Letter from the Editor

Journal of Undergraduate International Studies

Dear Reader,

Welcome to the Spring 2012 issue of the Journal of Undergraduate International Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. We received a record-breaking number of submissions this semester, and we are pleased to share with you an array of fine undergraduate work on a variety of intriguing and unique topics.

As my time as JUIS Editor-in-Chief comes to an end, I would like to stress what a fulfilling, enjoyable, and educational experience this has been. However, most of all, I would like to say how proud I am of my staff who, through their enthusiasm, skill, and dedication, are the foundation of this journal. I have no doubt that through their continued efforts, JUIS will serve as an outlet for the best undergraduate work next year and into the future!

I truly hope that you enjoy reading this issue as much as I have enjoyed helping to share it with you.

Aubrey Lauersdorf
Editor-in-Chief
The views expressed in JUIS are those of the authors alone, and do not express an editorial consensus. The authors are responsible for all information contained in articles. The editors do not assume responsibility for the validity of the facts expressed in the articles.

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The cover photograph was taken by Alexandra Wall, University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Devil's Peak, Table Mountain, South Africa. This photo was taken on a hike to Devil's Peak, one of the highest points on Table Mountain. While climbing, the photographer came across two blockhouses that were formerly used by the British as defensive and lookout positions against the Dutch. This photograph was taken from the roof of one of the blockhouses with the sprawling Cape Flats suburbs in the background.

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From the Chicago area, Nathalie is senior with an individual major in human-computer interaction. Some things that keep her on the move are art and design, tennis, noodles, new experiences, Halloween, Taiwan, video games, and enjoying the moment.
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The 1960s-1970s concurrently saw increased concern for the world’s population size and the propagation of new techniques of capital-intensive agriculture applied to newly bred, high-yielding crop varieties. This paper argues that there was an isomorphic and complementary relationship between the thinking of neo-Malthusians on the one hand and Green Revolution modernizers on the other and that this thinking had implications serviceable to US policymakers during the Cold War. This displacement of social explanations of poverty in favor of technical ones resulted in a disavowal of the political agency of patient populations and failed to account for or ameliorate poverty.

“That excessive populations in certain outstanding countries, such as China and India, are the direct cause of misery, disease, and starvation has been so well publicized by modern means of communication—the press, television, radio, magazines, etc.—that few thinking people would question the fact.”

-Alexander J. Stuart (1958). 1

“In the mid-1970s, an exhibition called “Population: The Problem Is Us,” created by the Smithsonian Institute and publicly funded by The National Science Foundation, toured grade schools across the United States. Featuring illustrated panels with captions like, “…there are too many people in the world. We are running out of space. We are running out of energy. We are running out of food. And, although too few people seem to realize it, we are running out of time,” the exhibit emphatically made the case that a very important, if not the most important, variable influencing the safety, prosperity, and viability of a society (or of the world) was the number of that society’s (or the world’s) human inhabitants. 2 Such alarmist rhetoric became pervasive during “the population hysteria of the 1960s and 1970s,” a hysteria that was particularly pronounced in the US, where it was not only largely created by intellectuals, elites, and their popularizers, but also amplified by the patronage of the US government and large philanthropic organizations, notably the Rockefeller Foundation. 4 Books like Isaac Asimov’s Earth, Our Crowded Spaceship and articles like Garrett Hardin’s “Living on a Lifeboat” (both 1974) provided metaphors which suggested that humanity had either recently entered or must realize it had long ago entered a new era, one in which previously vaunted and cherished institutions and ideals like democracy or the inviolability of the individual may have to be sacrificed. The perception that the planet was in a crisis situation in relation to a finite amount of resources, particularly food, seemed to necessitate, and spawned a good amount of literature.

Nick Ziegler. Nick Ziegler is a senior at the University of California, Berkeley, where he studies 20th century international history with an emphasis in South Asia. In fall 2012, he will be both studying at the University of Delhi and applying to PhD programs in history.
on, an ethics of triage, which had philosophers considering “whether we ought to feed the starving in places like Bangladesh and the Sahel of sub-Saharan Africa” and concluding in the negative. Antinatalist triage found its way into United States Agency for International Development policy, with the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978 proclaiming that US foreign aid “shall be administered so as to give particular attention to... the impact of all programs, projects, and activities on population growth” and that US aid would be “concentrated” in countries that have demonstrated both “commitment and progress” in efforts for the “control of population growth,” a policy which amounted to the institutionalization of Malthusian checks. The near-consensus of the politically influential class in the United States was that “future population growth will be reduced by rising death rates... if it is not reduced by declining birth rates.”

Even those who felt that “the current crisis literature makes one wonder whether the authors are intentionally presenting the most gloomy picture possible in hopes that action will come before it is too late” did not disagree that such action, sooner or later, must come. But such urgency was not simply motivated, as the triagists sometimes claimed, by assuring that attempts at “feeding the starving in teeming underdeveloped countries” did not hurt the very people they were meant to help. One of the persistent features of much of the population-resources literature, from Malthus on, has been a healthy suspicion of the ability of the lower classes to regulate their behavior. In the minds of policymakers and analysts, this anxiety mingled well with the circumstances of their global war against communism, an affinity made easy by the fact that, for all their global pretensions, the favored unit of analysis for triagists was the nation-state. Perhaps for the mundane reasons that “men of science... eat, dress, and have families like common mortals,” and that their very claim to expertise rested upon the ability to identify problems before they became crises, population-control advocates were inclined to repackage their ethical concerns as political concerns. Given the name “population-national security theory” by John H. Perkins, this conception of how societies worked linked overpopulation to hunger, hunger to political instability, and political instability to communist takeover; that is to say, the basic natural law governing whether a nation-state would ally with the United States or the Soviet Union was that law which governed the relationship between resource availability and aggregate population.

It is, therefore, surprising to find Norman Borlaug writing in 1975 that, “despite the truth of the old Mexican proverb, ‘a full stomach assures a contented heart,’ the importance of food to political stability is today generally overlooked.” For by the 1970s, the US and other governments had adopted the “green revolution” model of crop yield maximization, so emphatically endorsed by Borlaug, with at least as much enthusiasm as they had adopted policies of population reduction, culminating in his being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970. The two were by no means unrelated, and “understanding how population and food shortages were handled... is the fundamental clue to understanding the origins of high-yielding varieties of wheat” and other grains. In academic disputes, the pessimism of more orthodox Malthusian thinkers was often at odds with the seemingly more optimistic belief that technological innovation could, at worst, be “a means of buying time... during which to find some way to apply the brakes to population growth,” and, at best, a durable solution to the perceived problem of unreasonable world demand for food. However, in the policy arena, the two camps emerged as complementary responses to the same geopolitical problem. The schematic understanding of the food-population issue that gained prominence, which ignored the potentially determinative influence of mediating social factors, viewed the problem as one of “a race between ‘the stork and the plow,’” that is, between population growth and the technological progress needed to grow more food. Simply put, the two programs represented demand-side and supply-side solutions,
respectively.

Inasmuch as he considers concrete links between the population establishment and the green revolution modernizers, Perkins emphasizes the influence of “a network of personal associations and friendships” evident in, for instance, his reconstructed academic genealogy that led from Edward Murray East, an early neo-Malthusian, to Norman Borlaug. Though perhaps Perkins is right that such a “link of professional associations and friendships” might have “prepared [Borlaug and others] to sympathize with the apocalyptic vision of the population explosion,” the affinity is much deeper than that. The styles of thinking used by both the neo-Malthusians and the green revolution modernizers share common metaphysical, epistemological, and political convictions. It is this isomorphism in ways of thinking about the world, beyond mere professional affiliation or political complementarity, that justifies conceiving of the green revolution and the “population hysteria” as two manifestations of the same historical phenomenon.

In a November 2, 1974, address to the Club of Rome Forum (a meeting held in anticipation of the United Nation World Food Conference held 4 days later), Lester Brown, one of the more nuanced of the neo-Malthusian thinkers, suggested that “the complexity of the food problem is such that we must ask ourselves whether it may not now exceed our analytical capabilities.” This danger was averted by the adoption of discursive strategies that reduced the problem to manageable components. One means of accomplishing this was, as shown above, the lifeboat metaphor; as one critic put it, “the lifeboat image reduces the elements of the ethical situation to a logically manageable image.... Much of the triage literature slides easily into the implication that everything possible has now been done” to prevent the circumstances that create hunger in the first place. More generally, “the isolation of a very few variables—ideally just two, while controlling all others—is a key tenet of experimental science.” In the case of the food-population problem, this predilection was manifest in what Amartya Sen has called “the Malthusian focus,” which “represents a far-reaching abstraction from various social influences on hunger, starvation and mortality, making the food problem turn on the ratio of two physical magnitudes.” Again, the issue is one of either reducing one variable (population) or increasing the other (food), but aside from defining the problem for green revolution modernizers, the reasoning was recapitulated in the methods through which the solution was carried out; logical empiricism, when applied to agricultural matters, lends itself to monoculture, isolated-variable breeding strategies abstracted from actual fields being tended by actual peasants, etc. That much of this durability of problem solving strategy is due to the circumstance that the green revolution was, using James C. Scott’s term, a quintessentially “high-modernist” project will be pursued later.

One crucial concept that united both the green revolution and the antinatalist camps was that of “carrying capacity.” Nathan F. Sayre traces the evolution of the term, from one used in international shipping and other arenas to denote a mechanical or engineered attribute of manufactured objects or systems (beginning in the 1840s); to its extension to organisms and natural systems in the 1870s and its application to range and game management in the early 20th century; to K, a number that was meant to be an intrinsic attribute of an organism which denoted its maximal population...
size under optimal circumstances when abstracted from real habitats; and finally to its neo-Malthusian usage as a shorthand for limits on the number of humans the earth can support. At its origins, it referred to a fixed quantity of X that some encompassing Y should carry in abstraction from time or history. Since then, it has sometimes described a maximum limit and more often an optimal or normative one, but it has always aspired to idealism, stasis, and numerical expression. Only in the first of the four types of uses were these attributes justified... each new use appropriated the basic idea and, in some measure, the authority of its predecessors, overlooking—and ultimately forgetting—their contexts and limits. Simplifying the story greatly, an important distinction arose between the ideal and the actual carrying capacity relationship between a species and its environment (in rangeland management, these were called “original” [before overgrazing] and “actual” carrying capacities, while in population biology this distinction was captured by K and the actual observed population size in situ). The theoretical existence of K allowed scientists to infer “environmental resistance” to population growth by calculating the difference between K and the observed population size. Because “environmental resistance” is dependent for its extrapolation on K, a number that can never be observed, the equation, C = B : E (where C is carrying capacity, B is biotic potential [K], and E is environmental resistance), from William Vogt’s influential tract Road to Survival (1948) is in fact tautological. The unfalsifiability of carrying capacity helps to account for its durability and intuitive reasonableness. It can, therefore, instantly explain almost any social problem without the need to consider either social causes or social solutions. If carrying capacity is accepted, then “every empirical instance of misery and vice appears... as evidence of [environmental] checks, and the growing population emerges as the root of the problem.”

And it was widely accepted, as a “firmly established biological concept.” Given the nautical origins of “carrying capacity,” it is perhaps more than quaint that Garrett Hardin believed that “every country’s ‘lifeboat’ carries a sign that indicates its capacity.” The implication is both normative and teleological; just as a steamship was meant to carry a certain mass or volume of cargo, so was any given environment. As if to confirm that carrying capacity was an article of faith, Hardin also argued that “the interests of posterity can be brought into the reckoning of ethics if we abandon the idea of the sanctity of (present) life as an absolute ethical ideal, replacing it with the idea of the sanctity of carrying capacity” and suggested that one commandment in “a new Decalogue” be, “Thou shalt not exceed the carrying capacity of any environment.” Carrying capacity functioned for the green revolution camp in a somewhat different way; while it was accepted by Borlaug that “in all biological populations there are innate devices to adjust population growth to the carrying capacity of the environment,” it had so far “not asserted itself to bring into balance population growth and the carrying capacity of the environment on a a worldwide scale.” This presented an opportunity, for in Borlaug’s reading of history the carrying capacity of the world for humans had been increased dramatically in the past by technological progress, and the green revolution was doing so again. However, his optimism was only warranted because he was “confident that within the next two decades [man] will recognize the self-destructive course he steers along the road of irresponsible population growth and will adjust the growth rate levels” to one commensurate with the carrying capacity of the environment. Carrying capacity allowed neo-Malthusians to ignore even the complexity of ecological variables, collapsing them into one, in theory, numerically-specifiable quantity.

The affinity between the two approaches to the population problem becomes clear if one acknowledges, like David Harvey, that “the adoption of certain kinds of scientific methods inevitably leads to certain kinds of substantive conclusions which, in turn, can have profound political implications.” Harvey argues that logical empiricism, when applied to the population-resources problem,
has “inevitably produced Malthusian or neo-Malthusian results.” This is contrasted to the approaches of both Ricardo and Marx; the latter, according to Harvey, proffered a historically specific critique that denied the “naturalness” of the supposed natural law of population, instead finding it to be the particular law of population that operated under capitalism, endemic to capitalism itself. The virtue of this type of thinking, if one is not concerned with criticizing capitalism as such, is simply that it draws attention to the social relations in which all activities, reproduction and consumption among them, occur. Harvey’s argument concludes with translating the sentence “overpopulation arises because of the scarcity of the resources available for meeting the subsistence needs of the mass of the population” into language that is attentive to those relations: “There are too many people in the world because the particular ends we have in view (together with the form of social organization we have) and the materials available in nature, that we have the will and a way to use, are not sufficient to provide us with those things to which we are accustomed.” Conceiving of the problem this way increases the potential solutions; Harvey lists four:

1. we can change the ends we have in mind and alter the social organization of scarcity;
2. we can change our technical and cultural appraisals of nature;
3. we can change our views concerning the things to which we are accustomed;
4. we can seek to alter our numbers.

Because solutions 1 and 3 require far reaching changes in the consumption habits and social standing of the politically-efﬁcacious classes, these are unlikely to be pursued. It is telling that 2 and 4 were the major avenues by which the population-resource problem was pursued in the 20th century and in the US in particular.

In 1976 the economist D.W. Pearce decried the “contrasts, incompatibilities and inconsistencies” between the approaches taken by economists and non-economists to the population-resources relationship and “the arrogant attitude of scientists in commenting on economics, a subject about which many of them seem to possess astronomic ignorance.” While perhaps a case of disciplinary territoriality, the critique nonetheless draws attention to the fact that many of those who approached the population-resources issue were, by training, inattentive to social factors. This can be clearly glimpsed in the distinction between “lifeboat” conceptions of carrying capacity (as a relationship between needs and resources) and the economic principle of scarcity (as a relationship between wants and resources). Carrying capacity seeks to identify the natural, biologically-necessary degree of needs and contrast this to a fixed or at least finite and nearly exhausted amount of resources, whereas scarcity insists upon the social construction of wants and the necessity of trade-offs. Carrying capacity imagines a world on the brink of catastrophe, under which circumstances every trade-off is catastrophic and any adequate response calls for, potentially, measures that would not be admissible in less catastrophic contexts (as “triage” implies). While it is obviously the case that there is some special relationship between food and survival that does not hold between, for instance, books and survival, it is still clear that the scope of social influence upon food production, consumption, distribution, and availability is far greater than “carrying capacity” allows."

"While it is obviously the case that there is some special relationship between food and survival that does not hold between, for instance, books and survival, it is still clear that the scope of social influence upon food production, consumption, distribution, and availability is far greater than “carrying capacity” allows."
through technological innovation. While undoubtedly technology is one important way in which to ensure an adequate food supply, “it is unnecessarily restrictive to think that human inventiveness and creativity apply only in the sphere of technology—human beings can and do create social structures as well as machines.” However, the green revolution was named in contravention to the “red” revolution of Soviet Russia and was meant to preclude the need for or contemplation of social solutions to the problem; it was “intended to be a revolution that did not take up problems of social reform.” However one assesses the truthfulness of their claims to stand for social solutions to problems such as hunger, it is undoubtedly the case that the fact that the communist nations did make such claims helped to push the United States and other Western nations further away from social solutions. When the People’s Republic of China’s delegate to the 1974 World Population Conference in Bucharest claimed that “population is not a problem under socialism,” he was highlighting this categorical difference. Despite the arguable promise of reform of such mediating institutions as land reform, price controls, labor, etc. in addressing the problem of supplying adequate food to a given number of individuals, both the neo-Malthusians and the green revolution modernizers were happy to forego such untidy, multi-variable considerations. Inasmuch as the “social” realm is considered at all, it toggles between the binary positions of “functional” or “in strife,” and this toggling is wholly dependent upon the natural law governing population and resources: “The social, economic and political pressures, and strife are building at different rates in different countries of the world, depending upon human population density and growth rate, and upon the natural resource base that sustains the different economies.”

This either-or position is symptomatic of the type of development theory held in common by both the green revolution and the neo-Malthusian camps, a further locus of shared ideological commitment. Roger Revelle, a prominent theorist of the population-food relationship, wrote, “we tend to think of countries and peoples as forming a continuous economic spectrum, with the different stages of economic development being more or less equally present.” Whether the “we” is meant to include lay readers or merely members of the field of population-resource studies is unclear, but what is significant is that this statement makes evident a conception of development that is both unilinear and diffusionist. This corresponds to the theory of “dual economy,” “prominent throughout the 1960s and 1970s,” but first articulated in 1953 by Julius Boeke, which holds that economies in the late 20th century contained both “a dynamic, modern sector and a static, traditional sector. The static sector lacks savings, investment, capital, and infrastructure, an imbalance which can be corrected by the movement (diffusion) of capital, know-how, and information from the dynamic sector.” When the tendency to think dualistically was applied on a global scale, the results were typical of what J.M. Blaut has referred to as “Eurocentric diffusionism:”

The belief is both historical and geographical. Europeans are seen as the “makers of history.” Europe eternally advances, progresses, modernizes. The rest of the world advances more sluggishly, or stagnates: it is “traditional society.” Therefore, the world has a permanent geographical center and a permanent periphery: an Inside and an Outside. Inside innovates, Outside lags. Inside leads, Outside imitates. The significance of Blaut’s argument is not merely that Eurocentric diffusionism was an option, but that it was hegemonic; any child schooled in the West until late in the 20th century would enter the world with, to some degree, a “colonizer’s model of the world.” A biographical argument can be made that technicians, scientists, and others who became regarded as experts on the population-resources problem were especially unlikely to have an opportunity to expose such notions to scrutiny, their training being unconcerned with such matters; if so, it is unsurprising that the green revolution perfectly fits the mold of a Eurocentric diffusion project.

It is crucial to distinguish Eurocentric diffusionism from Eurocentric chauvinism; the former is a belief about matters of fact, “of science, and scholarship, and informed and expert opinion. To be precise, Eurocentrism includes a set of beliefs that are statements about empirical reality, statements educated and usually
unprejudiced Europeans accept as true, as propositions supported by ‘the facts.’” Diffusionism is ideology proper, operating at the level of what Slavoj Zizek has called the “unknown knowns,” that is, beliefs that those holding them are not aware they hold, thinking them benign, ethically and ideologically neutral, and simply correct. It is at this level that the social meaning of attempts to either reduce population or increase crop yields without considering social factors constraining production or influencing consumption must be located; contrary to the claimed neutrality of these “scientific” approaches to the problem, one critic has claimed, “it is rather the Malthusian arguments which are based on political arguments, in so far as they presume the maintenance of the present form of society.”

A persistent feature of Malthusian thinking, further evidence of its dualistic and Eurocentric tendencies, has been its propensity to find different laws of population for different classes of people. Malthus, in attempting to reconcile his principle of population with the problem of effective demand, ultimately decided that it was the duty of the nonproductive classes (presumably more prudent in their breeding habit) to conspicuously consume so as to be the engines of commerce, whereas the lower classes (who, given population growth, would consume more should wages or philanthropy allow it) were too profligate to be entrusted with such a social role. In the 1970s, Susan George argued that “the present world political and economic order might be compared to that which reigned over social-class relations in individual countries in nineteenth-century Europe—with the Third World now playing the role of the working class,” a case that becomes convincing when observing the fact that it is usually third world population growth that provoked such excitement from antinatalists and the green revolution camp alike. The principle of population is, in fact, a pair of laws: one economic law governing the reproduction of the rich, and one natural law governing the reproduction of the poor.

This survey of the deep ideological similarities between the antinatalist and the crop yield maximization movements in the 1960s and 1970s has been undertaken to show that the two were in some way mutually constitutive and in dialogue; and furthermore that they, being in Borlaug’s words, “two different sides of the same coin,” can be collapsed into a broader moment in the 20th century intellectual history of the West. Earlier, it had been suggested that James C. Scott’s notion of “high-modernism” is useful here, and it is appropriate to conclude that high-modernism is a suitable umbrella term for many projects undertaken in the 20th century to improve the lot of humanity or particular groups of humans, among them population control and the green revolution.

“The clarity of the high-modernist optic is due to its resolute singularity. Its simplifying fiction is that, for any activity or process that comes under its scrutiny, there is only one thing going on.” That is, high-modernism refers to a tendency to seek technical solutions to problems facing humanity, and to the faith that “rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws” provides the best chance at human happiness. It is by definition a faith, being “uncritical, unskeptical, and thus unscientifically optimistic about the possibilities for the comprehensive planning of human settlement and production.” But high-modernist intervention and planning is of a pair with what Scott calls “legibility,” which is the degree to which social processes
are observable, recorded, and known to the state. Scott argues that “the greater the manipulation envisaged, the greater the legibility required to effect it,” and conversely that the intent to manipulate implies a project to enhance legibility. It is because projects such as population control and the green revolution were useful to the state that scientists had their opportunity to, as one polemician urged them to, “come out of their ivory towers and lend their expert voices.” If experts had not convinced policymakers that population in excess of some natural carrying capacity was hazardous to their political and economic standing, such policies as outlined here would not had been adopted; but if such science as these experts had on offer was not beneficial to policymakers, those policymakers would not had been convinced. Finally, high-modernism allows the employment of scientific rhetoric as a justificatory tactic without being bound to the spirit of open inquiry that “science” allegedly entails.

In 1952, before the high-yielding varieties of grains and their attendant technological packages had been formulated, Josué de Castro posed the question: “Is it possible to consider hunger as a phenomenon inherent in life itself, a natural and inevitable contingency like death, or should it be regarded as a social evil, a plague of man’s own making?” Contemplating the question, de Castro took as foils those who reduce the question to a matter of the relative magnitudes between number of people and amount of food, abstracted from history:

Two schools of thought about world hunger are, in my opinion, really dangerous to the future of humanity because they falsify the social reality of the problem. One theory attempts to prove that famine is a natural and incurable phenomenon; the other offers as our only salvation a forced reduction in the world’s birth rate.

Furthermore, when de Castro considered the question of soil productivity, he found it to be “a function of the prevailing kind of economic organization” and concurred with Earl Parker Hanson that “such neo-Malthusians as Vogt seem totally unaware that it is never a land that is overpopulated in terms of inhabitants per square mile; it is always an economy, in terms of inhabitants per square meal.”

While showing that deviation from the predominant thinking on the population-resources problem did exist, the urgency of de Castro’s intellectual intervention can be taken as evidence of his marginality. That it had to be done is obviously the case, if one considers Vogt’s contention that “there is little hope that the world will escape the horror of extensive famines in China during the next few years. But from the world point of view, these may be not only desirable but indispensable.”

It might be unsurprising, given that he follows in the lineage of Vogt, that Borlaug insisted repeatedly that “while the population monster is being tamed,” it must be done “humanely.” However, despite such triage with a human face, the cause for urgency was no more diminished by 1978, when Borlaug wrote the following words:

‘Human rights’ is a utopian issue and a noble goal to work toward. But it can never be achieved as long as hundreds of millions of poverty stricken people in the world lack the necessities of life. The ‘right to dissent’ doesn’t mean much to a person with an empty stomach, a shirtless back, a roofless dwelling, the frustrations and fear of unemployment and poverty, the lack of education and opportunity and the pain, misery and loneliness of sickness without medical care. My work has brought me into close contact with such people and I have come to believe that all who are born into the world have the moral right to the basic ingredients for a decent human life. How many should be born and how fast they should come on stage is another matter.

By considering the problem of adequate provisioning of food in abstraction from the social influences on that provisioning, the only axiom being “society will automatically benefit from ‘gains’ from a slower population growth in the form of an economic and social development,” it follows easily that the patients of such benefits have no need for the political and social tools and opportunities to be themselves agents in the process. While a great amount of effort is expended ostensibly in the service of the poor, in de Castro’s
words, “The real problem, which is political, continues to be pushed out of sight—and therefore remains.” 89

The 1960s and 1970s saw a high water mark of concern for the size of the world’s population, in particular the size of populations in the poorer parts of the world. These concerns were supported institutionally, primarily by the US government and by large philanthropic organizations. Being convinced that social harmony, alliance with the United States, and consent to market economies and business relations with the United States followed mechanically from a population being in balance with the natural carrying capacity of a place (while, conversely, an out-of-balance population would result in communist takeover), the US government patronized both demand and supply side solutions to the problem in the forms of antinatalist policies and attempts to increase the yield of major grain crops through technical manipulation. This penchant for technical analyses and solutions to the problem of food availability was accompanied by the displacement of social explanations and solutions to the same problem. The result for patient populations was a disavowal of their ability to be political actors and a loss of political and social autonomy. These policies and the scientific attitudes that led to them can be understood under the rubric of “high-modernism,” which can furthermore be understood as one of the dominant trends in the intellectual history of the West in the late 20th century.

Endnotes

4. Thomas Schindlmayr, “Explicating Donor Trends for Population Assistance,” Population Research and Policy Review, 23.1 (February 2004), 25. Rockefeller Foundation support for population reduction research and policy was pervasive throughout the 20th Century, beginning with the pre-war eugenics movements and continuing into and beyond the 1960s-70s “hysteria.” John D. Rockefeller, II was personally driven to reduce population, particularly in the poorer parts of the world, creating the Population Council in 1962 and using his control of both Foundation funds and his personal share of the Rockefeller fortune to be one of the single most important figures in the 20th Century movement to control world population. See Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 2003), passim, and ibid., 32. The first Rockefeller foray into population research was a study in 1927 aimed at “some simple measure which will be available for the wife of the slum-dweller, the peasant, or the coolie, though dull of mind” to prevent reproduction. Connelly, 61.
6. Ctd. in Kasun, 79.
9. Fletcher, 52.
10. Stuart’s Overpopulation: Twentieth Century Nemesis (1958) is a tour de force in this regard. “The only way to raise permanently the living level enough to prevent a return to communism [speaking of Guatemala, which according to Stuart “actually was taken over by the communists for a time] is to lower the high birth rate. In all the other countries where communism threatens, a lowered birth rate will similarly solve the problem.” Stuart, 215.
12. John H. Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes, and the Cold War (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 119-120. It is perhaps notable that Josué de Castro, one of the major radical critics of the reduction of the population-resources dynamic to a natural law to the exclusion of social influences on hunger, largely accepted the main thrust of the PNST argument (that hungry people are prone to join quixotic programs for a better future). The major exception was that his examples are Nazi Germany and militarist Japan. Elsewhere, however, he critiques the tightened “prudent spirits” who “attribute social unrest to the sheer number of human beings,” arguing they “are simply blaming the hungry for the fact that there is hunger.” de Castro, 65, 495.
17. Perkins, 137-38.
18. Lester Brown, “The Complexity of the Food Problem,” in Santaj Aziz, ed., Hunger, Politics and Markets: The Real Issues in the Food Crisis (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 10. Brown’s nuance is evident in his concern for, beyond mere food supply, the impact of affluence on consumption, deforestation, desertification, water availability, employment, disease, climate, energy, and prices (as in By Bread Alone). Also notable has been his willingness in recent years
to go "Beyond Malthus," though without abandoning his unfalsifiable thesis that population growth and level are the ultimately determinative variables in the viability of any society. See: Lester R. Brown, Gary Gardner, and Brian Halweil, Beyond Mathus: Nineteen Dimensions of the Population Challenge (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999).


22. James C. Scott defines high-modernist ideology as "a strong...version of the self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and, above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws," and warns that it "must not be confused with scientific practice. It was fundamentally, as the term 'ideology' implies, a faith that borrowed, as it were, the legitimacy of science and technology. It was, accordingly, uncritical, unskeptical, and thus unscientifically optimistic about the possibilities for the comprehensive planning of human settlement and production." Scott, 5.


24. Ibid., 121.

25. This observation, and the reasoning behind it, is wholly due to ibid., 130.

26. Ibid.


29. Garrett Hardin, "Carrying Capacity as an Ethical Concept," in George R. Lucas, Jr. and Thomas W. Ogletree, eds., Lifeboat Ethics: The Moral Dilemmas of World Hunger (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 133-34. Hardin also wrote a poem called "Carrying Capacity," featuring a dialogue between the universe and a human tribe that is exceeding its environment's carrying capacity. "Don't speak to me of shortage," says the universe. "My world is vast/And has more than enough—for no more than enough./There is a shortage of nothing, save will and wisdom./But there is a longing of people.../Ravish capacity: reap consequences." Hardin (1976), 135-36.


31. Ibid.


33. Ibid., 40.

34. Ibid., 61-62.


36. Harvey, 59.


38. Ctd. in Paul Demeny, "Bucharest, Mexico City, and Beyond," Population and Development Review, 11.9 (March 1985), 99-100. Of course, actual Chinese population policy was as starkly different from the ideal expressed here as any pursued by a Western nation.


40. Borlaug (1978), 103-09.


44. Ibid., 9.


46. Eland Hofsten, "What Should Be Meant by Malthusianism?" European Demographic Information Bulletin, 9.3 (1979), 108. It is notable that Hofsten undermines his own point by appearing to claim for himself the very neutrality he denies the antinatalists he is criticizing.


48. Scott, 347.

49. Ibid., 5.

50. Ibid., 183.

51. Knobilch, 641.

52. de Castro, 49.

53. Ibid., 61.

54. Ibid., 451.

55. Ctd. In ibid., 65.


57. Ibid., 111.


59. de Castro, 59.

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In two modern-day cases, the atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 and in Darfur, Sudan from 2003 to 2010, sexual violence was used not only as a tool of war but also as a tool of ethnic cleansing and genocide by Serbian aggressors and Janjaweed, respectively. The shape that the sexual violence and torture against men and women in both conflicts took was influenced by the implicated societies’ discourses on masculinity, the roles of men and women in the community, and culturally portrayed (via media or other means) sexualities of the ethnic men and women involved.

Adopted by United Nations member states in 1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court identifies sexual violence as one of five possible methods through which genocide can be perpetrated, and it condemns more specific acts of sexual violence as crimes against humanity. Through the inclusion of these crucial provisions, the international community recognized that genocidal persecution of a group can include not only explicit acts of murder or physical destruction, but also the targeting of the group’s sexuality—be it through sterilization, sexual mutilation, forced pregnancy, or otherwise—for the purposes of “preventing births within the group.”

In keeping with worldwide norms on discussion of sexual violence, the Rome Statute’s provisions focus almost exclusively on women as the primary targets of sexual violence, most notably through its language of human trafficking and forced impregnation. Despite this feminine focus, however, its vague language is careful to leave room for the international prosecution of sexual violence or torture against men in cases of genocide or ethnic cleansing.

In two very modern cases, the atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Darfur, Sudan, sexual violence was used not only as a tool of war but also as a tool of ethnic cleansing and genocide by Serbian aggressors and Janjaweed, respectively. The use of sexual violence and torture against women in both conflicts was informed by the implicated societies’ discourses on masculinity and the roles of men and women in the community. Traditionally, theories on sexual violence as a weapon of war—especially in the cases of Muslim victims in both Bosnia and Darfur—discuss the power behind a male aggressor defiling a female victim, usually in the hopes of emasculating her husband or other male authority in her family (i.e., the head of household). In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, sexual violence was not confined to the female body as a battleground for male-to-male power-play; the male body was also humiliated, defiled, and mutilated on an unprecedented scale. What accounts for the difference between solely female targeting in Darfur and the encompassing of both male and female targeting in Bosnia can be traced to heightened masculine conceptions in Serbian nationalism—specifically the contradictory media-bred portrayal of the victims, predominantly Bosnian Muslims, as barbarously heterosexual and, more importantly, dangerously homosexual.

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The fact that this nationalist portrayal of the male victims is missing from the Darfur case is consistent with its lack of male-to-male sexual violence.

**Bosnia-Herzegovina Nationalist Masculine Discourse in Serbia**

By definition, ethnic nationalism indirectly emphasizes female sexuality: the ethnicity's right and, often, need to continue to exist in a nation(-state) is dependent on the feminine power of procreation. However, when this nationalism is directed against another ethnicity, or even defined in opposition to it, the mythologized role of the woman can backfire, leading to one side's aggression against the other side's female 'birth-machines' in a familiar power-play. As a result, the highly heterosexualized nature of the Serbian rhetoric informed the explicit types of sexual violence used by Serbian aggressors on the ground in Bosnia, specifically the targeting of over 50,000 women and an unknown number of men.

Capitalizing on this newly reinvigorated Serbian masculinity, the Serbian nationalist-controlled media portrayed the victims, namely Bosnian Muslims, as sexually anti-Serb. Specifically, Muslims were portrayed as sexually voracious barbarians who often directed their sexual appetites toward defenseless women, both Muslim and Serb. Images of Muslim men as violent rapists of Serbian women had a particular resonance with the nationalist idea of women as the womb of the nation.

The rumored forced impregnations of Serbian women by Muslim aggressors frequently emphasized by the nationalist newspapers conjured up visions of a pure Serbian lineage disrupted by Muslim blood. This propaganda served to further underscore the idea of Serbian victimization; especially once accusations of Serbian sexual atrocities became undeniable, the Serbian nationalist media retaliated with justifications claiming Muslim exploitation of the literal and metaphorical Serbian motherland.

Public vilification of the Muslim man did not stop with Serbian victimization, however. In efforts to defend surfacing Serbian sexual violence accusations by reinvigorating the “otherness” of Muslims, the Serbian media also referred to Muslim men's sexual voracity as affecting relations among their own. One particular news story in Politika exposed the "plight" of a Muslim woman who, having chosen a Serb husband against her family's wishes, found herself captured and sexually assaulted by Muslim aggressors.

Though the passionate, independent Muslim woman herself is depicted as an “other” to the nationalist ideal of a submissive Serbian woman, this story does identify at least one attempt by the Serbian media to show the undifferentiating depravity of the enemy, in part to justify Serbian actions in Bosnia.

According to the Serbian media during the time, Muslim sexual voracity was not limited to a heterosexualized identity. In fact, along with their depictions of Muslim men endlessly targeting Serbian women, Serbian newspapers...
also constructed the ethnic “other” in sexualized opposition to a masculine and militarily powerful Serbian man by representing Muslim men as feminine or homosexual.11 These representations reflected a wider Serbian concern with the hypersexual threat Muslims posed to Serbian nationalist and masculine authority. Through an inward lens, by claiming that the “other” was threatening the highly masculine Serbian identity, the Serbian press continued its theme of Serb victimization by casting the enemy in a homosexual light.12 In this way, Serbian nationalists related the perceived differences in sexual lifestyles to the power-play and “struggle for social dominance” between Serbs and Bosnian Muslims.13

Manifestations of This Discourse in Sexual Violence

This media-bred paranoia about Muslim men and women informed Serbian aggressors’ policies in organizing specially designated “rape camps” or “bordello camps,” occupied establishments like restaurants and hotels converted for the purposes of sexual slavery, sexual torture, and the imposition of forced pregnancies.14 Within these “camps,” women were the primary targets of mass sexual violence, yet they were also utilized as tools for male-to-male sexual violence. In Bosnia, Serbian aggressors would force men to rape their daughters, wives, or other female relatives under pain of death.15 In one reported sexual “game,” Serbian women were stripped naked in front of row of Muslim men, and the first man to have an erection was castrated.16 In the latter case, even Serbian women were forced to witness and take part in this violence against the vilified and sexually dangerous Muslim man, reflecting the nationalist theme that women within the nation should always serve a purpose for the nation, regardless of its consequences for them.

Male sexual violence against men continued and extended beyond the nature of sexual and psychological torture against women. Perhaps to reflect the view of Muslims as socially unacceptable (i.e., homosexual) even to Serbian self-determination.20 These political acts of male-to-male sexual torture and violence in Bosnia can be traced to both images of the Muslim man—the dangerous heterosexual and the unacceptable homosexual—in the Serbian nationalist media and rhetoric.

Darfur, Sudan

Masculine Discourse in Sudan

Put simply, the supposed ethnic dichotomy in the conflict in Darfur, Sudan is between “Arab-Muslims” and “Black Africans”—the former nomadic and the latter sedentary farmers.21 Despite the labels implying otherwise, both parties have a history of joint Islamic faith, unlike the opposing religions in Bosnia; in fact, though the explicitly Islamic Sudanese government has targeted the rebel groups as non-Islamic and thus threats to the well-being of the state, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)22 both have ties to Islamic political life.23 In their respective discourses, the government and rebels coin the cultural term “Arab” as the predominant difference between the two and target each other’s lifestyle difference (Arab vs. African), regardless of their shared faith. The Sudanese...
government in particular recognized most Darfuris as Muslims, though on a lower tier, who needed to be reinvigorated as proper Arab-Muslims through re-Islamization. In Sudan, discourses on gender, femininity, and masculinity are closely tied to the dominant religion, Islam, and its political and social significance. Arab-Sudanese culture expects boys to become men by “gaining honor” through battle and protection of the weak, among other acts. Unsurprisingly, familiar values of virility, bravery, and strength—all tied to a heterosexual view of the male—appear in Arab-Sudanese definitions of masculinity, as they did in Serbian nationalist discourse except without the additional Serb emphasis on the Other as homosexual. Furthermore, though the female power of pregnancy and birth is acknowledged, Arab-Sudanese society stands by the idea that a child’s ethnicity is derived from the father’s. The Bosnian case also showed this pattern, when Serbian men forcibly impregnated Bosnian Muslim women in an effort to assert the superiority of their genes over the women’s, which supposedly were weaker both ethnically and sexually.

The nature of the state and political elites in Sudan—and their “Islamist Civilization Project” geared toward further assimilating all corners of Sudan into a greater Islamic society—has significantly influenced harnessing and further developing these outlooks, especially given the nature of Sudanese politics and high society as a predominantly male endeavor. Since the National Islamic Front’s coup in 1989, the government has become increasingly involved in the micro social workings of the populace, especially in encouraging “proper” sexual habits. An example of the extent of the government’s reach in personal, sexual life appears in its investment in “mass marriages” for the purpose of encouraging its population to “populate the earth with good (Muslim) citizens.” The government’s gendered outlook continued when it dismissed a number of women holding high positions in the government bureaucracy to have them serve a better purpose as “wives and mothers within the confines of their houses.”

These constructed female and male societal obligations inform the type of sexual violence found in Darfur since 2003. Unsatisfied with the Islamicization of the African West Sudan, the Sudanese government contracted Janjaweed militias to defend against those groups who opposed its message of a greater Islamic Sudanese state. By extension, this granted a blank check to the militias to further their message through any possible means. Sexual violence against the female Darfuri population became the primary vehicle for the latter mission. In particular, aggressors targeted women’s ability to reproduce either unfavorable (African) or favorable (Muslim) ethnicities—much like the Serbian targeting of women for their reproductive abilities. Forced impregnation was used to Islamicize the Darfuri population, and, once raped, pregnant women were abducted and transferred to “peace camps” to ensure the birth of a Muslim baby. Women who were already pregnant, presumably by “lesser” African Darfuri men, were killed. Aggressors used another widely accepted feminine ideal, helplessness, against Darfuri women through breaking legs during rape to prevent escape. The Janjaweed also employed public rape—rape of a woman in front of her family—to accomplish two goals: shatter the family through the stigma of rape, and challenge and destroy men’s patriarchal power. As members of Sudanese society, Janjaweed were fully aware of the effects of their rapes on a woman and her family, namely that, if the deed is known, she most likely will be disowned by her male caregivers and banished to live on her own, usually with the added burden of her children. As in the case of Serbian versus Bosnian Muslim men, rape also served to shift the balance of power between Arab Sudanese and Darfuri African men. Arab Janjaweed perpetrators aimed to emasculate African men through the rape of their wards, their wives and daughters, before their eyes—

Manifestations of This Discourse in Sexual Violence

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and then proceeded to kill the men, with the justification that these men might join rebel groups and hence were fair combatant targets.

The Two Cases in Close Comparison: Similarities

Despite their differences, both cases above involved several similarly gendered tactics in war and in sexual violence. Racial epithets, for example, were frequently used during acts of sexual violence: in Bosnia, Muslim women were called “Turks” by perpetrators, while Darfuri female victims (of the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit tribes) were called “black slaves.”

The use of racial slurs during sexualized acts is evidence of how perpetrators conflated ethnicity and sexuality, justifying acts of sexual violence in the name of stopping a threat to ethnic self-determination. Along these lines, women in both cases were not seen as a dangerous military threat and were instead used as a means of affecting the male balance of power through reproduction or political superiority—or simply as the objects of male satisfaction.

"Along these lines, women in both cases were not seen as a dangerous military threat and were instead used as a means of affecting the male balance of power through reproduction or political superiority—or simply as the objects of male satisfaction."

Similar discourses on the role of (local and foreign) women in Serbian and Sudanese society—specifically, that they should have predominantly reproductive roles and identities defined by their male counterparts.

General violence against men also reflected discourses on masculinity in the two societies. Men were killed for the same justification in Bosnia as in Darfur: for fear that able-bodied men would join the enemy as extra manpower.

In Darfur, this was the justification for the government-sponsored militia "occupation" of Darfuri territories from the beginning—that African men would join the active rebel groups, if they had not already. In both cases, the perpetrators targeted enemy men for explicit civilian murder in part because killing men “can more easily be portrayed as legitimate combat.”

This gendered targeting allowed perpetrators to hide (at least temporarily) ethnic cleansing and allowed them to reserve “lesser” punishments for women and children, who are seen as more fragile, innocent, and defenseless by the local and international communities.

Similarities: Targeting of Victims

In terms of gendered violence, the primary difference between the two cases lies in the treatment of males as sexual objects in Bosnia and as equals in Darfur. Serb aggressors sexually targeted both men and women because both gendered victims were sexualized in masculine discourse and the nationalist media. Muslim men in particular were vilified as both...
highly heterosexual (posing a threat to pure Serbian womanhood) and plausibly homosexual (posing a threat to militarized, masculine, Serbian manhood). Janjaweed aggressors, on the other hand, targeted women and men separately when it came to inflicting sexual violence: women for sexual assault and men for the resulting psychological and political power-play, humiliation, and—eventually—murder. In the case of Darfur, sexual violence against men did not occur specifically because men (even men of the less desirable African ethnicity) were viewed as equal threats and were not extremely sexualized as in Bosnia.

Role of Technological Advance in Exposing Serbians to (Homo)sexuality

Nationalist Serbia’s highly sexualized culture was also a product of the modern age and the globalization and technology that came along with it. In the 1990s, Serbia, as part of the European continent, had a much greater access to the types of media that Sudanese infrastructure could not manage in 2003 and in many ways still cannot manage today—namely the wide networks of television and print media. Serbia’s globalized communist and post-communist society and technological advances allowed for pornography—in print and screen—to flourish, perhaps heightening the sexual undertone of male and female roles in society. The presence of widespread use of pornography obviously does not provide a causal link to the Serbian wartime sexual violence. Despite this, it is an important point of comparison between the two cases because it highlights how Serbians still committed such acts of sexual violence despite being exposed to such highly sexualized mass media through modern means. In Darfur, however, it is quite possible that most Sudanese perpetrators were not as well-acquainted with such mass sexualization of the populace, and yet they came to similar uses of sexual violence. In this particular issue, the stark contrast shows the complexities interwoven into sexual violence as a means of warfare in situations of ethnic cleansing or genocide.

Territorial Stability versus Nomadic Existence

The degree and type of sexual violence used by aggressors in each case also depended on the type of perpetrator regime set up: occupation and territorial stability in Bosnia versus marauding perpetrators in Darfur. The conflict in Bosnia began once Serbian aggressors invaded and occupied a specific set of territories in the former Yugoslavia. In fact, the aforementioned “rape camps” were the sites of most of the sexual violence. Serb military men thus had the time, the resources, and the private space to develop elaborate sexual schemes (e.g., sexual torture games) with which to “punish” the vilified Muslim men and women. In stark contrast to the territorially stable Serbs in Bosnia, the perpetrators in Darfur were nomadic and pillaging in nature. Despite Bosnia’s often mountainous terrain, which might impede population density in some areas, Sudan has a greater geographical hurdle on this front: desert. Thus, Janjaweed aggressors were forced to carry out their acts of sexual terror from village to village, often miles apart. As a result of this need for efficiency, Janjaweed were limited in their ability to perform, let alone formulate or develop, sexual and other violent techniques beyond the “basics” (rape, occasional quick mutilation, and murder of husbands, fathers, and sons). Therefore, in Bosnia, male-to-male sexual violence called for hiding the events from public view in a way that was not necessarily the case in Darfur—and in order for that to happen, control over the given territories was necessary. Although this territorial stability factor was not the primary mechanism fueling male-to-male sexual violence in Bosnia, its absence in Darfur in part shows it was an important necessary condition for the degree of male sexual torture that took place.

"The cases of genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Darfur, Sudan share striking similarities when it comes to how the respective societies shaped male and female identities, identities that were constructed but widely accepted and that informed the use of gendered violence."
Conclusion

The cases of genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Darfur, Sudan share striking similarities when it comes to how the respective societies shaped male and female identities, identities that were constructed but widely accepted and that informed the use of gendered violence. In both cases, the society in question accepted the ideal male identity as overwhelmingly masculine and female identity as wholly dependent on its usefulness to males, namely through reproduction and motherly care. Yet, in the former Yugoslavia, this masculine discourse veered significantly from simply constructing an inward male model toward constructing an additional image of the male enemy as a sexual opposite and a threat specifically because of his exotic sexuality. In this way, although sexual violence toward women in the two cases was comparable—and stemmed back to the well-known theories of the female body as the battlefield on which men fight for sexual, social, and political supremacy—sexual violence against men in the case of Bosnia was linked to nationalist propaganda expounding the sexual extremity (both heterosexual and homosexual) of the Bosnian Muslim. These cases show the power of discourse to shape the actions of individuals—but with much higher stakes that deeply wound the basic, social underpinnings of each victimized community.

Endnotes

4. Ibid., 160, 162.
5. Serbians were not the only aggressors during this conflict who utilized the power of sexual violence for ethnic cleansing purposes (in fact, Bosnian and Croat aggressors also took part in this technique). But because Serbian aggression against Bosnian Muslims during the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the only documented case of highly sexualized aggression against men, this paper will focus predominantly on the perpetrator-victim link between these two populations.

9. Ibid., 99, 117.
10. Ibid., 124-126.
11. Ibid., 156.
12. Ibid., 168.
13. Ibid., 164.
16. Ibid., 94-95.
17. Ibid., 95.
18. Žarkov, 166.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
22. The leader of the JEM used to be involved in the National Islamic Front, the dominant political party headed by Sudan’s head of state (since 1959), Omar Al Bashir.
24. Ibid., 490.
25. Because the conflict in Sudan lacks the same nationalist framework as the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina (especially in terms of breadth of a technological network for mass communication), masculine discourses are catalogued in less official (read: printed) media. Instead, cultural discourse on gender relations has been conducted from personal accounts as well as primary sources such as short written or oral stories.
27. Oladosu, 256.
31. Ibid., 419.
32. Ibid., 493.
34. Ibid., 157.
35. Ibid.
37. Reid-Cunningham, 287.
38. DeZotto and Jones.
40. Carpenter, 90.
42. Žarkov, 149.

**Bibliography**


his paper addresses the lack of social cohesion among Germany’s various ethnic groups through a sociocultural lens. I propose introducing forms of affirmative action legislation in Germany’s upper-level corporate positions (much like a recent bill raised for women in Germany) as well as in its media industry. These proposals are built upon the idea that increased physical interaction in decision-making boardrooms and cultural familiarity through television programs will help alleviate tensions between native and non-native German citizens.

Introduction

In the midst of increasing globalization and prevalence of technologies that bring people closer together faster, nations must be receptive and adaptable to the cultural and racial diversification of their populations. As the site of one of history’s biggest genocides, Germany must act more carefully than most, for the present survival of Holocaust victims and perpetrators serves as a reminder that a racist doctrine dominated its politics not too long ago. How can Germany, a country with a recent history of genocide, successfully integrate a newly racially and culturally diverse population into its political and social spheres? An in-depth, interdisciplinary examination of its political and cultural history from World War II to the present, coupled with theories on nationhood and acculturation, has led me to support the formation of a state-sanctioned, career-based integrative solution. In modern Germany, successful integration should involve dual processes of acculturation of German habits by foreigners, and transcultural acceptance by both native and non-native Germans, along with legal minimum quotas for citizens of color hired in high-level company and high-exposure media positions.¹

Note that I advocate “transcultural acceptance,” rather than “transculturation,” as coined by anthropologist Fernando Ortiz in 1940.²

Based on Ortiz’s framework, the latter term would suggest that Germany adopt the cultural practices of its immigrants and vice versa, which would unfairly deprive native citizens of their national heritage and customs. At the same time, immigrants in Germany support the country’s economy and enrich its cultural diversity, so their traditions and national identities should be respected in a way that does not impose foreign customs onto German citizens. Thus, transcultural acceptance implies a mutual respect between native and non-native Germans for each other’s way of life.

Acculturation traditionally means that foreigners, or minorities, have a way of identifying with, and possibly adopting, the culture of the country in which they reside.³ Mandatory German language classes are the most important acculturative process for long-term residents, for language serves as the basis of communication. These classes also constitute a form of transcultural acceptance on the part of immigrants. For native Germans, a crucial basis for transcultural acceptance is respect for non-native Germans and immigrants.

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which I will argue is built upon familiarity and proximity. Hence the advocacy for a legal employment quota in executive and media positions, for it will bring the two parties physically closer in the boardrooms, where influential decisions for the rest of the populace are made, and socially closer through media and popular culture, where the presence of an ethnic face will familiarize the population with the normalized idea of an ethnic-minority German citizen.

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Existing Arguments on Race and Immigrant Relations in Germany and Europe

As recently as 2002, Germany had the largest number of immigrants in the world after the United States. However, Germany only began implementing effective policies addressing the diversification of its population in 2005, with the advent of integration policies that treated all immigrants equally regardless of their ethnicity or country of origin. Prior to these changes, ethnic Germans (Aussiedler), usually returning from former USSR republics, were given favorable citizenship conditions by the state, which allowed them to automatically reclaim their German citizenship without residence or language requirements. Meanwhile, migrants from countries like Turkey, (until very recently considered “guest workers”) with whom Germany formed labor contracts in the 1960s to help rebuild the country after World War II, constitute approximately 60% of the foreign population. Nonetheless, it was considerably more difficult for them to gain citizenship despite having lived and worked in the country for years more than the ethnic German migrants. Although these naturalization laws have now changed to impose the same residence and language requirements on all migrants, ethnic minorities within Germany still remain largely underrepresented across various occupations. It is in this national framework that the current state of multiculturalism and integration in Germany will be analyzed. Considering the country’s history of genocide and state-endorsed racism, I will evaluate how modern Germany includes non-native Germans as part of their society. Because official policies towards integration and immigrants have only recently been implemented and because racism is difficult to quantify, approaches to this topic are variegated and lack a popular method. However, scholars’ findings on modern European and German immigration policies can be generalized into three distinct categories: a structural discrimination against minorities; the existence and underutilization of potential social and integration promoters; and the tendency of minorities to adapt to, and possibly adopt, a pre-existing culture.

Certain studies have found that both European and German institutions maintain a distinct division between ethnic majority and minority groups. Alana Lentin, a political sociologist at the University of Sussex, presents a degree notion of racism in her 2005 work *Racism and Anti-Racism in Europe*, in which she argues that European anti-racism exists “along a continuum of proximity-to-distance from the political culture of the nation-state.” She clarifies that anti-racist activities are “not explicable outside of an analysis centred on the histories of European states and the political processes they engender.” She considers the histories and politics of European countries as key determinants in the country’s attitude towards its ethnic minorities. After an analysis of United Nations cultural policies, along with the development of anti-racism in Western Europe, she reaches the conclusion that “the states of western Europe […] are developing a discourse of discrimination that separates increasingly between
This construction aims to keep out groups of “second- and third-generation ‘minorities’” in an attempt to keep the “in-group,” which includes both native and first-generation minority populations, more secure without outside influence. Although Lentin’s claims pertain to Europe as a whole, her notion of a constructed divide between populations is similar to the findings of a study based solely on Germany.

There are more than economic reasons behind the native German population’s prejudice against ethnic minorities. Jerome S. Legge Jr., a professor at the School of Public Affairs and Policy at the University of Georgia, wrote his 2003 work Jews, Turks, and Other Strangers based on empirical findings from surveys conducted throughout Europe over a span of several years. He divides racism into three separate spheres—economic resentment, symbolic racism, and traditional racism—and concludes that traditional racism is the most probable explanation for current conflicts within Germany. He claims that while economic resentment, based on the idea that minorities take jobs that native Germans would otherwise fulfill, may be an underlying reason for racism against minorities, it does not explain social attitudes such as lower approval responses for “marriage to a Turk.” He interprets such findings as proof for traditional racism, a systematic method of reacting more negatively to certain ethnicities based on existing stereotypes. Symbolic racism, which Legge defines as a masked expression of racism through support for conservative ideologies, is not highly regarded as a substantial explanation. He applies these indicators to the results of Germany’s 2002 national elections to reach the conclusion that “the German political system is accommodating anti-immigrant prejudice and anti-Semitism to a better degree than other European polities.”

Like Lentin, he sees a structural, state-based issue in the exclusion of immigrants and ethnic minority populations from the mainstream culture. Other scholars perceive the issue differently, claiming that potential institutions of integration are already in place in Germany, but that they are being ineffectively utilized or implemented by both minorities and Germans. Economist Thomas Liebig’s 2005 study for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), entitled “The Labour Market Integration of Immigrants in Germany,” cites discrimination as one factor among many for the existing (namely economic) inequalities in Germany. Citing data from the 1990s to 2004, he compares the economic situation of the immigrant and second-generation population to that of the native-born and concludes that deficiencies in language skills, lack of vocational training, and discrimination are the reasons behind the second-generation’s bleak employment situation, relative to both native-born Germans and immigrants in other OECD nations. He argues for more vocational and language training programs that assist young foreigners and suggests that Germany adopt anti-discrimination policies that other EU countries have already put in place. At the same time, he notes that many immigrants who are offered pre-existing training programs do not actually attend them.

There are studies that also highlight the existence of social programs that fail to fully include and benefit their targeted minority populations, particularly at the decision-making levels. In 2006, German Politics and Society published independent studies on Berlin’s Social City Program by Harmut Haeussermann, a professor of urban sociology at Humboldt University Berlin, in “The National ‘Social City Program’” and by Janice Bockmeyer, a professor of government at City University of New York, in “Social Cities and Social Inclusion.” Both scholars emphasize that while integration issues were addressed by the Social City Program, a series of government-sponsored measures to assist the economically disadvantaged, the opinions and status of immigrants were categorically ignored at the influential, executive levels. Haussermann cites two case studies of the Social City Program’s federal urban renewal initiative to conclude that the actual “social composition of the areas” was not an objective of the program, and that “work with local residents did not emphasize participation in decision-making.”

Along the same vein, Bockmeyer notes that the program’s emphasis was “drawn away from targeted groups such as immigrants or the disabled” and that while residents were welcome to share ideas and “cooperate” in program implementation,” they could not “[interfere] with program priorities.” The scholars’ findings point to the need for more actual participation of the immigrant community in executive positions, instead
of only in its implementation stages. Neither specifically addresses racism or discrimination as did Legge or Lentin, but the issues are inherently addressed through political topics. Bockmeyer argues that due to a “low level of trust” in authorities on the part of immigrants and ethnic minorities, these groups tend to gather in self-formed immigrant associations to forge both their own ethnic and political identities. She notes that these cultural groups are ultimately translatable to the political sphere based on research that found immigrants who participate in “ethnic organizations were more likely to be engaged in other political activities.”

The third collective perspective on modern German multiculturalism points to the tendency of the minority populations to be heavily influenced by and eventually take on the culture of the native population. Like Bockmeyer, Ayhan Kaya, director of the European Institute at Istanbul Bilgi University, found a correlation between immigrants’ participation in non-political activities and political activism as an important foundation for a multicultural society. Focusing on the second- and third-generation German-Turk demographic, he considers their current cultural situation a “transnational space,” in which culture is viewed not as a single, homogenous state of being but rather a constantly changing mixing of cultures and a process of “becoming.”

Due to the spread of technology and globalization, immigrant youths can easily keep in touch with the culture of their home countries via Internet, satellite television, and ease of travel (i.e. discounted flights to Istanbul). At the same time, having been born in Germany, they identify with aspects of the German culture as well, particularly in the realms of language and music. Kaya gives the example of German-Turkish hip-hop culture as the ideal embodiment of his theory of transnational cultural space—it serves as a way for ethnic-minority youth to represent themselves in the mainstream culture as part of a globally popular phenomenon. Through music, a medium that people of all cultures can relate to, they have a platform to express not just their new cultural identities but political opinions as well, thereby allowing them to enter the political conversation through non-political means. Hip-hop is therefore used to both “construct and articulate” their dual identities as ethnic minorities in Germany.

**Distinguishing Between Processes of Cultural Transformation**

Anthropologists call this process of adopting the mainstream culture as part of one’s own “acculturation.” Floyd Webster Rudmin, a professor of social and community psychology at the University of Tromsø in Norway, describes acculturation as the conception in which “minorities react to prolonged intercultural contact by assimilating to the dominant society, by separating from it, or by becoming bicultural.” In a similar way that the young Turks in Kaya’s study constructed a new identity by creating a transnational cultural space through the arts, acculturation allows minorities to adopt features of the dominant culture for themselves, completely reject it, or adapt certain features to create a “binational” identity. Rudmin argues, however, that prior studies in measuring acculturation are questionable because they assume three questionable presumptions—that respondents would experience a “loss of cultural attachment” after rejecting the two cultures, that their rejection implies a “rejection of all cultures,” and that “loss of cultural attachment is necessarily distressing.”

Fernando Ortiz offers an alternative to the idea of acculturation by claiming that transculturation is the process through which minorities and majorities should assimilate with each other. He offers the term as “a substitute for the term acculturation,” which he claims is inherently the “loss or uprooting of a previous culture, which could be defined as a deculturation.” He considers transculturation to be the more appropriate term because it not only “better expresses the different phases of the process of transition from one culture to another,” but it creates a new culture, a phenomena he calls “neoculturation.”

Therefore, based on Ortiz’s description of cultural integration, interaction between Germany and its non-native population would result in a new culture that is a fusion of both German and ethnic elements.
Altogether, with debates on various types of racism, its ties to socioeconomic disparities between foreigners and natives, and processes in which integration can take place, these scholars have formed an interdisciplinary framework for understanding German multiculturalism. What these arguments collectively point to regarding the furthering of integration in Germany is the importance of determining what type of cultural exchange should take place and which programs to implement in order to facilitate color-blind intercultural relationships.

A Brief Background on Historical German National Identity

The term Volk, German for “the folk” or “the people,” has been a part of Germany’s lexicon since the 19th century, during which the volkisch ideology was summarized by the term Blut und Boden, or blood and soil.21 This phrase reveals that the popular conception of a German national was rooted in the person’s ancestral blood line and origination, or birth, in Germany. Such a construction inevitably allowed only Caucasians of Germanic descent – in phenotypic terms, people with fair skin – to be accepted as a natural German citizen. This idea of nationhood became most popular after World War I and became an integral part of the Nazi Party’s ideology. Adolf Hitler references the volkisch movement in Mein Kampf, declaring “the National-Socialist German Workers’ Party adopts the essential elements from the basic reasoning of a general populist [volkisch] world-image […] This provides the basis for a victorious fight on behalf of this world-concept.”22

Although the notion of Volk was all but eradicated with the fall of the Nazi Party in World War II in 1945, Germany’s citizenship laws still operate partially on the principle of jus sanguinis.23 By inferring citizenship on the basis of the parent’s nationality, one’s lineage is to some degree still important in Germany when determining one’s national identity. The title of Charles Hawley’s 2004 article in Der Spiegel-Online summarizes one viewpoint—“How Germany Has Failed Its Immigrants.”24 He makes the claim that while Germany’s immigrants are at fault for not trying to learn the language and participate in German culture, Germans themselves are also to blame for not making integration a two-sided process. In the article, Heinz Buschkowsky, mayor of a Berlin district, states, “We in Germany have completely forgotten that integration is a process requiring action from both sides […] We have just assumed that the second and third generation immigrants would just become more German. But to expect someone from a foreign culture to abandon their culture was wrong.”25 This implies that acculturation, in which a population (usually the minority) adopts the culture and social patterns of another population (usually the majority), has been the standard expectation for integration within Germany.26

A relevant example would be the mandatory integration courses that teach German language and culture to immigrants.27 As Buschkowsky states, however, the majority must also play a role in at least accepting the idea that minorities need not completely give up their native culture for Germany’s. The assumption that minorities, including immigrants, would take full responsibility for inserting themselves into German society has proven to have negative consequences, as they are seen as

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The Framework for Understanding Integration in Modern Germany

The extent to which the German government should take part in integration and multicultural affairs is the subject of ongoing debate. The
second-class citizens. The feeling of not being a fully accepted or welcome in society has negative socioeconomic effects on the country, especially on its younger generations, as a report on young ethnic minorities in Germany stated that “a small segment of the young immigrant generation has accepted its troublemakers in Germany.” It gives the example of a German-born young man of Turkish descent who avoided going to school because he felt his teachers “were humiliating him” for his ethnicity, eventually being arrested at 15 for street crimes. Another, a 22-year-old German-born Turkish woman in dental school, asks why the public talks about, rather than with, the minority population in its debates on integration. These voices from a portion of the German population emphasize that integration realistically cannot be achieved simply through acculturative methods. Germany as a nation has a responsibility to ensure that the integrative actions taken by minorities are not only acknowledged but also actively accepted, thereby further encouraging minorities in their efforts.

Transculturation would not be the best response to this dilemma, for the process would result in a “neoculture,” which, as explained by Ortiz, is a combination of the two original interacting cultures. This imposed cultural influence onto Germany would create feelings of animosity, resentment, and injustice on the part of native Germans who wish to maintain their distinctive cultural identity even in a multicultural society. This was recently demonstrated in March 2010, when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan suggested that Germany open Turkish-language high schools. Voices on both sides of the political spectrum, from the conservative Christian Democrats to the more liberal Social Democrats, expressed disapproval of the proposal, according to a Der Spiegel-Online article that reported on the story. Although Germany does have a responsibility to support all members of its democratic society, members who as previously explained contribute to its economy and diversity, such a method of forcing a foreign culture onto a native population is not conducive to integration due to the opposition it would create.

Furthermore, Germany is home to its unique set of customs and traditions that compose a cultural identity for many of its citizens. Germans moving overseas may take part of that cultural identity with them, though by virtue of moving out of the country, it is reasonable to expect that they will have to pick up some of the cultural characteristics (especially the language) of their new host country to live comfortably in its society. Moving abroad includes the implicit understanding that cultural norms will be at least slightly altered. By the same logic, residing in one’s home country also includes the assumption that one is at the very least content or tolerant of one’s native customs. It would not only be unjust, but detrimental to global cultures as a whole, to force foreign cultures onto native inhabitants choosing to reside in their home countries, even in our rapidly globalizing world. A country, more than serving as an economic partner or official region of residence, is the cradle of a unique set of traditions, history, and language not found anywhere else in the world. In this sense, it serves as a preserver of
history and a haven for ideologies or customs. Israel, for example, is the protector of the Jewish faith; China, South Korea, and other East Asian countries preserve Confucian ideals. The preservation of a country’s native culture is imperative for the maintenance of global diversity and maintaining unique, long-held values for its citizens. This has proven especially difficult now as immigration increases between countries with traditionally few cultural similarities. The best way for countries to retain their historical identities while accommodating globalization would thus be to create avenues of mutual appreciation between the native and incoming cultures.

Hence, while the Turkish prime minister’s suggestion for Turkish public schools would be detrimental to multiculturalism, Germany should offer ways for its non-native citizens to insert themselves into the national way of life. Similarly, foreigners coming into Germany should be expected to adopt some of the cultural aspects of Germany as well. Therefore, transcultural acceptance, such as simply offering Turkish language classes in schools while requiring potential future citizens to speak German, would be the best process by which both native and non-native Germans would feel their original cultures are accepted and respected, would understand and be familiar with others, and would ultimately facilitate integration.

Such a movement is already underway, as seen in a new demographic term “Deukisch,” or German-Turkish.31 Organizations such as the Deukische Generation in Berlin strive to provide a community for the new generation of Germans of Turkish descent, who often struggle to find their own cultural identity in the divide between their parents’ homeland and their birthplace, as noted in the article. These mobilizations by communities of ethnic minority Germans point to the need for a widely accepted representation of the new, ethnic German of today’s multicultural society. As local groups of young Germans of various ethnicities begin to create an identity for themselves, their efforts to be accepted into Germany’s culture must be reciprocated by the nation. The most influential method to both acknowledge and encourage their integrative efforts would be to increase ethnic minority visibility in Germany’s public media industry and executive company positions.

Importance of Visibility and Social Status in Professions

Germany has diversified greatly despite its historically Caucasian population. Nearly twenty percent of its population is classified as having some type of migrant background.32 However, there is little chance for integration of ethnic minorities within Germany when the workforce is largely stratified. After the initial influx of laborers from other countries, Germany’s second- and third-generation foreigners have largely continued to work in the blue-collar sectors that their forefathers worked in. The scale of this trend was highlighted by a European Community Labour Force survey on the representation of first- and second-generation immigrants in occupational sectors between 1992 and 2003.33 In the plant and machine operators sector, which had seen a 12 percent decrease in growth, the second generation took up 1.32 times more share of the sector’s workforce than the native-born. In contrast, in the professional sector, which had grown by 27 percent in the same period, the second generation had only about three-quarters of the share of native-born professionals, and the foreign-born even less than that at about three-fifths. These data highlight the importance of advancing ethnic minorities to careers with a positive future outlook in which they can come in contact with other demographics as equals.

Therefore, the reasons for targeting the media and executive career fields as quota sectors are twofold: first, the number of minorities in those fields tend to be most disproportionate and second, by virtue of being high-powered, white-collar occupations, they automatically command attention and respect. In 2009, National Public Radio released a report on Germany’s minorities as part of a
A series on race in Europe. Entitled “German Minorities Still Fight to be Seen, Heard,” by Italian journalist Sylvia Poggioli, it singles out “mainstream media, police, judiciary, or politics” as the fields that particularly lack minorities. While the underrepresentation in these governmental jobs is important to note, I did not consider the law enforcement and political fields as necessary or ideal targets for quotas.

There are already processes in place to increase the number of minorities in the police force, such as a recently-passed law in Berlin requiring at least a quarter of open officer positions to go to applicants of a minority background. There can be no similar programs for political positions; since politics is an elected career position, it would be undemocratic to institute laws or quotas requiring people to vote for ethnic politicians. Therefore, the best way to increase diversity in politics careers in the media, which I found to be as disproportionate as possible in terms of minority representation.

In personally conducted examinations of Germany’s public media culture, there was very little ethnic minority representation. At ARD, one of Germany’s main public broadcasters, 38 out of its 38 moderators were Caucasian. The most popular television programs at RTL Television, a German commercial television station with the biggest market share, all feature Caucasians in nearly every recurring role. The single minority actor is the Turkish-German actress Sila Sahin, in Gute Zeiten, Schlechte Zeiten, out of a cast of 21 characters. In the highest-rated show at Das Erste, Germany’s number three commercial television channel, every actor is Caucasian. Such a lack of representation is alarming, particularly in a democratic society with a diverse background, and in light of the fact that media representation can play a significant role in political influence. Surveys have found that viewers who watched a television show featuring a particular demographic in a leadership role were more likely than before to vote for that same demographic. The catalyst to sustainable long-term integration within Germany can therefore begin in better minority representation in its media culture. At this point, the most effective way to instigate this change lies in a quota system, a form of affirmative action in the workplace.

The legalization of a professional quota system is not unheard of in Germany and current events suggest that such laws could stand to pass through the Bundestag and Bundesrat, Germany’s two legislative bodies. Evidence for this possibility lies in recent measures to install quotas for women in executive positions, which have generated considerable support within the government. Though not a part of this study, women are another underrepresented group in some career sectors, particularly in upper management. Though the approaches and target quotas differ, many are aiming for at least a 30 percent female representation on top German companies’ executive and supervisory boards, with a targeted passing date by July 2012. The precedent thus exists for a movement aiming for legal minority representation on company boards and in visible media careers. This is not only possible, it is the only way forward in the current political climate.

Despite efforts to mobilize immigrants and minorities to attain the
same educational and job qualifications as native Germans, discrimination still appears to be the key deterrent in those groups’ social, economic, and political advancement. In a study by the State Office of Statistics in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia, 2.6 percent of high school graduates are unemployed, compared to 9.6 percent of high school graduates with immigrant parents. These are students who have the same education and degree; the only difference being that one group is of German descent while the other is not. Therefore, a plausible explanation for the 7 percent difference between the two demographics’ unemployment levels is nationality-based discrimination. Because constructions of nationality can be based on color, as mentioned earlier in the German concept of Volk, this can also translate to race-based discrimination. Another reason for the difference in unemployment levels could be differing social skills. The employment process takes into account not just education and qualifications, but oftentimes interviews and personal as well. German students with native parents may have an advantage in this regard due to familiarity with German cultural norms. Students with immigrant parents, on the other hand, have grown up in a different cultural environment at home and in other social circles introduced to them by their parents. Other job-related social influences include networking and connections, which can also be influential in securing a job. Students with German parents who have established professional and personal relationships in the community are inherently connected to more potential employers than are students with immigrant parents with fewer connections in the German community. This calls for further studies surveying the correlation between existing professional contacts and one’s chances for employment, for such statistical evidence is currently lacking in studies on German unemployment.

Furthermore, the National Public Radio report by Sylvia Poggioli points to the fact that “surveys consistently show most Germans don’t want foreigners in their country,” adding that there has been an annual average of 17 race-related murders in recent years. Because violence and discrimination begins in the streets, in close proximity to the people, change must also begin in the local social sphere. Nations can impose the quotas from the federal levels, but it is the local forces that will ultimately carry out those laws and experience the results of integrative experiences. An example of this is highlighted by the student musical phenomenon, The Streets of Wedding, which originated in Berlin as an examination in racism for 100 German students of various backgrounds. Also covered in the NPR report, the musical became a national success as the students toured the country and helped break down racial barriers by presenting the diverse citizens in an empowered light. It quotes a Polish immigrant student who took part in the musical saying that before the show’s success, she had felt “like a ghost,” but “now I know I have to speak out, and [the country] will take notice of me.” The opportunity to present herself on a public stage gave this student the confidence to further her formerly withheld desire to be noticed, to be a part of the national conversation. Widespread exposure and confidence through successful public performance can thus be considered significant parts of minority empowerment. Additionally, according to John Eichler, an Afro-German who saw the show, other types of media presence influence the population to perceive minorities differently. He specified the election of Barack Obama as the first African-American president in the United States, which resulted in international media coverage. “Perceptions will change,” he said, “because we all have these stereotypes about people of African descent,” stereotypes which can change due to the shift in the racial composition and ethnic roles that Germans are now witnessing on television. These examples show that media-based influences have the potential to not only reach a wide range of people, but also help alleviate barriers that may have prevented different ethnic groups from interacting with one another in a positive light.
In much the same way, minority representation in the upper echelons of top German companies will facilitate integration. Throughout Europe, many firms do not keep official data on minority employment, according to a 2002 enterprise report by *Newsweek International*, titled “Race in the European Boardroom.” Written by Rana Foroohar, an editor at *Newsweek*’s international economics section, the article notes that many company representatives reacted to the topic with anger or confusion (“What a racist thing to ask!”), or gave responses offering Swiss or Belgian workers as examples of minority employees. In Germany in particular, the government discourages acknowledging ethnic minorities in the workplace, though after 2003 a European Union law increasingly pushes for firms to keep track of the number of minorities they employ. This relatively new law is the first step for Germany to begin implementing further measures to promote diversity in its companies, particularly in the boardrooms, for statistics and studies on minority representation in German firms is currently lacking. Such knowledge is necessary to start a dialogue on diversity in the workplace, for a debate on the issue of race and ethnicity among German companies’ executive positions cannot be sufficiently informed without knowing exactly what the current employment ratio is. Nonetheless, the extreme lack of minority executives is still evident, as the *Newsweek* articles states that, “in Europe, we could not find one top company with a minority CEO, and few with even one minority officer at the senior level.” Considering these deficiencies, implementing a quota system not only for careers in the media but also for executive and upper-level management positions would promote both diversity and further studies on race and ethnicity in professions. Through this system, more workers of German and non-German descent would be brought into closer professional and physical proximity, thus facilitating integration through well-rounded, wide-reaching company policies and actions decided by a variety of perspectives.

The potential for close professional proximity in increasing integration can already be seen in the case of Turkish-owned businesses, which are changing social perceptions of immigrants. The rise in the number of business owners of Turkish descent, from 22,000 in the 1980s to currently 80,000, is beginning to reshape how Germany views Turkish business owners, according to an October 2011 article in *Deutsche Welle*. The report states that this change in perception is one of increased respect, as the Turkish businesses create more jobs for Germany and offer products that target the German customer instead of Turkish immigrants who were traditionally their main consumers. This implies that there is a certain social status to having an established business practice, yet this status is not as easily identifiable among shop owners as it is among white-collar professions. The article quotes Holger Floeting, a Turkish business specialist at the German Institute of Foreign Affairs, as stating, “When you look closely at the name plates in front of the offices of doctors, lawyers and advertising agents you can see the type of jobs which are being offered to people in the service industry, yet this isn’t evident just walking on the street.” Because owning a storefront business like those seen “just walking on the street” lacks the social recognition of an official title or degree, there is little professional respect conferred onto the Turkish owners, whom Floeting states are often “overlooked.”

Furthermore, the existence of an immigrant-owned store is enough to form the basis for integration and benefits Germany as a whole, for business brings the community together in a professional exchange that also supports the economy. The stores not only “serve a great function by supporting integration,” but “by creating jobs and employing people they are making integration possible,” according to Rainhardt Freiherr von Baron Leoprechting, president of the Turkish-German Chamber of Industry and Commerce. By their mere presence in the local level, ethnic minority businesspeople are capable of creating a stronger sense of community.
in their areas. Taken to the upper levels in larger companies, where the policies and decisions for the local stores are made, more ethnic minority perspectives in the boardroom can encourage a more widespread and influential integrative movement. These findings collectively led me to the conclusion to construct this integrative business exposure most effectively by creating more opportunities—via employment quotas—for minorities at the executive levels, where the benefits of an ethnically-interactive professional environment are enhanced by the greater social recognition given to the minority citizens in these "name-plated" positions.

Future Outreach
With German chancellor Angela Merkel and French president Nicholas Sarkozy currently leading efforts to move the European Union out of its economic crisis, such events have confirmed the considerable influence that Germany has on the continent. Its power within the EU implies a degree of responsibility to set a positive example for other EU countries beyond matters of finance. Xenophobia and racism is not a new occurrence in European countries, one of the most prominent examples being France’s headscarf ban, considered racist by many critics.51 Though Germany’s power may largely be consolidated in the European Union’s economic decisions, its actions nonetheless have more visibility than those of other EU countries due to its position of power. Its efforts to uproot racism and discrimination within its borders could have an influence on other countries’ discrimination policies. Implementing a quota system for high-visibility careers within a national community of cultural respect and diversity would be Germany’s first steps in enhancing democracy and quality of life not just for its own citizens, but possibly for people in other parts of Europe as well.

Endnotes
1. The term “integration” is defined in this study as a state of mutually tolerant, respectful, and peaceful coexistence between demographics within a nation.
5. At APD, one of Germany’s main public broadcasters, 38 out of its 38 moderators are Caucasian. The law enforcement fields also lack minority officers, as evidenced by a 2011 law passed in Berlin requiring one out of every 4 open positions to go to an ethnic minority.
7. Ibid., 312.
9. Ibid., 87.
10. Ibid., 11.
11. Ibid., 172.
18. Ibid., 11.
19. Ortiz, 97-103.
20. Ibid., 103.
23. In May 1999, the German government passed a law combining jus sanguinus and jus soli (right of birthplace), the first revision in citizenship laws since 1913. Children who are born in Germany to non-German parents still do not automatically receive German citizenship; it is only granted when one parent has resided in Germany for at least 8 years and has had a legal resident permit for at least 3 years. See: Mathias Börs, “The Legal Construction of Membership: Nationality Law in Germany and the United States,” Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Working Paper No. 00.5 (2005); Legge, 163.
25. Hawley.
26. Rudmin, 3.
27. As of January 1, 2005, all migrant groups within Germany have to undergo 600 hours
of language instruction and 30 hours of culture training in order to qualify for full social benefits. See: Liebig, 212.


30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. In a 2010 study by the State Center for Political Education (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung) 19.3% of the German population was found to fall under one of four migrant classifications – foreigner with migration experience, foreigner without migration experience (i.e. non-German child of immigrants), German with migration experience, or German without migrant experience (i.e. German descendant of migrant parents). See: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, State Center for Political Education, 2010, http://www.bpb.de/wissen/NYSWU.0,Be/v6F6elerung_mit_Migrationshintergrund_html.html.

33. Liebig, 223.


38. The highest-ranked show at Das Erste is the drama Im falschen Leben. See: “Einschaltquoten und Marktanteile deutscher Fernsehsender.”


40. A survey conducted by the Geena Davis Institute on Gender in Media found that among viewers who watched “Commander in Chief,” a hit ABC television program featuring a female U.S. president, 73% were more likely to vote for a female presidential candidate after watching the show. See: http://bocl.chamberpost.com/2011/03/geena-davis-%E2%80%9Cgirls-can-see-it-%E2%80%9D.html.


42. Ibid.

43. Gezer, Popp, and Scheuermann.

44. Liebig, 243.

45. Poggioli.


47. Ibid.


49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.


Bibliography


Despite realist predictions of an expansionist China that aims to challenge U.S. hegemony, Chinese foreign policy is largely shaped by state interests and lessons learned from China’s “Century of Humiliation” in the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism. In the decades to come, China will likely become more willing to assume international leadership, but a growing sense of political insecurity might put confines on China’s foreign policymaking. China’s rise is not necessarily the source of instability in Sino-American relations and the Asia-Pacific region. To avoid making the “China Threat” a self-fulfilling prophecy, the U.S. should not treat China as a threat but strive to precisely interpret Chinese political thoughts and monitor Chinese international behaviors. This is a critical step toward building a constructive Sino-American relationship and enhancing world peace in the twenty-first century.

With the reemergence of China on the international stage, there has been a heated debate among both elite and public circles in the US and elsewhere about an emerging Beijing Consensus. While China has been compiling an extraordinary record, the West has stumbled catastrophically, especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. The US, in particular, suffered great losses and was left poorer, deeply in debt, and uncertain of its future. Along with recognition of China’s extraordinary economic progress, there is an increasing anxiety about potential Chinese expansionist intentions in East Asia and beyond as well as an incipient hegemonic war between the US and China. The hawkish view, spearheaded by realists like John Mearsheimer, maintains that a rising state like China will not accept the status quo but instead will become an aggressive state to achieve regional hegemony, thereby challenging US influence in the region.¹ To maintain global hegemony, Mearsheimer argues that the US should take measures to contain the rise of China. Based also on realist theories, Charles Glaser’s argument indicates that a Chinese drive for regional hegemony in East Asia would be both “unnecessary and infeasible.” This is because as long as the US is disengaged from the region, both Japan and South Korea will acquire stronger conventional military capabilities, and possibly nuclear assets, which is a worse option for China since China fears Japan more than the US.² While both arguments may hold some truth, they do not sufficiently factor in the internal dynamics that shape Chinese foreign policy. After all, the top priorities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—political stability and economic development—are more inwardly focused than the hegemonic theories suggest. China’s global engagement stands in line with the priorities of the CCP and Chinese national interests and is largely informed by the country’s haunting memory of the “Century of Humiliation.”

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The Evolution of Chinese Foreign Policy

There has been a dramatic shift in China’s approach to foreign affairs since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. In the Mao era (1949-1976), there was very limited contact between China and the rest of the world besides the Soviet bloc and some Third World countries. Chinese foreign policy was dominated by a highly ideological, top-down orthodoxy that openly despised realpolitik, or qiangquan zhengzhi (强权政治), the great bogeyman of all postcolonial ideologies. The CCP actively suppressed any interpretation of China being the victim of imperialist hands so as to construct a new victor identity for New China.3

During three decades under Mao, China worked vigorously to garner international recognition that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was the sole legitimate government of all China, including Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. The inception of the Sino-Soviet split in 1960 prompted China to develop relations with the West. With more contact with and recognition from the West, the Beijing government finally enjoyed wide support in the United Nations General Assembly. This led to the replacement of the Republic of China (ROC) government as the holder of the Chinese seat in the United Nations in 1971, a shift that became widely regarded as a symbol of China’s reintegration into the international community.4 Around the same time, China formed détente relations with the US—a design of Henry Kissinger, who recognized the shared interest between Beijing and Washington to curb the power of the Soviet Union.

China’s approach to foreign affairs began to change drastically under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, who envisioned a “peaceful rise” (和平崛起) for China. In the spirit of a “peaceful rise,” Beijing began undertaking a relatively conciliatory approach to disputes, with the CCP preferring compromises and shelving problems for future resolution. The aim of this strategy was to create a secure regional and global environment that was conducive to economic development at home. China also sought to deepen its relations with the West not only for the West’s assistance with China’s modernization, but also for cooperation with the West to counter Soviet power, which China deemed to be the greatest threat to its national security and to world peace.

Deng’s legacy remained dominant even after his exit from the highest echelon of Chinese leadership.5 In 1993, Jiang Zemin proposed a sixteen-character China-US policy: enhance trust, reduce friction, promote cooperation, and refrain from confrontation (增进信任，减少摩擦，发展合作，不搞对抗).6 China perceived itself as “a regional, or trans-regional, major power with glistening global color,” or “a quasi global power with regional capabilities and room to maneuver.”7 A harmonious and peaceful international environment without outright confrontation was deemed as conducive to China’s rise from being a great power to a potential superpower. Similar diplomatic philosophies were also proposed by the Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang in 2007 and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in 2011.8

In the past two decades, China has demonstrated a strong determination to “join the world,” or ru shi (入世).9 According to the Yearbook of International Organizations, China’s memberships in international organizations skyrocketed in the 1990s, and its actual number of memberships far exceeded the number of expected memberships predicted by gross domestic product per capita.10 One of China’s boldest and most prominent moves was joining the WTO. It was the result of fifteen years of difficult, complex, and often protracted negotiations in a period of economic transition characterized by the downsizing of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and widespread industrial unrest.11 China’s determination to “socialize internationally” was clear.
Overall, China pursues a pragmatic and adaptive diplomacy to achieve its national goals of political stability and economic prosperity. Combining a close textual analysis of the Seven Military Classics of ancient China that is still a part of modern Chinese military discourse and the study of Ming dynasty (1368-1644) foreign relations, political scientist Alastair Johnston argues that China has a long-standing pragmatic culture dating back to the Spring and Autumn period (770-476 B.C.), which would explain contemporary Chinese international behaviors. According to Johnston, the Chinese strategic tradition is essentially realpolitik that is sometimes provided with Confucian-Mencian rationalizations. Chinese leaders have been insisting upon operational flexibility and accommodating states whose strength and determination indicate little chance of victory. Colonel Kenneth Johnson further explores this topic. By studying the history and foreign policy decisions of the PRC, Johnson concludes that the Chinese yearning for social stability and economic modernization ensures that pragmatism in Chinese foreign policy is alive and well today. Beijing’s commitment to a "peaceful rise" that embraces economic globalization and the improvement of relations with the rest of the world reaffirms the essence of the nation’s foreign policy—that a stable international environment and peaceful cooperation with its partners are crucial for its internal development.

With an understanding of the primacy of state interests in shaping Chinese foreign policy, it is not difficult to understand China’s outreach to natural resource-rich countries. In pursuing foreign oil and natural gas, China spares almost no efforts to court fuel-rich states, be them rogue or not. The country’s global hunt for energy starts with former president Jiang Zemin’s call for a "go out" strategy, or zou chuqu zhanlüe (走出去战略). As a result of Jiang’s initiative, China’s trade of natural resources with countries in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and other parts of the world expanded by 600 percent between 2001 and 2007. Notably, Chinese-Russian trade reached $48 billion in 2007, making China Russia’s second-largest trading partner after the European Union. In 2010, China and Russia reached a bilateral loan-for-oil deal in which China would offer Russia a long-term loan of $25 billion. In exchange, China would receive a total of 300 million tons of oil through the newly constructed Sino-Russian crude oil pipeline from 2011 to 2030. However, Erica Downs at the Brookings Institution’s China Center calls the Sino-Russian energy relations “an uncertain courtship,” as the bilateral energy cooperation is impeded by the rise and fall of world oil prices and Moscow’s energy diplomacy. Downs further explores the realities of the Sino-Russian ties and predicts that the bilateral energy cooperation is likely to feature a “one step forward, two steps back dynamic” as Russian and Chinese interests begin to diverge in this decade and Moscow becomes more fearful of becoming a “junior partner” politically to Beijing. In other words, China’s seemingly amicable relationship with Russia is more mercantile in nature and less likely to be part of Beijing’s strategic plan to boost its leverage in the region.

Africa is another geographic area where China is investing heavily in natural resources. According to an official estimate, one third of China’s oil imports are now from Africa, and China ranks as the second-highest trading partner of the continent, behind the US. Chinese businesses operating in Africa are often criticized for undermining local efforts to improve governance and international efforts aimed at macroeconomic reform. This criticism is a result of their willingness to pay bribes and not stipulate how aid money is used; however, Chinese investment in Africa is expanding very rapidly. In Africa, the Chinese are known to be very pragmatic, and the state-owned enterprises are willing to do business anywhere, anytime, and at any price. As Sahr Johnny, Sierra Leone’s ambassador to Beijing, commented, “If a G8 country had wanted to rebuild the stadium, for example, we’d still be holding meetings. The Chinese just come and do it. They don’t start to hold meetings about environmental impact assessment, human rights, bad governance and good governance.” Generally speaking, Africans view China as a positive influence in the region. This is partly due to China’s...
“respect for sovereignty” rhetoric that resonates with many Africans. In the view of the Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade, “China’s approach to our needs is simply better adapted than the slow and sometimes patronizing post-colonial approach of European investors, donor organizations and nongovernmental organizations.”

As to the nature of Chinese involvement in economic affairs in Africa, Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Elizabeth Economy maintains that China is following a very traditional path established by European, Japanese, and American companies: offering poor countries comprehensive trade deals combined with aid. Economy also warns that it is important to understand that, unlike the US, China does not mix business with politics.

Chinese investment in Africa’s and Latin America’s natural resource markets is economic rather than strategic, despite constant charges that Chinese firms are maneuvered by the Chinese government to achieve some strategic result in the high-stakes game of global energy security.

In addition to state interests, the historical lessons drawn from China’s “Century of Humiliation” play an important role in shaping Chinese foreign policy. The Chinese view the Middle Kingdom as a nation of extraordinary eminence that lasted for thousands of years until its defeat by the British in the Opium War in 1840. China’s rise is nothing but China returning to its deserved niche or normal status in the international system. In this context, China’s century-long humiliation by Western and Japanese imperialism is made a huge issue in contemporary China and remains as a powerful tool to shape foreign policy decision-making. This explains the observation of Thomas Christensen that realist works are very popular in Chinese teaching, which is mainly because of Chinese historical disappointment with the world’s great powers.

Among the elites in the CCP, there is a demonstrated sense of frustrated realism. On the one hand, these elites tend to view nation-states as the main actors on the international stage and are suspicious of international institutions and global norms; on the other hand, they view participation in international affairs as an indispensable means to restore China’s deserved place among great powers in the international system.

There is a general distrust of international institutions because international norms and institutions are often interpreted as the tools the great powers use to keep China at its current undesirable levels of power and wealth. Many Chinese elites and citizens believe that the US has used global norms as an excuse to interfere in Chinese domestic affairs. By criticizing China’s poor human rights record and other shortcomings, the US attempts to frustrate China’s efforts to improve its international standing and image. Worse still, some believe the US is destabilizing the Chinese polity as part of a long-term conspiracy to contain China.

China’s “Century of Humiliation” also plays a role when it comes to the Taiwan issue. The carving up of Chinese territory by foreign powers during the “Century of Humiliation” is considered an unforgivable insult to the Chinese national body. This rhetoric was extremely popular across the Chinese mainland when China retrieved its control of Hong Kong from Great Britain in 1997 and Macau from Portugal in 1999. When the Chinese government assumed formal sovereignty over Macau in December 1999, a nationalist song called The Song of Seven Children – Macau (《七子之歌——澳门》), which is a monologue of Macau, gained overwhelming popularity across the mainland. The lyrics read, “Do you know that Macau is not my real surname? I have been away from you for...
too long, mother (i.e. China). But what they (i.e. the Portuguese) ripped away was my corpse. You (i.e. China) still retain my soul.” Taiwan embodies all the worst lessons of humiliation for China. Taiwan is considered the last unrecovered part of the Chinese national body. It was separated from the mainland in 1895 by the Japanese through the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki. Taiwan was promised back to China by the great powers at the Cairo Conference in 1943 as a reward for China’s considerable contribution to the defeat of Japanese fascism. However, since 1950, Beijing has believed Taiwan is protected from China by the US, which partially explains intense Chinese opposition to US arms sales to Taiwan.30

Looking to the Future

As to the future trajectory of Chinese foreign policy, national interests and historical lessons are still likely to play significant roles while China is likely to be more involved and take on leadership roles in international discourses and cooperation. While Bruce Gilley rightly claims that a rising China has adopted a foreign policy of accepting the US security architecture in Asia and beyond, China might gradually become an architect at some level in the future.31 Rhetorically promoting a peaceful international environment in which to grow the Chinese economy and leaving the tough diplomatic work to others is no longer enough.32 As Robert Art eloquently stated, “the strategy of peaceful rise is the policy of a weak state, of a great power not yet arrived, but of one whose power is growing, that needs a peaceful environment for its power to grow, and that wishes to avoid encirclement as it grows more powerful.”33

According to China expert Fei-ling Wang, Beijing prefers a multipolar world where China enjoys a great power status and holds the responsibility for maintaining a “just and rational” security order in the Asia-Pacific region.34 The contours of China’s more activist security strategy became clear in July 2010 when Shen Dingli, an international relations professor at Fudan University and one of China’s foremost security scholars, proposed that China should establish a more permanent Chinese military presence abroad through the establishment of military bases, even though it may take a decade or more for the capability of China’s navy to match those ambitions.35

China has also been working toward expanding its international presence and is likely to continue to do so in the years to come. Around the world, China has been establishing Confucius Institutes (孔子学院) to promote the study of Chinese language and culture, as well as to assuage the widespread “China Threat” rhetoric. Research-focused Confucius Institutes have also been opened to promote the study of China. Since the opening of the first Confucius Institute in November 2004 in Seoul, South Korea, 322 Confucius Institutes and 337 Confucius Classrooms had been opened in 94 countries and regions as of October 2010.36

The Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language aims to establish 1,000 Confucius Institutes by 2020.37 In an effort to bring Chinese voices to foreign locations, the Xinhua News Agency has launched a 24-hour global English-language television news service that is headquartered in New York City’s Times Square to compete with CNN and the BCC by delivering the Chinese perspective to international audiences.38 This trend will continue and will be enhanced by the fact that a much larger proportion of China’s next generation of leaders in a variety of fields ranging from the central government to multinational and state-owned corporations will be foreign-educated returnees. In a discussion of how the Chinese foreign-educated returnees will shape China’s future, Dr. Wang Huiyao, Vice Chairman of the China Overseas Returned Scholars Association and Director General of Center for China and Globalization, revealed that the Central Party School has been recruiting a growing number of foreign-educated returnees who will later serve critical roles in the central government. As Beijing takes the initiative, other major cities, and later provinces will follow suit.39 Thanks to their overseas experiences, these returnee leaders are likely to be more apt at forging ties with their counterparts abroad and expanding China’s international influence.

In recent years, Beijing has been moving away from its traditional foreign policy strategy and softening, though still retaining, its long-held and once rigid stance on sanctions and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. From
the end of the Cold War until around 2000, China had been the member of the UN Security Council that most frequently used its veto. However, in the past decade, Beijing not only continued to host the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear issue, but also participated in imposing sanctions against North Korea in the Security Council. Beijing also changed course in dealing with the Sudanese government, which sends 60 percent of the country’s oil output to China. Instead of protecting the Sudanese government from international pressure over human rights violations in Darfur, Beijing backed then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s three-phase plan for peace and stability in the region in 2006. Despite these strides toward international leadership, Thomas Christensen believes that China has recently failed to maintain this positive momentum in its foreign policy, damaging US-China relations in the process. The most widely criticized development is China’s ever more intimate relationship with North Korea. According to some knowledgeable observers, trade and investment relations between the two countries deepened in the past three years. When a North Korean submarine sank the South Korean naval ship Cheonan in March 2010, China not only refused to review the evidence, but also protected North Korea from facing direct criticism in the UN Security Council. In so doing, Christensen believes that Beijing alienated many other players in the region like South Korea, Japan, and the US.

Another criticism of negative, recent developments in Chinese foreign policy lies in the maneuvering power of nationalist public opinion. Widely cited are the September 2010 public protests and China’s hawkish responses to Japan’s arrest and detention of the captain of a Chinese fishing boat that collided with two Japanese vessels in a part of the East China Sea claimed by both China and Japan. It is believed that Beijing’s increasing assertiveness in international affairs can be partly attributed to the need of the government to cater to rising nationalism in China to maintain the legitimacy of the CCP. In private conversations, Chinese officials and pundits seem to play the public opinion card more and more frequently to justify externally unpopular foreign policy moves.

Nevertheless, believing in the maneuver power of nationalist public opinion in Chinese foreign policymaking is missing the point because it fails to acknowledge the fact that in China it is the government that possesses critical means to shape public opinion while there is relatively limited space for public opinion to be expressed—particularly when it comes to foreign policy issues. The Propaganda Department of the CCP maintains ideological control, censors news, and possesses almost absolute authority over what information the public can read and see. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Xinhua News Agency jointly decide the content and tone of foreign policy news reports to ensure that they are in line with China’s official positions.

It is also important to note that even when nationalist demonstrations are underway, the CCP is able to manage them to avoid social instability. When the CCP felt that the large, anti-Japan demonstrations in the spring of 2005 were getting out of control, it mobilized enough resources to end the demonstrations by officially forbidding future demonstrations and blocking anti-Japanese text messages and online posts calling for more protests. There was no backlash from the public, and popular discontent calmed down within a week.

Although there is more willingness on the part of the CCP to engage in international affairs, there are higher state priorities. National interests of maintaining a stable internal environment and a secure Northeast Asia override full-fledged demonstrations of nationalist sentiments or international leadership obligations of sanctioning rogue states.

Implications for US-China Policy: Not Making the “China Threat” a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

The problem with some contemporary Chinese political studies is that dangerously inappropriate analogies are sometimes used as explanations or evidence for an aggressive, expansionist China. Alastair Johnston notices that most scholars, government officials, and pundits who routinely make claims regarding China’s goal of establishing Chinese hegemony in East Asia and beyond often cite
problematic evidence. These intellectuals infer their conclusions of the leadership's thinking from particular readings of parts of Chinese history like the ancient Middle Kingdom tribute system. Others draw their inspirations from Europe, especially the rise of Wilhelmine Germany, to infer the political thinking and intentions of China. These analogies are often wrong because they assume similar historical conditions between contemporary China and China several hundred years ago, or China now and Germany one hundred years ago. The CCP is much more concerned with maintaining foreign investment and enhancing its political legitimacy than the Chinese or German governments did in the past.

Inferring the existence of Chinese revisionism from the use of the word “multipolarity” in Chinese political and military discourse is also problematic. One example is the 2002 congressionally mandated US-China Security Commission report, which took the multipolarity concept as prima facie evidence of a Chinese consensus that US unipolar power was in decline. Rosemary Foot argues that there is not even Chinese “soft balancing” against US supremacy through the formation of anti-hegemonic coalitions. Even though the relationship between Beijing and Moscow has matured greatly in the past two decades, there is still no sign that the close cooperation between the two is “soft balancing” against the US. Russia still remains uneasy and cautious about the rise of Chinese influence and material power, and these reservations inhibit the deepening of their relationship and limit the impact of the interests the two countries share.

Colonel Kenneth Johnson of the US Army War College warns that the US historically has a poor record of a comprehensive appreciation of the pragmatic imperatives underlying Chinese decision-making. Barack Obama was sworn into the Oval Office as “the first Pacific president,” who believes that George W. Bush’s administration had paid too little attention to Asia and had not done enough to maintain its traditional level of engagement there. China is seen by some scholars and officials as one of the biggest beneficiaries of the protracted and expensive US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, during which time China was able to assert more influence in Asia. As China continues to rise, it is critical for US policymakers to understand how China’s policy imperatives define Chinese international behaviors.

Analysis of the forces shaping Chinese foreign policy—state interests and lessons from the “Century of Humiliation”—have many critical implications for US-China policies. First and foremost, an assumption of an expansionist China and measures intended to hinder its rise will only jeopardize a healthy Sino-American relationship, making the “China Threat” a self-fulfilling prophecy. First, the evidence for Chinese expansionism is murky at best. With an assessment of China’s international behaviors based on the definition of revisionism, Alastair Johnston argues that China has been transformed from a revolutionary revisionist state under Mao to a more status-quo oriented one. Second, taking measures to hinder China’s rise will only make matters worse. Beijing remains very suspicious of American efforts in promoting dissent in China, pressing China to revalue its currency, creating fear of an aggressive China for its neighbors and others. A more nuanced strategy would be to strengthen US cooperation with China while establishing a strong US presence across Asia to encourage constructive Chinese behaviors and to promote confidence in other countries in the region.

Second, the US should actively seek common ground with China and avoid actions that may be interpreted by China as threatening to its core state interests. For example, the US should be more cautious in handling its relations with Taiwan, though this is much easier said than done. One the one hand, the US needs to fulfill its commitment to Taiwan to defend this island of vibrant democracy from communist infiltration or invasion. On the other hand, Taiwan is of core interest to China, and China is willing to do almost anything to prevent Taiwanese independence. In January 2010, Sino-American military relations worsened when the Obama administration approved an arms sale package to Taiwan worth more than $6 billion. The mainland largely saw this move as a pro-Taiwanese independence gesture,
which resulted in the Chinese leadership calling off military talks with the United States. Obama’s effort to enlist Beijing’s cooperation to sanction Iran was much complicated by this incident.

Third, the US should make constant efforts to enhance mutual understanding and improve mutual perception while acknowledging the differences in political culture and thinking between China and itself. To achieve this end, the US should continuously monitor Chinese strategic thinking and perceptions of the US. The US must nurture a generation of cadre in the national security and economic communities who are not only highly proficient in Mandarin Chinese but also have a solid background in Chinese political thought. The 100,000 Strong Initiative, a deal struck between Obama and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao in November 2009 to drastically increase the number of American students studying in China, is a good start.

Conclusion

In understanding the making of Chinese foreign policy, it is crucial to consider the internal dynamics of China in terms of both Chinese national interests and lessons from the past—particularly from the “Century of Humiliation.” Otherwise, Chinese intentions and capabilities would be often wrongly equated, resulting in what political scientist Robert Ross calls “diametrically opposed understandings of Chinese intentions.” The three most fundamental Chinese national interests are safeguarding the PRC political system, maintaining a peaceful international environment for China’s economic development, and unifying the motherland. Nationalism is sometimes factored into the making the Chinese foreign policy but does not override vital national interests. The nationalism card is not easy to play since nationalist anger toward the outside might easily turn inward. Chinese nationalist rhetoric is not to be taken seriously when it comes to making US-China policy. In the decades to come, there is good reason to believe that China will be more willing to accept international leadership. In the meantime, however, a growing sense of insecurity in terms of political stability that accompanies increasing national confidence might put confines on China’s foreign policymaking in favor of considerations for national interests and historical lessons.

China’s rise is not necessarily the source of instability in Sino-American relations and, by extension, in the Asia-Pacific region. To avoid making the “China Threat” a self-fulfilling prophecy, the US should not treat China as a threat. China is a status-quo power that focuses its efforts on its own state imperatives of maintaining social stability and promoting economic development. It is important for the US to nurture a generation of cadres who are able to precisely interpret Chinese political thoughts and monitor Chinese international behaviors. This is a critical step toward building a constructive Sino-American relationship and enhancing world peace in the twenty-first century.

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During the Decade of Roma Inclusion, inadequate education for Roma children has disproportionately been the focus of equality efforts. This paper will argue that education is promoted above other services because children are the main recipients of formal education, the West’s acceptance of public education as a human right ensures that its promotion will create little controversy, and education can be used to transmit social values that promote assimilation of Roma into Western culture. This paper will conclude that these reasons behind promoting education allow people to “embrace” Roma rights without having to truly accept Roma.

The Romani people, traditionally known as Gypsies, have a long history as the victims of discrimination and exclusion in Europe. Thought by most scholars to have migrated to Europe from India nearly a thousand years ago, they have been treated with a mixture of fear and contempt since. The Romani populations of the Balkans, Portugal, England, and Scotland were enslaved for centuries; in Romania, slavery was not abolished until 1855. In Germany, aristocrats made sport out of hunting nomadic Roma as game, and more than of half all Roma living in Nazi-occupied regions were murdered during the Holocaust, including nearly all Czech and Moravian Roma groups. Common views of the Roma hold them to be instinctively criminal, less intelligent than white people, and shiftless. These racist views continue to be widely held and unchallenged throughout the world, and, as a result, discrimination against Roma occurs on every level.

Currently, the number of destitute Roma is so high that the rate of chronic hunger among this group is similar to that of the peoples of Sub-Saharan Africa—one in every six people. A 2003 study conducted by the United Nations Development Program found that 41 percent of Roma do not even have running water in their homes. Nor is poverty their only concern—every year, hundreds, if not thousands, of Roma become forcibly displaced by governments or violent civilians. Ironic as it may seem, the more recent of these challenges continue to occur during what the Council of Europe has declared as the Decade of Roma Inclusion. Nonetheless, there is indeed a significant movement among powerful political organizations such as the European Union and the United Nations, smaller non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and ordinary Roma and gadjos (non-Roma) to fulfill the promise of the name. The Decade, designated to take place from 2005-2015, is an umbrella initiative sponsored by twelve European nations with the largest Roma populations, aimed at promoting acceptance of Roma and creating programs to help them gain lost ground. As the financial backer for many of Decade programs, the World Bank is also championing the Roma cause, allocating millions in grants and loans to fund research on the current situation of Roma across Eastern Europe and to support programs aimed at

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elevating Roma inclusion. Still, progress is slow, and the unsavory view expressed by Bulgaria’s Prime Minister Borisov that, “The Roma must break the vicious cycle of having someone else help them and must exert their own effort,” is still shared by many.9

Because of the nature of the topic, the majority of the research for this paper was conducted using Internet sources. Much of the analysis focuses on online news outlets and websites of various organizations that aim to help the Roma. The body of academic work regarding Roma participation in education is still fairly small, although it has grown notably over the last decade. Petra Gelbart’s dissertation, Learning Music, Race and Nation in the Czech Republic and Annabel Tremlett’s article “Gypsy Children Can’t Learn: Roma Children in the Hungarian Educational System” tackle the means and effects of educational exclusion within specific communities. Other more expansive studies of Romani experience with education also identify problems in education systems, but any sort of attempt to critically explain the recent emphasis on educational programs is absent from the current body of research on Romani rights. The social theories promulgated in Daniel Harris’ Cute, Quaint, Hungry, and Romantic: The Aesthetics of Consumerism and Ivan Illich’s “To Hell With Good Intentions” were helpful in providing a framework for this analysis, as was Cameron McCarthy’s book, The Uses of Culture: Education and the Limits of Ethnic Affiliation.

Exclusion and Inclusion in Roma Education

Recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a fundamental human right, education is one of the most prominent issues at stake in the surge to promote Roma inclusion. There are many obstacles to Roma who wish to obtain an education for themselves or their children. Across Europe, Roma have limited access to education, primarily because of racism. In Britain, there are school districts that refuse to provide buses to take Roma children living up to two miles away to school, despite the safety hazards posed to young children walking that distance in the dark.10 This is simply a mild example of the kinds of obstacles standing in the way of Roma accessing formal education—even graver is the quality of education given to Roma. Motivated by the belief that “gypsy children can’t learn,” school officials more often than not place Roma children in schools for students with mental handicaps, despite their being academically capable.11 This serves as a way to effectively segregate schools and is most common and unchallenged in Eastern Europe, although it is a problem in Western Europe as well. In Bulgaria 51 percent of children enrolled in special education programs are Roma, and in the Czech Republic 75 percent of all Roma children enrolled in school receive special education.12 Once moved to a special needs school, it is extremely difficult for them to be accepted into a normal school and, therefore, even more difficult to get a job except for menial work. In most regions of Eastern Europe, officials can simply deny admission to Roma students; in other cases, Roma children are allowed in, but they are forced to sit in the back of the classroom or be physically divided from their non-Roma peers. In a study of the Roma minority in Hungarian public schools, Annabel Tremlett found that Roma children in Hungary are frequently told that they cannot return the following year or are placed in a special “independent study” program in which few children, Roma or non-Roma, succeed.13 Such patterns in education almost guarantee that the Roma population of a particular nation will remain poor and seen as burdens to society.

Beyond this, there are other obstacles to education that Roma face, such as poverty. Oftentimes, Roma families cannot afford the school supplies their children need or are forced to take their children out of school so that they can work to supplement the family income. Bullying and intimidation from other students, as well as hostility
from teachers, also discourages Roma from attending school. Roma parents sometimes are forced to make the difficult decision to not send their children to school because of the risk of actual physical danger. Inside schools, gajdo children often tease Roma, and teachers stereotype them, assuming that they will be difficult or that they do not care about school. Facing such attitudes makes schooling an unpleasant experience, and, consequently, Roma parents sometimes choose to send their children to unofficially designated “Roma schools,” where the education is very low-quality, but they know their children will be in a welcoming environment.  

At times, Roma might also choose to not send their children to school because of cultural values. Traditionally, Roma culture places more emphasis on acquiring skills or trades from parent to child than on academic learning, and Roma groups do not always share the view of Western cultures that see childhood as a special, protected stage that lasts through the teenage years. The practice of marrying off young teenagers also stands in the way of their obtaining an education. When speaking of cultural objections to education, however, one must tread carefully because of the propensity of these arguments to be exaggerated and used as an excuse for not accommodating or accepting Roma. Many, if not most, Roma see the value of education and want their children to attend school but are prevented by economic obstacles or discrimination. In fact, in many recently desegregated schools, the number of Roma children who have applied for admission is so great that they cannot all be accommodated.  

In the international eye, the need for equitable education is by far the most represented issue, and the issue for which the most is being done. New instances of violence towards Roma, the general denial of resources to Roma, and, occasionally, Roma cultural initiatives all have their place in the news when something of particular interest occurs, but education is one of the few social problems facing Roma that is consistently written about for its own sake. Similarly, there are significantly more humanitarian projects focused on education than on any other one aspect of aid and reform. Although equitable education is definitely a necessary component in any Roma are to overcome the challenges of poverty and be seen as productive citizens. Housing, too, is of great concern to the millions of Roma families who live in below-grade housing units, which sometimes are demolished by city governments or burned by vigilantes, as is often the case in Romania and other Eastern European countries. Nevertheless, educational access and inequality receives more intervention than other challenges facing Roma. In news articles and press releases, education is frequently referenced by politicians, political organizations, and NGOs as the main solution to Roma poverty and exclusion. For example, President Basceau of Romania stated, while speaking of a new, rather vague initiative to help Roma adults find  

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segregation and inequity in education. The most prominent, well-funded programs tend to relate to education. Among these are the Open Society Institute’s Roma Education Initiative, the Decade offshoot the Roma Education Fund, the Council of Europe’s many Roma education and early childhood programs, and the work of UNICEF and World Vision.

Using World Vision as a case study provides insight into how this dichotomy plays out in mainstream aid. As one of the most prominent NGOs to address Roma development and equality, World Vision makes education a clear priority. World Vision’s website states that “a strong education and advocacy component” is the key to their current three-year initiative for Roma, “Fighting Discrimination and Stigma Against Roma Population.” The site goes on to name poverty, segregation, and lack of access to health care, education, and jobs as main problems for Roma but elaborates solely on the issue of education. Education is also a main focus of its online pages, which inform viewers of the stigma and struggle of Roma. For example, a page with the heading “Voices of Roma Youth and Adults: Realities of Exclusion and Discrimination” quotes various news articles that quote Roma who express the kinds of challenges they face. Each of these selections point to inadequate education as a key problem. Four of the five quotations used on the page are concerned with limited access to education, and the one abstract that focuses explicitly on racism is titled, “Roma: Daycare Center Gives Roma Access to Education.”

Encouragingly, education is one of the few areas that is showing improvement for Roma, albeit gradually. Roma continue to be pushed as far away from gadjo society. Without a solid foundation of education, poverty can rarely be alleviated. Education is also seen by many as the key to acceptance of Roma into European society by enabling Roma to become part of a successful middle-class. UNESCO director-general Irena Bakova succinctly summed up the necessity of education when she said, “Children are our most precious resource…the denial of (education) leaves everybody much poorer.” Therefore, it is no surprise that education is a special focus of development efforts for Roma—as it should be. However, it is just as obvious that education alone cannot bring Roma equality and acceptance in European society.

Because of the stereotypes associated with “Gypsies,” even educated Roma often struggle to find work. This in itself is a deterrent to Roma in pursuing education; academic Petra Gelbart, herself ethnically Romani, noted in her recent dissertation, “Today, some Romani families are so discouraged by their low chances on the job market that they fail to see how schooling can really help.”

Many employers simply refuse to hire Roma, and a college degree does not change this. The Philadelphia Daily News underscored this problem in a recent article

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paradoxically titled, “Education Moving Gypsies Forward” that told of a young Slovakian Roma who has been unable to find work as a teacher on account of her race since she graduated from college over four years ago.

Another answer to the question of the special attention to education is not quite so obvious. The humanitarian and political push for Roma education is directed entirely toward formal schooling for traditional-aged students—elementary school through high school. There are, in fact, programs directed toward vocational and literacy training for adult Roma, but the emphasis of mainstream news sources and NGOs is entirely on traditional schooling, which is almost exclusively restricted to teenagers and children. Keeping this in mind, it becomes useful to look to the role of children in public calls for Roma rights.

Roma children are often the literal poster child for Roma issues, in education and beyond. Again using World Vision as an example, the section of its website devoted to Roma issues features constant reminders that children are the victims of anti-Roma racism. Although the head of the page reads “Roma: The Plight of Europe’s Largest Minority,” this may as well be a minority without adults; while the text that follows speaks of disadvantages to “Roma” in general, the large color photograph emblazoned with the words “Go Away Gypsy!” is of the dusty feet of children, not adults. In another section titled “Voices of Roma Youth and Adults,” the adults mainly speak about their children or other children in their community, but they remain silent on how discrimination has personally affected them as adults.22 The World Bank’s representation of Roma is very much the same; of the twelve photos of Roma throughout the website, seven picture only Roma children, three picture a Roma mother and child, one pictures an elderly couple, and only one shows working age adult Roma.23

Similarly, the media draws far more on the victimization of Roma children than adults. An excellent example of this is a fire that broke out in an Italian Roma camp, tragically killing four children. The incident was picked up on by many mainstream online news outlets, including BBC News, Yahoo, and AOL, and stirred the Pope to admonish Italians for their exclusion of Roma.24 However, the many instances of outright violence towards Roma adults and communities are usually only covered by local news or special interest publications. Even when children’s issues are not specifically the focus, attention is constantly drawn to Roma children through words and photos in news articles and governmental reports. For example, in a New York Times article about a very controversial wall that had been erected in a Czech town, separating ethnic Czechs from ethnic Roma, the author concluded, “But more energy is needed to solve a problem that dooms Gypsy children to a lifetime of disadvantage and discrimination” (emphasis added by author).25

Finally, as with education, there are many more programs concerned exclusively with the well-being of Roma children than with the Roma community as a whole. For example, of the many projects for Roma inclusion funded by the World Bank, roughly half focus on children or education or have a large component that addresses one of the two. In addition to the many programs established to promote education, Roma inclusion projects established by individual nations and independent non-profits hone in on children and youth, excluding adults. Programs and organizations that emphasize helping Roma children include, but are not limited to, the Children and Youth Development Project in Macedonia; the Roma Children Inclusion Project in Romania; the Childhood Welfare Reform Project in Bulgaria; the Child Development and Disadvantaged Communities Project (also in Bulgaria); the Fund for Endangered Children; the Children’s Ark; the Roma Support Group; Roma for All; the Children’s Ark; UNICEF; World Vision; Save the Children; and the Roma Children’s Centre.

It seems, then, that the key to the education question is children. Children represent vulnerability and innocence; it is much easier to be moved by a smiling, chubby-cheeked child than by the lined, weather-worn face of an adult. In his famous speech, “To Hell With Good Intentions,” Ivan Illich controversially asserted that humanitarian work is ultimately about working in our own self-interest.26 Sociologist Daniel Harris builds off of this premise in his essay, “Cuteness,” arguing that the physical and mental limitations of children are an invitation to the paternalistic side of human nature to protect and care for.27 It takes no great strength of character to want to help children; in fact, according to Harris, people instinctively seek to care
for the helpless so that, by doing so, they may become more powerful. This social paradigm holds that more often than from true altruism, people are moved by their aesthetic consciousness to help children, whereas the distress of unbeautiful adults pulls remarkably less on heart-strings. Within the framework of these theories, the proliferate use of children to promote Roma rights and the great number of programs directed exclusively at children demonstrate that gado society is still not totally motivated to help the Romani people purely from a sense of social justice.

### In Their Own Image

Education has always been prized for its potential to transmit specific social values to students, and this is no less a factor in current education initiatives for Roma. The presence of this less-than-altruistic motivation is clearly demonstrated in one recent scholarly account of Roma socialization and education in Eastern Europe, which claims that “the socialization of gypsies at home” is extremely problematic and that schooling is the solution. Defining “gypsy lifestyle” as having “an extremely low degree of education,” “a high rate of childbirth,” and “a propensity for behaving against accepted norms,” the authors emphasize the refusal of Roma to adopt a Western lifestyle. They champion education as a means of assimilation, notably praising boarding-style schools that separate Roma children from the bad influence of their settlements. The importance of school, according to these authors, can be summarized by their statement that, “Gypsies live on the edge of society, and their children should be taught the basic skills of civilization.” Similar attitudes are reflected in a recent collaborative project between the University of Montana and Charles University in Prague on the importance of Roma education, which reported, “It was clear how young people can easily be influenced by negative attitudes about work” and then proceeded to relate an example of Roma preference for laziness and crime, emphasizing the positive role of teachers and tutors to counteract the negative influences of Roma parents.

This hypothesis is further supported by the fact that the EU and the World Bank strongly support developing Roma ‘youth leaders,’ calling on young people to lead the way for Roma inclusion and recently sponsoring several Roma teenagers from Central and Eastern Europe to attend a democratic leadership conference in New Zealand. There is no such summons, no references at all, in fact, for leadership on the part of older Roma. This total focus on raising up youth leaders instead of capitalizing on existing adult leaders in Roma communities suggests two things: first, that these powerful global entities have an interest in shaping future Roma, and second, that there is a feeling that Roma adults are already ‘lost’ to their disreputable ways.

In addition to being understood as helpless and in need of protection, the conception of children as innocent is significant in understanding this trend in Roma development aid. Because childhood is endowed with a special purity, it is easier to reject common stereotypes about Roma—that they are dirty, that they steal, lie, or cheat—when it comes to children than adults. Phrased another way, Roma adults are commonly viewed as morally dirty, but Romani children have not yet been corrupted.

This perspective is expressed appallingly well by Petra Vrtbosvka’s warning, as quoted by Petra Gelbart, that “Adorable, big-eyed little children soon turn into young Roma. They run away from home, steal, hang out with their circle of friends on the street, don’t want to study, quickly form intense romantic and sexual relationships, they love noise, dance, singing, shouting, and live in a large [wild] band.” It then becomes the job of schools and youth programs to intervene before this corruption can occur. Motivation Romania, a Romania NGO currently receiving funding from the World Bank, operates based on this sort of anticipatory action. The organization emphasizes the idea that by intervening at a young age they are preventing Roma boys from committing crimes, identifying one group of “beneficiaries” as “twenty boys, identified by local authorities as potential juvenile delinquents” (emphasis added by author).

Furthermore, there are certain assumptions about children and childhood that modern Western societies do not make about adults. Adults are perceived as being culpable for their socioeconomic position, whereas children are society’s dependents. It is very easy, when reading about financial problems or social prejudice against adults of any ethnicity, to have the knee-jerk “hard work” reaction—if they are badly off, it is most likely through some fault of their own. They just did not...
work hard enough. Children, on the other hand, do not evoke such a reaction. It is assumed that all decent human beings have a responsibility to help needy infants and children—and sometimes women and the elderly, who can be viewed as equally helpless—but this assumed responsibility does not generally apply to impoverished or otherwise struggling adults. Rather, it is the responsibility of adults to help themselves, no matter how debilitating their circumstances. In considering humanitarian and inclusion movements for Roma, this notion of the responsibility of adulthood is particularly important in light of the types of stereotypes commonly held about Roma. Racist views about Roma hold them to be unanimously lazy and averse to work, preferring to steal or beg instead. Initiatives to provide humanitarian aid or employment opportunities for Roma adults, therefore, meet the dual challenge of overcoming the view that adults should be able to help themselves and the racially imbued opposition that Gypsies do not want to help themselves. The school is uniquely the place of the child—the perfect victim; education, for these reasons, is the safest territory to address inequality. Furthermore, public education is something that all EU states are required to provide to its citizens and is, therefore, less likely to be viewed negatively as a drain on public resources. While education of Roma obviously continues to be an area of contestation in the gadjo community, there are fewer qualms raised on financial grounds about upping Roma participation in schools. In contrast, EU citizens, particularly those in poorer countries, resent even minor spending on Roma to provide things like health care and housing. By directing the majority of resources to Roma inclusivity in education, concerns about Roma providing for themselves, rather than relying on others, can be largely avoided.

By emphasizing programs that help only Romani children, it is possible for Europe to work towards racial equity without actually challenging the attitudes about Roma that are responsible for the presence of inequity to begin with. The failure of many Roma inclusion efforts to remedy racism is evidenced by the many instances of racism embedded in programs and reports funded by the World Bank, a major source of funding for Roma inclusion initiatives. For example, in a report entitled, “Czech Republic: Improving Employment Chances of the Roma,” the role of discrimination in hiring practices is extremely downplayed and racist views are even propagated. Relying on negative stereotypes to account for low employment among Roma, the report reads, “the remaining unemployed face binding barriers to employment possibly due to lacking skills and work habits, disincentives or lack of motivation to look for work, or other reasons such as discrimination,” casually including the problem of discrimination as something of an afterthought. At another point, the report excuses individuals who practice discrimination by saying, “employers may demonstrate a form of ‘statistical discrimination’ related to information asymmetries and lacking information about individuals” (emphasis added. by author). This technical language is a poor disguise for racism, meaning, in essence, that Roma generally do not have the qualities of desirable employees, although certain Roma individuals may. Racist overtones were also notable in interviews with the directors of Motivation Romania. Both the World Bank coverage of Motivation Russia and the non-profit itself demonstrate a buy-in of stereotypes of Roma as criminals and present an overall negative, patronizing view of Roma by making comments such as, “[the non-profit workers] gave boys basic social skills.” Given the international clout of the World Bank, the presence of racially tinged remarks in its programs for social inclusivity is particularly worrying. As both a sponsor of many governmental Roma
inclusion programs and a major world actor, the significance of the attitude of World Bank-funded programs for the Roma outreach movement as a whole cannot be underestimated.

Conclusion

This paper demonstrates that there is an imbalance in media and economic support of Roma rights, favoring education for Roma children over Roma adults. The victimization of Roma children, then, supersedes the victimization of the Roma population as a whole. So much of the focus is on children because helping children is the most socially acceptable thing to do. In helping children, particularly through education, gadjos are not forced to confront their racist beliefs about Roma and can even channel these beliefs through education aid. The point of this paper is not to encourage society to stop caring for Roma children, nor is it to suggest that all journalists and NGOs are consciously or unconsciously playing into selfish, racist thinking patterns. However, examining the current approach to Roma aid from a critical perspective shows this to be undeniably a factor in the current trend of youth-based Roma inclusion and awareness efforts. In moving forward with Roma inclusion, more must be done to directly combat racism and to provide for Roma in areas outside of education and childhood development if Roma integration is to be successful.

Endnotes

1. Ian Hancock, We Are the Romani People (Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2010), 6.
3. Ibid., 58.
4. We Are the Romani People, 35.
5. Petra Gelbart, “Learning Music, Race, and Nation in the Czech Republic” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2010).
13. Tremlett.
15. It is interesting to note that, despite Westerners’ horror that Roma do not always coddle their children, Western culture itself did not begin to dictate that children be treated as anything less than miniature adults until the last century and a half.
26. Ivan Ilich, To Hell With Good Intentions (speech given at the Conference on InterAmerican Student Projects, Cuernavaca, Mexico, April 20, 1968).
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Anwar Sadat: The Transformation of Egypt’s Foreign Policy

by Patrick Shipe

After the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser on September 28, 1970, neither Egyptian insiders nor the United States expected Anwar Sadat to survive his first month in office. At best, he would become a puppet of the Arab Socialist Union, the party and revolutionary propaganda vehicle of his predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Elliot Richardson, the head of the US delegation at Nasser’s funeral, met with Sadat only to report back “that Sadat wouldn’t last more than four to six weeks in power.”1 Sadat would not only come to defy his critics by holding onto power, but also transcend all expectations and chart a dramatic new course for Egypt. Sadat sent Soviet advisers packing while the US Embassy staff swelled to 872 in 1981 from a mere six in 1973.2 He abandoned Arab Socialism and formed the National Democratic Party that would come to rule Egypt until 2011.3 He launched the ambitious Infitah, which “opened” Egypt to private investment and ended public sector market domination. He presided over the famous October 6 breaking of the Israeli Bar Lev line in 1973 and concluded a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. How did Sadat arrive at these massive shifts in policy? How did he manage to rechart the course of a nation still reeling from its thorough defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War? Sadat’s leadership not only changed Egypt forever; it laid the foundation of the Middle East known today.

Sadat entrenched his strategy in a series of strategic convictions formed over the years he spent in Nasser’s shadow. He developed a strategy built upon a “pathological” distaste for the Soviet Union. He believed that Nasser could not separate the political and military realities of war and thus could not achieve the victory for Egypt he so wanted. Sadat reoriented Egypt to pursue a war of limited aims with Israel that would strengthen his ability to bargain diplomatically. He strongly believed that alignment with the United States was key to Egypt’s future, and Sadat’s strategy revolved around changing the US-Israeli dynamic. Egypt found itself in a political trap between the United States, Soviet Union, and Israel, and Sadat would try to break free. He settled on a direction for Egypt: “Peace plus Infitah [economic opening] equals prosperity.”4 While his strategic aims were sound—perhaps revolutionary after Nasser’s defeat—he failed tactically in the October War of

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1973 and chose to follow the road of negotiation without the extent of the leverage he had predicted to gain in 1973.

**Origins**

Anwar Sadat was as bound to the situation he faced when he assumed the presidency as he was by the prejudices he developed as an insider to the revolutionary regime. In order to understand the development of President Sadat's strategy, it is necessary to first understand both the origins of the situation he inherited upon entering office and the development of his approach toward it.

The best starting point for this particular story is the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, Egypt's de facto independence from Britain. The Free Officers Movement, an organization of junior army officers, forced Egypt's King Farouk to abdicate, compelling him to flee from his Alexandria summer palace aboard his yacht. Anwar Sadat, a Free Officer himself, delivered the first address of the revolution after leading the takeover of Cairo's radio facilities on July 23, 1952.\(^5\)

The Free Officers Movement was conceived in the midst of the same unresolved issues that Sadat would come to face. The Movement was a rejection of foreign influence in Egypt. It was a rejection of the corrupt Egyptians that benefited from that influence, and it was also a rejection of Israel. The Free Officers largely consisted of men who believed that King Farouk's poor leadership cost Egypt the war with Israel in 1948-49, and public discontent over the loss helped to push the Free Officers to victory.\(^6\) The average age of a Free Officer was thirty-four, and "all were native-born Egyptians of rural origins who had risen through the military to positions of responsibility."\(^7\)

The revolution marked the decline of British influence in the country—a consequence that would dominate Egyptian foreign affairs well into Sadat's rule—and the beginning of a tumultuous new relationship with the United States. The rise of Arab nationalism and the disengagement of colonial forces in the region fueled American anxiety about a perceived power vacuum that could be exploited by the Soviets. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles linked Arab nationalism itself to communism.\(^8\)

However, Egyptian-US relations after the Revolution did not immediately begin under such tension. Americans were sympathetic to the Egyptian revolution, as evidenced by the Truman administration's favorable response to Egyptian requests for military aid. Truman sent Deputy Secretary of Defense William C. Foster to Cairo, where he assured Nasser that "U.S. arms aid would be forthcoming." In spite of this initial desire on the part of the Americans to extend a hand to the new regime, the British expressed concern that the new regime could use advanced weaponry against them in the Suez Canal zone, where they sought to maintain their strategic presence. Thus, America "decided to postpone military aid to Egypt."\(^9\) Instead, Egypt made arrangements to procure arms from Czechoslovakia in what amounted to an indirect purchase from the Soviet Union.\(^10\)

Egypt had decided to enter headfirst into the politics of the Cold War—a conflict that introduced an irrefutable dimension to Egyptian politics.

The Czech-Egyptian deal broke "the Western monopoly on the supply of arms to the countries of the Middle East," leading John Foster Dulles to call the deal "the most serious development since Korea."\(^11\) Washington was eager to employ the issue of the Aswan High Dam to keep the Egyptians from Soviet orbit.\(^12\) The Nile was, and remains, Egypt's economic lifeblood—agriculture would be nonexistent without it, and controlling its flood was key to growth. The dam became a symbol of modernization and independence for Egypt, and the country needed massive financial assistance to complete the ambitious project.\(^13\) However, when it became apparent that the prospect of High Dam aid "had not succeeded in limiting the Czech arms agreement," the United States eventually decided against funding the project.\(^14\) Not only did the Soviet Union respond by extending Egypt a loan, but it was several times larger than the Western offer. In order to fund the rest of the dam, Nasser made the monumental decision of nationalizing the Suez Canal.\(^15\) This quagmire of events brought about the Suez Crisis of 1956 and a closer relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union.

The Suez Crisis marked the beginning of a rift in Sadat's thinking and Nasser's policies. Britain and France collaborated with Israel in an attack against Egypt, reoccupying the Suez Canal on October 29, 1956. The Israelis
gained control of the Sinai Peninsula, and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion had strongly intimated before the Knesset that he intended to annex the Sinai into Israel. A scathing international reaction resounded in the halls of the United Nations, especially from the United States. The US, in the midst of backing the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, felt it necessary to support Egypt and to demand the withdrawal of Coalition forces from Sinai. The United States succeeded, and Vice President Nixon heralded the move as a “second declaration of independence from Anglo-French Colonial policies.” Although it was President Eisenhower’s intervention that rescued Egypt and handed Nasser a massive political victory, Nasser decided that it would be politically prudent to thank the Soviets, who issued the “blustering” Khrushchev-Bulganin Ultimatum, demanding the attacks on Egypt cease. Nasser chose to publicly attribute the failure of the British, French, and Israelis “to the Russian ‘warning’, and praised the role of the Soviet Union in complete disregard of Eisenhower’s efforts.” Whether Nasser truly believed this is unknown; however, the political implications were real. Sadat saw this as another lost opportunity to develop strategic ties with the United States. Rather than view the Soviets as the heroes du jour, Sadat saw their reaction to the Suez Crisis—or the “Tripartite Aggression,” as is still fashionable in Egyptian circles—as representative of the lack of Soviet commitment to Egypt. The Soviet Union had impressed Nasser, particularly in light of the weapons deal and the funding for Aswan High Dam project. The United States abandoned him to appease the British, and he felt that the United Kingdom’s Baghdad Pact was a ploy to foment Arab resistance to Arab Socialism and his leadership. In the shadow of these events, Nasser failed to acknowledge the role that United States pressure had on stopping the so-called “Tripartite Aggression.” Sadat saw things very differently. When the Syrian president Shukri al-Kuwaitli delivered a plea for help to Moscow on Egypt’s behalf, the Soviets “refused point blank.” “This made me believe, from that moment on,” continued Sadat, “that it was always futile to depend on the Soviet Union.”

Furthermore, Sadat believed that Nasser’s decision to increasingly rely on the Soviet Union was a massive strategic blunder when it came to Israel. “As a professional politician,” wrote Sadat, “Nasser should have seized that chance to consolidate US-Egyptian relations, if only to frustrate the Israeli strategy which sought the reverse.” Nasser spent much time focusing on a complete military defeat of Israel. Sadat criticized Nasser for having this goal—how was Egypt, with its noncommittal Soviet support, going to annihilate an Israel that possesses complete US military support? Drifted towards the Soviet Union. Sadat argued that Nasser never truly tried to understand Israel’s political strategy. In his seminal work The Art of War, Sun Tzu gave the following advice:

4. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.
5. Next best is to disrupt his alliances.

Like Sun Tzu, Sadat believed that Israel’s essential strategy for existence was its alliances. Israel, argues Sadat, “always had to seek the support of the world’s biggest power.” At the beginning of the twentieth century, Zionists looked to Britain—a relationship symbolized by the Balfour Declaration. However, the aftermath of World War II sent the United States surging past ruined Europe. Israel, according to Sadat, decided to realign itself with the United States. In the end, the exact identity of the power was not important but rather such a power’s ability to exert global influence both politically and militarily in Israel’s favor. The United States was an ideal ally in that it had incentive to intervene in Mideast affairs—its own Cold War struggle. By aligning itself firmly with the United States, Israel could leverage...
worked to prevent its Arab neighbors from pursuing positive relationships with the United States. “Israel’s strategy is based on creating a rift between the United States and Egypt,” he wrote. He offered the example of the Lavon Affair, a botched 1953 Israeli operation that attempted to attack Western-linked targets in Egypt and present them as the work of Communist or Islamist terrorists. The attacks were meant to derail nascent US-Egyptian relations after the 1952 revolution. Israel felt threatened by the possibility of positive relations and thus tried to thwart them. “Nasser should have learned a lesson,” Sadat pointed out. The lesson was that Egypt had to put a wedge between Israel and the US, just as Israel tried to do to Egypt, in order to be politically victorious. Nasser meanwhile became “preoccupied with the fable… that he was a hero who had defeated the armies of two great empires.” The Suez Crisis was a pure political victory for Egypt and was a complete military disaster. Nonetheless, Nasser failed to differentiate the two. The distinction between a political victory and a military victory would guide Sadat in his first years of office.

Sadat’s sharp criticism of Nasser’s leadership strongly hints at his future policy choices. In the course of the Suez Crisis, he began to formulate crucial theories that would guide him as President. Although Sadat was a “yes-man” and a propagandist for Nasser—he edited the Al Jumhuriya newspaper and churned out editorials deifying him—he was nonetheless an original Free Officer who was permanently in Nasser’s inner circle. He met Nasser at the age of nineteen. Sadat wrote in his memoirs: “There were moments when I could not understand him or account for some of his actions. Nonetheless, my feelings toward him remain unaltered. They were feelings of love and love alone.”

Sadat sincerely believed that outside forces were working to undo a good man and the Revolution as a whole. Perhaps that is because the Free Officers never codified the goals of the Revolution after assuming power. Sadat discusses Nasser’s composition of a National Charter for the direction of the Revolution but criticized it as a diversionary document meant to do little more than distract the populace. Sadat would eventually launch his “Corrective Revolution” upon ascending to the Presidency in this vein. The Suez Crisis, in Sadat’s view, was the beginning of the end for Nasserite policies.

The Corrective Revolution

At Nasser’s death on September 28, 1970, Sadat was vice president and in the line of succession. Sadat did not intend to stay on as President at first. When he finally decided to submit his candidacy to officially take the post, the world did not expect him to last very long. An Israeli intelligence brief offered a bleak assessment of Sadat’s political future—he was not expected to have one. The Israelis assumed that Nasser would never select a possible rival as vice president. Sadat, they assessed, was “colorless, weak, and narrow-minded, and he was not a leader who could remain in power.” These reports were not without basis. Sadat knew that he had enemies in the ruling elite, especially in the Arab Socialist Union. Dissidents among the Free Officers proposed a system of “collective rule” as the best way to continue Nasser’s legacy.

Sadat realized that the first war he would fight would not be for the Sinai, but for legitimacy as the heir of Nasser. He immediately moved to mobilize the state propaganda organs under his control and had the al-Ahram newspaper print a response to dissidents. Nasser “had given Sadat his vote.” At the same time, he selected Ali Sabri as his vice president. Sabri embodied everything that Sadat came to detest in Nasser’s regime: “left-wing, radical, and pro-Soviet.” However, the choice of Sabri as vice president communicated a sense of continuity to Egyptians and kept him politically alive well past the six weeks that Elliot Richardson had predicted. Sadat supported his efforts with countless speeches, repeatedly invoking Nasser and the Soviet Union. Accepting his nomination as a candidate for President, Sadat told the Egyptian parliament:

I came to you on the road paved by Gamal abd-al-Nasser, and I regard your presenting my candidacy for President as a directive to follow in Nasser’s footsteps. I solemnly give you my word of honour that I shall continue to follow Nasser’s ways under any circumstances…

He delivered his first public address as
President of Egypt on the Suez Canal front line to the Army—another important power center Sadat strove to woo. He began with a moment of silence for Nasser, announcing after, “We shall all try to advance in the course charted by Nasser.”

As Sadat cemented his public image and established credibility among the people, he strove to take control of the narrative regarding the Suez front. Upon becoming President, he moved to renew the ceasefire with Israel for three more months. After several more extensions had elapsed, the situation transformed into a “ceasefire that was not a ceasefire,” as Sadat managed a balance between a real war he could not win and the anxiety of his people. He continued to give fiery speeches as his government churned out press releases about war preparations on a daily basis.

His efforts also helped to establish him on the international scene. Upon the second expiry of the ceasefire (after its first renewal), Sadat announced before the Egyptian National Assembly a plan that would re-open the Suez Canal to international shipping if Israel committed to a partial withdrawal within thirty days. President Nixon spurned him, sending Sadat a short message insisting that he would not be pressured by Sadat’s deadlines. Nonetheless, Sadat’s war preparation campaign did just that. The administration began to “show more flexibility” as it considered war a very real possibility. Secretary of State William Rogers put Israel on the defensive, stating that American policy dictated, “The 1967 border should be the border separating Egypt from Israel.”

Sadat discovered the extent to which the regime had been taping phone conversations when an advisor brought him a large stack of typed records. In an ominous speech that Sadat made on May 1, 1971, he cautioned the people who attempted “to impose his or their will on the masses…in an attempt to form positions of power through which to impose his or their guardianship on the people, since this people, together with Gamal Abdel Nasser, have toppled all positions of power.” Ali Sabri was dismissed from his post the following day. He had successfully isolated his political opponents within the regime, won the support of the Army, and achieved control over public information.

Sadat’s consolidation of power in the Corrective Revolution revealed in him an adept politician who was willing to take large risks in the hope of a larger dividend. He was not hesitant to provoke superpowers in order to gain diplomatic maneuverability.

Sadat had effectively cut them out, and they were not pleased. Sabri attacked Sadat for “selling out to America” and publicly made the case that the Arab Socialist Union was the sole body that could “interpret the ‘immortal leader’s’ [Gamal Abdel Nasser’s] teachings.” In a dramatic sequence of events, Sadat had not consulted Sabri and his allies before he announced his Suez Canal initiative threatened their role as a “power center” in the Egyptian government.
achieved “de-Nasserization in Nasser’s name.”

The October War—A War of Limited Aims

The October War of 1973 was the major test of Sadat’s new strategy and orientation. It would test Sadat’s theory that a war of limited aims was the best way to change the status quo—Israel’s occupation of Sinai—and put Egypt in a position of diplomatic strength. Sadat wrote that he “used to tell Nasser that if we could recapture even four inches of Sinai territory…and establish ourselves there so firmly that no power on earth could dislodge us, then the whole situation would change—east, west, all over.” Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s meeting with Egyptian national security adviser Hafez Ismail in March 1973 corroborated this assumption. Kissinger told Ismail frankly, “You talk as though you were the victors and Israel were the loser. The situation will not change unless you change it militarily.”

On October 1, 1973, President Sadat issued his official directive to the commander-in-chief to the Armed Forces. He clearly spelled out the Egyptian strategy:

The strategic objective I hereby set the Egyptian armed forces to achieve, and for which I hold full political responsibility, in the light of all that I have heard and learned about their preparations, may be summed out as follows:

To challenge the Israeli Security Theory by carrying out a military action according to the capabilities of the armed forces aimed at inflicting the heaviest losses on the enemy and convincing him that continued occupation of our land exacts a price that is too high for him to pay.

In other words, Sadat clearly articulated in official capacity his position that it was not necessary to aim for the complete destruction of the Israeli armed forces to achieve his political goal. The Sadat strategy could be characterized as that of a defensive war. Although Egypt began the war, the 1973 October War was in practicality a counterattack part of the same war that began in 1967—a war in which Egypt was on the defensive. It was a continuation of a conflict that had left the enemy on its soil. Repossession of Sinai was thus a continuation of a defensive strategy. “The ultimate aim of a defensive war… can never be an absolute negation,” German war scholar Carl von Clausewitz says. “Even the weakest party must possess some way of making the enemy conscious of its presence, some means of threatening him.”

Sadat’s strategy was exactly that. His conception of the “Israeli Security Theory” is based on the idea that as long as Israel believes there is no credible threat to the status quo, it faces no military, political, or psychological reason to give in to Arab pressure. The Israeli Security Theory essentially allowed Israel to ignore the Arab presence completely. It removed them completely from the equation—an equation Sadat wanted to get back into.

Sadat’s strategy performed miraculously well. In a matter of several hours, the whole world witnessed thousands of Egyptian troops crossing the Suez, breaking Israel’s purportedly impregnable Bar Lev line. Egyptian tactical creativity on the ground excelled—the Army had ordered custom-built high-pressure water pumps to pulverize the Bar-Lev line’s earthworks on October 6. Instead of charging aimlessly into the desert to become targets for the Israeli Air Force—the same force that had achieved utter domination of Egyptian skies in 1967—the Egyptian ground forces stayed close to their highly effective surface-to-air missile batteries. Approaching Israeli tanks that had grown accustomed to seeing Egyptian infantry flee in the face of their armor were faced with fatal shoulder-carried anti-tank missiles like the AT-3 Sagger.

The Israeli Counter-Crossing

Sadat’s “dizzy triumph” distracted him from his clear and cogent war plan—a limited war to restore Egyptian negotiating power. He decided to send Egyptian troops further into Sinai to secure two strategic points, the Mitla and Gidi passes. The attack took Egyptian tanks out of their SAM-protected zone and into “well-prepared” Israeli positions. The morning of October 14 alone cost the Egyptian Army 250 tanks. Egypt seemed to commit the same blunders that had cost the Israelis at the war’s beginning, driving 400 tanks into 900 enemy tanks. Two days later, in the early morning of October 16, 1973, two hundred Israeli troops led by General Ariel
Sharon crossed the Canal near Great Bitter Lake, a lake that lies toward the southern end of the Suez Canal. Sharon “paddled” across undetected and began striking Egyptian Army targets, especially SAM batteries. Sharon’s crossing should have been simply an inconvenience—he originally crossed with only seven tanks. Anwar Sadat and his Army Chief of Staff, General Saad Shazly, differ on how the events unfolded, a disagreement that cost Shazly his job and had him effectively exiled when Sadat nominated him Ambassador to England. In his memoirs, Sadat portrays Shazly as someone who had lost his mind—he came to an emergency meeting “a nervous wreck”—suggesting that Egyptian forces withdraw to the west bank of the Canal. Sadat presents himself as someone who cunningly avoided a trap—a withdrawal was “precisely what the Israelis had wanted.” Sadat’s account immediately shifts to his discovery that the United States was providing Israel with untested “modern weapons,” and that he knew Egypt could never take on the United States. The Deversoir pocket, the Israeli infiltration force led by Sharon on the west bank, was simply “for the television cameras,” an effort “to save Israel’s reputation” after Egypt’s initial victories in the war. He adamantly held his ground: “I challenge Israel to declare the real losses she sustained in the Deversoir Bulge.” Sadat saw his eventual decision to call for a cease-fire as a mark of wisdom; he had done his best and now the situation was beyond his control.

Shazly and other historians challenge Sadat’s heroic retelling of the last days of the October War. He claims to have protested Sadat’s decision to push deeper into Sinai, only to have been silenced. Shazly paints a Sadat drunken with the possibility of a larger victory and obsessed with controlling the war narrative. Shazly writes that he intended to only pull back enough forces to counter the Israeli pocket on the west bank, not all as Sadat claimed. While Sadat mocked the Israeli Deversoir counter-crossing as something for cameras, Sadat did not want to show any sign of weakness or panic and therefore refused to withdraw any troops. Shazly believes ultimately that Sadat failed in adhering to his strategy and was personally responsible. “He could not claim that he had been kept in ignorance. The fate of the country was in his hands.”

Eventually the Deversoir pocket grew, and Egyptians began to realize what was actually occurring on the west bank of the Canal from “wounded men, ambulance drivers, [and] hospital staff.” After a cease-fire passed the Security Council on October 22, 1973, the Israelis continued to improve their position. In a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tacitly gave his approval to an Israeli operation after the cease-fire:

Dr. Kissinger: You won’t get violent protests from Washington if something happens during the night, while I’m flying. Nothing can happen in Washington until noon tomorrow.

The Prime Minister [Golda Meir]: If they don’t stop, we won’t.

Dr. Kissinger: Even if they do… Even if they do? Israel proceeded to encircle Egypt’s Third Army, cutting it off from its supply route.

Aftermath

The October War was not a complete failure politically. The war dealt a large blow to Israel’s invincibility, and it psychologically shook the people of Israel. Vis-à-vis Israel, Egypt was better off after the war than before: “It was proving to be what they had suspected all along: not the real battle, which might have yielded a lasting, honourable settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but a mise en scène for the Pax Americana which certainly would not.” Essentially, the October War strengthened Sadat’s position, but not to the extent that he had hoped. His Third Army, encircled by the Israelis in Sinai, only was able to access their supply line due to a special request from Kissinger to Israel. Sadat hardly envisioned that having his forces stranded in the desert at the mercy of Kissinger’s whim was the new position of strength that he had chosen to fight for.

Conclusion: Where is our breakfast?

Upon Nasser’s death, Sadat planned to “carry on as Vice-President until [he] had removed the ‘consequences of aggression,’ and then allow elections to be held.” At this time, the consequences of aggression he spoke of were the Israeli occupations in Sinai,
Gaza, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank—all the territories occupied by Israel upon its victory in the 1967 war. He characterized his decision to become President as something he was doing for his country—a service. Yet the on-and-off tradition of the autocratic Emergency Law has restrained real democracy to this day, even in the light of the Arab Spring. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has declared it shall repeal the law, but that remains to be seen. For while the original aggressor was Israel, that threat was neutralized by the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979.

Why, then, does Emergency Law persist? It persists because Sadat’s efforts resulted in the creation of a new aggressor, a new agitator of the Egyptian order, this time from the inside.

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Why, then, does Emergency Law persist? It persists because Sadat’s efforts resulted in the creation of a new aggressor, a new agitator of the Egyptian order, this time from the inside. At first these were groups that had been once considered on the fringe, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. He tried to play these groups against each other and the Nasserites to solidify his power. At the beginning of his term, he was truly fighting an internal conspiratorial tumor, the pro-Soviet thugs and incompetent Nasser loyalists. However, as he toiled in his foreign policy efforts, he began to practically everyone. And then he found himself dead.

The cry of the 1977 Bread Riots succinctly describes the plight we now face in describing Sadat’s strategic legacy:

Ya batal el-'ubur, fayn el-futur? Oh, hero of the crossing, where is our breakfast?52

A discussion of Sadat’s economic policies is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the chant that proved to be so effective in 1977 provokes a thought—Sadat achieved what he wanted in terms of foreign policy. He had the United States on his side. He excised the Soviet-style public sector domination. He brought peace between Egypt and Israel. But did Sadat get what he wanted for the reasons he wanted? Sadat believed in the existence of a peace dividend. He believed that with peace Egypt would be free to become a modern democracy. He was a believer in Egyptian exceptionalism and frequently reminded his guests about the age of his country, which he pegged at 7,000 years.

The peace treaty remains popular today in one certain sense. The Egyptian people are tired of war. They had been at war too many times, and the peace stopped the bloodshed of Egypt’s youth and the drainage of the economy. In spite of this, the peace dividend never materialized in the fashion Sadat hoped it would. It was not the peace that Egyptians opposed, but rather the price they paid.

The lower classes suffered the near ruin of their economic livelihood as Sadat bent down before the World Bank and the IMF and repealed sanctions on basic foodstuffs. He immediately reinstated and expanded food subsidies, leaving future President Mubarak with a $3.8 billion per year program by 1986.53 Investment after the Infitah opening concentrated on lucrative luxury markets that created a small wealthy class of Egyptians without substantially inducing any “trickle-down effect.”

On the regional front, he abandoned the Arab world and gave up all of his cards—peace and recognition—in order to conclude a peace treaty that left Jerusalem and the West Bank in Israeli hands. He acquiesced to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1981, dropping a demand that Israel sign it as well. Despite Egypt’s economic woes, he wanted the treaty so he could purchase two nuclear reactors.54 He suddenly looked a lot like his good friend, the Shah of Iran. Although the reality of the comparison is far more complex, both
attempted to pursue an aggressive pro-US agenda and an inhuman pace of modernization. What is more interesting, however, is that both Sadat and the Shah dubbed projects of theirs “revolutions”—revolutions that, contrary to the term, were meant to preserve the current leader.

General Shazly believes Sadat found himself on this path because of his tactical mistakes in the October War.\(^5\) Having compromised his hold on Sinai by attempting to charge forward and out of the defensive umbrella, he gave Israel a tactical advantage that created conditions on the ground unfavorable to the mammoth agenda he hoped to exploit from a political victory. Put short, the political yield from the maneuver was simply not enough. Biographers David Hirst and Irene Benson contend that Sadat took the easy way out, choosing to abandon the larger struggle of recovering all the occupied land in favor of an Egypt-only strategy. Supporters say this was symbolic of Sadat taking the lead, and detractors say that Sadat lost a game of chicken in order to fall into the American sphere of influence. Sadat became famous for his bravery, but the price he paid would imprison Egypt for another thirty years.

Anwar Sadat was many things to many people. He was Pat Robertson’s Prince of Peace and Time magazine’s Man of the Year. To biographer Joseph Finklestone, he was the “visionary who dared.” To Egyptians, he was the hero of the Crossing who could not bring them breakfast. His strategy of a limited war with Israel and realignment with the United States in order to divide its ability to support Israel began as strokes of genius—a complexity that Nasser never understood. However, his actions at the end of the October War ceased to be smart and turned defeatist.

Endnotes

4. Hirst and Benson, 233.
10. Ibid., 30-32.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 42.
19. In Search of Identity, 146.
20. Ibid., 147.
22. While Britain never supported the creation of the State of Israel today and enforced a U.N. arms embargo during its War of Independence, Zionists worked well to ensure that British policy would at least not prevent them from accomplishing their aims. Similarly, while the United States and Israel did not enjoy the same alliance in the 1950s as they do now, worries of expanding Soviet influence in the Middle East ensured that Israel would win in 1967 and 1973.
before the Yom Kippur War (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2010), 132.

27. Hirst and Beeson, 106.
28. Ibid.
33. Hirst and Beeson, 110.
34. Ibid., 109.
35. Ibid., 108, 112.
36. Ibid., 115.
37. Ibid., 118.
38. In Search of Identity, 244
42. Hirst and Beeson, 157-159.
43. In Search of Identity, 262.
44. Ibid., 265-267.
45. Hirst and Beeson, 159-163.
46. Ibid., 162.
48. Hirst and Beeson, 164.
49. Ibid., 167.
50. Ibid., 179
51. In Search of Identity, 204

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