patients needing pathology, diagnostic tests, and/or major surgery to Dehradun, but if they miss the morning jeep heading in that direction, they have to wait until the next morning to catch it or find another way of getting there.

The issues Dr. Pai most commonly sees in and around Patti have a different profile than the emerging non-communicable disease trend in India. Malnutrition plagues the villages more than diabetes does because the lifestyle there requires hard work and does not always supply the calories and nutrients essential to replenish that exertion. In addition to lack of adequate food supply, malnutrition can result from lack of education about healthy diet choices, which CFHI addresses in its medical camp education programs on health and hygiene, HIV, water sanitation, and vaccination. A local woman in each of nine villages serves as a health promoter trained in these areas as well as first aid and delivery by the sustainable “train-the-trainer” philosophy. Perhaps as a result of these education initiatives, Dr. Pai has not seen evidence to substantiate the claims—often from doctors who do not even work in rural areas—that in some cases villagers setback their health further with harmful traditional medicine practices. The home remedies he occasionally comes across could classify as traditional only in the sense that they have passed down through the generations, not necessarily from Ayurvedic origins. That said, Dr. Nathawat at the Doon Hospital says that AYUSH’s popularity shows in rural areas especially, even with the increase in the urban-area demand for AYUSH within the last 10 to 15 years.

Observation in the Patti clinic also reveals that the villagers must hold an intense respect for Ayurveda. The first visitor of the day brought in an ultrasound of a child’s kidney stones and requested that Dr. Pai prescribe Ayurvedic treatment. Dr. Pai nodded in agreement, mumbling something about the allopathic surgical option costing 20,000 to 30,000 rupees, as he dictated to himself the Ayurvedic remedy: Cystone; Niri; Patharchata, a plant ground with water and taken orally; and Kuhl, a dal. This shows true complementary medicine at the most basic level: two forms of medicine complementing each other by offering what the other cannot. Allopathy provided the diagnostic test, and Ayurveda supplied relatively inexpensive treatment. In some cases, Dr. Pai prescribes allopathic and Ayurvedic medications for the same issue. A patient with shoulder pain received directions to use Mahanarayan oil, an Ayurvedic treatment, and Advil, the well-known allopathic drug. A young girl with chronic epilepsy stopped in for a routine check-up, as her condition had stabilized thanks to the combined Ayurvedic and allopathic treatment.
regimen Dr. Pai had her try.

The many patients prescribed a combination of allopathic and Ayurvedic medications do not have to go to multiple pharmacies in order to see those prescriptions filled. They need only walk across the hall from the office where Dr. Pai does consultations to the pharmacy where Vijul Shah distributes medications for free. A villager who learns the necessary pharmacist skills from Dr. Pai, Shah doesn’t know what pharmacy schooling requires—for example, whether pharmacists who fill prescriptions for both Ayurvedic and allopathic medicines must have some sort of background knowledge of each system. He does, however, believe that the side-by-side prescription of Ayurvedic and allopathic drugs has become more and more common.

The phenomenon of the private clinic run by a single practitioner brings to light the out-of-pocket, into pocket scenario. In his private homeopathic clinic, for example, Dr. Nayar takes payment from his patients and puts it directly into his wallet before they have even left his office. The OPD charge in the Government Ayurvedic Hospital and Panchakarma Center (Majara) would not even buy a day’s worth of medicine from Dr. Nayar’s private dispensary, located behind his office; he charges 200 to 400 rupees per week for medicines and 500 rupees for first consultation. To his credit, however, Dr. Nayar waived the consultation fee for a poorer patient.

Ayurveda and allopathy in India have both spread their reach since their roots among the upper classes, but private institutions still mostly cater to the wealthy. As allopathic medicine established an early alliance with English and urban elite interests, Ayurveda grew out of the Brahminic tradition in South India because of its Sanskrit textual basis, according to Margaret Trawick. The transmission of the Ayurvedic tradition occurred exclusively between generations of families (typically among males) until the establishment of Ayurvedic colleges. While Trawick argues that “the Sanskrit component remains central” still “and the modernization of Ayurveda, like its traditional transmission, remains largely in Brahman hands,” Vaidya Kapoor believes that unlike in ancient times, any person regardless of class or socio-economic status can seek an Ayurvedic degree and/or treatment. The similarity in treatment preference between rural and urban areas supports Vaidya Kapoor’s assertion that class does not serve as a determining factor. An all-India household survey conducted by the National Council of Applied Economic Research in 1995 showed that 80 percent of urban households used allopathic medicine and only four percent used Ayurveda, not much different from rural areas in which 75 percent used allopathic treatment and eight percent used Ayurveda, according to Padma Srinivasan.

The possibility that the increasing use of integrative medicine has in turn amplified Ayurveda’s use does not change this; while in rural areas NGOs like CFHI rely upon Ayurveda as much as allopathy, private Ayurvedic clinics in urban areas provide a balancing counterpart to the private allopathic institutions.

Even though private hospitals do not address the healthcare needs of the poor, Vaidya Kapoor believes that privatization has not hurt Ayurveda and that it will actually develop its infrastructure. She also does not take issue with the modernization of the Ayurvedic drug market, as evidenced by the Ayurvedic medicine flyers decorating the hospital walls and by her voluntary break from OPD consultations to accept an Ayurvedic drug marketing representative’s offer of a few trial
medications. This contradicts Banerjee’s position that a “pharmaceutic episteme” has governed state and civil society organizations’ efforts to modernize Ayurveda by “retaining its usefulness as a mere supplier of new pharmaceuticals and... dismissing its worldview.” He sees this in operation behind the Ayurvedic medicine manufacturing companies and NGOs promoting Ayurveda that cropped up in response to the colonial state’s attempts to suppress it in the late nineteenth century and in the Udapa Committee’s assertion that the modernization of Ayurveda requires the mass-production of its medicines. Vaidya Pandey, like her colleague Vaidya Kapoor, actually pushes for the improved standardization of Ayurvedic drugs. Where Patwardhan et al. see Ayurvedic education standards as the area keeping Ayurveda from reaching its full potential, Vaidya Pandey lays much of the blame with the lack of drug standards.

With the privatization of its practice and the standardization of its drugs, Ayurveda has essentially followed the path of modernization taken by allopathic medicine. But just because allopathic medicine traveled down this path first does not mean that it caused Ayurvedic medicine to do so. As previously mentioned, vaidyas have worked out of small, family-run practices since Ayurveda’s foundation—perhaps the ancient times’ equivalent of today’s private for-profit sector. Then again, perhaps the movement toward privatization and standardization seen by Ayurveda stemmed from that of allopathy, because despite some integration they still hold competitive positions in the same league.

Dr. Pradyot Gowda—who practices Ayurveda primarily as well as yoga, polarity (chakra) therapy, and acupuncture—illuminates a few other reasons for choosing to work in the private for-profit sector. Dr. Gowda went into private practice because he had the opportunity and the necessary resources and because of his own personal domestic preferences; his wife works as a tailor in the shop on the street side of his office, and the couple lives in the same complex. This reflects Dr. Gowda’s dedication to practicing what he preaches: if his patients come early in the morning they can see him doing his daily yoga, as he tells them to do, or if they show up during meal times they can witness him taking his own advice to eat five servings of fruit a day and to drink plenty of water. Though the majority of Dr. Gowda’s patients come to him for chronic diseases, he does sometimes suggest the use of common allopathic medicines for supplementary purposes. Because he concentrates on muscular-skeletal disorders, Dr. Gowda does not have to make referrals to allopathic hospitals as much as some other Ayurvedic practitioners confronted with faithful followers of Ayurveda who have emergency medical issues and need allopathic care.

Like most other Ayurvedic practitioners, Dr. Gowda has a stethoscope on his desk in addition to various Ayurvedic medicines, but he also has a magnifying glass—not a typical medical tool. In addition, his desk features a wide variety of books. Those such as How You Can Get Rich Quicker! and Teach Yourself the Internet in 24 Hours one might expect to see in a private practitioner’s office. Others, on the other hand, one might expect to see accompanying a magnifying glass and Ayurvedic medicines, such as Ayurvedic Remedies and Matrix Energetics. This last title comprises Dr. Gowda’s current reading selection between patients. It theorizes that humans can influence the order or disorder of their smallest component particles, thus dictating the state of their health. Dr. Gowda’s own vitality reflects his health wisdom: at 99 years of age, he has clearly followed Ayurveda’s preventive and holistic philosophies, or as he says: “No matter what you want to do,”—he gives examples such as practicing religion or making money—“you can do it only when your body is sound.”

Conclusions

A sound body requires the cooperation of Ayurveda—and in some cases homeopathy—with allopathic medicine. However, the relationship between Ayurveda and allopathic medicine did not have to follow this more amicable route. Influenced by the literature available on Ayurveda, which overwhelmingly presents a dismal view of its status, this study hypothesized that once the colonial government set the precedent of greater investment in allopathic medicine, Ayurveda would move toward extinction.
and interviews conducted for this study at all three levels of the Indian healthcare system represented by the Government Ayurvedic Hospital and Panchakarma Center (Majara), the Doon Hospital, HIHT, two physician-owned private clinics, and CFHI in Patti, fulfilled the objective of investigating how allopathic medicine’s presence in India has affected the practice of Ayurveda but did not support the hypothesis. Rather, the fieldwork revealed that the relationship between Ayurveda and allopathic medicine has moved beyond mere coexistence to symbiosis; they need each other in order to treat the whole array of medical issues. Allopathic medicine better handles emergencies while Ayurveda and homeopathy provide more effective treatment for chronic diseases. In addition, Ayurveda excels in the realm of preventive medicine.

This study also investigated potential rural and urban as well as class differences in preference for and access to Ayurvedic versus allopathic medicine. In contradiction to the expectation of finding a correlation between rural residence, lower class, and the use of Ayurveda, this study discovered close to no difference in the reasons for using Ayurvedic or allopathic medicine between rural and urban areas or between classes. The degree of their interaction depends upon patient preferences—some patients have predetermined which kind of medicine they want—and upon the doctor’s recommendations, which depend in turn upon the type of issue, i.e. urgent versus chronic.

Integrative medicine also takes the form of referrals from Ayurvedic or homeopathic facilities to allopathic institutions for diagnostic tests. Only the latter has this sort of equipment. Ayurveda has adopted some of allopathy’s diagnostic methods, such as taking blood pressure, due in part to the wider availability and lower cost of the involved equipment. The modernization of Ayurveda has also involved privatization and drug standardization. In general, Ayurvedic and homeopathic practitioners do not prescribe allopathic medications, with the exception of Dr. Pai of the CFHI clinic in Patti, whose educational experience licenses him to do so. Although Dr. Gowda sometimes suggests allopathic medications to patients in his private Ayurvedic practice, the types of allopathic medications he suggests do not require prescriptions and serve supplementary purposes—such as easing pain—to Ayurvedic treatments that may take longer to cure the root medical problem and not just the symptom.

The Ayurvedic and homeopathic education systems reflect the development of integrative medicine as well. Students at homeopathic medicine schools learn allopathic anatomy as do Ayurvedic medicine students, who also spend six months of their internship period in an allopathic institution. Allopathic medicine education, on the other hand, does not cover any teachings of Ayurveda or homeopathy. This segues into a possible question for further study, consisting of whether integrated medicine in India functions as a two-way street, i.e. if allopathic doctors refer chronic disease patients to Ayurvedic hospitals as well.

**Recommendations for Further Study**

It appears from this study’s findings that allopathic medicine’s presence has undeniably influenced the development of Ayurveda and even homeopathy, which came to India sometime after allopathic medicine did. Further study on this topic could investigate the story of integrative medicine from the perspective of allopathic medicine: To what extent do allopathic doctors refer their patients to ISM&H practitioners? When they recognize that a chronic disease shows no promise of responding to allopathic treatment, for example, do allopathic doctors suggest that the patients try Ayurvedic medicine or do they keep attempting to treat the issue allopathically? To answer these questions in full one would need to cover all of the bases by visiting both private and public hospitals and by interviewing doctors as well as patients. In addition, this study may paint a brighter picture of integrative medicine than exists elsewhere in India, as Uttarakhand has the reputation of representing an “AYUSH state.” Further study could also contrast integrative medicine between states, which may involve how other forms of Indian traditional medicine interact with allopathy, as their popularity varies by region.
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s a severe economic downturn took its toll on the country of Ireland, the waves of immigrants entering the country during the Celtic Tiger era stopped coming; indeed, some of these immigrants began emigrating from their adoptive nation, hoping to find better prospects elsewhere. By incorporating original interviews and data and historical analyses, this paper seeks to examine the evolution of the Polish immigrant community in the Greater Dublin Area from its foundations, focusing primarily on migration between the mid-2000s and 2011 and its implications for contemporary Irish culture.

Introduction

The Center for Creative Practices in Dublin, Ireland devotes itself to supporting immigrant and experimental artists and connecting them to the Dublin arts scene. In 2011, in conjunction with the National Audiovisual Institute, Art Polonia, and the Polish Embassy in Dublin, the organization arranged several screenings of documentaries emerging from the Polish Documentary School over the last 50 years. The last of the films screened in November — Diary.pl (2004) — provided a glimpse into the lives of six young individuals living throughout Poland, engaged in everything from art to protest to politics. The subjects of the documentary represent a generation looking to break free from traditional Polish culture.

In 2006, there were over 63,000 individuals of Polish origin living in Ireland, with the vast majority concentrated in the Greater Dublin Area; all in all, this group represents the largest immigrant community aside from nationals of the United Kingdom. Now, Polish shops dot central Dublin. The language dominates cell phone conversations overheard on walks around St. Stephen’s Green, and the waitresses at coffee shops throughout the city all seem to come from small towns outside Krakow. Polska Newsweek lines newsstands, and smalec and canned bigos are for sale at the Dunnes store in the local shopping center.

University College Dublin professor Bryan Fanning noted in 2007 that “the changes wrought by immigration are both pronounced and subtle. Walk around the centre of Dublin and you will see amidst the fly-posters for nightclubs ones for Polish elections; the presumption perhaps being that some voters will slip over to Warsaw or Krakow on polling day by CIE coach or Ryanair.” Indeed, these changes have persisted during the past several years: the Evening Herald publishes a weekly insert in the Polish language; brochures at the local Bank of Ireland branch come in both English and Polish; and some of the largest cultural organizations in Dublin — like Art Polonia — sprang recently from the work of Eastern European immigrants.

Ultimately, many emigrants from Poland left for economic reasons, wanting to escape painfully high unemployment rates. Others sought social freedom or the chance to fly on the wings of adventure. But to speak of a homogenous Polish community in Ireland would be a gross generalization. Even if the greater part came in search of money, they have stayed for a wide

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range of reasons that are no longer fundamentally economic. This paper seeks to explore these causes via data analysis and personal interviews with immigrants, made possible with the help of the Department of Russian and Slavonic Studies at Trinity College Dublin and Forum Polonia; complete interview transcripts are presented as an appendix. Some interviewees are cited using solely first names in an attempt to respect privacy and underscore that the Polish immigrant story is not one story at all, but a seemingly limitless collection of narratives that are always in flux and always deeply personal.

Pre-Accession:
Early Migrations and the Foundations of Irish Economic Success

Migration is defined as “leaving the country of origin for a purpose other than tourism or leisure.” Often, migrations are categorized by the nature of the decision (voluntary vs. forced), reason for migration, duration of stay, geographical distance of move and the legal character of the migration. Before the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, emigration from Poland occurred predominantly as a result of political factors. Beginning in the 1800s, the country experienced a significant outflow as individuals began to leave the rural areas in response to the emancipation of peasants. Around 1830, after the November Uprising (an armed rebellion in the then-partitioned nation, fought against the Russian Empire) approximately 10,000 exiles left Poland due to persecution. Following the end of World War I, those plagued by poverty and oppression left to seek labor markets elsewhere, especially in North America and Western Europe. In the wake of World War II, Eastern European governments instituted policies that prevented emigration, in effect closing the borders and eliminating mobility.

After 1989, movement came mostly as a result of economic pull factors elsewhere in the world. Blockades to emigration were lifted with the collapse of communist governments, ending isolationism. The end of Martial Law brought spikes in the numbers of Poles heading to North America and both Eastern and Western European countries, as well as the initial formation of strong Polish migrant communities, particularly in the United States. Most of the Polish citizens leaving the country in the early 1990s did so with the intention of engaging in short-term, semi-legal labor that would provide funds with which to return to the homeland. During this time, member states of the European Union began to open their borders, enabling individuals to enter and work in their countries without visas, albeit for restricted periods of time.

At the start of the 20th century, Ireland was still a mostly agricultural country. Following the Great Famine in the mid-1800s, rural Ireland transformed into an area of land-owning peasants on family farms producing about 86 percent of the country’s exports in 1924. The period between 1922 and 1932 in Ireland was marked by comparative advantage, during which Ireland specialized in the production and export of dairy, bacon, eggs and beef. It was during this time that the position of Minister of Agriculture came into being, reinforcing the agricultural sector of Irish society. As University of Limerick Scholar Peadar Kirby states in his analysis of the Celtic Tiger, “industrial development was largely neglected” during this interval, and the government paid little attention to the socio-economic development of its citizens.

Around 1959, Ireland’s focus shifted to industrialization and the government began to protect young industrial institutions. Tariffs rose from about 10 percent to 45 percent by 1936. After the Second World War, Ireland struggled to maintain productivity in the face of neutrality and distance from Western European trading markets. The liberalization of the Irish economy took place in the late 1950s, when a new Minister for Finance began to focus on economic expansion. Policies promoting foreign direct investment were implemented, and free secondary education was established in the 1960s; Ireland entered the European Community in 1973. Although the country experienced relatively high unemployment rates at the start of its industrialization — unemployment rose from 7.3 percent in 1980 to 17.3 percent in 1985 — the sector of the labor force unable to find work declined drastically in the late 1990s. Beginning in about 1994, the nation experienced annual rates of GDP growth of about seven percent, allowing
for improvement in standard of living and huge growth in the labor market. Poles entering Ireland around 1997 due to the initial boom in the Irish economy formed the forth wave of Polish immigrants moving to Ireland pre-accession to the EU. The first wave occurred at the end of World War II when the Irish government offered approximately 1,000 scholarships for Polish students wanting to attend university in Ireland. The second wave coincided with emigration of members of the Solidarity movement in the 1980s (political exiles effectively unable to return to their home country), and the third wave — known as the “migration of hearts” — was made up of females emigrating to marry Irish males. The economic growth that brought the fourth wave created shortages in both low- and high-skilled worker groups, reversing emigration from Ireland and encouraging population growth. The notable wage difference between Ireland and Eastern European countries like Poland compelled families to send members West in order to accumulate wealth that could be sent back home. Over time, these immigrants changed the face of the labor force in Ireland and fed into sectors of the economy such as services and construction, rather than the traditional agriculture and manufacturing industries.

Table 1: Irish economic and employment growth, 1993-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>Labor force (000s)</th>
<th>Unemployment rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1386</td>
<td>15.6</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1423</td>
<td>14.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1452</td>
<td>12.3</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>1498</td>
<td>11.7</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1560</td>
<td>9.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8.5</td>
<td>1645</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>1713</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1767</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1810</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1845</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1882</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Key changes in economy and society, 1987-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GNP</th>
<th>Population (000s)</th>
<th>Unemployment (000s)</th>
<th>Migration (000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>3567</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>3668</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>-5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>3664</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>3847</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>3979</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Celtic Tiger:
Rapid Immigration Influx and The Rise of a Community

“Just a few years ago, Ireland had almost no immigrants at all,” National Public Radio host Renee Montagne reported in August 2006. “Now, thanks to the Irish economic miracle, the country has been transformed and immigrants have flooded in.” By the early 2000s, smaller government and focus on foreign direct investment had turned Ireland into an economic powerhouse. A rising minimum wage was paired with slight reductions in the income tax. By 2004, Ireland’s GDP continued to expand by over four percent annually, and unemployment remained at just over four percent. When Poland joined the European Union in 2004, the Polish minimum wage was approximately 177 euros per month, compared to the Irish minimum wage of 1073 euros per month. At 20 percent, the Polish unemployment rate was the highest among all 25 countries in the EU.

Ireland became one of three countries — in addition to the UK and Sweden — to open its labor markets to the citizens of the ten new EU member states. As a result, incoming Poles could work without obtaining visas or working permits. This move enabled immigrants to find jobs in sectors of the workforce normally reserved for nationals, such as military and police force careers, according to Bart, a finance officer who moved to Dublin in 2006. Many of those who left Poland to find employment in Western Europe became embedded in the lowest levels of the labor market, often taking on low-skilled jobs as construction workers and laborers. In actuality many Poles emigrating to Ireland formed an economic group with differing characteristics; according to data from the Central Statistics Office, 31 percent of Polish nationals working in Ireland in 2006 were non-manual workers, and many of the manual workers were well-educated youth working below their skill level. Rather than being delegated by family members to earn money for a family based in Eastern Europe, these new post-accession waves of immigrants were often unmarried, coming alone or with small groups of friends.

The rapid expansion of infrastructure throughout Ireland created massive shortages of both manual and high-skilled labors. “Jobs were lying on the
street," Bart noted. Since companies were expanding and experiencing profit growth, newcomers were able to rise quickly through the ranks, particularly if they took initial risks; in some cases, starting salaries of $20,000 were doubled over the course of five or ten years. Alicja Bobek, a Trinity Ph.D. candidate who also conducted interviews with Poles in the Dublin area, cites the story of one architect, Gosia:

“I came on Wednesday, then I was walking around on Thursday and Friday… And Tuesday was the last day of dropping those CVs that were left and the last firm that I walked into… I dropped the CV, some guy took it from me and I left. And 10 minutes later some man called me and asked, if I could come back to the same office that I had left a moment ago… So I came back and I had something like an interview as I wasn’t really prepared; I had some samples of my portfolio, as far as I remember. But anyway, he asked me to send him an email with some samples of my work, so I did send him an email in the evening, and in the morning he invited me for another interview. But as he said, that interview was only to tell me that he’s hiring me.”

Others, especially students and those with recently acquired degrees, left in the spirit of adventure. Artist Magda Nowacka, for example, cited a childhood love of Celtic fairy tales and the mysticism that surrounds Ireland. “I’ve always had a kind of obsession with Ireland: for me it was the right choice,” she said. Artists like Nowacka came also with the intention of finding funding and possibilities for having work shown. Her single exhibit in Krakow occurred entirely by accident, when a cafe put her photography on display. In the height of an economic boom, “people have money, and spend money on everything,” she said. “I think it’s also because people here are more open to extremes. There, if I say I’m an artist, people say I’m crazy. Here, if I say I’m an artist, people say, ‘Oh, what do you do?’” While Nowacka immigrated to Ireland alone, relying on her schooling and the goodwill of Irish natives, others came with friends or partners. Dominica, a waitress at one of the oldest pubs in Dublin and student at the National University of Maynooth, looked at the move as an opportunity to “do something different.”

Between 2002 and 2006, the number of Poles in Ireland climbed from several thousand to over 60,000. Once they had arrived, these new immigrants took on the task of assimilation. Dubbed the “www migration,” they used the Internet, both before and after migrating, to orient themselves, build networks, and identify resources and organizations. “When I came here there were three Polish churches, [and] organizations like Dom Poleski,” Bart, the finance officer, said. The Polish chaplaincy in Dublin became the keystone for some sectors of the Polish community, while others turned to groups like the Irish Polish Society, which established relations with the newly created Polish Embassy in Dublin in 1991. Polish shops opened throughout the city center. Since levels of bureaucratic intervention were low, starting a business was relatively easy at the time. Websites like Forum Polonia, and Gazeta gave Polish immigrants going
to Ireland an outlet to share everything from stories and favorite local restaurants to contact information and job listings.

By early 2005, the Polish Social and Cultural Centre and weekly Polish-language insert of the Evening Herald were well-established. In 2007, the National Gallery in Dublin launched an exhibition titled “Paintings from Poland: Symbolism to Modern Art,” which comprised the largest collection of Polish art ever displayed in Ireland. The Irish Film Institute began holding the annual AIB Polish Film Festival in 2006, and October 2007 saw the start of a weekend school based in St. Paul’s Community College devoted to teaching the Polish language. These new Polish-Irish residents, despite emigrating largely for financial reasons, soon became lifestyle immigrants, culturally embedded beyond the workplace. However, others - like Bart - surrounded themselves with fellow Poles. “My friends are Polish,” he said in Polish. “When it comes time to speak English, it’s difficult for me.”

Young students like Dominica, making up another part of the Polish-Irish community, spend far less time with other Poles: “My boyfriend is Irish. I’m usually in places with a lot of Irish people, so I don’t really have a lot of contact with Polish people.” Former Trinity College teaching assistant Ewa recounted the value of mixing cultures, rather than creating self-imposed “Polish ghettos.” “I had a lot of Irish students and only a few Polish friends, I lived with an Irish landlord, in my office I had German and Russian friends, so I couldn’t feel surrounded by Polish immigrants,” she said. While she attends Polish chapel and cultural events, she avoids the trap of isolating herself: “I would never think that Polish people living here don’t need English,” she said. “It’s quite the opposite: I think they should learn English and be open for natives, because we all are guests here.”

The individuals interviewed cited a general feeling of comfort, of being at ease with Irish natives. Describing her experience adapting to Ireland, Ewa explained, “I really felt good and natural here, and I didn’t feel any big difference between both communities.” The Polish community in Ireland included hundreds of thousands of immigrants by 2006. Immigrants were able to choose whether to engage primarily with Irish nationals or remain within bubbles of Polish identity. Some deemed interaction with other Polish nationals less productive, describing stereotypical Poles as “rude” and a “source of embarrassment,” with limited English and no inclination to become part of Irish society.

These preconceptions pushed young migrants to break from insulated Polish environments.

**Lifestyle Immigrants:**
*Redefining “Home” in the Wake of Economic Collapse*

In order to obtain funding from the European Union, Ireland was divided into two geographical regions: the poorer Border, Midland and Western European Region; and the more developed Southern and Eastern Region. This partitioning magnified the effects of economic fluctuations. Employment in the Southern and Eastern Region fell only 3.2 percent in 2008, while it fell by 6.5 percent in the BMW Region. The failure to address these disparities had grim effects for industries like agriculture and construction, particularly as the housing boom came to a crashing halt. Other government actions — including Finance Minister Charlie McCreevy’s decision to increase public spending by almost 50 percent while cutting the income tax — have been cited as causes of the 2008 economic collapse.

According to Dublin Institute of Technology research director Ellen Hazelkorn, by 2009, “the property bubble of recent years was exacerbated by incentives, a narrow tax base, and irregular practices in the banking sector.” Even small dips in the economy created surges of concern, destroying consumer confidence; in the first half of 2009 alone, GDP declined by 9.8 percent. In 2010, Irish government officials, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Union began to consider a large-scale bailout. The country that once had one of the lowest unemployment rates in the European Union saw these figures shoot upward; in late 2011, the rate stood at approximately 14 percent of the labor force.

A weak economy made it difficult for even well educated Irish nationals to find employment, and data suggests the immigrants who flooded into Ireland during the economic boom may now be leaving. In 2006, nearly 94,000 Personal Public Service numbers — used for identification by the Department of Social
Protection, the Revenue Commissioners, and the Health Service Executive — were issued to Polish immigrants in Ireland. By 2008, the number declined to about 42,000, and has since further decreased. While the slowed inflow of immigrants to Ireland may be partially a result of economic downfall and improving conditions in Eastern European countries like Poland, as Trinity College researchers established in 2009, it may also be "linked to the fact that many young Poles, who are the most mobile section of society, have already left Poland." At the end of 2007, about 203,000 migrants over the age of 15 were living in Ireland. As of the beginning of 2009, the number had fallen by only several thousand, suggesting that migration back to the home country has not actually proven a favorable option. “The assumption that migrants will return home when times are tough is misplaced,” a researcher at the Trinity Immigration Initiative told a Global Post reporter in 2009. “They get involved in social networks, make friends, and they also have the option of social welfare.”

Those who do leave likely do so to seek work elsewhere or out of fear of ostracism from frustrated employers and co-workers. As the Irish economy faltered, press reports in media outlets like Newsweek reported cases of “suicidal Poles” unable to fit into Irish society or find and keep well-paying jobs. Some Irish employers began to ban the use of Polish in the workplace, a shift from the open curiosity of Irish natives described by Polish immigrants around 2004. As wages began to fall and companies faced bankruptcy, these immigrants were faced with the decision of whether or not to leave Ireland.

Ultimately, the vast majority stayed. Their reasons for remaining in the Irish Republic are even more varied than their reasons for coming, but many focus on the social rather than financial aspects of living in the Emerald Isle. Even those who lost their jobs in the economic downturn feel little inclination to return to their homeland. While a number of interviewees working with Trinity College researcher Alicja Bobek reported “cuts in their wages and working hours,… not all of those who have become unemployed as a result of the recession went back to Poland.” As one now-unemployed architect told the researcher:

“Because in here everyone is kind of, you know, more laid back with everything. While in Poland it is like, you know, that you are 29 years old and you have to do this and this and that. And you know, if I move to Poland and I am 29 years old and I am not married, I just lost my job, I have no savings, then I am, you know, the biggest loser. While in here… It’s cool, no problem with that. You know… I suspect that it would be difficult to go back to Poland with all of this.”

The “laid back” nature of Irish natives, the focus on family and collaboration rather than competition, and lower levels of bureaucracy are among the reasons immigrants are hesitant to leave. Even in the face of job insecurity, artist Magda Nowacka considers Ireland home: “Now, you kind of hold on to what you do. You try not to take risks with your money… But I wouldn’t go back. I like it here. And I don’t think a lot of people went back.” The opportunities and standard of living remain higher in Ireland than Eastern Europe, and this difference is particularly noticeable for immigrants whose perceptions of Poland are limited to what they remember of pre-migration times. Even on meager wages, migrants can afford a lifestyle that seemed impossible in Poland. Speaking of his acquaintances, Bart commented, “Some have left and come back to Ireland, and some have left even farther to Norway and Holland. But it’s nice here. The wages allow us to live at a certain level, even if some probably work lower than their qualifications.” Those put out of work in recent years have turned to classes to learn new skills rather than returning to Poland; some continue to pursue business plans, building networks even in times of economic struggle in order to start their own initiatives and organizations. “I thought most people would come here for a while to make some money and take it home, but actually most people stayed,” Nowacka said. “I think they like it here. It’s a nice environment… If we didn’t like it that much, we would go.”

Since 2008, various parts of the “Polish community” in and around Dublin have developed a sense of permanence. The older generations who migrated to Ireland in search of short-term jobs to support families in the homeland have either returned or settled into ethnic networks. The immigrant population has developed internal divisions,
with the “horizontal ties of ethnicity… contested and replaced by individually constructed vertical class divisions between migrants, which are shaped by different occupational niches … and the influence of different educational and class backgrounds in Poland.”

When interviewed, Nowacka identified three major sectors within the Polish immigrant community: those centered around the chaplaincy, coming from a more traditional Polish background (often older and more likely to engage in manual labor), those who came to pursue art and intellectual endeavors, largely uninterested in church life and more likely to engage in dialogue with the Irish culture, and “the rest,” those with stories too nuanced to form any strong collective.

Since the first large waves of Poles settled in Ireland in the 1990s and again upon accession, the line between what is distinctly Irish and distinctly Polish has blurred. Some of the young migrants seeking adventure and opportunity settled down and had children who attended Irish schools. They turned entirely from economic immigrants to lifestyle immigrants, no longer intending to leave with pockets full of cash. “My younger son was born in the Rotunda Hospital,” Gancarz said. “He is a big Dub himself.” Their sense of home was rebuilt, and they had the agency to control how Irish or Polish they wanted to make their experiences. For those struggling economically, programs like EPIC (Employment for People from Immigrant Communities) have been set up recently. These programs — especially successful after 2008 — target Irish-born children of immigrant parents unable to regain their footing after Irish economic collapse.

For a number of immigrants, staying in Dublin is a matter of having fallen in love with the country. “There is no tension between Irish and Poles,” Ewa said. “I saw many times an interest, curiosity, opening for each other, but never negative reactions.” Despite very different pasts and geographic conditions, these cultures are eager to come to mutual understanding and to remain sincere to one another. “Ireland showed me that people can become known if they work hard, not because their uncle is a CEO of a big company,” Gancarz said. “The Irish hate ‘fake’ people.”

What Now?

The most recent generation of Polish immigrants to Ireland has, in many ways, distanced itself from the culture of its homeland. Diffused throughout the city and country, no longer is a Polish community concentrated in specific areas of Dublin. If working class Polish migrants, many of them older with families back home, have gone back to Poland, the population that remains is full of young, educated, and thriving migrants. They have begun to get married, often outside their own ethnic group, and start families, to send children to Irish schools, and fill significant roles in the Dublin arts and culture scenes.

In fall 2011, the European Union House on Dawson Street celebrated Dublin Culture Night with a display of work by Janusz Kapusta, a Polish graphic artist and painter whose art has been featured in newspapers and magazines such as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. Though Kapusta was born and raised in Zalesia, Poland, his graphics and illustrations are vehicles for social and political commentary on the United States, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. In many ways, Kapusta is emblematic of the young Polish migrant’s vision, one in which identity is more than one’s place of origin or residence. The Polish Embassy works with organizers of Polish festivals to design events appealing to the Irish general public, and to other non-Poles living in the area. The societies prioritize accessibility, holding events in the English language and concentrating on universal themes. Sapielak stressed the importance of intercultural dialogue,

“Now, you kind of hold on to what you do. You try not to take risks with your money… But I wouldn’t go back. I like it here. And I don’t think a lot of people went back.”
not just between Poles and the Irish, but also in ways that transcend origin: “It’s not about what nationality the arts represent, it’s about representing some ideas and some values and I think they are much more universal.”

Even in the midst of recession, migrants continue to create and actively take part in intercultural dialogue. The Centre for Creative Practices, also headed by Sapielak, was founded in 2009, and hosts everything from Polish culture nights to Spanish flamenco performances. These immigrants make up a new generation of Dubliners, equipped with international vision. “Young Polish migrants are brave and eager to explore,” according to Nikola Sekowska of the Polish Embassy in Dublin. They remain active and eager to exchange cultures, to understand and influence the society around them. Largely as a result of the influx of Poles in the early 2000s, Dublin shifted from monocultural to multicultural.

While several of the individuals interviewed think occasionally of returning to Poland, to their families and hometowns, an attachment to Ireland ultimately holds them back. For them, to be Polish in Ireland is to be neither Polish nor Irish, but to represent a fusion of cultures and outlooks. Their assimilation will never be complete: accents, social upbringing, and unfamiliarity with idioms and childhood stories will remain, as Magda suggested. But, as a woman interviewed for Alicja Bobek’s sociological study stated, “When they ask me where I am from... Then I am saying that I’m from Poland. And then I start to think that maybe I should start saying that I am from here. Because I am from here and I am not going anywhere at the moment.”

The immigrants’ stories form no master narrative. They are from different places and backgrounds, moved across the European continent for different reasons, and remain for reasons even more diverse and nuanced. Undoubtedly, they, like Gancarz, have memories of the “green trees and tall grass, hot summers and snowy, freezing winters.” They reminisce about parents and brothers and sisters, about the old, worn buildings of Krakow or bustling traffic on Czerniakowska Street in Warsaw, but choose to remain in Ireland’s capital, building new memories for themselves and their children. Though Polish immigrants have predominantly stopped flowing into the Irish Republic, the children and grandchildren of those who have settled there will solidify the impact of the migration that occurred at the height of the Celtic Tiger economic boom. These immigrants will be a living testament to a generation of Polish-Dubliners who remained even when threatened with economic collapse, unemployment, and language barriers. As Gancarz relayed in his interview: “I fell in love with Ireland and I would find it hard to leave my Green Island, especially now when times are so rough. You don’t leave the love of your life when she needs you the most.”

Endnotes

10. Kirby, 22, 32.
11. Bobek, 64.
12. Kirby, 36.
18. "Census 2006."
20. "Census 2006."
23. Kirby, 64-65.
29. Bobek, 128.
30. Ibid., 120.
34. Bobek, 153.

Bibliography


The United States' Role in Re-Establishing the Iraqi Educational System

by Irene Gibson

This paper responds to the question of what role the United States should play in developing Iraq's educational system. To approach this question, it is divided into six sections. First, background on Iraq's recent history is provided. Second, U.S. interests in the issue are presented. Third, pre-existing policies on Iraq's education are summarized. Fourth, several policy options are outlined. Fifth, one option is recommended. Sixth, a conclusion summarizes the importance of helping Iraq's educational system. In the appendix are sources for further research and tables comparing the advantages and disadvantages of each policy option.

Introduction

The United States holds the responsibility and duty to aid Iraq in regaining Iraq's former status in the educational sector. It is in the interest of the U.S. to improve Iraq's education, as this aid is a logical and moral obligation that will benefit U.S. security, international perception, regional strategy, economy, and promotion of women's rights. Based on previous developmental projects in Iraq, progress is both possible and probable. Iraq has a long-standing tradition of educational excellence, enabling the country with the capacity and precedent to excel. Iraq's educational adaptability enables its educational system to be steered in the right direction. Additionally, many Iraqis, particularly those in universities, desire to partner with the U.S. and facilitate welcome alliances. In order to improve Iraq's educational system, it is recommended that an Iraqi Education Board with U.S. and Iraqi members is established and funded to decide educational reforms, establish food programs connected to schools, and encourage Iraqi teacher return. Improving Iraq's educational system enables both the U.S. and Iraq to have a shared future through educational connection.

This policy report is intended to respond to the question of what role the United States should have in developing Iraq's educational system. To approach this question, the paper is divided into six sections. First, background on Iraq's recent history is provided in order to facilitate understanding of the problem. Second, U.S. interests in the issue are presented. Third, pre-existing policies on Iraq's education are briefly summarized. Fourth, several policy options are outlined. Fifth, one policy option is recommended. Sixth, a conclusion to summarize the importance of helping Iraq's educational system is provided. In the appendix are sources for further research and tables comparing the advantages and disadvantages of each policy option.

Historical Background of Iraq's Educational Sector

This section progresses temporally through the history of Iraq's educational sector from Saddam Hussein's rule to U.S. occupation to the present, providing background knowledge of Iraq's educational situation and then explaining problems that currently hold back education in Iraq.

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Education under Saddam Hussein and UN Sanctions

Under Saddam Hussein, Iraqi education thrived.¹ In 1973, Iraq had an 80% literacy rate, free tuition, nationalized education, full gender inclusion, secular curriculum, and no religious education requirement for non-Muslims. The system was controlled by the Ministry of Education, which oversaw general education through eighteen Directories of General Education representing the eighteen political divisions of Iraq.² Strong centralization existed at the national level, with decentralization at the Directories level. However, the system was not free of politics; during the 1970s teachers were obligated to join the Baath political party, and though many refused, schools taught Baathist ideals.³ Despite its indoctrination, the Iraqi system was highly regarded throughout the Middle East and produced world-renowned scholars.⁴ Education continually improved, and by 1990 the literacy rate had risen to 90%.⁵

However, the 1990 UN sanctions, in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, destroyed the education system.⁶ The first months of sanctions prevented importation of medicine and food, a harsh punishment for a country that imported 70% of its food. The additional ban on oil exports caused state-sponsored education to suffer; Iraq’s education budget fell 90% from $230 million to $23 million.⁷ Iraqi society suffered as a whole. Currency was valued at less than 1% of pre-1991 value, causing incomes to plummet.⁸ According to UNICEF, half a million children died as a result of the sanctions; the Iraqi health ministry counted a million Iraqi deaths.⁹

The sanctions targeted education and scientific research in particular by banning imports of almost all educational materials. The UN Special Commission (in charge of overseeing Iraq’s compliance with weapons limitations post-Gulf War) went into university libraries and took or destroyed scientific books. During this time, 83% of primary schools fell into disrepair, existing schools lost funding, new schools were not built, and education declined.

Numerous reports documented the extent of Iraq’s educational deterioration.¹⁰ Breakdown in the teacher training system produced under-qualified teachers and school attendance suffered. In 1995 the literacy rate dropped to 42%. A 1996 UNESCO report stated that primary teachers were not attending class; if they did, they had to cope with terrible conditions including poor pay, almost no reading materials, and about one desk for four students.¹¹ The 2000 report cited the same issues. Conditions throughout the country were so poor that throughout the 1990s, any Iraqi who had the capacity to leave Iraq did so.¹² In 2002 the decline continued as both attendance and female literacy rates decreased while shorter days and supply scarcity increased.¹³ Teachers took multiple jobs or stopped teaching, and if they did teach, presented curriculum outdated by 20 years.

Iraq used only 1.2% of its 2011 budget on education, a lower portion than that allocated by Saddam Hussein.²⁶ Outside the system, much of the money spent on education has faced coordination problems and uncertainty in planning. This was partially in response to the still prevalent danger in the area: from 2003-2011, 451 scholars were assassinated in Iraq.

Transitional Instability under U.S. Occupation

Sanctions primarily ended (except those which concerned buying of arms and related material) in May 2003 when the United States invasion of Iraq concluded and Coalition Forces began occupation.¹⁴ Though Saddam Hussein had been ousted, Iraq was suffering greatly. The combination of war and sanctions had hurt all aspects of Iraqi life; education was just one aspect of the stressed social atmosphere. Therefore, as all sectors were in dire need, education did not receive the outside support it had found in the past. However, education
continued, with faculty-elected university presidents in control, elimination of Baath party favoritism, and 90% of university students finishing the year.  

Literacy rose to 58% in 2003. However, new challenges emerged. The majority of university teachers had not traveled outside Iraq, there was little internet availability, looters had taken supplies from schools, and existing textbooks were outdated or full of propaganda.  

Issues of displacement and violence also remained. In 2005, over 450,000 Iraqi families were homeless, making educational consistency almost impossible. Although the educational situation had appeared promising in early years of the occupation, it later worsened. Educational association became an early target of violence; from 2003-2007, 78 deaths occurred at the University of Baghdad alone. During this time, 30% of Iraq’s remaining professors, doctors, pharmacists, and engineers left the country. Remaining teachers had to endure numerous threats and the resulting condition of fear, which forced teachers to alter their schedules if they wished to teach safely.  

In response to threats, some universities limited the amount of time teachers were required to spend on campus. A strong sense of uncertainty dominated education, with courses cancelled, under-qualified students teaching, bombings on campuses, professors transferring to other universities, and little to no academic research. Some hypothesize that teachers were targeted due to their generally secular nature, but it is difficult to determine intent: a variety of groups conducted attacks, at times targeting universities in general.  

New politics also contributed to educational instability. Iraqis feared criticizing the new administration. Now instead of a bias in favor of Baath party members, there was a bias against them. L. Paul Bremer III’s first executive order as chief civilian administrator of the occupying forces dismissed all senior Baath Party members from government positions, resulting in thousands fired from high positions in education. Significant percentages (sometimes up to 20%) of staff in many universities were dismissed. Worries about a shortage of teachers developed, as many people had joined the Baath party to gain jobs, and now had lost their income and benefits. Though former Baathists were allowed to appeal their cases to American personnel, the review was done case by case and the process did not immediately solve the issue of jobless teachers in an environment that desperately needed teachers.  

Additionally, false promises from America in terms of educational development were disheartening for Iraqis and Americans alike. The U.S. corporation Creative Associates International (CAII), charged with developing Iraq’s educational sector during occupation, was not successful and set a negative tone for future development. Security issues – particularly prevalent for programs associated with America – were often at fault for the incompletion of other projects. Any association with America, even through the simple action of using American technology, could make one a target. Security became so poor that in 2008, 1.6 million Iraqis were internally displaced and an even greater number were displaced in surrounding countries.  

Current Status of Iraq’s Educational Sector  

Today, Iraq struggles with many of the same issues. Iraq used only 1.2% of its 2011 budget on education, a lower portion than that allocated by Saddam Hussein. Outside the system, much of the money spent on education has faced coordination problems and uncertainty in planning. This was partially in response to the still prevalent danger in the area: from 2003-2011, 451 scholars were assassinated in Iraq. Colleagues of those refugees looking to return are still threatened. Though some academics are returning, Iraq remains too dangerous for others. Memories of more violent times still linger in the minds of the displaced, deterring return. Though mediation to move to safer parts of Iraq may help alleviate the dangers, issues dealing with gender roles and post-traumatic stress disorder are rampant throughout the system.  

However, hope remains. Many Iraqis have a strong desire to work with the U.S., particularly through study abroad programs between Iraqi and American
universities. As many of Iraq's university classes are taught in English, there is a strong desire to learn the language. There also exists a strong precedent of study abroad in Iraq, particularly by PhDs. This practice is supplemented by the Iraqi government, which provides free education that includes fully funded scholarships for study abroad opportunities. Currently, the government offers about 10,000 scholarships for PhD students, but the demand to study abroad exceeds the supply of available opportunities. Recently a 2012 study abroad exchange for Iraqi students to come to the U.S., offered by the U.S. State Department, received 13,000 applications for its 50 openings.

Despite significant setbacks in all aspects of education due to sanctions and occupation, which have resulted in violence, population displacement, and brain drain, Iraq's educational system, particularly in universities, is open to working with the U.S.

Department of State Interests in the Issue

This section explains the benefits to the U.S. in aiding Iraq's educational system.

Security

Improving education in Iraq is an investment in the security of the United States. In the past, failure by the U.S. to provide proper aid after withdrawing from a country hurt security interests. The Afghan War from 1979-1988 is a perfect example of this occurrence. Because the United States would not grant the money needed for reconstruction of Afghanistan's educational system after the war, illegitimate forces came to power, leading to an increase in anti-American sentiments. Because of the power vacuum partially due to lack of education in Afghanistan, the Taliban was allowed to rise. This became a security problem when the insurgent groups in control of the area spread their ideals and weapons across the world. Furthermore, because the U.S. failed to offer a sustainable fix for Afghanistan, it is again in combat with Afghanistan now. Allowing Iraq's educational system to fail is to allow another power to take its place and this could be detrimental to U.S. security, particularly with the various insurgent groups in the still politically unstable area. An insecure population with few options is more likely to take part in a militant group than a population that has access to education.

Previous Promises

The United States is also bound by its promises to Iraq. During reconstruction, the United States concentrated on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons despite claims to concentrate on restoring Iraq. In order to follow through on its own plan, the United States must restore Iraq's educational system. The American plan for Iraqi higher education was made against Iraq caused many UN Assistant Secretaries to resign; the sanctions were compared to genocide. If the United States wishes to claim the role of world benefactor, then it must prove its ability to fulfill this role by leaving the countries it exits in better shape than when it entered. This reconstruction also enables the U.S. to be a leader in realizing the right to education, a UN initiative. Education is a strong method of improving a country; literacy rates are measurable progress markers that have direct correlation with significant developmental benefits. As half of the deaths in 2006 were estimated to be preventable, education can directly save lives, a benefit both ethical and developmental.

With education, Iraq's future can be saved.

Knowledge develops in a particular atmosphere, and Iraqi intellectuals with better perception of the U.S. can improve U.S. relations in the future. This may allow the United States to increase its presence in Iraq and/or gain a much-needed ally in the Middle East.

U.S. Leadership and International Perception

Aiding Iraq would improve the international community's perception of the United States. This is particularly important as the U.S.-led sanctions

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U.S. Leadership and International Perception

Aiding Iraq would improve the international community’s perception of the United States. This is particularly important as the U.S.-led sanctions
even before engagement with Iraq. This plan included four points: achieve de-Baathification, increase communication, normalize Iraqi science, and establish autonomous universities. These goals can never be fully met until the educational system improves. Neither normalization nor autonomy can by fully realized in the current educational atmosphere.

**Geostrategic Implications**

By re-establishing Iraq’s educational system, the United States may receive positive recognition, particularly from intellectuals and those who study abroad. Knowledge develops in a particular atmosphere, and Iraqi intellectuals with better perception of the U.S. can improve U.S. relations in the future. This may allow the United States to increase its presence in Iraq and/or gain a much-needed ally in the Middle East.

Iraq would be a particularly useful ally because of its location and perception in the region. Iraq’s location would be beneficial considering its border with Iran. Iraq is also an especially important topic in the Arab world. In the 2002 Arab Human Development Report, written by Arab intellectuals and policy analysts, Iraq was identified as an Arab issue and a concern on both the international and regional scale. To improve Iraq is to improve relations throughout the Arab world.

**Economic Implications**

Through improving the educational system of Iraq, the United States would improve relations with Iraq, including economic relations. This would allow the United States access to more of the oil it needed. This would not only increase the oil security, but also decrease oil prices, therefore possibly gaining the current administration public support.

**Promoting Women’s Rights**

A current setback in women’s rights has posed a problem since occupation. This lack of women’s rights is atypical for Iraq, which has a strong history of accepting women in the workplace and in education. According to the Director of Iraqi Committee for National Media and Culture, women were 4/10 doctors and university graduates and were an “integral part of national development program.” Among women’s rights were equal pay, a year for maternity leave, independent income, and the right to vote. But because of displacement and security issues, women’s roles are becoming less liberal.

Education can provide females with the opportunity to regain their previous roles in society. Girls who become educated can follow the liberal example set by Iraqi women of the past and mothers unburdened with childcare (for at least part of the day) can also take part in helping the community. Educating mothers can also potentially prevent deaths; an educated mother may be able to better address her anemia (a case present in 9/10 pregnant women in 2006). Iraq’s female education will also set an example for other countries in the area and act as a large step in accepting women rights in the Middle East.

**Intellectual Sense**

According to a 2010 commentary issued by the Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program, American politics needs to become more open to intellectual expert opinion in order to prevent problems before they occur. Promoting education in Iraq can realize this goal. The critical situation of Iraq’s education needs to be addressed because academics see it as an issue. One of the steps the U.S. government can take is to listen to the call by Iraqi university professors and presidents to increase cultural understanding between the U.S. and Iraq. Multiple U.S. universities are reciprocating this call and currently trying to work with Iraqi universities. As universities are centers of intellectual activity, following their model is to follow intellectual opinion and therefore addresses the Homeland Security commentary. Improving education in Iraq is also an international intellectual concern, represented by the various international conferences focused on Iraq’s education system. In one 2007 conference, over 500 academics, university presidents, professors, and senior staff from across the globe attended to contribute.

**Progress is Possible**

Based upon previous developmental projects in Iraq, progress is both possible and probable. Following 1990 sanctions, aid from foreign sources prevented the educational system in northern Iraq from falling into critical condition. Additionally, Iraq has a long-standing tradition of educational excellence and therefore has
the capacity and precedent to excel. Iraq is also a signatory to numerous significant declarations that establish educational rights. Although these declarations have transformed into multiple versions of education objectives, depending upon the situation, the precedent of transformation bodes well for the United States. Educational versatility can enable Iraq's system to be steered in the right direction. Many Iraqis, particularly those in universities, desire to partner with U.S. and facilitate welcome alliances. This enables both the U.S. and Iraq to have a shared future through educational connection.

It is in the interest of the U.S. to improve Iraq's educational system, as it is a logical and moral obligation that will benefit U.S. security, world perception, regional strategy, economy, and promotion of women's rights.

Past U.S. Actions:

This section provides a summary of U.S. and UN policies addressing the reconstruction of Iraq's educational system after the U.S. invasion, and which policies remain today, in order to analyze those policies and address remaining issues in Iraq's educational system.

Educational Development Commitments to Iraq during Occupation

In June of 2003, after the Coalition Provisional Authority ended Iraq's national education curriculum, the UN Security Council agreed to fund a program for rewriting Iraq's curriculum. The Authority, which at the time controlled education in Iraq, supervised and appointed Iraqi educators to rewrite school books. The Authority also pledged its commitment to bettering the educational system and planned to spend $37 million (not including salaries) on 43 universities, colleges, and technical schools with requests for increased funds. By October 1, 2003, six million Iraqis attended school. Un a month schools closed due to insecurity, violence, lack of power, and dilapidated building conditions. At this time, both the insufficient infrastructure and the security situation limits education.

CAII: A Mistake in Developmental Policy

Perhaps the largest mistake in developmental policy the United States made was to contract Creative Associates International (CAII). This private, for-profit corporation was chosen by the Agency for International Development to rebuild Iraq's education system. The organization's involvement in educational development was absolute; as an analysis in The Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies explained: "School buildings, textbooks, teacher preparation, curriculum planning, administration – all would be implemented by CAII directly or by firms subcontracted by CAII." As the company had never competitively bid for contracts, congress and the press cried foul. The lack of competition meant that there was a higher cost to taxpayers and CAII's spending on its own security far exceeded that of non-profits. Security was such a large percentage of the budget that CAII spent more on security than on the development project itself. CAII staff was also removed from Iraq because of security reasons, which further distanced the development process from its recipients. Also, Iraqis complained that there was too little Iraqi involvement in the process. Other issues, such as Iraqi anger over bombings and general population health issues, hindered CAII's projects.

Another serious issue within CAII was its misplaced intent. Hiring a private company with an agenda undermined the ideas of democracy that the U.S. wanted to promote. The relation of education to CAII established education as a business opportunity intended to promote capitalism and suggested that the United States intended to indoctrinate Iraq with the American ideals CAII was designed to propagate. One of CAII's primary goals was to "promote democracy" when its focus should have been to improve the educational system. To promote American ideals in education was to take away the democratic right of the Iraqis to establish their own educational system, a right that the United States supposedly campaigned for. Externally imported curricula also brought sustainability into question, as a forced curriculum only lasts as long as its enforcers remain in Iraq.

Various reports estimate that CAII successfully distributed supplies in
Iraq, but made little to no advancement towards long-term development.\textsuperscript{47} However, CAII successfully left the United States with unfinished goals to strive toward: train teachers, administer surveys to determine school needs, create accelerated learning programs, repair schools, and better manage information.

**Current Expenditures and Ongoing Actions**

Currently, Iraq remains divided over many aspects of education, particularly history. In 2008, in addition to the rewriting of school materials already underway, Iraq and UNESCO began the process of Iraq’s curriculum overhaul, which continued until 2012.\textsuperscript{48} Recent history is a particularly contested subject and currently is being avoided altogether due to controversy and differing opinions on Hussein and the U.S. However, despite various viewpoints, many security and infrastructure issues in Iraq have been remedied, particularly in southern Iraq, and many universities thrive in safe environments.\textsuperscript{49} The United States still remains a donor to Iraq’s educational system. From 2003-2011, the U.S. spent more than $1 billion on education in Iraq.\textsuperscript{50} Also, since 2004, over 2,500 exchanges have been facilitated in Iraq by the U.S. The successes of current programs bode well for elaboration and expansion of education in the future.

The U.S. has an extensive history of attempting to address the rebuilding of the educational system of Iraq, but has been met with significant challenges along the way and is still working towards sustainable improvements in the educational system.

**Policy Options**

This section provides four potential approaches to rebuilding Iraq’s educational system.\textsuperscript{51}

**Option 1: U.S. the Benefactor, Iraq for Iraqis**

In this project, the role of the United States is purely as a benefactor. The United States would give $500 billion, or double Iraq’s USAID 2011 budget,\textsuperscript{52} to Iraq’s government under a strict treaty that would allocate the money to educational purposes only. The money would be given in installments of $100 billion once a year, over a period of five years, to ensure its proper use. This provides an enormous potential of aid to Iraq; the plan grants more money to education than the entirety of Iraq’s budget.\textsuperscript{53} Committing to such a sum has both precedent and feasibility. In past development projects, support for Iraq has almost equaled Iraq’s budget at the time\textsuperscript{4} and in perspective, the suggested sum added to Iraq’s current aid equals about half of the budget spent by USAID in Afghanistan in 2011.\textsuperscript{54} If given all at once, in addition to the aid currently spent on Iraq, the expenditure would move Iraq to third on the list of benefitting countries of USAID.

This method takes the approach of aid as opposed to intervention, and allows the United States to improve Iraq’s educational system at exceedingly limited risk. This option allows Iraqis to control the decision-making process, and through education to establish a national unity to decrease violence. The plan would promote democracy in Iraq by allowing Iraqis to determine their own course while still allowing the U.S. to aid the educational system. This strategy would also combat the dominant negative stereotype throughout the world that the United States invades countries and becomes entangled in their politics, as this approach demonstrates the exact opposite.

**Option 2: Gentle Guidance**

In this proposal, the United States has no official presence in Iraq but operates through specific programs to aid Iraq’s education. These programs would be offered to each educational institution, but not be forced. This method concentrates on a more individualized approach that would allow each school to choose its level of participation. The plurality of programs offered would also enable aid to better fit individual cases and therefore have greater impact than a blanket program. Aid would be supplied through three methods: virtual classes, non-profits and NGOs, and study abroad opportunities.

Virtual classes would be given by renowned university professors from across the globe who agreed to donate their time and have some of their lectures filmed. American government administrators would review the videos.
and provide subtitles in the proper dialect of Arabic for the schools that wished to receive the films. These films could then be sent to the universities in Iraq that wished to receive them, or be made available online for those schools. This would expose students to ideas outside Iraq, modernize education, and enable America to have positive, helpful representation without the risk of physical harm to donors.

Non-profits and NGOs, particularly those from another country, (such as Sweden, which has a good reputation in the Middle East) would also be funded. Again, this provides aid without direct intervention. One suggested source for identifying organizations to be funded is in the member list of the NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq (see sources consulted). By finding multiple non-profits and NGOs already established in the area, the U.S. can safely choose which aspects of educational development to promote with the confidence that the program chosen is already on the ground. Also, as the U.S. does not implement the funded programs, the U.S. can retain deniability if it so desires. In addition, funding associated foreign programs could be more successful than funding programs associated with the American stigma.

Study abroad opportunities would be offered to university students and professors to come and study in the U.S. This would facilitate understanding between two cultures while improving the education of visiting Iraqis. The exchange would be both cultural and professional. This program would also act as an incentive for Iraqis to study and understand the U.S. Eventually universities could establish lasting relationships and become sister universities, from which each university could benefit the other. Also, Iraqi students would be exposed to American students and U.S. government aid - better representations of America than the soldiers of the past.

No budget proposal is attached to this project, as with a capable coordinator several costs could be eliminated. Universities could be given privileges if they agreed to participate in the virtual classes or exchange programs. Or, the two opportunities could be campaigned for and, if accepted by the universities, paid for through university budgets. Also, depending on the number, type, and success of non-profits and NGOs funded, the budget would need to be determined at the time of the option’s acceptance.

Note: The aspects of this program are not mutually exclusive and can potentially be implemented independently of one another or combined with another option if so desired.

Option 3: Return Home

This program promotes the return of displaced Iraqi intellectuals through incentives and focuses on individuals. In this approach, it is the people, not the system, who would receive aid. The U.S. would work with the Iraqi government to determine an agreement in which a program to ensure monetary, health, and security incentives for teachers at all levels of education.

Monetary incentives in the form of increased teacher salaries would provide sufficient cause for teachers to return to schools. As lack of work and funds are serious problems for many refugee families, this plan would be successful. Good salaries would not only attract previously employed teachers, but act as an incentive for students to enter education, particularly if the salaries are better within education than in other fields. By drawing students to the educational field, the sustainability and quality of teachers would be ensured.

Special health benefits would be extended to teachers. Access to health care would be centered within universities themselves in the hopes that attacks on the universities would decrease because they were associated with health, a neutral right and universal need. This health care would be extended to the families of teachers, therefore acting as an additional incentive. The possible need for more health programs would also demand more workers, enabling women to re-enter the workplace.

Increased security, provided by the Iraqi government, would be posted around schools. This would increase the safety of both teachers and students and therefore increase attendance in both sectors. If schools were seen as safe havens, this alone may be enough incentive to seek education. As university professors suffer particular risks, residence within colleges can be offered for teachers and their families.

Note: The aspects of this program are not mutually exclusive and can potentially be implemented independently.
of one another or combined with another option if so desired.

**Option 4: United Fellowship**

Through shared efforts between Iraq and the U.S., this policy enacts large-scale changes to improve the educational system and increase school attendance. In this plan, the U.S. assumes a larger role in Iraq’s educational system by having three U.S. members (the remaining members being Iraqi) on a ten-member Iraqi Education Board that would determine the educational course for the country. The Board would be given $500 billion\(^2\) by the U.S. in order to fund its decided educational reforms as well as the aspects of this policy. The two sectors that the Board would be required to allocate funding for, outside the Board’s own educational decisions, would be food programs and campaigns to encourage Iraqi teacher return.

Food programs, preferably partnered with a non-profit to lower costs, would be implemented within primary schools. These programs would give one meal to any child who attended school, thus attracting and sustaining attendance. This would also increase the student’s ability to retain information, as hungry students cannot concentrate as well as those who are healthy. This is particularly important considering that, according to UN data collected in 2005, 15.4% of Iraq’s population was food insecure with the rations they received and 31.8% would be insecure if they did not receive rations.\(^5\) Also, chronic malnutrition in children in these insecure families was 33%.

Campaigns to promote the return of teachers would be decided by the Board, but may include holding conferences to update displaced Iraqis on the situation in Iraq and the new programs available. These conferences could also be used to approach old teachers with job offers. An increase in teacher pay would also be suggested, which could offset the security issues the teachers might still face. Even if such campaigns are not successful in the return of teachers physically, the meetings can act as conferences on ideas to improve the Iraqi education from abroad.

In addition, the U.S. would partner with universities to provide study abroad programs for Iraqis. This would be applicable because study abroad programs already have a history in Iraq and because English is a language of interest for the region.\(^5\) The Board would not fund these programs, but would initially coordinate them. Also, virtual class meetings through webcam would be initiated in order to enable students to connect regardless of their participation in study abroad.

By centralizing educational development, organization is ensured for the program. At the same time, the involvement of multiple parties and the multiple methods of assistance offered allow each aspect of development with the capacity to grow on its own. This diversification and individualization enables successful programs to improve even if some others do not experience the same rate of success.

To ensure the commitment and respect of Iraq’s government, the government would be asked to continue subsidizing education at all levels so that it was free of charge. Iraq’s government would also agree to have compulsory stipends for all those entering university. In this way, lack of family funds would not hinder education and all would have equal opportunity.

There are several different options that can be chosen to aid in the reconstruction of Iraq’s educational system. A variance in options is presented, as it is understood that, depending on the wishes of the State Department, a variety of approaches may be necessary.

**Recommendation:**

This section recommends one policy option and justifies that choice. Though ideally all four options would be fulfilled, it is understood that constraints limit budgets and other resources; therefore, implementing only one of the options is suggested.

Option 4: United Fellowship

The United Fellowship option is optimal because it is a multifaceted approach that integrates previously successful educational strategies with modern improvements. This will allow the program to be accepted by Iraq while still providing a means of progress. Centralized educational planning, study abroad programs, and subsidized education are three aspects already familiar to the system and the campaign for teachers to return is simply a re-introduction. Food programs will not be criticized as altering education, but rather be praised for providing a humanitarian
need. The dominant disadvantages of the plan concern the possibility of Iraqi Education Board ineptitude, which can be rendered unlikely if board members are chosen well.

The second-largest risk of this option is its direct link to the U.S. This link would associate the U.S. with any failures of the Board and may be interpreted as becoming overinvolved. However, as previously stated, the U.S. holds a responsibility to the educational system of Iraq. The United States holds the duty to aid Iraqis in achieving their former status in the intellectual sector, and the best means to achieve this goal is to adopt United Fellowship.

Further analysis of advantages and disadvantages associated with Option 4, along with evaluations of the other options, can be found in table comparison format in the appendix.

Conclusion:
The United States has the responsibility and duty to aid Iraq in restoring its former intellectual status. Though the U.S. has an extensive history of attempting to address the rebuilding of the educational system of Iraq, it has met significant challenges along the way and should continue aid through sustainable improvements in the educational system. Based upon previous developmental projects in Iraq, progress is both possible and probable. Following 1990 sanctions, aid from foreign sources prevented the educational system in northern Iraq from falling into critical condition. Additionally, Iraq has a long-standing tradition of educational excellence and therefore has the capacity and precedence to excel. Iraq’s educational versatility can enable its system to be steered in the right direction. Also, many Iraqis, particularly those in universities, desire to partner with the U.S. and facilitate welcome alliances. It is in the interest of the U.S. to improve Iraq’s education, as this aid is a logical and moral obligation that will benefit U.S. security, world perception, regional strategy, economy, and promotion of women’s rights. Improving Iraq’s educational system enables both the U.S. and Iraq to have a shared future through educational connection.

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9. Phyllis Bennis
10. Jacqueline Ismael
11. Agustin Velloso De Santisteban
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13. Jacqueline Ismael
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It’s Morning Again" for US-Iran relations. Or, at least, it was supposed to be. When President Obama took office, analysts and journalists alike heralded a new chapter in the two countries’ long and difficult history. Whereas President Bush lambasted Iran as a member of the Axis of Evil, President Obama promised a policy of engagement without preconditions. And he was sincere. It was perhaps his rhetoric and tone that impressed us most.

But three and a half years into the Obama Presidency, US-Iranian mutual enmity is worse than it ever was under the Bush Administration. With renewed earnest, the news media speculates when, not if, there will be targeted air strikes. As Washington adopts more and more adversarial policies, the President’s rhetoric becomes more and more aggressive against Iran.

This article will analyze precisely those two components of America’s Iran posturing: rhetoric and policy. The author will chronicle US-Iran relations, analyzing the major events by comparing presidential rhetoric with policies and contrasting the Bush and Obama Administrations. The author will conclude by answering the question: when it comes to the Iranian issue, is President Obama really different from President Bush?

Words matter. Ever since Woodrow Wilson was in the White House, presidents have increasingly relied on speeches. Whether it is to win votes along the campaign trail, to garner support in Congress for legislation, or to inspire the people during turbulent times, today’s president often serves as “Persuader in Chief.”

And in today’s climate of hyper-partisanship, the rhetoric is arguably more biting than ever before. There are few issues that both sides of the aisle can discuss together, much less agree on. Iran, however, is one of those few issues. Since the 1979-80 Iranian Hostage Crisis, Iran has been an enemy of the United States. Presidents have made many speeches regarding Iran, and have crafted countless pages of policies against the Iranian regime. But in the aftermath of the Iraqi Occupation, many began to question President Bush’s inclusion of Iran in his so-called Axis of Evil. Bush’s approval rating dropped lower and lower, and President Obama was elected in many ways as a referendum on the Bush Administration. This rang particularly true for US-Iran Relations. Both President Obama’s rhetoric and his policies indicated to many a departure from President Bush’s tactics.

This article seeks to answer whether or not the two really were so different. In order to explore broadly the relationship between presidential rhetoric and foreign policy, this article focuses specifically on the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. But before diving into each respective administration, it is important to provide some background on Iran in the lead-up to President Bush’s

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inauguration.

**A Brief Recap Post-Revolutionary Iran**

Prior to 1979, when Iran was ruled by Reza Shah of the Pahlavi Dynasty, the West generally viewed Iran as a friend. Indeed, Tehran was the site of an important Allied conference between Premier Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill, and President Roosevelt. The Shah, for his part, was enamored with the modernity of the West. And while his White Revolution in the 1960s, which included visions of women's rights in the face of Islamic customs, was arguably well-intentioned, it was accompanied by the kind of tactics one would expect from an authoritarian regime: strong-arming at gunpoint, imprisonment of dissidents, and torture.

In 1979, the Pahlavi Dynasty faced a conservative revolution. The winner of the fight against the Shah and his Western ideals was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who, upon taking power, established the Islamic Republic of Iran. A charismatic leader à la Mussolini, Khomeini was able to sustain the public fervor he had fomented to win the Revolution by scapegoating new enemies to replace the recently deposed Shah. America was an obvious choice, considering its history of meddling with Iran's domestic politics to ensure the Shah's hold on power. Meanwhile, after holding hostages in the American Embassy for over four hundred days, Iran quickly jumped to the top of America's list of enemies.

But Khomeini's charismatic leadership did not just focus Iran's attention abroad. Several different factions of Iranian society and politics were brought together by the Iranian Revolution, having put aside their domestic differences in the name of an Islamic Republic led by Khomeini. As a result, his death in 1989 reopened old political wounds. The next Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, was not as respected and, therefore, unable to prevent partisanship and government in-fighting. Slowly but steadily, politicians much less conservative than Khomeini began to gain power. In the year of Khomeini's death, Ali Rafsanjani of the Pragmatist Party won the presidential election. And while most of his two terms in office were countered by the Conservative Party majority in the legislature, he was succeeded in 1997 by a Reformist candidate, Mohammed Khatami, who built upon President Rafsanjani's foreign policy efforts. The new "Dialogue Among Civilizations" movement was meant to increase Iran's likeability abroad, even with western nations including the United States. Secretary of State Madeline Albright reciprocated President Khatami's overtures by publicly apologizing for the 1953 CIA-backed coup against former Iranian Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh – the first admission of its kind since the Revolution. Indeed, in the years leading up to the Bush Administration and September 11th, US-Iranian relations were at their warmest since becoming enemies in 1979.

Important to note is the role of the Supreme Leader. Head of both religion and state in Iran, the Supreme Leader has constitutional authority to call virtually all of the shots. And so, when considering the foregoing changes in the Iranian political landscape, as well as when contrasting the following two American administrations, remember that all the while, Ali Khamenei has been Iran's Supreme Leader. Precisely when he chose to take a more active role in issues that matter to the US (e.g., nuclear developments, fomenting terrorism, moves towards regional hegemony, etc.) is hard, if not impossible, to tell. But keep in mind that for all that has changed in the past 23 years, Khamenei has been a constant presence throughout.

**Bush Administration**

President George W. Bush's first term began with little to no change in foreign policy vis-à-vis Iran. His first act was to continue the National Emergency with respect to Iran. Every president since Jimmy Carter has cited similar reasons for signing and re-signing this type of executive order: Iran's support for terrorism, efforts to undermine the Middle East Peace Process, and the desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction. And although he also extended President Clinton's Iran Libya Sanctions Act, President Bush expressed optimism for the Reformists in Iran in his accompanying statement:

"I hope that the Iranian people's recently expressed desire for a freer, more open, and more prosperous society will give our two countries an opportunity
to identify areas where our interests converge, and where we can work together constructively for our mutual benefit.”

One month later, America and the world were left reeling from the attacks of September 11th. While some in Arab countries celebrated by burning American flags, many Iranians held candlelight vigils for the victims; even Supreme Leader Khamenei publically condemned the attacks. President Bush, for his part, sympathized for the Iranians who lost their lives alongside Americans and other peoples on those fateful flights.

American retribution came swiftly for the Taliban in Afghanistan. Khamenei, like most other regional leaders, was by no means comforted by the strong presence of American military might in the region; he even cautioned against an invasion of Afghanistan in the same speech in which he expressed solidarity with the 9/11 victims. But this all notwithstanding, Iran supported the Northern Alliance and cooperated with the United Nations to repatriate nearly one million Afghan refugees. And President Bush, days before his State of the Union Address, acknowledged the role Iran was playing: “[We’ve] had some positive signals…early in this war from the Iranians. We would hope that they would continue to be a positive force in helping us bring people to justice.”

Thus, in the months leading up to and immediately following 9/11, the Bush Administration’s Iran rhetoric was warming up and its Iran policy was to collaborate in the fight against a common threat posed by Al-Qaida. However, in his first State of the Union following the attacks, President Bush assigned Iran to the Axis of Evil, alongside Iraq and North Korea. The speech and its headlining metaphor quickly became a rallying point for American foreign policy making, in many ways framing a new world order. But before continuing to chronicle the Bush Administration’s Iran rhetoric and level, Axis of Evil was intended to build off of the momentum following the attack on the World Trade Center and “restructure” the War on Terror’s ethos to target groups and regimes beyond Al-Qaida that posed a threat to the United States. The principle strategy was to emphasize the “indivisibility of evil,” to make the public react to states that sponsor terror the same way they react to terrorists themselves. Even the metaphor itself reflects this attempt to paint multiple enemies with the same brush: we defeated the Axis Powers, we battled the Evil Empire, and now we must continue our defense of freedom and liberty against the Axis of Evil.

After the speech, policy-makers kicked into gear. In April 2002, the House Subcommittee on National Security held a hearing titled “Combating Terrorism: Axis of Evil, Multi-lateral Containment or Unilateral Confrontation?” The hearing included testimony from former officials of the Clinton and Reagan administrations concerning how those governments fought terrorism, with the hopes of applying lessons learned to the fight against Iran, North Korea, and Iraq. By Fall 2003, the military journal Parameters published a piece analyzing the four ways...
that President Bush could constitutionally authorize assassinations inside those countries. And in August of 2003, once the Hussein regime had been toppled, Republican Party chairman Jon Kyl issued a directive to his party members to refocus their sights on Iran and North Korea, urging that, “There is no time for delay in addressing these threats.”

Finally, while the speech’s impact on domestic actors is clear, President Bush also hoped to inspire dissidents inside Iran:

“And the fact that the president of the United States would stand up and say Iran is just like Iraq and North Korea — in other words you’ve got a problem — and the president is willing to call it, is part of how you deal with Iran. And that will inspire those who love freedom inside the country.”

In other words, President Bush hoped that his words would bolster the confidence of frustrated Iranians, and that they would go on to destabilize the regime. Thus, the Axis of Evil metaphor is an illustrative example of targeted, purposeful rhetoric, aimed at influencing actors to craft and implement subsequent policies.

**Bush Administration, Continued**

In 2003, and in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Bush administration refused to take the military option off the table in dealing with Iran. This threat was bolstered by toppling the regime in Iraq, an event which spurred the Iranian government to offer an olive branch. In a letter from the Swiss Embassy, Iran put it all on the table: the nuclear program, support for proxy groups, and potential recognition of Israel’s right to exist, all in exchange for Iran’s sovereignty and ending the pre-existing sanctions. But at the time, the authenticity and credibility of the document was questioned by some, so the Bush Administration didn’t act on it. Instead, President Bush continued to publically criticize Iran’s government for aiding Al-Qaeda, for not complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and for abusing human rights, while also praising the Iranian people’s desire for freedom, democracy, and human rights.

In December, after the devastating earthquake in Bam, Iran, which killed approximately 50,000 people, President Bush extended his sympathies to the victims and offered to help. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Iran’s UN envoy, Mohammad Javad Zarif, conversed on the phone in a rare instance of direct contact. Still, to the press, President Bush affirmed that this conversation and subsequent humanitarian aid did not indicate any thaw in US-Iran relations. So here, the Administration’s rhetoric was tough, and its policies for the most part mirrored that.

Starting in 2004, controversy around Iran’s nuclear program grew to become the defining issue of US-Iran relations. President Bush’s State of the Union that year anticipated this in its only reference to Iran:

“America and the international community are demanding that Iran meet its commitments and not develop nuclear weapons. America is committed to keeping the world’s most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the most dangerous regimes.”

The UN condemned Iran for keeping some of its nuclear activities secret, Iran kicked out the inspectors, and in response European leaders put together a trade package with the hopes of enticing Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment. But for the most part, President Bush’s rhetoric had little to do with the nuclear issue. Rather, he returned to the Axis of Evil refrain; it was, after all, an election year. Immediately after a sentence about Iraq, President Bush’s stump speech criticized Iran and North Korea for “challenging the peace.” On nearly thirty separate occasions, President Bush delivered these lines, further cementing his Axis of Evil metaphor by mentioning the three countries in succession. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that this rhetoric/policy dissonance — in which the speeches harped on the vague Axis of Evil metaphor while the specific policy goal was to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons — resulted in no substantial changes on the Iranian front for US foreign policy. In other words, by repeating the same Axis of Evil refrain over and over again, no attention was called to the nuclear issue, all but ruling out the possibility of crafting any new and substantive policies.

By 2005, the Bush administration’s rhetoric had gravitated back to the nuclear issue, and a major policy shift resulted. In March of that year, the US agreed to support France, Germany, and Great Britain (the EU-3) in their negotiations with Iran by contributing to the trade packages being offered in return
for Iran halting its nuclear program. As the Iranian Government considered the package, President Bush reaffirmed his desire for diplomacy to work. He even applauded Russia’s potential compromise to provide Iran with enriched materials in exchange for Iran’s agreement that it would not build reactors and acquire the technology themselves.

But unfortunately for the United States, the Conservative candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected President of Iran in June. From the Iranian perspective, the Reformist Party had had its chance. That Khatami’s “Dialogue Among Civilizations” initiative was met with the “Axis of Evil” metaphor represented a stinging failure for those advocating better relations with America and simultaneously was a boon for the conservatives and ultraconservatives. And even though President Bush didn’t know at the time just how much Ahmadinejad’s presidency would cool US-Iran relations and policy, he still spoke out strongly against the unfair and oppressive manner of the 2005 election.

Just three months after Ahmadinejad’s election, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found that Iran was in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If the nuclear issue had been central to US-Iran relations before, it was even more important now. The Bush administration applied a series of tactics to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The policies included economic sanctions, UN resolutions of condemnation, and occasional leaks of a possible targeted military strike on nuclear facilities. Rhetorically, these efforts were buttressed by support for the EU-3’s efforts and insistence on seeing diplomacy through, calls for the world to work together with “one voice” against Iran’s nuclear program, and praise for the freedom-seeking groups in Iran. This last piece of rhetoric was in fact featured in the President Bush’s 2006 State of the Union: “Tonight let me speak directly to the citizens of Iran: America respects you, and we respect your country. We respect your right to choose your own future and win your own freedom. And our Nation hopes one day to be the closest of friends with a free and democratic Iran.”

The intentions behind this overture were twofold. The first was to delegitimize the Iranian Government and its self-purported right to nuclear power — in other words, since the Iranian regime is not a representative one, America will speak to and respect the people of Iran instead of the regime that rules over them. The second intention represented more long-term thinking, in that, America predicts that Iran’s leaders will one day fall to a popular revolution led by today’s disenchanted youth; America must not alienate the latter at this time. Rather, America’s rhetoric should convey in the clearest possible terms that aggressive policies aren’t targeted at Iran’s youth, but rather at the regime currently oppressing them, their freedoms, and their future.

Put another way, this second strategy aimed to make an ally out of the Iranian people by emphasizing that they and America share a common enemy: the regime.

The nuclear issue remained at the forefront of US-Iranian relations through the end of the Bush Presidency. And of course the friction points that pre-date the Bush years still existed, such as Iran’s support for terrorist groups, what that meant for Israel, and retaliatory economic sanctions. But in late 2007, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), a joint communiqué from various intelligence agencies, cast serious doubts on Iran’s nuclear intentions. Not only did the NIE claim that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 (which makes some sense, considering that Iran saw in that same year what happens to anti-American regimes that are accused of having weapons of mass destructions), but it further questioned how much nuclear technology the Iranians even possessed:

“We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough [highly enriched uranium] for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely. We judge with moderate confidence that Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough [highly enriched uranium] for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame…All agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.”

The NIE stirred up considerable policy debate in the US. And while at the time many close to the Bush Administration questioned the NIE’s findings, the evidence compiled is generally accepted today. Still, the end of President Bush’s term was in sight, so the Administration didn’t make any rhetoric or policy changes towards Iran. Instead, Barack Obama inherited America’s Iran policy that focuses intently on the nuclear
program.

**Obama Administration**

Throughout the 2008 presidential campaign, and as President Barack Obama entered the White House, analysts and journalists alike heralded a near 180 degree turn from President Bush, his rhetoric, and his policies. President Obama criticized the Bush Administration heavily for refusing to meet face to face with the Iranian government. And President Obama publically signaled a desire for this shift:

“We should take an approach with Iran that employs all of the resources at the United States disposal, and that includes diplomacy. And so my national security team is currently reviewing our existing Iran policy, looking at areas where we can have constructive dialog, where we can directly engage with them. And my expectation is in the coming months we will be looking for openings that can be created where we can start sitting across the table, face to face, diplomatic overtures that will allow us to move our policy in a new direction.”

Interesting to note is the phrase, “and that includes diplomacy.” Even a cursory glance at the statements relating to Iran from President Bush – be they in interviews, press conferences, or speeches – demonstrates the rhetorical emphasis placed on and faith in the diplomatic process, albeit one led by the EU-3. President Obama therefore implied that President Bush’s policies didn’t match up with that bit of rhetoric and that the new administration would work harder to implement diplomacy in more tangible forms of policy. During his first Nowruz Address, President Obama did indeed convey substantial differences from his predecessor’s addresses. Most striking was the following portion:

“I would like to speak clearly to Iran’s leaders: We have serious differences that have grown over time. My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran, and the international community. This process will not be advanced by threats. We seek instead engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect.”

Keeping in mind President Bush’s rhetorical dismissal of the Iranian regime in favor of speaking “directly to the Iranian people,” this piece of rhetoric from the Obama Administration was a fundamental departure. Not only is the tone friendlier and focused more on future solutions than on past problems, but the speech respects the leaders of Iran by speaking plainly to them (later in the address, President Obama also used Iran’s official title as an Islamic Republic). And the new rhetoric was for a time met with new policies. President Obama reportedly sent a secret letter to Supreme Leader Khamenei in which he re-acknowledged the US’s role in the Mossadegh coup, affirmed Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program, and announced that the US would attend future diplomatic meetings between Iran and the UN (such as the P5+1 talks).

But in June of 2009, this show of warmth met its first roadblock: the Iranian presidential election. President Ahmadinejad was announced as the winner, but the lack of free and fair elections, the speed with which the results were announced (suggesting that many votes weren’t actually counted), and the results themselves (the Reformist challenger, Mir Hossein Mousavi, was far more popular than the final results indicated) pushed Iranian citizens to take to the streets and protest electoral fraud. Faced with the first large-scale and public protests since its inception in 1979, the Islamic Republic flexed its authoritarian muscles. Several factions within its military structure, from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to its Basij youth militia, were unleashed upon the peaceful “Green Movement.” The movement then evolved from protesting the election result specifically to questioning the very legitimacy of the Islamic Republic generally. Tear gas, gunfire, imprisonment, kidnapping, rape, and torture soon silenced the movement, however.

The Obama Administration spoke out strongly against Iran’s human rights abuses:

“We call on the Iranian Government to stop all violent and unjust actions against its own people. The universal rights to assembly and free speech must be respected, and the United States stands with all who seek to exercise those rights… If the Iranian Government seeks the respect of the international community, it must respect the dignity of its own people and govern through...
Still, President Obama tried to toe the rhetorical line between criticizing the show of tyrannical force and interfering in Iran’s domestic politics by siding with the protesters:

"The United States respects the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran and is not interfering with Iran’s affairs. But we must also bear witness to the courage and the dignity of the Iranian people and to a remarkable opening within Iranian society. And we deplore the violence against innocent civilians anywhere that it takes place. The Iranian people are trying to have a debate about their future. Some in Iran—some in the Iranian Government, in particular—are trying to avoid that debate by accusing the United States and others in the West of instigating protests over the election. These accusations are patently false… This tired strategy of using old tensions to scapegoat other countries won’t work anymore in Iran. This is not about the United States or the West; this is about the people of Iran, and the future that they—and only they—will choose."

President Obama’s policy towards the Green Movement reflected this delicate balance. Despite his solidarity with the victims of the violence, President Obama did not aid the protestors. However, instead of punishing the Iranian government, he acknowledged President Ahmadinejad as the winner of the election. His rhetoric and policy choices mirrored America’s attitude towards China’s human rights abuses: condemn without action.

In September, and as if to refocus America’s attention as the protests died down, the chief of the IAEA announced that Iran couldn’t produce a nuclear weapon in the near future and that the threat posed had been exaggerated. A few weeks later, Iran revealed a previously undisclosed nuclear enrichment facility in Qom. President Obama signaled America’s return to old priorities in his remarks to the United Nations later that month, in which he mentioned the threat of Iran’s nuclear program, without making reference to the Green Movement. Great Britain, France, America, China, Russia, and Germany met in October, and Iran subsequently agreed to swap the lion’s share of its enriched uranium in exchange for fuel to produce medical isotopes. But in the months that followed, Iran delayed responding to the proposal and ultimately rejected it despite the initial positive indications. This was the second and final roadblock to President Obama’s engagement policy. The day after Iran announced its rejection of the deal, President Obama very clearly announced the end of his attempts to engage:

“At the beginning of my administration, we put in place a policy that we have executed as drawn up over the last several months. What we said was that we would take a new approach and say to Iran that we are willing to engage them directly…we indicated that our offer would be on the table for a certain period of time, and that when that time ran out, we would look at other approaches that would increase pressure on Iran to give up its nuclear weapons program.

And so as a consequence, we have begun discussions with our international partners about the importance of having consequences…we will be developing a package of potential steps that we could take that will indicate our seriousness to Iran.”

These were not empty threats. The international community rallied with President Obama and sought to punish Iran. It took little over a month for the IAEA to pass a resolution, censuring Iran for its secret plant at Qom. And President Obama’s rhetoric became more aggressive as well. Whereas at the Green Movement’s height he was careful to defend human rights without patently siding with the protesters, his remarks in December weren’t nearly so neutral:

“The United States joins with the international community in strongly condemning the violent and unjust
suppression of innocent Iranian citizens, which has apparently resulted in detentions, injuries, and even death.

It’s about the Iranian people and their aspirations for justice and a better life for themselves. And the decision of Iran’s leaders to govern through fear and tyranny will not succeed in making those aspirations go away… I’m confident that history will be on the side of those who seek justice.”54

These phrases are reminiscent of President Bush’s attempts to drive a wedge between Iran’s frustrated citizens and their government. And considering that when the crackdown was at its height President Obama’s rhetoric was relatively weaker, it seems as though here, he was applying indirect pressure on Iran over the nuclear program with the tried-and-true tactic of emphasizing the people/regime disconnect. The State of the Union Address a month later made reference first to Iran’s nuclear obligations and second to America’s support for the “human rights of the women marching through the streets of Iran,”55 further indicating this mixed approach.

Tensions over the nuclear issue escalated throughout 2010. Although Ahmadinejad at times indicated a softening of Iran’s position, these promises were always either not fulfilled or were followed closely by aggressive acts (e.g., rocket launches, naval maneuvers, further enrichment, etc.). In February, the IAEA concluded that Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapon. In March, Russia announced plans to build a reactor in Iran over the summer. Two days later, President Obama’s Nowruz Address also escalated, again calling attention to the dissonance between the Iranian people and the regime, but this time with special attention to the nuclear issue. He argued,

Iran’s leaders… have refused good faith proposals from the international community. They have turned their backs on a pathway that would bring more opportunity to all Iranians and allow a great civilization to take its rightful place in the community of nations.”56

So whereas before, the Iranian government’s disrespect for its own people was cited indirectly in response to the nuclear issue, here President Obama was blending the two ideas even more closely together: Iran’s insistence on a nuclear program is yet another way in which the government is making life harder for its citizens.

This rhetorical escalation was matched by policy. In June, after lobbying extensively and spending a great amount of political capital in Russia and China, America’s policy efforts came to fruition, and for the fourth time the United Nations Security Council passed a set of broad sanctions on Iran.

“These are the most comprehensive sanctions that the Iranian Government has faced. They will impose restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities, its ballistic missile program, and, for the first time, its conventional military. They will put a new framework in place to stop Iranian smuggling and crack down on Iranian banks and financial transactions. They target individuals, entities, and institutions, including those associated with the Revolutionary Guard, that have supported Iran’s nuclear program and prospered from illicit activities at the expense of the Iranian people. And we will ensure that these sanctions are vigorously enforced.”57

President Obama at the same time took the opportunity to rhetorically reinforce the people/regime wedge, including an explicit reference to the Green Movement:

“These sanctions are not directed at the Iranian people…[when] faced with the opportunity to find a new way forward, one that would benefit its own people, the Iranian Government has chosen instead to remain a prisoner of the past.

Saturday will mark one year from the day that an election captivated the attention of the world, an event that should have been remembered for how the Iranian people participated with remarkable enthusiasm, but will instead be remembered for how the Iranian Government brutally suppressed dissent and murdered the innocent.”58

And the following month, President Obama supplemented the UN’s newest policy with another round of unilateral sanctions from America. By this time, not only did Iran face the world’s strongest condemnation to date, with America piling on more than anyone else, but it was also at the receiving end of President Obama’s harshest rhetoric since taking office. There is even a case to be made that President Obama’s rhetoric outmatched that of President Bush.59

While the latter did proscribe Iran to the Axis of Evil, his rhetorical tactics were kept distinct from one another most of the time. President Obama, on the other hand, was by this point combining various arguments (e.g., nuclear aggressions, people/regime dichotomy,
human rights abuses, etc.) and hurling them at Iran in a rhetorical whirlwind.

And so, since the end of President Obama's active attempts to engage due to Iran’s behavior, relations between the two countries have worsened. Meanwhile, both President Obama's rhetoric and his policies have kept pace. He publically sided with Iran’s dissidents and continued to leverage human rights abuses against the nuclear program. Iran was caught plotting to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Washington. President Obama authorized the use of Stuxnet, a sophisticated cyber-attack, against Iran's nuclear facilities. And Israel, not to be left out, feels increasingly threatened by the possibility of a nuclear Iran. This puts even more pressure on President Obama to keep the military option on the table (just like his predecessor). But until that day of military conflict comes (if it ever does), the economic warfare continues.

As recently as July 30, 2012, President Obama enacted additional economic sanctions on Iran, targeting financial institutions that deal with the heart of Iran's economy: oil revenues. A month later, the IAEA revealed that Iran had doubled the number of centrifuges in the subterranean power plant in Qom.

Conclusion

Is President Obama’s Iran record, both of word and of deed, really different from that of George W. Bush?

The answer is undoubtedly complicated, and much of the evidence is circumstantial. Until the attacks of 9/11, President Bush was on par with his predecessors in his treatment of Iran. And up to that point, relations were warming, due at least in part to Rafsanjani and his Pragmatist platform. But after 9/11, President Bush and the country were eager to crack down on terrorism worldwide, so relations soured throughout the Bush Presidency.

President Obama took over claiming to want to halt the skid, and his initial policy of engagement did yield different rhetoric and policies. But this time it was Iran that either failed to capitalize on this shift or was not interested due to the figures in power (i.e., Ahmadinejad). America then returned to its old ways of dealing with this member of the Axis of Evil. In fact, in this year’s Nowruz Address, President Obama accused the Iranian government of lowering, “an electronic curtain…around Iran… cutting the Iranian people off from the world.” By playing on the Iron Curtain metaphor from WWII, President Obama continued the pattern of borrowing metaphors used against past enemies, just like President Bush did in 2003. Because the Axis of Evil metaphor in many ways epitomizes President Bush’s foreign policy, those who saw President Obama as a stark change to the Bush Doctrine must have been shocked to see this president not only using his predecessor’s exact same rhetorical tactics, but also implementing even harsher policies.

Perhaps this confirms George Friedman’s recent hypothesis that when conducting American foreign policy, the particular person in the White House doesn’t matter so much as the constraints of the current geopolitical world order. And since President Obama inherited a post 9/11 world, one framed by the War on Terror against the Axis of Evil, his engagement policy with Iran was doomed to fail. To put Friedman’s point another way, Iran escalated its aggression and forced President Obama to respond in kind.

Or maybe the timing just hasn’t been right. Khatami’s “Dialogue Among Civilizations” was tried in the post-9/11 world, and President Obama’s attempts to engage were directed at an increasingly conservative Iranian political culture. If the leaders of both countries are willing to improve relations at the same time, and if the world order is conducive to East-West cooperation, then Iran and the US might just have a chance of finally ending this decades-long state of mutual enmity.

Endnotes


12. Ibid., 424.


33. Heradstveit and G Bonham, "What the Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran," pg 432.


39. There was a third instance of appealing to Iranian reformers and youth. Somewhat less direct (but no less frequently applied), this goal was to double down on the mission in Iraq. For example, at the National Newspaper Association Government Affairs Conference in 2006, "A free Iraq will inspire reformers in Iran."

40. Katzman, "Iran," pg 51.


42. Moran, "Timeline."


44. An annual tradition dating back to President H. W. Bush in which America wishes Iranians well during one of their most prominent holidays.


46. Barack Obama, "Videotaped Remarks
47. Katzman, “Iran,” pg. 52.
51. Interestingly, President Obama mentioned North Korea in the same breath, reinforcing The Bush era’s emphasis on the remaining members of the Axis of Evil.
58. Ibid.
59. Consider too that the Bush administration’s fear of WMDs being held by Iran was largely confirmed after Obama took office.
68. George Friedman, “The Election, the Presidency and Foreign Policy,” Stratfor, July 31, 2012.

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Fighting’ Words: America’s Rhetoric and Policies against Iran—Comparing the Bush and Obama Administrations / Jay Friedel
Will History Repeat Itself?

The Development of the South–North Water Transfer Project in China

by Nicole Nolan

his paper questions the development of the South-North Water Transfer Project (SNWP) in China, a costly and extensive proposition to ameliorate intensifying water shortages throughout China. This is a particularly interesting concept due to the extensive environmental damage during the Mao era and the fact that, with the establishment of the SNWP, the damage seems to continue. The paper examines a series of historical encounters with similar projects, such as the Three Gorges Dam, in order to apply these situations to the potential damage the SNWP could cause. The piece concludes by presenting a few other proposed alternatives, specifically the process of seawater desalinization.

Will History Repeat Itself?

China is notorious for attempting to harness the power of nature, a goal that has led to an extensive history of environmental degradation. Projects such as the Three Gorges Dam, paired with exponential growth in industry and population, have the country reeling with pollution and resource shortages. Consequences of extreme human interference in the natural world throughout the past century are now threatening modern China’s continuing growth and livelihood. One of the most substantial threats to the booming country is a water shortage that has quickly evolved into a crisis. Farmland is developing cracks due to water shortage and aquifers that have sustained large cities for decades are depleted. Water supply, particularly in Northern China, can no longer support the enormous populations of cities like Beijing, with a population over 20 million, and Tianjin, with a population of over 12 million.¹

The Chinese government and other organizations have proposed numerous solutions, which include better water management, desalination, and water diversion. China’s government has chosen to undertake the most expensive and largest option: water diversion from south to north. The South-North Water Diversion Project is expected to divert a massive 40 to 50 million cubic meters of water annually, cost around $62 billion, and displace upwards of 300,000 Chinese people.² Estimates suggest construction on the project will be complete by 2050, but numerous concerns have slowed progress. While on the surface the South North Water

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Transfer Project seems absolutely necessary given China’s current water scarcity, opposition to the project has been strong primarily due to cost, human displacement, and the uncertainty of environmental effects. However, water scarcity drastically limits the development of industry, agriculture, and the economy. Due to these threats to China’s growth, the government approved the project in August of 2002. Although the South-North Water Diversion Project appears to be a solution to China’s water shortage crisis, the possible consequences to construction regions suggest that this enormous project may be more detrimental than beneficial to China’s overall livelihood.

China is currently experiencing unforeseen and unprecedented growth. In 2010, the economy was growing at an incredible 11 percent. While this growth has begun to slow, the sheer number of people and industries in contemporary China are rapidly draining resources, particularly water. This unfettered water consumption, coupled with low levels of annual rainfall, paint a troubling picture for the state of China’s water supply.

Water availability per capita, World Resources Institute, 2007

The Yellow River, one of China’s main sources of water, has already begun drying up, a visible manifestation of the severity of the crisis. Farm fields are developing cracks, subsequently delay crop harvesting and forcing China to import grain from surrounding countries. This could soon elevate world grain prices, placing stress on the international political world. Farming is not the only facet of Chinese livelihood suffering from water scarcity—a whole host of other practices requiring water will be burdened by scarcity. Water demand is growing in all three sectors: agricultural, residential, and industrial. The issue of water shortage is clearly not one that will be easily solved or simply go away, which is why the Chinese government has turned to water diversion.

In 1952, the former chairman of the communist party Mao Zedong first proposed a water diversion project, similar to the one that is being constructed today. Although it took nearly half of a century for the idea to come to fruition, construction of the South-North Water Diversion Project finally began in December of 2003. It is the largest project of its nature ever undertaken, and is enormously expensive—more than double the price tag of the $26 billion Three Gorges Dam project. Upon

Water use per capita ranges drastically: 170 meters cubed in water-scarce areas to 2600 meters cubed in water-abundant regions. China is among the lowest-ranking countries for water availability per capita, far behind South and North America, Europe, and trailing even Sub-Saharan Africa.

Population density of China; Inventory of Conflict and Environment; red areas depict highest population density

Average Rainfall in China; dark blue depicts areas with heaviest rainfall

Already a dry country, rapidly increasing water demand has placed extreme stress on the government and civilians. Agriculture and industry consume a vast majority of the country’s water supply, as China is among the largest global agricultural producers of rice, wheat, corn, peanuts, and tea. Production of iron, steel, aluminum, cement, chemicals, and fertilizers drive China’s industrial economy. Additionally, China’s population is heavily concentrated in the middle and northern regions of the country where average groundwater resources are four times less than the south. The coexistence of such water-draining practices and minimal amounts of rainfall places immense stress on China’s current water system.

Population density of China; Inventory of Conflict and Environment; red areas depict highest population density

Average Rainfall in China; dark blue depicts areas with heaviest rainfall

Water availability per capita, World Resources Institute, 2007

Will History Repeat Itself? The Development of the South–North Water Transfer Project in China / Nicole Nolan
completion, the diversion project will have three routes beginning in the south and diverting water north: one in the west, one in the middle, and one in the east. Without treatment, where it becomes heavily concentrated. Sediment buildup is also becoming an issue in China’s bodies of water. Deficient infrastructure and management techniques are primarily to blame for the lack of water treatment and extreme pollution.

The eastern route alone would be over 1,155 kilometers long and require 23 pumping stations. Predictions say that another $80 million will need to be allocated for water treatment facilities, on top of the $62 billion price tag of the project. Industrialization along the routes of the South-North Water Project poses a serious risk of pollution to diverted water, which has created concern amongst scientists. This project could potentially draw more industry to areas along the diversion route, further soiling the diverted water.

Pollution of China’s rivers and lakes puts additional stress on the water shortage crisis. Currently, surface pollution of these bodies of water is leading to the extermination of certain species. More than 5 percent of rivers in China are devoid of fish and 80 percent of waterways are polluted in some way, some so polluted that they have become unusable. Only about 22 percent of industrial wastewater is correctly treated. Wastewater is frequently discharged into the country’s rivers, lakes, and seas without treatment, where it becomes heavily concentrated. Sediment buildup is also becoming an issue in China’s bodies of water. Deficient infrastructure and management techniques are primarily to blame for the lack of water treatment and extreme pollution.

It seems that the Chinese government has failed to fully analyze the domino effect that this project may have on water quality, waterway ecology, and civilian displacement.

Another significant argument against construction of the South-North Water Diversion project is the potential ecological impact of such a grandiose venture. Construction of channels as well as polluted sewage water may affect aquatic life in other waterways and fisheries, potentially altering entire ecologies. Researchers and engineers have numerous suggestions for mitigating these issues, such as lining channels and digging drainage canals to reduce salination of runoff water. Forest belts to reduce soil erosion, regulation of lake levels, and improved sewage treatment are other possible options. However, one of the most viable mitigation options would be to reduce the size of the project. Cambridge University author Liu Changming claims, “uncertainty of environmental impact of a water transfer project is in direct proportion to its scale.” Therefore, if the Chinese government reduced the magnitude of the diversion project, even only slightly, the potential for negative environmental impacts would also decrease.

China is currently experiencing both tangible (flood and drought) and intangible (disruption of traditional Chinese culture) consequences of their extensive past of environmental exploitation. Whether it is through revolting water pollution or intense water shortage, it is clear that the country must literally clean up its environmental act. The South-North Water Project is an attempt at this, but is it justified? Given the potential consequences and China’s grim environmental history, it seems that the Chinese government has failed to fully analyze the domino effect that this project may have on water quality, waterway ecology, and civilian displacement. China’s government has the opportunity to learn from past endeavors like the Three Gorges Dam. This pursuit of
clean energy and flood control actually uprooted hundreds of thousands from their homes, destroyed cultural relics, and resulted in severe environmental changes. These consequences are just beginning to be understood, but have clear and significant effects on China’s population, specifically those who inhabited the Three Gorges region. The South-North Water Diversion Project carries uncanny similarities and potential consequences; hundreds of thousands must be relocated and the environment is heavily threatened. While future economic growth would be difficult without the diversion of water, maintaining Chinese livelihood would be impossible with relocation and further environmental damage. Although a fair amount of construction has already begun on the diversion project, in the future other options must be taken seriously into consideration before selecting one colossal project to solve an issue.

If construction were stopped, innumerable resources and incredible amounts of time would be wasted. In the future, the government must be more cognizant of other less grandiose options with less significant consequences. Geologist Yong Yang, along with 50 other reputable Chinese scientists, compiled a book called South to North Water Transfer Memorandums that challenges the project and “raises serious concerns about construction at high altitudes, seismic stability, pollution in the Yangtze, climate change and the potential for reduced river flow to shut down hundreds of downstream hydropower stations, perhaps inflicting power blackouts on millions of people. Yong argues against the project, claiming that, “The government, they will make a goal… Then their researchers think their job is just to say it works. Everybody will just say the good word, and try to find data to support it… It’s not a very scientific way of doing research.” This alludes to an inevitable issue in a one party-system: there is no opposing party to refute the government’s claims. Similar to projects such as the Dazhai Campaign in the 1960s and the Three Gorges Dam, it seems that with the South-North project, the government is attempting to solve an issue with one enormous venture without considering any other options. However, it is clear that the issue of water shortage is much more complex than one project can ameliorate.

Researchers have been examining other possible solutions to the water shortages plaguing China. These include desalination and introducing new water-saving measures. Currently, the Chinese public is paying an unrealistically low price for water. For example, in the province of Hebei, the cost to producers and distributors of water is about 6 yuan per cubic meter. Yet, people pay only one tenth of that—.6 yuan per cubic meter. Therefore, water is undervalued by the general public, which allows consumers to be wasteful. If the price is altered to match production and distribution costs, basic economic laws of supply and demand say that water consumption will decrease.

Another option, desalination, is becoming a more viable option with increased research. A pipeline recently opened in 2010 is the first in China to deliver desalinated water to a municipal water system on a large scale. A desalination plant in Beijing removes salt from seawater, producing 100 million liters of drinkable water every day—enough to quench the thirst of hundreds of thousands. However, as Liu Zhenghong, general manager of the China Water Industry Investment Company, noted, 100 million liters is only a drop in the bucket for a growing and already enormous water demand in cities like Beijing and Tianjin. Proponents of desalination argue that desalinated water could flow through existing pipelines and therefore would not require further construction, forced location, and environmental destruction as the diversion project would. However, desalination can be costly—one ton of desalinated water costs between five and seven yuan. This cost may detrimentally affect suppliers and local economies, forcing consumers to pick up the cost. Industry experts believe that government subsidies will be required to rationalize desalination because it is difficult to attain public, private, and foreign investors. Wang Rongjian, vice president of the Singapore Hyflux Group, argues that the South-North Water Diversion Project and desalination can coexist and will work together successfully to solve the country’s water crisis.

China’s water crisis will continue its manifestation as industry, economy, and population progresses. Experts foresee that 4.5 billion cubic meters will be required by the year 2030 to support economic and population growth; the South-North project will divert an anticipated 40 to 50 million cubic meters,
which is only a measly 10 percent of what will be needed. It is clear that China needs some intervention that will prevent this crisis from becoming uncontrollable.

On the surface, the South-North Water Diversion Project seems to accomplish this. However, as researchers and government officials examine similar past situations, the negative consequences seem to overtake the anticipated benefits.

Human relocation, sacred locations, and the environment can no longer be sacrificed for an exponentially growing economy. The project should not be cancelled because China’s government has already allotted precious resources and time. Instead, in the future, the government must take into account the seemingly insignificant repercussions that affect entire groups of people and ecologies. China will undoubtedly encounter more crises and shortages in the future, and will undoubtedly attempt to harness the staggering power of nature to solve these issues. However, there is a Chinese proverb that cautions against the contemporary view of nature as a tool for man: “水能载舟，亦能覆舟” or “the water that bears the boat is the same that swallows it.”

**Bibliography**


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Endnotes


The Journal of Undergraduate International Studies, published at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, presents a compilation of essays and photos from undergraduate and postgraduate students from around the world. Publications document a wide variety of socio-political issues ranging from international conflict and diplomacy to environmental issues to international economics. Most importantly, the Journal of Undergraduate International Studies is intended to serve as a platform for global discussion and the open exchange of ideas, in effect, expanding our understanding of global interactions.