Letter from the Editors

Journal of Undergraduate International Studies

Dear Reader,

It is with great pleasure that we present the Fall 2013 edition of the Journal of Undergraduate International Studies. Our editorial staff strived to locate the most compelling arguments among a plethora of impressive, sophisticated, and engaging submissions. Our final selection reflects both our goal to showcase the world’s premier undergraduate research and our mission to explore the depth and breadth of International Studies.

The production of this edition is the result of an exceptional editorial staff and the widespread support of the L&S Honors Program and the Coddon Family Foundation. Additionally, it is the fruit of over a decade’s worth of work from numerous UW students and faculty. To all those that have contributed to the journal both this year and in years past, we would like to offer our most sincere thanks.

The seven submissions we have selected include research from across the globe. Together, they comprise one of our most diverse editions to date. As you read, we hope you find that this semester’s edition of JUIS is as exceptional as we believe it is.

Alex Reed and Sophia Jones
Editors-In-Chief
Don’t Look Down. I saw a poster in a Norwegian train station that described Norway as “unspoiled, uncrowded, unequaled.” I could not agree more, especially after hiking two hours to arrive at this view of Preikestolen’s impressive 604 meter drop.
Alex Reed  
*Editor-in-Chief*

Alex, originally from New Jersey, is a junior pursuing a BBA in Finance and an honors degree in Political Science. His interests lie in international economics, international political economy, foreign direct investment, and economic development. In Spring 2014, he will have to say goodbye to Madison (and JUIS) before he travels to Denmark to study at Copenhagen Business School. His favorite activities include golfing, sailing, and watching Badger football.

Sophia Jones  
*Editor-in-Chief*

Sophia Jones is a senior completing her undergraduate degree in Communication Arts and Art History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where she will graduate in 2014. She works at WSUM, the local student radio station as their Website and Social Media Director and is the Gallery Coordinator for the Overture Center for the Arts. In her spare time in Madison, she co-hosts the weekly radio show El Monde E Musiv, a world music program on WSUM 91.7 FM Madison Student Radio. Outside of school, she enjoys practicing yoga, reading, and cooking.

Samantha Jorgensen  
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Samantha is a junior majoring in Political Science with a focus in international relations and global security. Her main area of interest is Latin America, especially Brazil, and she is planning on studying abroad there next year. She also studies Portuguese and hopes to one day find a career where she can utilize the language. In her free time she enjoys baking, reading, and attending Badger football games.

David Glickstein  
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David is a senior majoring in Political Science, Music Performance, and Latin. Within political science, he has a particular fascination with nuclear policy, terrorism, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Upon graduation, he hopes to continue his studies on these topics. Besides having a passion for politics and international affairs, he is an advocate for classical music and frequently attends the symphony and other concerts.

Sarah Kvithyll  
*Editor*

Sarah is a senior majoring in Political Science with a certificate in African Studies. She has spent time studying conflict resolution and democratization in Israel and South Africa, respectively. After she graduates in May 2014, she would like to move to Washington DC to work with democratizing countries to improve the quality of their elections and reduce corruption within their governments. In her free time, she enjoys listening to good music and watching movies.

Grace Leppanen  
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Grace is a sophomore and has not decided on a major. She plans to attend law school.

Daniel Thomas  
*Editor*

Daniel, a sophomore from Denver, Colorado, is pursuing a degree in International Studies, with a focus on global security. Interested in Russian culture and politics, he will spend the spring semester interning at the United States Embassy in Moscow, Russia. In his free time, he enjoys skiing, cycling, and coaching debate.

Elizabeth Stephens  
*Editor*

Elizabeth Stephens is a freshman,
undecided in her major. She is most interested in working in the field of journalism or studying creative writing or English. Outside of school she enjoys running, writing, and spending time with family and friends. She hopes to study abroad in England as a junior or senior.

**Emily Panken**  
*Editor*

Emily, a freshman from White Plains, New York is undecided in her major. Her main interests include journalism and international relations with a concentration in Middle-Eastern affairs. She hopes to study abroad in Israel her junior year and further explore the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and peace process. Upon graduation she would love to work at a news station either as a foreign news correspondent or a producer of a news show.

**Hannah Kitslaar**  
*Editor*

Hannah is a freshman from Green Bay, Wisconsin, pursuing majors in International Studies with a focus in global security, legal studies, and Russian. She will begin the Russian Flagship Program at the start of the Spring 2014 semester. In coherence with the program, she will spend six weeks studying at Lomonosov Moscow State University in the summer of 2015 as a prerequisite to the capstone academic year of study at St. Petersburg State University. An enthusiast of foreign languages and national security, she hopes to pursue a career in the Intelligence Community after graduation. Outside of class she enjoys exploring all that the city of Madison has to offer.

**Ainsley Nelson**  
*Editor*

Ainsley is a freshman at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and has not yet decided on her major. She is interested in international studies and learning foreign languages. Her free time is spent hanging out with friends, reading, dancing, eating, or listening to music. She is from Door County, Wisconsin and spends her summers working in area restaurants.

**Yi Jiang**  
*Editor, Layout Designer*

Yi is a freshman majoring in Political Science, focusing on international relations, economics, and history, with particular interest in international development concerning global poverty and health inequity, specifically in Asia. She is also studying French and Mandarin Chinese. When she has spare time, she enjoys creative writing, painting, reading, wandering outside, and pursuing graphic design. In the future she plans on attending graduate school and working to develop sustainable solutions to rural poverty.
## Table of Contents

**pages 8-18**  
by **Brian Yost**

**pages 19-30**  
2. Delegation from Regional to Global: ASEAN and the UN in Conflict Intervention  
by **Audrye Wong**

**pages 31-41**  
3. Turkey and the Post-Cold War Politics of Energy  
by **Michael Goldstein**

**pages 42-51**  
4. The February 28 Incident: An Economic Perspective on the Decolonization of Taiwan  
by **James Meresman**

**pages 52-55**  
5. Undifferentiated Citizenship for All, and All For One United India  
by **Nina Assadi**

**pages 56-71**  
6. Targeting Different Root Causes: An Analysis of Policies Curbing Witchcraft Accusations in Ghana  
by **Dorien Venhoeven**

**pages 72-79**  
7. The Bushehr Delays: Did the Iranians Abandon Their Financial Obligations?  
by **Matthew Michaelides**
The prevailing literature on stateless organizations often attributes rebel group formation and recruitment to “greed or “grievance,” while attributing the terrorism to relative deprivation or a “culture of violence.” By analyzing Lashkar-e-Taiba (Lashkar), a group that fails to fit exclusively into the “rebel group” or “terrorist group” taxonomy, this paper posits hypotheses on the causal mechanism of Lashkar recruitment. This paper utilizes empirical evidence on Lashkar militants to argue the centrality of public goods provision and the legitimacy spillover in recruitment. Furthermore, it argues that these hypotheses can be validly applied to a geopolitically significant subset of other terrorist groups.

The popular perception that the collapse of the Soviet Union marked an explosion of violence by non-state actors, specifically insurgent and terrorist organizations, initiated considerable academic interest in these conflicts and their participants. Empirical analysis has generated many possible theories explaining why individuals take up arms against powerful and weak states alike. Out of conflicting accounts of violence arises the greed-grievance debate, whether grievances arising from injustices perpetrated by the state induce the formation of rebel groups and motivate participation within them or whether the many material opportunities civil wars bring attract less-scrupulous groups and participants.1 While applicable to insurrections seizing territory, recruiting members, and fighting state forces in their respective countries, the vast majority of these theories fail to apply to insurgent groups operating in and recruiting out of one state, while engaging in irregular warfare and terrorist attacks in another. Lashkar-e-Taiba (Lashkar), a Pakistani militant group fighting for the secession of Indian Kashmir and Jammu, exemplifies this type of categorically ambiguous group. Exhibiting many of the characteristics of both insurgent and terrorist groups, Lashkar fails to neatly fit into the prevailing theoretical frameworks of either insurgent or terrorist recruitment.

This paper attempts to rectify this gap in the literature by examining the institutions and membership of Lashkar, utilizing recent empirical data gathered on more than 900 Lashkar militants.2 Drawing upon these empirics this paper both challenges the applicability of prevailing theories of terrorist recruitment, and illustrates the geographic and educational similarity

Brian Yost. Brian Yost is a senior at Northwestern University studying Political Science, Economics, and International Studies with a concentration in Issues in International Security. This paper was written in Professor Ana Arjona’s Violent Rebels seminar and he would like to thank her for her support and guidance.
among Lashkar’s membership. Lashkar’s institutions and provision of public goods act as key causal factors in recruitment. The first section sets forth some basic definitions relevant to the discussion of terrorism and insurgency, it then details the background of Lashkar. Introduced in the second section is descriptive statistics of Lashkar recruitment that refute much of the current literature on terrorist recruitment. The third section, argues that Lashkar’s successful creation of civil society institutions and provision of public goods allows for the recruitment of Pakistanis into the group. The fourth section provides some empirics that support my theory of Lashkar recruitment and details the limitations of this theory and of the empirical evidence. The fifth section concludes by illustrating the relevance of this analysis to the study of terrorist and rebel group recruitment.

I. Definitions and the Background of Lashkar-e-Taiba

To a certain extent, categorizing the militant nature of Lashkar becomes more a semantic question of definitions than a substantive debate. The similar tactics, motivations, and structures of many insurgent and terrorist groups, coupled with media narratives that apply labels of terrorism more for their connation rather than their academic accuracy, make the categorization of Lashkar complicated. John Lynn in *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*, argues terrorism and insurgency exist on the same progression of violence and organization, and the level of material and human resources available to the group determines the nature of its violence and thus its classification.3 4

This paper focuses on the definition of insurgency from James Fearon and David Laitin’s “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”; “insurgency is a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from a rural base area.”5 Other accounts of insurgency stress the importance of rebel governance, with Zachariah Mampilly arguing the centrality of rebels as counterstate sovereigns6 and Ana Arjona emphasizing the role of rebel institutions in civil war.7 Bruce Hoffman8 in *Inside Terrorism*, defines terrorism as the “deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.” Lynn builds upon this definition to include the inducement of outrage in the target audience as an additional goal of terrorism.9 Alexander Lee characterizes terrorist organizations as engaging in violence, which prioritizes the inducing of a psychological effect over an immediate military gain.10 Thus the literature primarily differentiates insurgent and terrorist groups by examining the goal-orientation of the group’s violence. Synthesizing these definitions classifies a terrorist group as one engaging in violence for the purpose of political change through the mechanism of inducing psychological effect, either fear or outrage, not through tactical military gain. The background and methods of Lashkar will illustrate how placing Lashkar into such neatly delineated categories proves challenging.

Following the instigation of the most recent face of the Kashmir conflict by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in 1989, Markaz Daawat wal Irshad, an organization led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and propagating scriptualist Sunni Islam, established Lashkar as its militant wing to engage Indian security forces in Kashmir. Four Lashkar military compounds train recruits in guerrilla warfare and combat tactics, signaling the insurgent and terrorist nature of the organization’s strategy for eliminating the Indian military presence in Kashmir.11 Tariq Ali argues the Pakistani Army provided critical support in the founding of Lashkar, to the extent that a counterfactual absence of Pakistani state patronage would have precluded the establishment of the organization.12 Additionally, Ashley Tellis in “The Menace that is Lashkar-e-Taiba” argues that even following the initiation of the US War on Terror in 2001, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence has maintained extensive, though increasingly clandestine, support of Lashkar in the form of safe havens, training, equipment, and, most critically, funding. He also asserts the
external patronage of Lashkar goes far beyond that of the Pakistani Army and ISI; Tellis argues Lashkar raises funds from businesses, transnational organized crime groups, and Islamic NGOs and charities. Stephen Tankel asserts Lashkar currently derives much of its funding from the remittances of the Pakistani diaspora and wealthy Salafists in the Persian Gulf. Leaked US diplomatic cables offer support to these arguments; Declan Welsh notes Saudi front companies and charitable networks have laundered substantial funds to Lashkar, and Saudi donors were the “most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide.” These transnational actors may be playing a growing role in funding Lashkar; Tankel argues the initiation of the U.S. War on Terror in 2002 has severely constrained Pakistan’s ability and resolve to support terrorist organizations, forcing Lashkar to seek funding elsewhere. 

This substantial patronage, coupled with Lashkar’s strict hierarchical leadership and militaristic discipline and precision, has propelled Lashkar to the zenith of Kashmir militancy. Often characterized as one of the most powerful militant groups in South Asia, Lashkar has carried out terrorist attacks and paramilitary raids on Indian military personnel and civilians alike. Though these attacks had historically been confined to Indian Kashmir and Jammu, Lashkar has more recently stepped up attacks in major Indian cities, including the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks where 10 Lashkar gunmen killed more than 160 civilians and raised tensions between India and Pakistan to alarming levels. Lashkar more commonly engages in guerilla attacks against Indian security forces in Kashmir and indiscriminate violence against non-Muslims in Kashmir. Lashkar, by massacring Hindu and Sikh villagers in remote hill villages and executing high-profile and well-planned attacks on military bases and convoys, maximizes the publicity of its attacks and generates a climate of fear within Kashmir and Jammu. By creating a climate of fear and insecurity, while simultaneously raising the costs of Indian governance, Lashkar is attempting to remove the Indian military and civilian presence in Kashmir and Jammu and facilitate the Pakistani annexation of the region. This strategy illustrates the difficulty in classifying Lashkar as an organization; Lashkar’s strategy includes both the use of terrorism: inducing political change by mechanisms of fear or outrage, and insurgent tactics: guerilla warfare to make the Indian presence in Kashmir too costly to maintain. Lashkar as an organization is not entirely terrorist or insurgent and thereby necessitates further study to understand its recruitment and the recruitment of similar groups.

II. Literature on Terrorist Recruitment

The material weakness of terrorist and insurgent groups and their susceptibility to defection makes the nature and quality of membership critical. This centrality of membership and recruitment to violent conflict makes the study of recruitment particularly salient in understanding violent groups and understanding the factors that predict conflict to ultimately prevent further bloodshed. This paper aims to show that institutions and networks of Lashkar in Pakistan have a causal effect on recruitment. Figures 1, 2, and 3 provide data on the education, home provinces, and recruitment channels of 900 Lashkar militants. Before incorporating these descriptive statistics into this analysis, outlined below are common hypotheses on terrorist and rebel recruitment.

Scholars often trace the origins of terrorist groups and subsequently their recruitment to the psychological effect of relative deprivation. Caroline Ziemke in The Same Light as Slavery: Building a Global Antiterrorist Consensus argues globalization opens up much of the world’s populace to images of wealth and prosperity that these people will never experience. She argues many of these individuals perceive themselves as oppressed, and combatting this “culture of violence” in Pakistan will take defining the national role of Islam and creating a unifying national vision through this definition.

The literature also focuses on the opportunity costs of participation, arguing participants join based on a rational assessment of incentives of joining and opportunity costs of engaging in insurgent or terrorist violence. Concordantly, recruitment can be predicted by individuals with reduced opportunity costs relative to others who engage in violence as a means of rent-seeking. Eleonora Nilleson and Philip Verwimp argue reduced opportunity costs of violence by means
of reduced crop output increases rebel recruitment.²³

Lee synthesizes elements from the two previous frameworks, arguing that there exists a set socioeconomic threshold, below which member’s wealth and education preclude the necessary level of education to engage in political activism or violence. Above this threshold, Lee argues, individuals will weigh the opportunity costs of engaging in political violence and ultimately those who experience economic deprivation relative to the other members of this informed group will engage in political violence or terrorism.²⁴

Finally, media outlets and certain authors often propagate the hypothesis that there exists a link between Islam and terrorism, thus implying that an individual’s religiosity or lack thereof causally influences their participation in a terrorist group. Historian Bernard Lewis, in linking the historical role of Islam and Islamic fundamentalism to modern Islamic terrorism lends credence to hypotheses that religious radicalization induces participation in terrorism.²⁵ Appeals to religion would therefore be effective in recruitment and more religious individuals would have a significantly higher likelihood of joining Islamic terrorist groups.²

Contrasting Descriptive Statistics

These four theories of terrorist and rebel recruitment fail to accurately explain participation in Lashkar. Though these arguments offer forth many useful methods of conceiving terrorism, they do not match the empirics of Lashkar recruitment and therefore lose some external validity as theories applicable to the broad spectrum of terrorist and rebel recruitment. These empirics disprove these theories as externally valid in regards to Lashkar and terrorist groups with a symbiotic or complementary relationship with their host state; though this paper characterizes Lashkar as a terrorist group, Lashkar does exhibit many of the traits of both an insurgent group and a terrorist group, and thus these authors would argue against the applicability of their frameworks to Lashkar, not the invalidity of their theories. These empirics demonstrate these theories must be further developed to encompass the vast majority of cases they wish to explain.

A comparison of figure 1 and statistics on the education levels of Pakistani males challenge the validity of Ziemke’s and opportunity cost arguments; the members of Lashkar possess a significantly higher level of secular education than the Pakistani male population on average.²⁷ Were relative deprivation a compelling theory of terrorist recruitment, in this case why would the less educated members of Pakistani society, who have seen fewer of the fruits of globalization, take up arms. Relative deprivation also fails to explain the findings of figure 2; the vast majority of Lashkar fighters are from the Punjab region of Pakistan, not from Indian Kashmir. If individuals experienced relative deprivation, they would often lash out at those they deem culpable of the deprivation. This theory could fit with fighters from Indian-Kashmir rebelling based on deprivation-based grievances, but it fails to explain the geographic trends of Lashkar membership. Ziemke argues Pakistan’s (and therefore Lashkar’s) “culture of violence can be diminished by defining the national role of Islam;”²⁸ ironically, it is one of the more compelling national Islamic visions, Lashkar’s goal of a greater Islamic Pakistan containing Kashmir and
Jammu, that fuels much of the violence in the region. The arguments focused on the opportunity costs of participants similarly fail to explain the empirics; the cadres of Lashkar have achieved higher levels of education than the greater Pakistani male population. This higher level of education equates to higher opportunity costs associated with joining a terrorist or insurgent group. Having demonstrated that the membership of Lashkar have higher opportunity coast than the average noncombatant, opportunity cost-based theories of recruitment cannot explain the empirics of Lashkar.

Lee presents a more complex theory of terrorist recruitment, but his postulation of a socioeconomic framework derived from an informational asymmetry between social classes does not reflect the empirics of Pakistani society and likely much of the globalized world. The informational asymmetries that Lee asserts prevent much of a society from engaging in political activism and violence exist only as an anachronism of Lee’s case study. Lee tests his hypotheses with data from early nineteenth century Bengal, a case not representative of the effects of modern globalization and technology on communication and propaganda. In the Pakistani case, Tankel argues the government has exposed Pakistani youths to intense propaganda about the Kashmir issue and militarism. The Pakistani government saturates the country’s television stations with images of Indian soldiers assaulting Kashmiri citizens and disseminates stories of the murder, rape, and immolation of Kashmiris by Indians. Recent polls support this notion, noting that 73 percent of Pakistan believes the Kashmir situation remains a problem and 79 percent view the Pakistani Army as positively influencing the country. We can assume the great majority, if not the entirety, of the Pakistani population possess the information necessary to engage in political activism or terrorism. The lack of an informational asymmetry reduces Lee’s argument to a basic opportunity cost model of terrorist recruitment, one which the empirics of Lashkar membership refute.

Finally, it is thought that religiosity and Islamic fundamentalism predict participation in Islamic terror groups. Again, what is an intuitively compelling theory does not stand up to additional scrutiny with Lashkar empirics. One would expect Lashkar recruits to be more religious than the general populace and, by using religious education as a proxy for religiosity, the empirics challenge this hypothesis. Lashkar recruits do not exhibit high levels of formal religious training relative to other Pakistanis. Fewer than 5 percent of Lashkar cadres have attained a sanad ("a formal certificate signifying
completion of a defined religious curriculum”) and each had only spent fewer than three years at a madrasa, on average. Though religious education cannot irreproachably proxy for religious fundamentalism, these empirics lead one to believe the prediction of Lashkar recruitment requires more than hypotheses of levels of religiosity and religious fundamentalism.

III. A Theory of Lashkar Recruitment

This article argues individual interaction with Lashkar through exposure to public goods provided by the group increases the likelihood of an individual’s participation in Lashkar. Interaction with the group via its institutions proves to be central; Lashkar recruits by means of its institutions and pre-existing social networks, enhanced by legitimacy gained through the provision of public goods. Counterintuitively, this argument discounts the role of: individual ideology, support for Kashmiri liberation, opportunity costs, and selective incentives for joining the group. Building on the theoretical framework of Arjona, who argues the nature of rebel governance in an area predicts recruitment levels, differences in Lashkar’s situation from a classic insurgency necessitate a different approach and therefore a different theory of recruitment. Lashkar acts within the boundaries of a sovereign state and does not seek to supplant the institutions of the state; rather, it provides supplementary public goods in areas of inadequate or nonexistent state provision of public goods. Additionally, Lashkar coopts or mimics many of the networks used by the state in military recruitment; I assert that Lashkar membership more resembles the make-up of the Pakistani army than it does a group of those aggrieved by the government. In the following section, I will illustrate the centrality of public goods provision and social networks with empirics from Lashkar recruitment and literature describing Lashkar institutions and organization in Pakistan.

Provision of Public Goods

Lashkar engages in a variety of social and political activities beyond those directly related to execution of terrorist and guerilla attacks in Kashmir, Jammu and greater India. Lashkar, including its umbrella organization MDI, has developed institutions in Pakistan devoted to the provision of the public goods the state fails to adequately supply. The al-Dawa Medical Mission, an organization under the direct hierarchical control of Saeed, the MDI, and Lashkar, has provided medication, check-ups and, in many cases, medical camps and hospitals in areas of Pakistan in severe need of health services. Specific to rural areas, where the absence of the state can be felt more saliently, Lashkar operates ambulance services, mobile clinics, and blood banks. Unlike many major Islamic organizations associated with terrorism, MDI, and by transitivity Lashkar, operate both religious and secular schools; by 2001, MDI’s school system consisted of 127 schools educating more than 15,000 students. These schools, currently operating during a time of systemic decline in Pakistani public education, propagate the Lashkar interpretation of Jihad and the Kashmir conflict in a secular setting.

The provision of public goods induces participation in Lashkar through multiple, complementary mechanisms. Though the schools primarily attempt to prepare their students to become productive members of Pakistani society, the intense propaganda to which MDI schools expose their students shapes their view of the Kashmir conflict and of the national vision of Pakistan. This process, independent of religious education or radicalization, may act as a formative experience in these individuals’ lives and cause participation in Lashkar; anecdotally, this hypothesis is in line with the secondary intent of the MDI school system. Saeed Athar, Lashkar’s provincial chief of Balochistan, illustrates this intent, arguing “Children are like clean blackboards – whatever you write will leave a mark on them forever.” From the above mechanism, I provide my first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: If an individual has received secular education from an MDI or Lashkar-sponsored school, he will have a higher chance of participating in Lashkar terrorism.

The provision of public goods also generates a sense of legitimacy surrounding Lashkar and concurrently spurs recruitment. In developing health and education services, Lashkar provides the technical services that constitute part of the
organizations necessary to govern a civilian populace. In reference to the governance structure of territorial insurgent groups, Mampily classifies these technical services as a causal factor in the formation of counterstate sovereignty. Lashkar’s symbiotic relationship with the state precludes any formation of a counterstate, but the mechanisms involved in this formation are still at work; in the light of inadequate Pakistani state provision of public goods, the technical services legitimate Lashkar as an organization and, through this, legitimate Lashkar’s use of force to annex Pakistan, an aspect of legitimacy reserved for sovereign states. If individuals come to view Lashkar as a legitimate actor within the state, garnering what could be perceived as a degree of sovereignty or authority, these individuals will perceive Lashkar’s militant activities as legitimate, by the mechanism legitimacy spillover. In this well-documented psychological phenomenon, an individual’s beliefs of legitimacy, concerning one section of an organization “spillover,” causes the individual to view other sections of the organization as legitimate. From this concept, stems a second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: If an individual or his family has benefitted from Lashkar or MDI’s provision of public goods, he will be more likely to participate in Lashkar terrorism.

Additionally, because legitimacy spillover positions the militant actions of and membership in Lashkar as legitimate as state military actions and service, the same mechanisms that contribute to military recruitment will contribute to Lashkar recruitment. These include areas of heavy military recruitment and propaganda as well as areas with historically high levels of military service. This paper operationalize these mechanisms as:

Hypothesis 3a: If an individual lives in an area with high military recruitment, he will be more likely to participate in Lashkar terrorism.

Hypothesis 3b: If an individual has friends or family members who serve or have served in the military, he will be more likely to participate in Lashkar terrorism.

Finally following the aforementioned reasoning, comes the following intuitive hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: If an individual has friends or family who participate in Lashkar, he will be more likely to participate in Lashkar terrorism.

IV. Applying Empirical Evidence

Recent breakthroughs in compiling the biographies of Lashkar cadres have allowed for unprecedented analysis into the background and characteristics of those who choose to engage in Lashkar terrorism. This empirical evidence, in its limited capacity, supports the hypotheses of the proposed theory. Figure 2 illustrates the geographic commonalties of the Lashkar cadres; the vast majority of Lashkar recruits hail not from Kashmir or Jammu, but rather from the Punjab region of Pakistan. Congruent to these hypotheses, Lashkar and MDI operate the majority of their offices and institutions in the Punjab region. The recent study by the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point concurs, noting that Lashkar has developed infrastructure in Punjab at higher levels than any other region in Pakistan. The saturation of Lashkar institutions in Punjab increases the likelihood relative to other regions that its inhabitants have attended Lashkar and MDI-affiliated schools and benefitted.

![Nonreligious Educational Attainment Levels of LeT Militants (n=154)](image-url)

FIGURE 3.
from Lashkar and MDI’s provision of public goods. This relationship tentatively supports hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2.

Furthermore, Mariam Abou Zahab argues the sociological profile of Lashkar recruits bare a remarkable similarity to those of non-commissioned officers in the Pakistani Army. The areas of high recruitment by the Pakistani Army also share considerable overlap by the areas from which Lashkar recruits many of its membership. These congruencies support hypothesis 3a and hypothesis 3b, with the “dynamics of the Indo-Pakistan security competition” that Christine Fair argues contributes to Lashkar recruitment also contributing to Army recruitment, making the mechanism of recruitment for both similar.

Finally, figure 3 illustrates the feasibility of hypothesis 4, showing that 25 percent of Lashkar members in this sample were recruited by family members or friends. Though this relationship seems obvious, it is important to note the role of social networks in recruitment. Furthermore, this relationship shows the centrality of personal relationships in terrorist recruitment.

Caveats and Limitations

This theoretical framework is not without its caveats, the primary one being the sample of empirical evidence. Rassler et al compiled this data from the biographies of 900 Lashkar militants translated from Urdu-language publications published by Lashkar and its associated organizations; one cannot assume this sample is representative of Lashkar as a whole. Without random sampling and regression analysis of the Pakistani population and the members of Lashkar, no conclusive evidence supporting or refuting this argument exists. This data provides a useful starting point for the crafting of a framework to be tested later, and for challenging the previous theories of Lashkar and terrorist recruitment. The second major caveat concerns possibility of bias in the sample; Rassler et al compiled these biographies from publications produced and disseminated by Lashkar; thus, there exists the possibility that Lashkar manipulated the biographies for its own purposes. The direction of this bias would be the opposite of what has been observed; had Lashkar manipulated these biographies, the organization would have emphasized the role of Kashmir nationals in the struggle. Publishing that a higher percentage of the Lashkar fighters hailed from Kashmir would support the group’s central claim that Kashmiris want to be liberated from India and absorbed into a greater Pakistan. The study observes little, if no, bias in the direction that one would assume it to be. Thus research incorporating the geographical empirics of this study can disregard the possibility of systematic bias in this characteristic of the fighters.

A possible limitation of this theory is the narrow scope to which the theory may apply. The relationship of Lashkar to the Pakistani state, the organization’s extensive social institutions, and Lashkar’s use of terrorist and insurgent tactics positions Lashkar as a special case of terrorism and therefore terrorist recruitment. Though the theory here developed to explain the recruitment of Lashkar cannot be generalized to the vast spectrum of terrorist organizations that operate throughout the world, this theory can be applied to a small, yet geopolitically significant, subset of terrorist groups. Terrorist organizations that provide substantial public goods to their host societies while maintaining a symbiotic or, at the very least, amicable relationship with their host states have emerged as a very serious international problem. Eli Berman and David Laitin argue the provision of public goods allows religious terrorist organizations to prevent defection and therefore maximize the lethality of the group’s actions. Berman and Laitin highlight the provision of public goods by Hamas, the Taliban, and Hezbollah, organizations that share many characteristics with Lashkar in terms of institutional development and relationships to their host states. In arguing that terrorist organizations follow a club framework, they assert that the sacrifices these groups require to attain the club goods fundamentally defines the membership (and therefore the recruitment) of the organization. Berman and Laitin’s theory does not, however, account for situations where the attainability of goods does not depend on membership in the club; their theory does not explain why Pakistanis join Lashkar when they benefit from Lashkar public goods, regardless of their status in the “club.” This paper’s theory can be applied to groups whose provision of goods does
not follow the “club model,” making the implications of the theory critical to understanding the recruitment within this growing category of institutionally active terrorist organizations.

V. Conclusion

The empirical evidence from the Lashkar case illustrates the role of public goods provision in terrorist recruitment. Though developed with Lashkar as its ideal-type, this theory explains the recruitment patterns of other terrorist groups with substantial public goods provision and amicable relationships with their host states. The education levels, geographic concentration, and sociological similarity of Lashkar militants to military officers support the argument that Lashkar’s provision of public goods facilitates its recruitment through direct and indirect mechanisms. Direct methods include the role of formative education on shaping one’s views of Lashkar terrorism. Examination of the indirect mechanisms of Lashkar’s public goods provision challenges the prevailing assumption that the psychological phenomenon of relative deprivation motivates terrorism, and supports increased study into the role of legitimacy spillover in the context of terrorist organizations. The tentative support of the theory outlined in section 3 provides motivation for further study of the role of public goods in terrorist recruitment, specifically in the Lashkar context. Theories of recruitment based on relative deprivation, opportunity costs, socioeconomic thresholds, and religious fundamentalism do not predict terrorism in the Lashkar context and cannot be applied to many terrorist organizations. The provision of public goods by terrorist organizations does provide multiple empirically supported mechanisms for terrorist recruitment, with those directly benefiting from the public goods and those experiencing legitimacy spillover more likely to participate in terrorism. These results argue that, in reference to organizations that provide public goods and operate in external military conflicts, the proximity and intensity of public goods, social institutions, and military recruitment predict participation in terrorist organizations. This theory provides an array of implications for further research and policy-making, most notably supporting the argument that counterterrorism requires strengthening and legitimating weak states, while competing with terrorist organizations in providing much-needed public goods to local populations. 

Endnotes


4. Lynn argues that terrorism exists as a fourth stage, preceding guerrilla, mobile, and positional warfare on the three staged framework of revolutionary violence originally developed by Mao Zedong.


39. Ibid.


42. The classical formulation of state sovereignty is that of Max Weber: “[t]he state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. See Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited by Hans Heinrich Gerth and Charles Wright Mills (Abingdon: Routledge, 1948), 78.


51. Ibid.


53. Ibid.


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Buying Legitimacy: Public Goods, Legitimacy Spillover, and the Recruitment of Lashkar-e-Taiba / Brian Yost


Delegation from Regional to Global:  
**ASEAN and the UN in Conflict Intervention**

by Audrye Wong

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is often derided as a toothless talk shop incapable of managing regional conflicts, but interventions in Cambodia and East Timor suggest that ASEAN has been able to demand international action and use the UN to further its own interests. When limited by resources or divided by heterogeneous interests, ASEAN states have also directly delegated conflict intervention through the United Nations (UN). At the same time, ASEAN has attempted to minimize loss of control by leveraging the General Assembly as an institutional check and balance. While the UN remains dominant, regional organizations pursue complementary relationships and delegation can occur in both directions.

**Introduction**

As attention turns to regional organizations as an alternative mechanism of dealing with specific conflicts and issues, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is often derided as unable to effectively manage conflicts in its own backyard, in contrast to organizations such as the African Union (AU), which, together with the UN, recently sent peacekeeping troops to Darfur. A scholarly consensus has attributed such inaction to the colonial past of Southeast Asian member states, the resultant fundamental principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, as well as the “ASEAN Way” of consensus based decision making. For example, although Asia accounted for 40 percent of armed conflict in the period 1990-2005, multilateral peacekeeping operations in the region constituted just 13 percent (the corresponding figures for Europe were 8 percent and 41 percent respectively).¹

Indeed, post-Cold War multilateral peacekeeping operations in Southeast Asia have been rare, essentially limited to Cambodia in the early 1990s and East Timor since 1999. At the same time, ASEAN as a regional organization acted differently in each case. It actively lobbied on Cambodia through the UN and formulated a peace process, but declined the opportunity for a collective initiative against the atrocities in East Timor, leaving Australia to take the lead. How then can one explain the dynamic between the UN and regional organizations such as ASEAN in conflict intervention – under what conditions do they work together, what form does collaboration take, and when does a regional organization seek UN involvement? How much initiative does a regional organization have as an actor, versus as a forum, or resource?

Applying the theoretical framework of principal-agent theory, when and why would ASEAN delegate regional conflict management to the UN, and under what circumstances might states delegate to ASEAN versus the UN?

This paper seeks to go beyond the usual region-based generalizations to develop a more nuanced perspective of the relationships between international and regional organizations in issues of conflict management and peacekeeping.

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While there has been considerable analysis of regional actors directly engaged in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, such as the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the nature of ASEAN involvement remains understudied. Although ASEAN has its own regional peacekeeping force, it remains important to understand other actors, to formulate an international peacekeeping operation. There has also been little explicit comparison of Cambodia and East Timor cases. In place has been the prime upholder of non-enforcement action shall be taken “without the authorization of the Security Council” (although regional organizations are encouraged to contribute to the “pacific settlement of disputes”); and (iii) the Security Council must “at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies.”

Thus, these legal provisions emphasize the centrality of the UN and the Security Council in determining and responding to threats to international peace and security, as laid out in Chapter VII.

The 1992 Agenda for Peace document, written under then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, acknowledged the potential of regional organizations in contributing to conflict management and peacekeeping that could “not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.” Although, he reiterated that the “primacy of the UN…must be respected,” thus maintaining a top-down delegation of conflict management tasks by the UN to regional organizations.

To reduce agent slack, he outlined key principles of UN-regional cooperation in his 1995 Supplement as a rules-based (although admittedly vague) form of delegation, including the need for agreed mechanisms for consultation and a clearly defined division of labor. Areas of coordination would range from diplomatic consultations to mutual operational support and deployment of field missions. Alternatively, global-regional cooperation could also be based on horizontal partnership. This model recognizes that regional organizations can acquire greater agency as an actor in the international arena, complementing the role of the UN in maintaining international peace and security. Some have further suggested that the subordination of regional organizations to the UN is becoming outdated in the face of an emerging “regional multilateralism.”

Amidst an increasingly post-Westphalian logic that moves toward the pooling of sovereignties, “regions” become the most relevant actors, obtaining legitimacy and authority as Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum note from “below and within” states and civil societies. Thus, regions or regional organizations could also act as a principal: delegating tasks to their appointed agent, the UN. Although this reverses the conventional model of interaction, this paper argues that ASEAN has managed to play the role of the principal, albeit with varying degrees of success.

Why might regional institutions seek to cooperate with or delegate tasks to their international counterparts? The most obvious motivations are the gains from specialization and division of labor; conflict management or intervention via a peacekeeping force is likely to incur high costs that member states are unwilling to bear, and delegation to the UN provides needed resources and expertise. Scholars have also proposed that delegation by state actors to an international organization (IO) can bring
several benefits, including: managing policy externalities through information provision and lowered transaction costs, enabling collective decision-making via an agenda-setting IO, resolving disputes through arbitration, enhancing the credibility of long-term policies, and creating a policy bias effect that “locks in” preferred domestic agendas through an international-level agreement. However, in the presence of heterogeneous preferences, or great power states, delegation to a third-party agent becomes less likely. Using this broad framework of principal-agent theory, this paper will analyze the dynamics of ASEAN-UN collaboration in the cases of Cambodia and East Timor and the nature of their roles as principal and agent.

Cambodia: An Activist ASEAN

The Cambodian conflict was sparked when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, overthrowing Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime and installing a new Hanoi-backed government: the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). From the start, ASEAN had vocally and forcefully opposed Vietnam’s invasion as a violation of Cambodia’s sovereignty and self-determination. A statement issued in January 1979 during the Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia and requested the UN Security Council to take immediate steps to end the conflict. Subsequent joint statements and communiqués into the 1980s continued to reiterate the Cambodian people’s right to self-determination and demand the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. This swift response was all the more remarkable given the lack of any formal conflict prevention, containment, or resolution roles delineated by the still-embryonic association, particularly toward non-member states. ASEAN states shared fears of an expansionist Soviet-backed Vietnam that could spread the communist threat to the region. Despite (or perhaps because of) the lack of a well-institutionalized secretariat, their convergent interests mobilized a united response.

Given the context of the Cold War, the UN Security Council predictably met with stalemate over any response. The Soviet Union vetoed resolutions against its Vietnamese ally, while China continued to support the previous Khmer Rouge regime and engaged in border conflicts with Vietnam. As the issue moved to the UN General Assembly, ASEAN stepped in as the leading actor, successfully shaping the international community’s view of and response to the Cambodian conflict (on ASEAN’s desired terms). In November 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted an ASEAN draft resolution that had been tabled by the Security Council in January, as well as another ASEAN-sponsored resolution in October 1980 calling for an international conference on the Cambodian issue. The declaration issued at this ASEAN-initiated, UN-sponsored International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK), which took place in July 1981, was then endorsed by the UN and, as stated by Muthiah Alagappa, constituted “the basis for international consideration of the conflict.”

Why did ASEAN turn to the UN? Implementing a comprehensive peace settlement as it envisioned was well beyond ASEAN’s limited capabilities – after all, the organization was barely a decade old. Lacking a collective self-defense arrangement as well as adequate military capabilities to respond to Vietnamese aggression (including incursions into Thai territory), collective diplomacy and ultimately intervention through the UN was the best way for ASEAN member-states to address the Cambodian issue. The UN umbrella would provide much-needed expertise and resources for peacekeeping as well as electoral supervision. Indeed, from February 1992 to September 1993, the UN Transitional Administration of Cambodia (UNTAC) deployed 22,000 personnel at a cost of over $1.5 billion, and ASEAN member-states were “relieved” to rely on UN assistance. ASEAN’s diplomatic lobbying provided valuable information to other actors, got the General Assembly to adopt sponsored resolutions, and the ICK declaration provided an institutionalized global mechanism to monitor compliance at lower transaction costs. For over a decade, the UN served as an important forum for consultations on the Cambodian conflict; “shuttle diplomacy” during intra-ASEAN meetings as well as with extra-regional actors generated critical momentum and sustained political will among the international community to participate in resolving the crisis.

Moreover, to the Vietnamese, the Association was far from an impartial party, and they were unwilling to accept any ASEAN-dictated terms. The UN’s high degree of agent autonomy, with an established bureaucracy and the Security Council’s powerful mandate, also empowered it to induce an equilibrium solution between the ASEAN-backed
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea and the Vietnamese-installed PRK regime (and by extension, between ASEAN and Vietnam). Despite an intensive flurry of ASEAN-driven diplomacy through the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs), the first Paris peace conference in 1989 had ended in a deadlock. Following this setback, the three major powers in the Security Council – the United States, China and the Soviet Union – wielded their individual, as well as joint leverage to push for a comprehensive political settlement. From 1990-1991, direct involvement and cooperation between the Permanent Five of the UN Security Council was key in overcoming obstacles, such as distrust among the Khmer factions and Vietnam, verifying Vietnamese withdrawal, that had stalled the peace process and the formation of a transition government. After a series of meetings, the Paris Peace Agreements signed on 23 October 1991 endorsed an overarching mandate for the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Thus, ceding the driver’s seat to the UN was critical in providing a neutral political framework for the PRK and Khmer factions to come to the table and accept a negotiated settlement.

At the same time, these political breakthroughs contrasted with and undermined ASEAN’s original hardline position, and ASEAN was compelled to moderate its stance to avoid falling out of line. Delegation to the UN, a much more powerful agent, inevitably entailed some loss of principal control, and the Security Council’s actions also strongly influenced the Association’s positions. ASEAN’s attempts at an intermediary role were only successful under the aegis of the UN. While all ASEAN members were signatories to the Paris Agreements, recognition of Southeast Asia’s stake in the process was increasingly given to individual countries that displayed more moderate positions. For instance, Jakarta was made co-chair of the Paris peace conferences and participated in Security Council discussions on operationalizing the UN settlement framework.

In this sense, many would argue that ASEAN ceded initiative to the highly autonomous and influential UN Security Council in a classic illustration of agent slippage. After all, scholars have conventionally argued that the role of great power interests was crucial for eventual conflict settlement. Alagappa in “Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict” noted that ASEAN was most effective in conflict containment, but not conflict termination, since it played a marginal role in the Paris Peace Conferences and eventual peacekeeping operations. It was only the thawing of the Cold War and other changes exogenous to ASEAN’s role that allowed concrete progress in a peace process after 1987. In fact, there also appears to have been a re-delegation of tasks from the UN to ASEAN in what Alagappa called a “de facto division of labor.” While the Security Council hammered out the comprehensive framework agreement, ASEAN had the smaller responsibility of organizing the JIMs (still under the authority of the Paris Peace Conference interim committee), which focused on achieving national reconciliation and the formation of the Supreme National Council.

For all its diplomatic activism, ASEAN as a regional grouping was ultimately subject to extra-regional decisions implemented via the UN Security Council. This suggests the relatively low autonomy of regional organizations within a vertical hierarchy of competence and power, with the UN as a global institution at the apex. Yet, this paper would argue that this does not necessarily imply that upward delegation was a futile choice for ASEAN. In fact, awareness of its own minimal clout spurred the Association to reach out to the UN and the international community as a source of political authority and power. ASEAN was most effective as a mediator and source of information, ideas, and initiatives on how to deal with the Cambodian issue – the heavy lifting had to be left to the great powers. For a regional body such as ASEAN to act as an effective player, it needed to rely on an internationalization strategy in order to bandwagon with the resources of external powers and elicit a solution. Delegation to a more powerful and autonomous agent was hence the necessary and - deliberate - choice.

While it was broader geopolitical changes that ignited the Cambodian issue and enabled the deployment of UNTAC in 1992, ASEAN as the principal agent did not entirely lose its control – it still sought to shape the scope of UN responses. Since the 1980s, it had been instrumental in institutionalizing its concerns with the conflict management process. ASEAN did not merely seek to spotlight the Cambodian issue on the UN’s agenda, but also to actively internationalize the conflict as a means to mobilize widespread support and make the “cost of dominance in Cambodia unbearably high for Hanoi,” using what
Alagappa terms “coercive diplomacy.” In particular, using the General Assembly mechanism as a sort of institutional check and balance against the eventual decisions by the UN Security Council, the Association sought to frame the debate according to its own terms, lobby major powers, deny diplomatic recognition of the Vietnamese-installed PRK government, and consolidate support for Khmer resistance forces.

Controlled delegation to the UN was a means for ASEAN to lock-in its preferred policies and interests. For example, the ICK declaration essentially articulated the Association’s principles on the Cambodian people’s right to self-determination and its goals for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces. It also incorporated ASEAN’s proposal for a comprehensive peace settlement, including a ceasefire by all parties, arrangements to prevent armed Kampuchean factions from disrupting Meetings and multiple ASEAN proposals were ultimately reflected in the Paris Peace Agreements of 1991. This included the implementation of a ceasefire, a transitional coalition involving all four political factions, as well as UN oversight of demobilization, supervision of administrative structures, and the administration of national elections.

In addition, the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea was an ASEAN-driven initiative. Although the three Khmer resistance groups were operating independently and essentially agreed to a marriage of convenience, such coordination served to present to the international community a legitimate representative for the Cambodian people that was capable of replacing the PRK government. ASEAN was also able to politicize Cambodia’s seat at the UN, normally a purely rubber-stamping process. Mobilizing other Third World states in the at the UN, which was unprecedented for an overthrown government. This was an important step in isolating the Vietnamese-installed PRK regime and denying its internal and external consolidation of power. It was also remarkable given the genocidal activities of the Khmer Rouge, which lent an undeniable humanitarian justification for Vietnam’s intervention.

While ASEAN was unable to fully control UN actions or alter the conflict dynamics, it was successful in restructuring the terms under which eventual peace process negotiation and conflict settlement took place. In effect, ASEAN was using the global reach of the UN as an instrument to promulgate its views and interests in the conflict, as well as legitimize its own goals. This was in fact a larger-scale reflection of how ASEAN member-states were using the regional Association to amplify their voices on the international stage, enabling ASEAN to function as a coherent actor with the ability to delegate. At the same time, the legal and political capacities of the UN (and the Security Council in particular) enabled it to respond as an independent actor.

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or controlling election outcomes, a UN peacekeeping force to ensure law and order, and the holding of free elections under UN supervision. Similarly, the priorities outlined through the Jakarta General Assembly, using the rhetoric of non-intervention, it successfully campaigned every year to maintain the Khmer Rouge – now called the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) – as the Cambodian representative

**East Timor: A Stymied ASEAN**

In December 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor in the wake of Portugal’s withdrawal during the decolonization process. This was condemned by the UN Security Council and General Assembly, but no concrete action was taken until 1999, when Indonesia and Portugal finally signed the 5 May agreements, entrusting the UN to conduct a “popular consultation” for the East Timorese to vote between independence and autonomy as an Indonesian province.
After the overwhelming vote in favor of independence, pro-integration militias with the support of Indonesian armed forces carried out a retaliatory terror campaign, leading to mass violence and internal displacement. Ultimately, a Security Council Resolution on 15 September 1999 authorized a multinational humanitarian intervention force (INTERFET) to East Timor, led by Australia. Subsequently, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established on 25 October 1999 as a peacekeeping force responsible for the administration of East Timor during the transitional period.29

Traditionally, scholars have classified the Association as a passive bystander in the East Timor crisis, paralyzed by a firm adherence to the regional norms of sovereignty and non-interference, part of the “ASEAN Way.”20 According to Alan Dupont, ASEAN countries saw the Chapter VII mandate given to INTERFET and UNTAET as “a slap in the face” to Indonesia, which had not yet formally ceded its claim to sovereignty over East Timor at the time of deployment. They feared that such action would set an unwanted precedent for Western intervention in the internal affairs of other member-states.30 However, this constructivist argument falls apart when we consider ASEAN’s previous readiness to meddle in the Cambodian conflict. How then can we explain the Association’s apparent inaction, and why did it not play as active a principal role in delegating to the UN?

ASEAN’s suppression of the East Timor issue had begun well before the referendum and UN-endorsed intervention in 1999. In the early 1990s – and indeed since the 1970s – ASEAN’s main objective was to de-internationalize the conflict. This entailed vigorous diplomacy at the UN to keep the issue off the agenda. ASEAN member-states tabled annual motions, postponed relevant debates, and lobbied Western powers to downgrade UNCHR resolutions to weaker, non-binding chairman’s statements. They consistently voted with Indonesia in the UN General Assembly, or at most abstained, as Singapore did in 1975 and 1976.31 At the Asia-Europe Meeting, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and a 1994 ASEAN informal summit, the Association successfully condemned and blocked attempts by the EU and Portugal to discuss the East Timor issue, threatening a suspension of dialogue and membership.32

Such support from Jakarta’s neighbors stemmed from the historical specter of communism that preoccupied the region in the 1970s – in that context, Indonesian annexation of East Timor was seen as the best way to prevent the emergence of an independent state (and a base for communist subversion) under the left-leaning FRETILIN guerrillas. ASEAN’s stout defense of Indonesia’s heavy-handed actions stood in stark contrast to the opposition by other Third World countries.33 Continued internal conflicts and social unrest into the 1990s raised concerns that East Timor separatism would trigger a “Balkanization” of Indonesia alongside refugee spillovers.34 As a result, ASEAN states sought to preserve political and socioeconomic stability in the region by preventing East Timorese independence.

That the East Timor conflict involved Indonesia also complicated the regional response. One of the main reasons behind ASEAN’s creation in 1967 had been to promote reconciliation with Jakarta in a regional community framework, following the latter’s violent “Konfrontasi” policy toward its neighbors.35 In contrast, neither Vietnam nor Cambodia was a member of ASEAN during the Cambodian conflict in the 1980s and early 1990s. Furthermore, as ASEAN’s largest member-state, Indonesia, did not hesitate to wield its clout via issue linkage and the mobilization of transnational politico-business networks, placing economic and political pressure on neighboring governments. For example, the Philippines, which was highly reliant on Indonesian mediation to handle the Mindanao Muslim insurgency in the south, caved to Jakarta’s demands to ban a planned conference by the Timorese resistance in 1994.36 Thailand and Malaysia both took similar steps in preventing meetings by pro-independence activists and civil society groups.37 This lack of impartiality greatly hindered any sort of effective ASEAN response to the situation in East Timor, and certainly inhibited any intervention or delegation of conflict resolution to the UN.

ASEAN’s paralysis eventually led some member-states to directly seek out the UN as an alternative venue for action, catalyzed by the flagrant violence by pro-Indonesian militias after the 1999 ballot results in East
Timor. This was also facilitated by external changes in the geopolitical environment, providing ASEAN states with more room to maneuver. During the Cold War, Western powers such as the US and Australia had been equally complicit in muting any international response to East Timor because of Indonesia’s strategic value as a pro-Western, anti-Communist ally in Southeast Asia. As the communist threat evaporated in the 1990s, and public opinion grew in favor of East Timor independence, as a result of media and NGO coverage, there was reduced incentive to maintain a Jakarta-first policy.

Amidst this convergence of preferences, ASEAN countries quickly spoke in favor of the ballot outcome supporting East Timor independence. Even before Western countries, Malaysia and Thailand were the first to publicly offer troops for an international intervention force, with Singapore and the Philippines soon following suit. That this occurred despite voiced threats from Indonesia — Foreign Minister Ali Alatas warned, “Do not talk about peacekeeping...unless you want to shoot your way into East Timor”— suggests that ASEAN was not completely opposed to the ideas of humanitarian intervention or international peacekeeping, but rather had been stymied by Jakarta’s bullying influence. Although analysts, like Jürgen Haacke, pointed out that ASEAN governments would not have participated in INTERFET “had it not been for Jakarta’s explicit consent,” other Western countries similarly emphasized the importance of obtaining Indonesian assent, in UN Security Council meetings and elsewhere. Because ASEAN lacked the capacity to marshal a multilateral peacekeeping force, immediate and direct delegation to the UN was the most efficient choice. Not only was ASEAN unable to compel Jakarta to accept a Southeast Asian-led force in East Timor, ASEAN member-states were also aware that they quite simply lacked sufficient experience and resources. Their contributions to INTERFET ultimately depended upon financial assistance from great powers; Australia already bore a significant portion of mission costs, and a $107 million INTERFET Trust Fund was established to cover developing country expenses, with Japan contributing 100 million USD. Infantry units as well as critical communications, and intelligence support came from other Western powers such as the US, UK, Canada, and France. For the UN and international community, entrusting ASEAN to organize or operationalize multilateral intervention was scarcely a feasible option, especially when ASEAN Regional Forum had failed to even discuss the East Timor issue on its annual agenda. Acknowledging this reality, Southeast Asian states such as Singapore and the Philippines immediately highlighted at Security Council meetings the need for international assistance through the UN, rather than calling for an ASEAN-led alternative.

Indeed, a change in Indonesia’s position was achieved not through ASEAN but through pressure from UN-linked institutional mechanisms. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis had devastated Indonesia’s economy and left it dependent on Western fiscal donors, opening room for coercive leverage on the East Timor issue. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank froze loans and aid packages, while the US and EU threatened to suspend military assistance and impose an arms embargo, unless Indonesia accepted a foreign intervention force. The relative power endowed to the UN Security Council allowed it to act as an effective agent in enforcing a multilateral solution of humanitarian intervention. The authority of the UN umbrella further provided credible shelter for individual ASEAN states to advocate for East Timor peacekeeping against Jakarta’s desires. Interestingly, after Indonesian officials bowed to extra-regional pressure, they quickly sought to boost ASEAN participation – a pretense of voluntary delegation to the regional organization, as its preferred agent. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas arranged for his well-respected Thai counterpart, Surin Pitsuwan (who was also chair of the Standing Committee of ASEAN), to meet with General Wiranto, the Indonesian military commander, on 14 September 1999, and obtain his agreement for deployment of ASEAN troops as part of INTERFET. On the same day, Indonesian president Habibie formally requested help in organizing an ASEAN military contribution.

Clearly, despite its low institutionalized capacity, ASEAN still retained an important legitimating role. As a regional body that counted Indonesia as a member, it lent credibility to domestic nationalistic sentiment against foreign intervention in East Timor, still seen as Indonesian territory. A UN-endorsed solution, by virtue of Security Council and Western power, carried imperialist overtones, but ensuring ASEAN involvement could provide a
have claimed active Southeast Asian intervention in the East Timor conflict, these were not always as an ASEAN bloc. INTERFET and UNTAET contributions were under individual country flags, and limited to the major member-states (and founding members), namely Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia. In a revealing remark, Rodolfo Severino, the ASEAN Secretary-General at that time, said that the absence of collective ASEAN peacekeeping is “not so much because of its policy of non-interference as because of its member-states’ aversion to investing the Association with any kind of supranational power, particularly one involving military force.” Southeast Asian states remain wary of delegating too much institutional power to ASEAN that may infringe upon their own national interests in the future. Because they continue to view multilateral institutions as a resource to be selectively employed, rather than a beneficial actor in its own right, organizational solidarity has been limited.

Moreover, one major change between the earlier Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict and the East Timor intervention was the expansion of ASEAN to include the Indochina countries Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar in the 1990s. This increased the heterogeneity of member-state preferences, particularly as the Association had sought to speed their inclusion through a low bar of accession, despite significant economic differences and criticisms of human rights violations in the CLMV countries. Widened membership thus led to diverging policies and further accentuated intra-ASEAN divisions on how to respond to developments in East Timor. In fact, observers have suggested that ASEAN leaders were initially most concerned with the potential impacts on the Association’s unity, instead of the unfolding humanitarian crisis. While the Thai Deputy Foreign Minister declared that, “the time has come to show that we can solve the region’s problems ourselves with the cooperation of countries outside the region,” other ASEAN members such as Vietnam and Burma displayed little enthusiasm and strongly disapproved of any external intervention.

During a Security Council meeting on September 11, 1999, statements by Cambodia and Laos contrasted with declarations by Singapore and the Philippines regarding international assistance in Indonesia.

A parallel can be drawn with the ASEAN response when Cambodia again faced civil war between rival political factions in 1997. In this case, the Association became the delegated agent. The major powers – the European Union, Japan, and especially the United States – had little stomach for further first-hand intervention and pressured ASEAN to act. This was a reverse of the situation in the 1980s when ASEAN had lobbied for global involvement. Because its previous success in the Cambodian case had been the core of the Association’s claim to manage regional order, ASEAN had little choice but to respond to its Western partners in order to preserve its reputation and credibility as a regional body, especially in the wake of international outcry over its decision to admit human rights violator...
Myanmar as a member. An ASEAN Troika, consisting of the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, was appointed to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis. But a sustained response was now far more difficult in the late 1990s, after Vietnam joined as member in 1995, and Laos and Myanmar were admitted in 1997. The civil war in Cambodia effectively pitted the ASEAN-backed FUNCINPEC against the Vietnam-backed CCP. Intra-ASEAN divisions, with the newer members less disposed to continued diplomatic intervention, led to a somewhat bizarre compromise. Cambodia was admitted to ASEAN in 1997, with its formal admission ceremony postponed until after certain conditions were met, including the holding of free and fair elections, and formation of a senate. Moreover, Indonesia was also struggling with international pressure on the East Timor conflict. Using the rhetoric of non-interference, it increasingly opposed further ASEAN involvement in the Cambodian issue. As member-states sought to protect their own national interests and limit institutional mandates when they were no longer conducive for the former, delegation to the regional association declined markedly.

Conclusion
The delegation of conflict resolution or peacekeeping operations to a multilateral institution is most likely to occur when state preferences are closely aligned. But contrary to the UN Charter’s top-down model of delegation, in which the UN decides to subcontract certain tasks to regional organizations, the dynamics of the interventions in Cambodia and East Timor suggest that ASEAN has also been able to bring issues to the global level and demand international action via the UN. When member-states’ interests are homogeneous, ASEAN has been a cohesive regional actor, effectively using the UN as a global-level resource to further its own interests, be it intervention in the Cambodian conflict or initial non-intervention in East Timor. Expanded membership and heterogeneous state interests has limited ASEAN-initiated delegation in the 1990s. When Southeast Asian states were willing to take action against a fellow ASEAN member – Indonesia – despite stymied action at the regional level, they also chose to support intervention directly through the UN, particularly when great power interests became more aligned.

Delegation to the UN and its Security Council was usually unavoidable because of ASEAN’s limited clout and resources, making ASEAN highly reliant on extra-regional actors for concrete action. As a mechanism of control, ASEAN sought to leverage the General Assembly as an institutional check and balance. But when preferences diverge, as in the Cambodian case, the more powerful UN Security Council has been able to act as an autonomous agent. By virtue of the Association’s relative lack of institutionalization and collective capacity, ASEAN still remains largely subordinate to the UN as an interventionist actor. However, delegation flows can occur in both directions, and ASEAN has also assumed the role of principal.

Interestingly, there also appears to be an element of mutual legitimation between the international and regional organizations. UN involvement lent powerful international legitimacy and support to ASEAN’s interventionist goals in Cambodia, as well as enhanced the Association’s reputation as a regional institution. Even when Western powers and the UN took the lead in intervening in East Timor, ASEAN’s presence served to “regionalize” and, hence, legitimize their actions, even if on a superficial level. Ultimately, the two types of institutions are complementary - while preferences may not always be aligned, and the UN remains dominant, sustained regional-international interactions help to safeguard international peace and security, as so optimistically stated in the UN Charter.

Endnotes

7. At that time, ASEAN member-states comprised: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (the five founding members). Brunei joined in 1984.


15. This was a political coalition of the three Khmer resistance groups: Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge, Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNINCF), and former Prime Minister Son Sann’s Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF).


19. Ibid., 439-467.

20. The SNC, comprised of both government and resistance party representatives would serve as the official Cambodian decision-making body under UNTAC.


22. Ibid.


38. Ibid.

39. This was additionally catalyzed by the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991, in which Indonesian forces killed and wounded hundreds of unarmed East Timor civilians during a demonstration in Dili.


41. Ali Alatas. The Robbie in the Shoe: The Diplomatic Struggle for East Timor (Jakarta:
Delegation from Regional to Global: ASEAN and the UN in Conflict Intervention / Audrey Wong


44. None of the Southeast Asian countries had prior experience in peacekeeping, peace enforcement or humanitarian action, with the exception of Malaysia, which had sent troops to the UN operation in Bosnia.


51. Rodolfo Severino. “Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary-General,” (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006).


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The paper will address the role that the energy trade has played in shaping Turkish Foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. The role of energy is most notable in two arenas of policy: relations in the Caucasus and with the European Union (EU). Each arena is marked with its own significant challenges and policy nuance. Turkey’s EU accession hopes and its competition with Russia in the energy market are inherently tied to the issue of Eurasian relations, while debates over Turkey’s role as an “energy hub” bring serious questions to its relationship with the EU.

Furthermore, the effects of US policy have shaped Turkish policy in both of these arenas, providing an outside force to ensure that Turkey is not the sole player in the rich energy markets of the Eurasian region. Turkey has undoubtedly shown that it is willing to emerge as a major participant in the region and engage the surrounding resource rich countries in what can be described as “oil politics.” The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union mark an important transition phase for Turkey’s role in the Eurasian energy market. Fiona Hill in “Caspian Conundrum: Pipelines and Energy Networks,” finds that Turkey’s main objectives since the early 1990’s, and in the wake of the USSR’s collapse have been “to secure new energy supplies, and to establish [Turkey] as the transit country for energy flows from the Caspian to consumer markets in Europe.” This two-pronged approach marks the beginning of Turkey’s desire to make significant forays into the Eurasian energy market in the modern era for a number of reasons. The first reason is the emergence of the Newly Independent States (NIS) after the collapse of the USSR, which created significantly larger number of parties to deal with in terms of energy agreement. Many in Turkey were quite hopeful that the cultural ties between themselves and the NIS could be the backbone for favorable relations. However, the emergence of the NIS marks a turning point in Russian-Turkish relations, and Turkey soon found itself in direct competition with the Russian Federation for spheres of influence over the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Turkish policy in the initial stages was characterized by a zero-sum approach, meaning theoretically a larger Turkish role in the energy market inevitably meant a minimization of the Russian sphere of influence. Therefore, Russian competition from the outset was unavoidable. The degree to which Turkey and Russia would cooperate in the coming years has been shaped by both necessity and mutual economic benefit. This cooperation will be elaborated upon in depth later.

Turkey’s Policy Motives and Energy Objectives

One cannot address Turkey’s forays with the NIS without addressing the debate over Turkey’s policy motives. There are significant questions as to whether or not Turkey’s assertiveness represents an emerging trend of Neo-Ottoman behavior in Turkish

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policy, or a pursuance of cooperation and agreement on the basis of mutual economic benefit. The true characterization of Turkish policy in this region is perhaps a moderation of these two views, yet there are camps within Turkey that fall on both sides of the argument. Whereas the traditional Kermalist elites, often found in the military establishment, are strong non-imperialists and would denounce any characterizes Turkey’s engagement. Energy agreements have been some of the most evident areas of cooperation and negotiation for Turkey in Eurasia.

How have energy agreements and projects shaped Turkey’s policies in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and has “oil diplomacy” been either a positive or limiting factor for policy decisions? The areas of most notable concern are Turkey’s negotiations with Azerbaijan, 

"There are significant questions as to whether or not Turkey’s assertiveness represents an emerging trend of Neo-Ottoman behavior in Turkish policy, or a pursuance of cooperation and agreement on the basis of mutual economic benefit."

policy that is reminiscent of an Ottoman legacy, there are a significant number of advocates pushing a uniquely Turkish version of a Eurasian identity, finds that the proponents of an increased Turkish role in Eurasia fall on both the left and right sides of domestic politics. While many right wingers advocate a Eurasian identity based on the cultural ties of the Turkic peoples, many left wingers and Islamic fundamentalists push a new identity that is essentially anti-Western, and oftentimes advocates Islamic ties. It appears as though neither Turkish approach to the NIS has been fully embraced, neither Neo-Ottomanism nor complete Kermalist isolation, and instead slow and careful progression Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Turkey’s main objective in pursuing energy agreements with these countries in recent years has been to ensure that the primary route for the export of oil from the Caspian is through overland pipelines in Turkey (oil will eventually end up in the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan). Turkey stressed this route for security reasons, yet Turkey’s motivations and preferences for this route are far more numerous. First, there are many in the Turkish policy establishment that recognize the minimized role of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in aligning Turkey with the West since the collapse of the USSR. If Turkey becomes a major component in the safety and security of oil exports in the region, then it is in the interest of major importers such as the United States, to protect their investments. Seeing the increased role of Turkey in oil exportation through a Ceyhan pipeline, the relationship between Turkey and the US did in fact become an area for mutual cooperation. Turkey and the US formalized a “strategic energy alliance” in 1997 to promote energy diversity and security, develop Caspian resources… transport oil and gas through Turkey… and facilitate international investment,” according to Hill. Second, beyond the obvious economic benefits for Turkish construction companies and industry employees, overland oil routes, which end up at a Black Sea port, must pass through the Bosphorus. Financially, this is an unattractive option for Turkish policy, as tariffs and taxation on ships passing through the Bosphorus are limited and controlled by the 1936 Montreux Convention. Culturally, the Bosphorus represents an important issue for the elites of Istanbul, who hold the straits as a significant part of Turkish cultural identity. The idea of the straits becoming an overpopulated shipping route represents an anathema for many in the Turkish elite. This is best exhibited by the protests of 2000 over an oversized Romanian freighter’s attempt to pass through the straits. The controversy was resolved through negotiations with the Romanian Foreign Ministry, yet the matter of the Bosphorus as a shipping route still remains a contentious issue.
The BTC Pipeline

Thus, the best option in the eyes of Turkish policy makers was a pipeline that had the port of Ceyhan as its final destination. In 1999 it was decided that the pipeline would be routed through Georgia and became known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.11 Throughout its planning stages and construction the BTC pipeline was faced with several challenges. Russia opposed the early stages of the process. The “near abroad policy” stressed in Moscow, as Melina Altunisik points out, “emphasized Russia’s vital political, economic, and military interests” in the Caucasus. The Russian firm Lukoil was motivated by financial incentives. In 1993, the President of Lukoil as well as the minister of fuel and energy visited Baku to negotiate a Russian role in Caspian oil deals. This visit resulted in the allocation of 10 percent of Azerbaijani shares to Lukoil, while Turkish shares only achieved a maximum level of 6.75 percent.12

Iran and Russia also backed their positions by disputing the legal status of the Caspian Sea. The Caspian during BTC construction was essentially divided under a non-spoken agreement of territorial sovereignty.13 Iran and Russia opposed many of the agreements and held a number of territorial disputes in the Caspian, though by 1994 Russia mostly backed away from its opposing stance on the BTC, and Iran was left as the largest opponent of the plan.14 Iran, who holds significant interest of its own in being the sole exporter of regional oil, was effectively countered by the support of the US and the EU to move forward on the BTC pipeline.15 The pipeline also faced significant challenges due to high construction costs matched with unstable oil prices.16 Instability caused by regional conflict was also a major issue, yet the Turks insist, mostly to appease US concerns, that routing oil through a NATO country is the most stable option. However, Turkey was not without its own problems of instability in terms of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), who had committed terrorist acts before on Turkish oil pipelines. Although after the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, the Kurdish concerns were largely overcome.17

Construction began in 2002 on the BTC pipeline and the pipeline became functional in 2006.18 Through the acquisition of the BTC pipeline, Turkey showcased its determination to become an “East-West energy corridor,” as well as its viability and stability as an energy source, garnering US support. US support for the BTC pipeline was critical, especially in countering the political motivations of Iran to have a pipeline of Caspian oil routed through Iranian territory.

Iran and the US: Energy Oppositions

Although the ability of the Turks to negotiate with the US on this issue is particularly encouraging, it remains problematic that the Turks are unable to gain significant leverage in lobbying against the Iranians for the BTC without the backing of the US. This is perhaps one of the first major limitations and challenges to Turkey’s role to become a major energy hub. Economically, there is a general consensus that Iran represents the cheapest and most viable long-term option to route oil from the Caspian.19 While the advocates of the BTC pipeline highlighted the security of the pipeline operating in a NATO country’s territory, many industry experts also note that an Iranian pipeline would represent a relatively secure option.20 Seemingly, the Turkish position in lobbying for Caspian oil relies heavily on US backing. If US opposition against the Iranians shifts in the future, then Turkey’s assertiveness in the oil sector may become problematic.

There is prior evidence that the US is willing to lift economic sanctions on Iran. In 1998, when the Russian company Gazprom was developing several oil fields in southern Iran, the US decided not to impose sanctions on Gazprom. This was in direct contradiction to the 1996 law requiring sanctions on companies that invested over $20 billion in Iranian petroleum industries.21 There has also been instances of countries disregarding the possible penalties for cooperation with Iran. In 1997 Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Iran announced plans to construct a pipeline from Kazakhstan to the Persian Gulf. The US company ExxonMobil lobbied the US government for permission to participate in the construction of an Iranian pipeline from Neka to Tehran.22 If US opposition to Iran erodes in the future, and there is a rapprochement, this could severely undermine Turkey’s advantage in being a major player in Caspian oil.
There are instances of cooperation between Iran and Turkey over energy issues, yet those occurrences seem to be heavily influenced by the position of the United States. Iran, holding the world’s second largest natural gas reserves, represents a viable option for Turkey in its desire to diversify sources of natural gas. Plans to construct a natural gas pipeline from Iran to Turkey were strongly opposed by the US in 1997. The US also opposed Turkish plans to import natural gas from Turkmenistan routed through Iranian territories. Although these deals went forward without the approval of the US, this could represent a pattern in Turkish-US relations. While Turkey’s maneuverability on many oil issues is seemingly dependent on the US for support, there is also significant opposition by the US to any Turkish efforts of cooperation with Iran. Why is the US willing to allow non-Turkish cooperation with Iran, yet opposes many Turkish efforts for economic cooperation? Seemingly, the answer is a geo-strategic one. If Turkey is able to significantly diversify its energy portfolio, perhaps the US risks having Turkey develop too much of a role in the Caspian energy trade. Hill notes that “Although Turkey is central to US Caspian policy, its energy needs, geographic position, and regional relations point to a different set of partners from US preferences in future energy calculations.” US embargoes and sanctions stem primarily from its opposition to the Iranian Nuclear program. Because the Iranian resolve on possessing a nuclear weapon is strong, and there is unwillingness on the US side to negotiate, the US is bound to have strong effects on Turkish energy policy for years to come.

**Russian Energy Politics**

The Russian opposition to the BTC pipeline in its early planning stages represents a pattern of relations in the Caucasus that from the end of the Cold War until 1997 was marked by disagreement. Russian objectives at this point were defined in the “near abroad policy.” Seeing the Caucasus as an area in which it was essential to promote themselves, the new Russian government sought to oppose any Turkish efforts to expand Turkey’s sphere of influence. According to Tannisaver, Turkey’s objectives in the early post-Soviet era were defined by a desire to “solidify the newly gained independence of the Caucasian states… and to become a major actor in the region to secure economic and security benefits.” In order to fully capitalize on new financial opportunities Turkey looked to the BTC pipeline and other energy deals with Caucus countries. A move to diversify Turkish sources of energy would mean less reliance on Russian oil and gas. Good relations with the states of the Caucasus would also mean an expansion of Turkish allies in the direction of Russia, thereby creating a “buffer zone” of states between Russia and Turkey. In addition to the early rivalry over the BTC pipeline and the issues regarding the Caspian, the Russians accused the Turkish government throughout the 1990s of supporting the rebels in Chechnya through “clandestine activities.” In return, there were accusations by the Turkish government, especially under the Ciller administration, that Moscow was supporting the PKK. These accusations were perhaps not unfounded, as Russia allowed the meeting of the “International Congress of Kurdish Organizations,” in which the PKK was an active participant. Despite the signing of agreements in 1995 and 1996 between Moscow and Ankara to cooperate on matters of terrorism prevention, the Russians did nothing to prevent PKK lobbying and participation in politics.

The year 1997 marks a turning point, in which Russian-Turkish cooperation began to increase, based on mutually beneficial economic relations. A November 1997 meeting of the Turkish-Russian Joint Economic Council was the starting point for a number of natural gas agreements between Turkey and Russia. The most important agreement of these talks was the Blue Stream natural gas project, which established plans to build underwater pipelines in the Black Sea. The Blue Stream Pipeline was completed in 2003 and became fully operational in 2010. Furthermore, the 1997 meeting marked a series of cooperative agreements over the BTC pipeline in which the two countries, Tannisaver notes, agreed to “abstain from actions likely to harm each other’s economic interests or threaten…territorial integrity.” As a result, Turkey promised to hire a number of Russian companies in order to build the BTC, and Lukoil
expressed interest in having a stake in the pipeline. Since 1997 the Russian-Turkish relationship has largely been based on mutual economic benefit. Despite the modest gains Turkey has made in the Caucasus, projection of political influence in this region still remains a “zero sum game.” In this type of environment, especially when the relationship is based on economic incentives, future cooperation between the Russians and the Turks remains extremely fragile. Unilateral decisions as seen in the 1998 Russian financial crisis, in which Russia devalued the ruble, caused Turkish businesses to suffer, and prices of Turkish goods in the Caucasus to increase dramatically.

A relationship based strictly on economics is subject to extreme change in the event of a downturn or depression. Furthermore, even two decades after the collapse of the USSR, a period in which Turkey made it one of their main goals to diversify their energy portfolio, the majority of energy imports still largely come from Russia. Turkey in 2008 imported 93 percent of their oil and 97 percent of their natural gas, both of which were disproportionately made up of Russian imports.

A reliance on Russian energy not only constrains Turkish policy decisions towards engaging Moscow, but also reduces the ability of Turkey to project influence in the Caucasus. Throughout the 1990’s, Turkey was only able to make modest gains in the Caucasus, largely due to their reliance on Russian energy as well as the Caucasus’s “unwillingness to consider Turkey their ‘new big brother.”

Despite the strong rhetoric in Turkey to present itself as the regional protector for the NIS, there were serious limitations in Turkey’s ability to project economic and political influence over the Caucasus. Turkey was limited by the simple unwillingness of the Caucasus to accept another “big brother” having seen the failure and collapse of the USSR. Also, Turkey failed to make significant inroads politically in areas where Soviet ties had previously been so strong.

In fact, the rivalry between Turkey and Russia had the effect of strengthening ties between NIS states, to ensure their stable economic trade. Since the end of the Cold War the countries of the NIS had made more progress diplomatically together then Turkey, which failed to represent itself as a model for the NIS. Turkey’s initial approach after the collapse of the USSR was to represent itself as a viable and successful economic model, an option which was largely supported by the United States, who was worried about the increased political influence of Iran.

However, the Turkish policies in the Caucasus cannot be considered an outright failure, and success can be seen in a number of areas. Turkey saw modest success in increasing ties with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and the numerous countries with which it holds profitable, albeit fragile, energy agreements. In the coming years, Russia and Turkey may face a serious challenge to their relationship, as their zero-sum Eurasian connection may also carry over into their alliance with the EU.

### Turkey as a European Energy Hub

Turkey’s hopes of EU accession are largely intertwined with their goal to become an “energy hub” or transit point to connect Eastern energy pipelines and networks with the West. However, it should be noted that there is a large difference between Turkish energy “transit” behavior and “brokerage” behavior, as noted by Ali Tekin and Paul Andrew Williams in *Geo-Politics of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus*. As an energy transit country Turkey would refrain from imposing exorbitant fees and duties for transporting energy from the East to EU nations, while “brokerage” behavior will entail Turkey “capitalizing on its transit position to obtain parochial rent-seeking advantages.”

If Turkey hopes to represent itself as a country with European interests at heart, it would of course assume the former position, providing an option for European energy that carries less political baggage than the current pipelines, which pass through Belarus and Ukraine.

Turkey is put in a unique position to provide another avenue by which the EU can receive its required energy resources. Since 2006, when Russia cut off gas supplies to Europe due to a pricing dispute with Ukraine, the EU has been looking to diversify its sources of energy. France, Germany, and Italy believe the disputes with Russia can be solved with the construction of pipelines that bypass Belarus and Ukraine. The newly inducted EU states are willing to turn away from Russian energy in a move towards greater association with Europe and a disassociation with
their former Soviet partners.41 Both of these outlooks work to the advantage of Turkey in increasing its ties to the EU. Geographically, Turkey is in the perfect position to emerge as a European energy hub, and economically Turkey has the infrastructure and developed economy necessary to begin such a large project. The Nabucco pipeline project is at the head of Turkey's hopes to be an energy transit hub.

The Nabucco Project

The Nabucco project is a proposed gas pipeline, which will run from the eastern Turkish border with Iran and Georgia to Baumgarten, Austria.42 As a whole, the project's mission is to diversify European energy sources away from Russia, but there are several other goals defined by the consortium in charge of the pipeline. The Naabucco project aims to increase supply, security, and prominence for the parties involved.43 The Nabucco pipeline is seen by many as an alternative to the Gazprom South Stream project, which would only serve to increase EU reliance on Russian natural gas. Seeing the BTC pipeline as the beginning of an "erosion of Russian leverage," Russia hopes to prevent the construction of the Nabucco project, which has emerged as a major political concern for the future of the project.44 Russia has used disputes over the legal status of the Caspian, and whether it is considered a "Sea" or a "Lake" according to international law. This has largely prevented the building of Trans-Caspian pipelines, which are essential to future phases of the Nabucco project.45 Furthermore, the 2008 South Ossetia war highlighted the relative instability of the Caucasus and the willingness of Russia to still engage in the ongoing regional ethnic disputes. While the Georgian-Russian conflict did not affect the supply of natural gas significantly, it still emphasized the relatively fragile environment that exists in much of the Caucasus.46 Because of the risks associated with a project so large, the Nabucco pipeline requires significant governmental commitments regarding credit.47 Since the 2008 conflict, many governments in the region are hesitant to give such assurances, an obstacle that Turkey must overcome. Turkey also faces obstacles in meeting adequate supply for the Nabucco pipeline. The planners of the project have made it part of their mission statement as Tekins and Williams state not "to exclude any supply sources."48 However, the choosing of suppliers is of geopolitical consideration for Turkey. Even though there are doubts as to whether or not it will be able to provide an adequate supply of gas in surplus to its already massive export portfolio, Iran has emerged as a potential supplier for the project. However, the inclusion of Iran in the project would be met with protest by the US, and perhaps the EU nations, which have aligned with the US in opposition to Iran's nuclear program.49 The US would far prefer the inclusion of the northern Iraqi oil fields under Kurdish control as a major source for the project, yet this poses political challenges on both the Turkish and Iraqi side. The Iraqi central government, which does not fully recognize the northern autonomous Kurdish region, would prefer that the gas be sourced from oil fields other than those in Kirkuk, as the northern fields are a source of constant tension between Baghdad and the Kurds.50 Although the AK party administration under Erdogan has seen rather peaceful relations with the Kurds of northern Iraq, there is still great hesitancy to include the Kurds in the Nabucco project at the expense of the central Iraqi government.51 The Shah-Deniz natural gas field in Azerbaijan is also a possible prospect for supply to the Nabucco pipeline, but shaky relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan beginning in 2009 (regarding the Armenian-Azeri conflict) have brought doubts to the willingness of Azerbaijan to support a Turkish centered energy project.52 Turkey's maneuverability on the Nabucco project is severely limited by its ability to resolve conflicts that pose such

"The debate over potential supply and security issues still rages and many are skeptical as to whether construction on the pipeline will ever begin."
great stumbling blocks. The prospects of Turkey resolving the disputes over the Caspian are low, and seemingly, it would be in Turkey’s best interest not to involve itself in an international dispute. Turkey needs to prove that the relative security risks of the Caucasus are low, in addition to convincing the EU that there is significant enough supply to meet the energy needs of Europe. It has been generally established that a diversification of European energy would be a positive step for the EU. Pavel Baev and Indra Overland emphasize that “liberalization may appear to be an economically sounder policy, as its main thrust goes in the direction of creating a real market for natural gas in the EU in place of the system of non-transparent bilateral deals and fixed prices.”55 However, in order for Turkey to capitalize on this move towards diversification, it must present the Nabucco project as a more favorable option than the South Stream project, which has the strength of providing guaranteed sources and a stronger backing because of Gazprom’s prominence in the energy industry.56 It remains to be seen which project will take center stage, as construction on the Nabucco pipeline was scheduled to begin in 2010, yet no construction has taken place. The debate over potential supply and security issues still rages and many are skeptical as to whether construction on the pipeline will ever begin.

Competing Policy Objectives

The United States also plays an important role in Turkey’s current relations with the EU. While Turkish hopes of EU accession are assisted by the United States, Russia hopes to counter the United States through improved relations with the EU.55 This represents an important dichotomy that places Turkey in the middle of a flurry of competing policy objectives. It should be noted that the US and the EU agree with the need for European energy diversification. The American perspective opposes the enlargement of the Iranian energy industry because of the Iranian nuclear program, and disavows Russian supply for the Nabucco program from a pragmatic geopolitical standpoint. American support for the BTC pipeline was critical, and if one accepts the premise that the building of the Nabucco pipeline represents a positive step in closer associations for Turkey with the EU, then US support for the Nabucco project will be an important element. An expanding natural gas industry and the global economic downturn in 2008 both raise questions as to whether the US will fully support the project. Richard Morningstar and Senator Dick Lugar did attend the signing ceremony of the Nabucco project in 2009, but this is only a minor sign of encouragement in a series of possible sources of tension between the US and Turkey. Turkey and the US have been at odds in recent years due to Turkey’s growing hostile relationship with Israel because of the leadership of the AK party, as well as the ambivalence in Ankara towards Iranian nuclear ambitions. Since the Nabucco project relies on Iran as a potential supplier, there could be consequences for Turkey’s relationship with the US. The US would prefer Middle Eastern or Caspian sources of gas for the Nabucco project.56 Turkey will need to weigh the consequences of confrontation with the US over this issue with its energy relationship with Russia and Iran.

Those in Turkey who continue to hope for EU accession place great emphasis on Turkey’s ability to represent itself as an alternative energy option for Europe. However, the people who ascribe to the traditionalist Kemalist mindset of insularity, note that EU membership, while theoretically attainable under closer inspection, may not be the preferable option. There are some calls among Kemalists for a “privileged partnership” EU relationship with Turkey in terms of energy, which would entail essentially the same benefits Turkey holds now under the Customs Union. Those in Ankara who subscribe to the same school of thought established under the Ozal administration feel as though increased economic ties between the EU and Turkey would only help Turkey’s chances for membership. Essentially, Tekin and Williams summarize the two competing schools of thought as “assum(ing) Turkey’s energy role to be simply an alternative transit route for supplies not controlled by Russia, while the other one interprets it as an important contribution to European energy security through the country’s accession to the EU.”55 Overall, in the current atmosphere, Turkish hopes for full membership in the EU are dim. The rejection of Turkey’s EU hopes in 1987 at the Luxembourg Summit still holds resonance in the
minds of many elites in Ankara. Turkey’s negative relations with the EU can be traced back to Luxembourg, which marks an important turning point for serious anti-European sentiments in Turkey. Although accession into the EU attempts at membership combined with the current atmosphere in both Turkey and EU are not promising. Two thirds of Turkish citizens oppose an enlargement of the EU. Even though the majority of Turkish citizens support EU membership there are questions as to the cultural significance of Turkey’s accession into the EU, as well as hesitancy on the part of the EU to accept a country with an Islamic cultural background.

Turkey’s Hopes For EU Accession

Turkey’s hopes to emerge as an “energy hub” for the EU is reflected in the “bridge theory,” in which Turkey becomes an important mediator between East and West providing both a material and diplomatic bridge. The bridge theory has been a common theme in Turkish politics, because of Turkey’s geopolitical advantage. Those who desire to capitalize on this innate strategic benefit cite increased cooperation and integration as the primary route for success. This has been a cornerstone of Ahmet Davutoglu’s foreign policy, and as a result Turkey has seen significant strides in cooperation and integration with several regional actors such as Russia and Iran. Turkey has essentially sought a normalization of relations, Israel perhaps being the largest exception, because of Davutoglu’s policies. However, because of the significant challenges Turkey faces, its relationship to the EU still hangs in the balance. At this point, the leading school of thought in Turkey emphasizes that the primary way to achieve European integration is to use Turkey’s geopolitical advantage, and embrace the bridge theory.

Murat Soysal highlights the biggest challenge to this theory in stating that “for such a role to be convincing and effective, the essential requirement is a political and ideological neutrality towards different worlds, namely the Western or European nations on the one side and the Asian or Middle Eastern countries on the other.”

Ideologically, for the bridge theory to hold, Turkey’s own culture, which is heavily tilted towards the Western ideals of secularism since the days of Kemalism, must embrace the East so as to not present itself as a tool for the promotion of Western values. While the secularism and Western orientation of Turkey is arguably changing towards a more Islamic direction under the Erdogan administration and the politics of the AK party, it is unlikely that close to 90 years of a secular foundation will be shaken by the administration of a single party. In this environment, many advocates of the bridge theory emphasize the need for increased economic integration with Europe in a move towards greater institutional ties and economic liberalization. The need for Turkey to emerge as an energy hub is one of the most crucial elements of this theory. An integrationist theory is a far cry from the “zero-sum” attitudes that characterized the Kemalist foreign policies of the past, which viewed cooperative gains as exactly that which is lost by Turkey. Perhaps those who ascribe to the tenets of the bridge theory and its guiding principles view energy policy as a primary route, despite its historic limitations in the Caspian and Caucasus regions.

Conclusion

What do Turkey’s energy policies since the end of the Cold War tell us about the future of its foreign policy? Furthermore, what does Turkey’s energy policy tell us about its interactions with three of its largest political concerns: Russia, Iran, and the US? In terms of Russia, Turkish energy policies have seen the greatest limitations, but perhaps also the greatest gains. Competition over the Caspian and NIS characterized the early interactions between Russia and Turkey, but their relationship slowly moved to cooperation. The main theme in European energy politics today is the need for energy diversification, which in many cases means a diversification and exploration of options at the expense of Russia. Turkey has a constantly growing economy, and Russia is its largest trading partner. In this framework, Russia supplies 63 percent of Turkey’s natural gas, and 23 percent of its oil. Turkey’s hopes for diversification must be balanced with the need to meet its
energy requirements. Because of the unwillingness of Turkey to sacrifice its energy requirements and the relative willingness of Russia to manipulate the energy market for political gains, it is in Turkey’s best interest to seek cooperation with Russia rather than conflict. Within this environment, as many experts have indicated, it is foreseeable that both the South Stream and the Nabucco pipeline may be built, for they are not mutually exclusive projects. Although there are significant questions as to whether there would be substantial supply for both pipelines to operate at full capacity, this would be a preferable option as compared to outright competition with Russia and Gazprom. This must be reconciled with the desire of the EU to seek alternative energy avenues as well, and policymakers in Ankara must decide whether European integration through the use of energy avenues is a viable option. Energy security and EU integration are not entirely conflicting ideas, but they certainly do not complement one another. Turkey has shown willingness in the past to forego areas of conflict with Russia for the sake of economic cooperation, and it is foreseeable that it may do so again.

Relations with Iran and the United States are inherently tied together, as long as Iran continues their current nuclear program. Even under the leadership of the AK party and a relative improvement in their relationships with Iran, Turkey has faced serious limitations on the supply of energy from its Eastern neighbor. Iran has not only continued to embrace a conflicting stance on the status of the Caspian Sea, but also has failed to commit to a significant supply of gas to Turkish projects. Even if Turkey were able to secure these commitments, there would be serious opposition by the United States, which has remained the most vocal opponent to the Iranian nuclear program. However, Iran represents a real opportunity for Turkey to explore diversified options of energy supply if they are willing to forego the potential consequences to their relationship with the US. As of 2007, Turkey and Iran had reached several agreements regarding the supply of gas to Turkey, but once again, nothing capable of forgoing Turkey’s reliance on Russia for their energy needs. Turkey is faced to choose EU accession and their western relationships, or to focus on their Eastern relationships and secure domestic energy to meet Turkey’s energy needs. However, Davutoglu’s policies do not see these two ideas as mutually exclusive. Through his “zero-sum” approach, the AK party has simultaneously placed an emphasis on the formulation of stable relations with all of Turkey’s neighbors, while continuing to place emphasis on the emergence of Turkey as a strong regional actor and major power in the energy transport arena. In response to whether or not Turkey was moving away from its Western orientations and alliances, President Gul noted that:

“A country’s direction is determined by its values, and not by its relations. The Important point is in which direction Turkey’s values develop. These are democratic values, respect for law, equality of men and women, liberal economy and so on. These better show in which direction Turkey is going.”

There is a strong indication that Turkey is approaching its relationship with Iran carefully and cautiously, yet for the sake of its own regional security and energy objectives Turkey hopes to be a mediator in the major issues between the US and Iran.

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s relative stance in regards to matters of foreign policy has been “rational realism” reconciled with a desire to capitalize on the new opportunities brought on by the collapse of a regional rival. Energy policy has consistently remained one of the cornerstones with which Turkey formulates an assertive regional policy, and it seems likely to remain that way for the coming years. A full revision of Kemalist tendencies seems not only unlikely, but an impossibility, given the integration and cooperative relationships Turkey has formed with other countries. In many cases, energy trade and policy has formed a fundamental part of many of Turkey’s relationships. Energy policies of course, like many other elements of Turkey’s strategic plans, are not without their limitations. These limitations were highlighted in Turkey’s modest successes in the NIS after the collapse of the USSR. As seen in the limited successes in the Caucasus, the building of pipelines and economic agreements may result in increased cooperation, but
does necessarily mean a rise in Turkish political hegemony. Energy policies are therefore an important factor but cannot be the only avenue by which Turkey approaches integration with the EU. If the "bridge theory" is fully embraced, energy linkages with Europe must be part of a larger package of increased ties with the EU, both culturally and economically. Popular sentiment for the EU in Turkey is waning however, and the current pattern of relations with the EU may in fact remain the status-quo for quite some time. In this atmosphere, the Nabucco pipeline could be an important step towards energy diversification, but does not necessarily mean increased chances for Turkey's EU accession. Turkish policy makers face a real challenge in the coming decades, as energy policy and the questions that come with it remain a complicated and vexing issue affecting all areas of Turkish foreign policy.

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The February 28 Incident:
An Economic Perspective on the Decolonization of Taiwan

by James Meresman

his paper examines a crucial time in the history of Taiwan – decolonization. It addresses the problems and solutions surrounding Taiwan during Japanese and Chinese rule from an economic perspective. In particular, it uses a watershed event in Taiwanese history – the February 28 Incident – and places this event in the context of Taiwan’s growth into an independent nation.

On February 28, 1947, an uprising in Taipei, Taiwan quickly spread to the rest of the island and brought yet another case of a messy decolonization process to the forefront of international politics. A mere two years earlier, the Potsdam Declaration was signed by Allied powers, ensuring that once World War II ended, so would Taiwan’s period of colonization under Japanese rule. The Retrocession Day that followed on October 25, 1945 officially ceded Taiwan to the Republic of China, yet the day’s celebrations would provide an ominous contrast to the violence and bloodshed that took place only sixteen months later. But what went wrong with the transfer of power from the hands of Japanese imperialists to those of the Chinese nationalists? In trying to understand this tumultuous period in Taiwanese history, it is helpful to take an economic perspective. The conflict between the Taiwanese population and the Chinese nationalists spurred a newfound conversation concerning Taiwanese independence, stemming from immediate economic woes rather than political matters. Furthermore, the economic problems that sparked this conflict do not have one clear cause or source. Instead, it was a combination of three factors – Japanese short-sightedness, Chinese economic mismanagement, and a postwar context – which sparked the February 28 Incident, and ultimately changed the course of Taiwanese history – economically, politically, and socially.

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Taiwan’s History

In order to understand Taiwan’s position internationally after World War II, it is helpful to clarify the island’s history. The multitude of the Taiwanese population is made up of Han Chinese immigrants who came to the island under the administration of the Dutch East India Company. However, the earliest known inhabitants of the island are an aborigine population closely related to the natives of other islands.

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in Southeast Asia.\(^1\) Between 1624 and 1662, while China was in the turmoil of dynastic change from the Ming to the Qing Dynasty, the Chinese population in Taiwan quadrupled, as mainlanders fled political disorder.\(^2\) Taiwan became a prefecture of China’s Fujian province of the Qing Dynasty in 1684, and a full-fledged province in 1885.\(^3\) So began the island’s long history of subordination to foreign rule.

In 1895 Taiwan became a Japanese colony, which it remained until 1945, when it was ceded to the Republic of China after World War II. Thus, the Taiwanese have dealt with three different central governments over the course of their history – the Qing Empire, the Japanese colonial regime, and the Nationalist Chinese nation-state – and all of these regimes governed from afar. In short, the Taiwanese population effectively never had the opportunity to govern themselves. Nevertheless, and perhaps ironically, as we shall see, the surge of decolonization movements that shook empires around the globe in the 20th century did not animate the colonized Taiwanese – until the February 28 Incident.

**Japanese Colonization**

The time of Japanese colonization was a period of tremendous economic growth for Taiwan. Economist Samuel Ho explains that Taiwan’s transition from a neglected Chinese province to a Japanese colony turned the island from an essentially closed economy to an open economy.\(^4\) At the onset of colonial rule, Taiwan lacked almost any measure of modern or industrial development, but this quickly changed. Agriculture was by far the most important employer and producer in the economy throughout colonial rule, yet over time industry and modern infrastructure also began to play a crucial role.

Beginning in 1898 the Japanese made major improvements in sanitation and health care. For instance, in 1904 Governor-General Kodama Gentara took great pride in the fact that the island had 180 doctors trained in Western medicine.\(^5\) Education through primary and technical schools became widely available, and the Japanese began to create a foundation for sustained economic growth. They unified measurements and currency, created postal, banking and telegraph systems, built infrastructure including harbors, railroads, and power plants, and ultimately developed industry in sugar, aluminum, cement, iron, chemicals, textiles, and lumber.\(^6\) In his comparison of the economic situations in Japanese and French colonies, historian Bruce Cumings calls Taiwan a model for export-led development.\(^7\) He goes on to describe Japanese rule as more of a modernization effort than a colonization effort. The 1930s and 40s, even compared with the “economic miracle” of Taiwan in the 1960s and 70s, which was Taiwan’s period of greatest material progress, as Japan taught the island how to export and protected the domestic market.\(^8\)

As economically progressive as Japanese colonization proved to be, there was a catch. In the words of Samuel Ho, by becoming a colony of Japan, Taiwan “traded political independence for stability and economic progress.”\(^9\) The colonial government’s objectives in Taiwan were not only to found and stimulate an economy, but also to keep economic power in Japanese hands. The government enacted strict regulations on Taiwan’s economy, encouraging the concentration of economic power in the corporate sector and ensuring that this sector was owned and controlled by Japanese officials. The Farmer’s Association, for example, which was founded in 1900 at the initiative of wealthy farmers and landlords, soon became an arm of the government. By the 1920s the Japanese had in the Farmer’s Association the type of institution needed to bring scientific farming to Taiwan, while at the same time maintaining the central government’s stake in Taiwan’s enormous agricultural sector.\(^10\)

The government also encouraged Japanese migration to the island, and
through institutionalized discrimination practices severely limited upward mobility for the Taiwanese population.\(^{11}\) The Japanese colonists dominated the economy through state-sanctioned monopolies, and in the end, Japanese goals on Taiwan differed little from those of European imperialists in their own colonies. The island was to become a cheap source of raw materials and economic support structure for the Japanese Empire.\(^{12}\) This style of colonial development, which included high tariffs to promote exports over imports and brought wealth from the colonies to the metropole, hearkens back to the Western European system of mercantilism. In fact, during Japanese rule about 85 percent of the island’s exports went to the home islands of Japan’s Empire.\(^{13}\)

Thus, historian Steven Phillips calls Japan’s rule a “progressive despotism” that promoted political stability and economic development, yet crushed dissent and maintained a Japanese power structure.\(^{14}\) Similarly, Samuel Ho explains that perhaps the most serious of the intangible costs of Japanese colonization was that it prevented the emergence of a dynamic Taiwanese entrepreneur-capitalist class. Consequently, an element crucial to sustained economic growth was absent in the Taiwanese population, and if Japan suddenly decided to withdraw from Taiwan, economic growth would stall.\(^{15}\) This was, ultimately, what happened in 1945 when Japanese entrepreneurs and capitalists were hastily repatriated from Taiwan, after Japan’s defeat in the war. The Japanese did not put enough economic or political power in the hands of the Taiwanese population, and thus when the Japanese left, so did Taiwan’s wealth and human capital.

The role of the remnants of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan’s economic collapse is succinctly shown by none other than Chen Yi himself, Taiwan’s Governor-General during the February 28 Incident. On December 31, 1946, just two months prior to the uprising, Chen Yi gave a radio speech directed to the people of Taiwan. In his speech he reviews the past year’s accomplishments, and sets out goals for the New Year. He recognizes the need for “economic and psychological reconstruction” of Taiwan, yet he blames the problems of Taiwan on the “vicious policies” of Japanese imperialists “to keep our Taiwan brethren ignorant and restrict their opportunity to...achieve elevated positions in society.” He goes on to describe his “Five Year Economic Reconstruction Plan,” proclaiming 1947 as the “Production Year” for Taiwan. He explains that Chinese rule has instituted equal opportunity and incorporated the Taiwanese into government, and explains how the Chinese economic policy is different from that of the Japanese, “which was designed only to rob profits from the people in order to support Japanese military aggression.”\(^{16}\)

First and foremost, it is telling of the social situation in Taiwan that prior to the February 28 Incident, Governor-General Chen Yi identified the faltering economy as a primary target for governmental action. The Taiwanese population was clearly distressed from the postwar economic situation, and Chen Yi recognized this. More importantly, though, is the fact that he connects the current economic woes to the past remnants of Japanese rule. Although much of his speech is Chinese nationalist propaganda — as we will see, Chinese administration was just as, if not more oppressive than that of Japan. The economic failure in Taiwan after World War II was not caused solely by Chinese mismanagement. Both Japanese and Chinese occupation of Taiwan was exploitative, and Japan’s failure to prepare the Taiwanese economy to be self-sufficient definitely played a large role in the subsequent financial crisis. Chen Yi’s view, though obviously biased and somewhat misleading, conveys an important aspect of the cause of the rebellion. To make matters worse, this was only the first of the three primary causes of the economic downturn that led to the February 28 Incident.

**The Chinese Nationalists’ Economic Mismanagement**

On the surface, the structure of the Chinese nationalists’ economy in Taiwan was not all that different than the Japanese approach. The Kuomintang government of the Republic of China continued the Japanese legacy of strict state control of the economy. Governor-General Chen Yi’s system of
“necessary state socialism” consisted of monopoly regulations that took control of nearly all Taiwanese corporations. Moreover, just as the Japanese had maintained control of high governmental and economic offices, the Chinese nationalists also assumed leadership in Taiwan. Thus, it was not the Taiwanese population in charge of the economy, but “carpetbagging” mainlanders who migrated to fill the void left by the Japanese.10

Ultimately, the only real difference between the structure of the Taiwanese economy before and after Retrocission Day was the central government’s stated values and principles. Japan ruled Taiwan as a traditional colony, supporting the Empire that was centralized in the metropole. In contrast, the Kuomintang’s ideology was grounded in Sun-Yat Sen’s Three Principles of the People, which emphasized the unity and nationalism of the Chinese people. In governing Taiwan, the Chinese called the Taiwanese their “brethren” and implemented their nationalist ideology by favoring national capital over private investment.11 Governor-General Chen Yi took Sun-Yat Sen’s economic policies seriously, interpreting them to justify his administration’s intervention in all economic activities.12 He claimed that the purpose of his economic planning was the people’s welfare, and by the end of 1946, his administration controlled even more economic activity than the Japanese had.13

Even though the Chinese nationalists’ economic structure in Taiwan did not differ greatly from that of the Japanese, economic conditions under Chinese rule nevertheless plummeted. The year of 1946 was one of unrelieved economic disaster. Prices rose steadily, production fell, and unemployment among the Taiwanese became a grave problem.14 In 1939 Taiwan produced in excess of 1,400,000 metric tons of sugar; in contrast, in 1947, the first full crops produced under Chinese management yielded only 30,000 metric tons, about the same amount which had been produced in 1895 before the Japanese developed the industry.15 Manufacturing industries before the war had employed between 40,000 and 50,000 Taiwanese; fourteen months after Japan’s surrender, fewer than 5,000 Taiwanese were employed.16 The cost of foodstuffs, building materials and chemical fertilizers rose, and Taiwanese workers could not meet the rising cost of living in the cities. As a result, many drifted back to their ancestral homes in the countryside, and the small, but prosperous Taiwanese middle class began to vanish.17 Even public health deteriorated. In middle of 1946, four cases of the bubonic plague were discovered, and as summer approached cholera reappeared on the island, a disease which had not been known in epidemic proportions since 1919.18

Yet if the economic structure in Taiwan was not dramatically changed after the transfer of power in 1945, where was the Republic of China’s fault in causing this severe economic downturn? Corruption among many of the ruling Chinese nationalists was the second primary cause for Taiwan’s economic collapse. In the words of American diplomat George Kerr, efficient Japanese ownership and management had been “replaced overnight by inefficient Chinese ownership and management.”19 Bribery was pervasive among Chinese officials, and because of the political and economic structure, the Taiwanese population was unable to rehabilitate their own small industries and commercial enterprises. The governing mainlanders held the licensing power, controlled transport, and manipulated capital and credit sources.20 The Taiwanese were overwhelmed by the red tape of the governmental bureaucracy, finding themselves at the mercy of three corrupt principal agencies: the Finance Commission, the Department of Transport and Communications, and the Taiwan Trading Bureau.21

Contempt for the ruling class grew as the Taiwanese experienced nationalist corruption first-hand, recalling fondly the rule of law under the strict, yet predictable police state of the Japanese. Mainland Chinese at all levels were in a position to vote themselves salaries, bonuses, and perquisites.22 New extremes of wealth and poverty appeared. Men and women from Shanghai set unprecedented standards of luxury, and ragged peddlers and beggars became a common sight.23 The Taiwanese joked about passing
the Five-Part Imperial Exam, referring to the five things officials craved: gold, automobiles, rank, homes, and women. They mocked Sun-Yat Sen’s Three Principles, since his face was on the currency that so many officials demanded as bribes. Due to this government corruption, the schism between the Taiwanese and their Chinese nationalist superiors was exacerbated.

At the same time, Kuomintang soldiers looted every city street and suburban village unfortunate enough to have a Nationalist Army barracks or encampment nearby. These underpaid and undisciplined conscripts became objects of scorn and contempt among the Taiwanese population in much the same way as the government officials. As mainlanders flooded the island, they looted war-damaged buildings and unguarded property. It soon became common for the Taiwanese to refer to the Japanese as exploitative ‘dogs’, and to the mainland Chinese as greedy and uncultured pigs. The Taiwanese complained that for every shipload of commodities that left the ports they received in return only a shipload of greedy mainlanders. American diplomat George Kerr offers countless anecdotes of atrocities committed by mainlanders upon the Taiwanese population. Yet what becomes clear from these stories is not only the social and political schism in Taiwan at this time, but also a deep-seated corruption among the ruling class. Chinese mainlanders in both high official positions and low-level military ranks drained Taiwan of its economic potential through dishonest leadership and maladministration.

General Albert Wedemeyer, a United States Army commander who served in Asia during World War II, provides a condemning view of Chinese nationalist rule in the wake of the February 28 Incident. On August 17, 1947, he reported to Secretary of State George Marshall on the state of Chinese rule in Taiwan, and his discussion stresses the Chinese nationalists’ blame in causing the economic ruin and political chaos that led to the February 28 Incident. He explains the following:

“The Central Government [of the Republic of China] lost a fine opportunity to indicate to the Chinese people and to the world at large its capability to provide honest and efficient administration... Chen [Yi] and his henchmen ruthlessly, corruptly and avariciously imposed their regime upon a happy and amenable population...[the Taiwanese] fear that the Central Government contemplates bleeding their island to support the tottering and corrupt Nanking machine and I think their fears are well founded.”

Later in his report, he mentions the abundance of natural resources on the island and the previously impressive record of Taiwan’s commercial production.

Wedemeyer’s view in his report is of twofold importance. First, he describes that the Taiwanese population is not distressed due to a lack of independence, but rather primarily because of the economic ruin that has plagued their country. Months after the event, Wedemeyer interpreted the main concern in Taiwan as economic more so than political. Second, he argues that the Taiwanese unrest that was brought to the world stage was a direct result of the incapability of Chinese leadership to sustain the island’s economy. He points to the economic potential of Taiwan as a nation, and denounces the Chinese
nationalists for wasting that potential. Another American perspective of the troubles in Taiwan is provided in an article published in The New York Times on March 4, 1947, entitled “Formosan Rebellion is Quieted by Chinese Governor’s Promises.” In the article, columnist Tillman Durdin describes the tense situation in Taiwan over the week that followed the February 28 Incident, and corroborates Wedemeyer’s opinion. Referencing the 32 Demands and Governor-General Chen Yi’s “promise to organize a joint Kuomintang-military-civilian inquiry board to investigate causes of Formosans’ clashes with ‘outsiders’,” Durdin attempts to provide information on a still-unclear situation in Taiwan. He then goes on to calm the American sentiment that the Taiwanese rebellion may be addressed towards the United States, because America had offered aid to the Republic of China through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). He explains that these fears are unfounded, saying that local assurances indicate that the uprising had no anti-foreign motive. Instead, the rebellion was due solely to the economic corruption of the local government in Taiwan:

“Reliable informants said the open revolt started when Chinese authorities, who have been clamping on economic controls, searched for smuggled cigarettes... [The Taiwanese] labeled the Chinese administration ‘a corrupt bureaucracy’ that had strangled the formerly prosperous island with monopolistic controls over industry and commerce.”

Like General Wedemeyer’s opinion in The China White Papers, Durdin’s analysis of the situation in Taiwan demonstrates two important things about the views concerning the uprising. First, the original motive of the revolt was chiefly, if not completely, economic distress. He does not phrase his summary of the situation in words one would find in descriptions of other countries undergoing decolonization, where political independence and social inferiority were the primary reasons to revolt. Second, in the week following the incident, Durdin certainly sees the economic distress – at least through Taiwanese eyes – as an immediate result of corruption among the Chinese nationalists.

Though not completely comprehensive and ‘fair’ to the Chinese nationalists, both General Wedemeyer and Tyler Durdin convey an understanding of the situation in Taiwan after the uprising that is common among historians past and present. Specifically, they see the cause of the economic woes in Taiwan, and thus the ensuing incident, as results of the Chinese National Government’s faults. Though these views are those of Americans insulated from the conflict, they are close to the event in time. This perspective is thus crucial to understanding the causes and effects of the February 28 Incident. Economic mismanagement on the part of the Kuomintang was not the only cause of the uprising, but it was certainly a critical factor.

The Post World War II Context of Taiwan

A third source of Taiwan’s economic downturn can be attributed to the context of the end of World War II. In a sense, this factor made much of the economic causes of the February 28 Incident rather unavoidable. The Chinese nationalists inherited an industrial infrastructure that was worn down from the demands of the Japanese war effort. Allied bombing of the island during the war devastated industrial facilities, and to make matters worse, work on repairs of damaged areas ceased upon Japan’s surrender as Japanese technical experts and managers returned home. Steven Phillips maintains that “in such a situation, any government would have had a difficult time managing the island’s resources.” It also certainly did not help that there was a dramatic difference in the economic power of Japan and the Republic of China while they ruled Taiwan. Since the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, which enabled Japan to annex Taiwan, the island nation was no longer tied to a chaotic and crumbling China, but became part of an
increasingly powerful and economically developed Japan. In contrast, the mainland economy of the Republic of China struggled heavily during its recovery from World War II. Cold War competition with its communist neighbors and expenses in the Second Sino-Japanese War hindered the Republic of China’s ability to support Taiwan’s economy.

The horrific economic conditions in Taiwan came to a head in early 1947. On the evening of February 27, six police officers attempted to arrest a woman selling cigarettes illegally in Taipei. After a policeman struck the woman, an angry crowd gathered and violence broke out after an officer fired his weapon, killing a bystander. The next day, 2,000 to 3,000 Taiwanese marched to the Monopoly Bureau Headquarters, and hundreds moved on to Governor-General Chen Yi’s office. Besides the beating and shooting, what the islanders protested was not political dependence on foreign rule necessarily, but rather unemployment, food shortages, inflation, and corruption. That afternoon either a soldier or police officer fired into the crowd, sparking an island-wide uprising against police, soldiers, bureaucrats, and any mainland unfortunate enough to be on the streets. It was in the wake of this disaster that many different Taiwanese groups used the opportunity created by the temporary power vacuum to pursue their own agendas, which included the traditional demands of a colonized population – independence, self-determination, and the like.

Within a week of the February 28 Incident, there was an immediate outcry against the Chinese nationalist regime. On March 7, a Settlement Committee composed of senior economic and professional men on the island, presented to Governor-General Chen Yi a petition known as the 32 Demands. This list of demands, grouped into six general categories, appealed not for an overthrow of the Chinese nationalist government, but rather a reform of their policies. For instance, it insisted that “the Office of Governor-General shall be reorganized by the Settlement Committee…so that righteous and able officers can be appointed.” Items such as these called for continued Chinese nationalist involvement in government, and a removal of the maladministration that had contributed to the uprising. The demands also included a reduction in taxes, the reduction of state interference in industries, the advent of a Committee for Inspecting Public Enterprises to prevent corruption, the abolition of the Monopoly and Trading Bureaus, and repayment for lost wealth from exported sugar and food. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, the 32 Demands offered more relaxed appeals than may be seen in other countries’ decolonization efforts. The Taiwanese demanded not a full-fledged change in regime, but rather the reorganization of government policies, largely economic, that caused the conditions that led to the February 28 Incident.

In 1951, years after the uprising, columnist Han Lih-wu published an article in Taiwan Today, a weekly newspaper based in Taipei, about the interconnectedness of the Taiwanese population, the Chinese nationalists, and the previous Japanese colonizers. His discussion is remarkably non-partisan, and provides a view of the February 28 Incident that points to the complexities and contingencies of the Taiwanese situation. Lih-wu argues that “due credit should be given to the Japanese for their achievements during their occupation of Taiwan…[because] a general foundation had been well laid in local economy…[and] life was regulated, stable and fair.” He attributes the ensuing economic downturn on the stresses that World War II brought upon the island. As a result of the war, “Taiwan was at its low ebb when returned to the Chinese national fold” – not only was the economy’s infrastructure crippled, but the Taiwanese people were used to being servile subjects. The need to find enough trained personnel after Japanese withdrawal was aggravated by the Chinese government’s problems on the mainland, and ultimately, the problem of governing Taiwan was not too much government centralization, but rather a shortage of people with sufficient experience and understanding, “which came with years of servitude” to the Japanese.

Later in the article, Lih-wu speaks rather well of the Chinese nationalists’ efforts, saying that while the government had good intentions and honest purposes, “there were bound to be petty opportunists and unscrupulous
politicians.” But regardless of the violence and conflict in 1947, Taiwan was making a quick recovery, even compared to the mainland and other war-affected areas in the Far East. He declares that Taiwan is no longer a colony but an “island fortress” that has forged on through hard times. Just as both the Japanese colonists and the Chinese National Government set Taiwan up for economic failure and the ensuing uprising, these parties, with the advent of the new Provincial Government, set the island up to flourish. He goes on to explain that this unlikely and unintended cooperation between the Japanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese laid the foundations for the island to ultimately gain self-rule.

It is important to take Lih-wu’s characterization of Taiwan in 1951 with a bit of skepticism. On May 19, 1949, Chairman of the National Government of the Republic of China, Chiang-Kai Shek, declared martial law in Taiwan, which extended until 1987. This period of strict political suppression and prosecution of opposition (real or perceived) to the Kuomintang was known as the White Terror. Thus, Lih-wu’s ability to speak out against the National Government was undoubtedly limited. Nevertheless, he offers many critical insights into the period of transition from Japanese to Chinese rule in Taiwan. His article conveys many of the various views on why the transition in the late 1940s was so difficult. He makes clear that the February 28 Incident was not caused by any single facet, but was rather a combination of a number of economic contexts – namely, post-World War II economic distress in both mainland China and the island of Taiwan itself, the remnants of Japan’s colonization that limited the preparedness of the Taiwanese to revive their economy, and the Chinese nationalists’ mismanagement of the island’s economic, political, and societal situation. In fact, concerning the bright economic future of Taiwan, Lih-wu was certainly right. Taiwan’s remarkable development into a substantial East Asian economic power would be largely due to international aid – particularly from the United States – over the decades following the February 28 Incident. Taiwan’s swift economic development after the 1950s is known to many as the “Taiwan miracle.” Bruce Cumings emphasizes that the foundation for Taiwan’s economic growth in the 1960s was ultimately established in the 1950s, agreeing wholeheartedly with Lih-wu.

Conclusion

It is important to recognize the fact that taking a purely economic view of the February 28 Incident does not give the full picture of the problems of decolonization in Taiwan. There are very fine lines and a grey area between economic, social, and political problems of the decolonization era, and often it is difficult to separate one from the other. Nevertheless, the history of Taiwan, as well as the events surrounding the incident itself seems to point to economic problems as a crucial factor in the February 28 Incident. George Kerr goes so far as to say outright that Chen Yi’s economic policies based on “Necessary State Socialism” were the ultimate causes of the 1947 rebellion. Similarly, Steven Phillips spends much time discussing the two economic transitions that Taiwan was facing in late 1945: the movements from Japanese to Chinese societal influence, and from wartime mobilization to peacetime reconstruction. Moreover, political grievances, though fiercely present after the uprising, seem to be much more subtle prior to the event. The vast majority of the Taiwanese – up to 80 percent – were rural folk who played no role in the uprising. Of the remaining 20 percent, only a fraction played little if any role, and of those who participated, only some had serious political grievances. In A Tragic Beginning, the authors state that there is no compelling evidence that the uprising was deliberately organized by Taiwanese who planned to turn Taiwan into a separate, sovereign nation. Ultimately, of the problems facing Chen Yi’s administration, none was more serious than the economic crisis.

In studying the complicated and deep-rooted economic issues that plagued Taiwan after decolonization, it should be emphasized that these problems did not stem from any one source. Rather, they were the combination of an unsustainable Taiwanese economic infrastructure created by Japanese colonists, Chinese
nationalists’ mismanagement of their newfound territory, and the general economically debilitating post-World War II context. Thus, to focus only on one of these causes does not give a complete picture of the situation in Taiwan. Though the Taiwanese often look back with nostalgia at Japanese rule, Bruce Cumings’ argument that the Japanese era was more modernization than colonization is a somewhat superficial view. Both regimes were exploitative in their own manner, and each contributed to Taiwan’s economic disaster in different ways. On the other hand, American perspectives from George Kerr, General Albert Wedemeyer, and columnist Tillman Durdin, insist that Taiwan was a “clean slate” for the Chinese nationalists, and “under proper management [Taiwan’s] modern economy could have been made to generate great surpluses needed in the rehabilitation program for China proper.” This view, too, tends to look at the Taiwanese problem only at a surface level. Neither offers a comprehensive understanding, and both omit fundamental aspects of Taiwan’s decolonization.

The mid-20th century brought with it a wave of decolonization that passed over nearly the entire globe and tore down long-established Empires. While economic conditions played a large role in decolonization, many were sparked by the worldwide emergence of concepts such as human rights and self-determination. Taiwan however, was not a typical case. Instead of political ideologies spurring the realization of economic oppression, in Taiwan it was the other way around. Although not formally a colony under the Chinese Nationalists, Taiwan experienced the direct consequences of a ruined economy that are characteristic of colonization. The fact that these economic conditions were at their height preceding the February 28 Incident was no coincidence — it was the true cause of the uprising. Consequently, it was not until after the uprising that many political demands became public. The forum for political independence, formerly underground, was thus drawn to the surface, and Taiwan’s course of history was permanently altered.

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The article considers the prevailing argument that democracies within multi-ethnic societies, including India, are majoritarian governments, where institutionalized discrimination becomes likely, and under a partisan state could degenerate into a mobocracy. Examined is the current debate surrounding Indian Prime Ministerial candidate Narendra Modi. This paper addresses the question of whether or not a Hindu nationalist such as Modi is an electorally viable choice within a multi-cultural, multi-faith, and multi-lingual state such as India.

There is a prevailing argument that democracies within multi-ethnic societies are at best majoritarian governments in which institutionalized discrimination is likely. While some even argue majoritarian governments can potentially collapse into a mobocracy under a partisan administration, in which the state becomes complicit of mass terror inflicted upon religious minorities. India, a nation where majoritarianism remains the norm, regardless of the political party in power, is certainly no exception to this rule. For this reason there is quite a heated debate currently surrounding Indian Prime Ministerial candidate Narendra Modi, namely over whether a Hindu nationalist such as Modi is even an appropriate or electorally viable choice within a multi-cultural, multi-faith, and multi-lingual state such as India.

This electoral debate emerged following Modi's recent appointment as head of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) opposition campaign in the general elections in 2014. Most arguments in support of Modi have focused on his economic achievements as Chief Minister of Gujarat. He has undoubtedly become the epitome of economic growth following the immense success of the northwestern state of Gujarat during his administration. Therefore the contentious issues surrounding Modi are chiefly political, with many worried that his potential ascendance to a role in national politics challenges the very idea of an India in which diversity should be recognized. Many fear that if Modi becomes Prime Minister he will employ his position of dominant power and influence to pursue a policy of assimilation towards religious and linguistic minorities, instead of striving for public policies that embrace diversity and integration.

For this reason, this central electoral debate has elicited many important political questions related to the state of Indian politics, including whether: India should follow a French or American model of secularism, what the role of group identities should be, and whether minority groups should be afforded special rights above the established individual rights of all citizens. These concerns are certainly not unrealistic either, as Hindu nationalists have always sought a European style of nationhood predicated upon a notion of uniformity as opposed to integration. Thus, Modi’s Hindu nationalist platform seems to conflict with modern Indian secularism, which was essentially founded on the political compromise that neither the majority nor the minority should feel its rights becoming subservient to another. Modern Indian secularism insists that the government remain equally distant from

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all religions. After all, group identities have become so entrenched within Indian society, since the time of Partition that it has since been the prevailing notion within national politics to protect group religious identities as paramount to effectively governing a democratic India.

Given the significance of group identities within India, there is some debate as to whether a Hindu nationalist such as Modi is even an electorally viable choice regarding the upcoming 2014 general elections. While Modi’s Hindu majoritarian platform may succeed in galvanizing a large portion of the electorate, it could also inadvertently polarize the nation, and as a result make him an unacceptable candidate for most non-Congress parties. This issue becomes salient upon further examination of a few fundamental realities of Indian politics. For example, while small communities can largely be ignored by candidates in bipolar elections, as exemplified by the case of Gujarat, they become far more consequential once electoral contests become multipolar. Therefore Modi is likely to be unsuccessful in states that provide a majority of the seats to the Lok Sabha because these are states where Muslims have become electorally significant, either because of their numbers or due to the multipolarity of the party system. Given these fundamental realities of Indian politics, and the fact that campaign platforms directed towards economic growth have invariably reached a limited portion of the overall electorate, many agree that Modi’s impressive record of economic development does not offset the need to issue an official apology regarding the riots that occurred under his administration. Thus, it is becoming increasingly apparent that Modi must take responsibility for the violence that occurred during his administration, implement a good deal of ideological moderation, and establish a multi-party alliance in order to become a viable candidate.

"...Modi must take responsibility for the violence that occurred during his administration, implement a good deal of ideological moderation, and establish a multi-party alliance in order to become a viable candidate."

...better suited for Indian society because it celebrates diversity and provides ample political space to religious group identities, such as those of Hindus and Muslims.

Although some scholars would agree that the United States has achieved a terrific balance between...
allowing minority groups to make social, economic, and political progress, while remaining strong as a nation, others point out that, historically speaking, religion as a social institution has never been as deeply rooted within the identity of American citizens as it has been for Indian citizens. Furthermore, there has never existed any open hostility between religion and the state as that which currently exists in India. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that implementing the American model would hardly yield the same results in India as it did in the United States.

For these reasons, India should not attempt to replicate either a French or American model of secularism in order to acquire national purpose and strength, especially when considering the impracticalities associated with implementing either of these models. Instead, any prime ministerial candidate should be inclined towards the traditional Indian model of secularism, in which the state maintains equal distance from all religions but reserves the right to intervene in issues regarding religion, if either public order or the personal security of individuals becomes threatened. Such a model serves to recognize the individual's connection with religion as uniquely different from the individual's relationship to the state. Establishing a system of undifferentiated citizenship, in which Indian society would not be forced to become either homogeneous or majoritarian, would allow for citizens to personally identify with any group and enjoy many sub-identities, while at the same time officially recognizing citizens as equal and free individuals. By doing so, the government would be able to assume an active role in breaking down deeply rooted religious group identities that have caused social and political divisions for decades.

For example, the existence of personal laws have long been a hotly contested issue, because of their tendency to privilege group identities. This contradiction is perhaps best illustrated in the case of Shah Bano, whereby the state privileged her identity as a Muslim woman over her identity as an individual Indian citizen. This policy seems to contradict India’s uniform civil code and the idea of a liberal democracy, in which group identities are meant to take a secondary role to the political identity of an individual.

Those in favor of affording special rights to minority groups insist that it leads to redistribution from the majority and therefore improves discrimination, well those against affording special rights to minority groups argue it creates political tension within the majority community and weakens inter-caste relations.

While the interests of minority groups should be protected, granted they do not infringe upon the rights of individuals or minorities, group rights should not be given greater importance over individual rights. It is impossible to ignore the political tension that modern Indian secularism has created between the rights of individuals and the rights of minority groups. This is because affording special rights to minority groups based on identity has several negative implications for Indian society as a whole. First, imposing additional restrictions forces individuals to either accept the state’s definition of their faith or to effectively reject their own personal religious beliefs. Thereby restrictions promote a discriminatory framework of differentiated citizenship based primarily upon an individual's ascriptive status. Second, any such rights should either be extended or denied to all citizens equally, otherwise they serve to create resentment within the majority community and worsen communal relations. Third, minority rights promote further identity entrenchment. Rather than fighting that which already exists by promoting the introduction of religious quotas, it ignores the fact that caste cannot be changed (unlike religion). Muslims in India have not experienced the historical context of discrimination that OBCs (Other Backward Classes) have experienced, in which state policy was legitimately needed to correct for societal bias.

For these reasons, state welfare programs should not be based upon caste or religious identity, but rather simply targeted towards those in legitimate economic need. Therefore, undifferentiated citizenship should be promoted as a tangible way to separate individual and group identities and the state. While some scholars would argue that such a policy could have terrible implications on the nation as a whole, including the precipitation of untold violence on minorities, such an argument fails to recognize that the
current model of Indian secularism has the same propensity for conflict and violence, by incentivizing deeply rooted religious identities, namely through the existence of personal laws.

Conclusion
Regardless of the polarizing nature of these important political questions, most seem to agree that above all India needs to focus on strengthening the rule of law, so that violence does not go unpunished and that institutionalized discrimination comes to an end. Therefore Modi, having been blamed for his complicity in the brutal 2002 Gujarat riots that occurred during his administration, hardly seems an appropriate candidate to carry out this pressing task. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the long-term development of India’s democracy will rest upon its ability to maintain an unwavering commitment towards civil liberties, constitutional governance, and the universal principles of human rights, instead of devotion to sharply divided group identities. Thus, a Hindu nationalist such as Modi does not seem to be an ideal choice to represent the multi-cultural, multi-faith, and multi-lingual state of modern India.

Endnotes
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
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16. Ibid.
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18. Ibid.
21. Ibid.

Bibliography


Ghana enjoys a status as one of the role model states of the African continent, due to its sustained political stability, democratic advancement and human rights conditions. One issue that continues to stain its human rights record, however, is that related to accusations of witchcraft.¹ In Ghana, as in many other African countries, it is believed that unfortunate events such as premature deaths, sicknesses, job failures, and others are caused by witches: people with evil intentions and special spiritual powers.²

After such a mishap occurs, individuals, especially women with weak social protection, may be accused.³ The alleged witches are often assaulted and may then be banished to so-called “witches’ camps.” There is no fair trial in which they are able to defend themselves against the accusations. In recent times, there has been an increased amount of attention for these human rights abuses in national and international media⁴, by governmental and non-governmental institutions⁵ and in academia.⁶ The need for intervention has been widely recognized and many non-governmental organizations and religious organizations have started to combat the human rights violations in various ways. There are also a number of recommendations that have been made by independent researchers, NGOs and various governmental institutions, but not yet executed.⁷ This article will offer an inclusive analysis of these varying efforts in order to see which has the most potential to curb the problems of human rights abuses in Ghana. In order to do so, it will first provide an overview of the Ghanaian witchcraft beliefs, the accusations, the witches’ camps, and the human rights accusations. It will then present a categorization of the types of policy that have been recommended and executed so far. This section will also introduce a model by which the different kinds of policy can be analyzed based on the perceived root cause of the problem. Finally, the potential of the different policy options will be discussed.

Background
A belief in the existence of a spiritual world that includes forces of witchcraft is extremely widespread in all layers of Ghanaian society, “cut[ting] across divisions of class, age and gender.”⁸ A survey by the Ghanaian National Centre for Civic Education (NCCE) found that 89.37 percent of the interviewees in the Northern region believe that witchcraft exists.⁹ It can be defined as, according to the definition of Evans-Pritchard: “a natural philosophy by which the relations between men and unfortunate events are explained [...] embracing a system of values which regulate human conduct.”¹⁰ In Ghana, witches are held responsible for all sorts of disease, death and misfortune in the form of: addiction, drunkenness, poor academic performance, insanity, accidents, loss or destruction of property, drought, floods, fire, snake bites, relationship failures, parenting problems, and more.¹¹ Whenever such an unfortunate event occurs, many Ghanaians seek

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to find an explanation for the ‘why’ question, as well as answering the
‘how’. The anthropologist E.E. Evans-Pritchard gives a particularly fitting
example of this, in his book on the Azande people living in central Africa. He
explains the kind of questions that will
be asked in the event of an old wooden
shelter collapsing and injuring people
sitting under it;

"Now why should these
particular people have been
sitting under this particular
granary at this particular moment
when it collapsed? That it should
collapse is easily intelligible, but
why should it have collapsed
at this particular moment when
these particular people were
sitting beneath it?" 12

He acknowledges that the
Zande, like the Ghanaians, are aware
of the direct processes that cause the
construction to collapse (the degradation
of the wood). He goes on to explain
that this causal mechanism would have
sufficed as an explanation for most
Europeans. They would have attributed
the fact that these particular people
were sitting under it, at this particular
time, to bad luck. More often they would
not even bother to ask that question.
Zande and Ghanaians alike, however,
see witchcraft to be that ‘missing link,’
explaining the particulars of a mishap.
Suspicions of witchcraft are thus
very likely in a society that has been
socialized into this kind of thinking.

Once suspicions are raised, they
are the subject of continuous gossip and
conversation. These are largely muted
until consensus is reached among
community members, and a public
accusation follows. 13 Both people with
special spiritual gifts, such as pastors,
church leaders and fetish priests, 14
and ‘lay’ people, those without special
spiritual gifts, take part in the process
leading up to an accusation. Lay people
may identify certain traits and behavior
that are held to be typical of witches.
In Ghana, these traits may include red
eyes, light skin, blindness, lameness,
old age, displaying extreme anti-social
behavior, excessive poverty, excessive
wealth, and wretchedness. 15 Another
commonality among the accused is
their gender. Although some men have
also been accused and exiled, the
great majority of the accused witches
are female, due to their inferior social
status. 16 People without special spiritual
powers may also ‘expose’ witches
through dreams and revelations, or
do so because they know that an
alleged witch has given a gift to a
person, just before the misfortune
occurred. 17 Dreams and revelations or
the presentation of a gift may serve as
legitimate reasons to accuse a person.
Accusations are made because it gives
victims perceived control over the source
of evil that they believe has caused the
misfortune.

Confessions are habitually
demanded of accused witches because
the confessions are considered
necessary for successful healing.
In order to exorcise someone of a
witchcraft spirit, a victim first needs to
acknowledge that they are under the
influence of that force. 18 The confession

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is important because if someone has confessed, the community can bring him or her to a witches’ camp, a prayer camp, a witch doctor, or some other kind of person with the power to neutralize the witch powers.\textsuperscript{19}

**Human Rights Abuses**

There are three kinds of human rights abuses that are linked to the accusations: violence, exile to the witches’ camps and the lack of a fair trial. Victims may suffer from one or more.

The violence most often occurs within the communities in which the accused live and may precede exile to the witches’ camps. In the course of accusation, alleged witches are sometimes beaten, burned, mutilated or subjected to other kinds of pain.\textsuperscript{20} This is done for different reasons. First, violence may be used to force the accused to confess. For this reason, a woman was showered with kerosene and set on fire in Tema, Greater Accra region in 2010.\textsuperscript{21} Second, violence may also be used for direct elimination of the perceived source of the victim’s suffering, by murdering the witch, or to avenge the suffering inflicted upon one’s community member. In 2012, for example, a group of youths attacked a congregation of around 40 suspected witches in the Northern region. The youths claimed that this group of elderly people was responsible for the sudden deaths of a number of young people in the area. The mob searched houses and threw stones at the group of alleged witches.\textsuperscript{22}

A third category of violence is that of exorcism. This is less common since exorcism is usually left unto outsiders with supernatural powers. However, the national media has reported such cases. One example is that of a couple and a student in the Western region, tried in September 2012. The student was accused of having “inflicted severe wounds on the face” of a 7-year old girl whom she suspected of being a witch living in her house. The 19-year old used a kitchen knife to remove the witchcraft powers from the child.\textsuperscript{23} There seems to be little recognition of this type of violence in the academic literature.

The first instance of human rights abuse is the perpetration of violence itself, but in all of these cases, the accused are also faced with a lack of a fair trial. Hearsay and dreams are regarded as proof of a person’s guilt.\textsuperscript{24} The judgment of a person with powers to ‘see’ witches is considered irrefutable. As illustrated by an address of a chief from the Northern Region:

“All of us in Mamprugu know that the chief is ancestrally bequeathed with the powers to see witches and know them immediately.”\textsuperscript{25}

Eighty percent of the witches’ camp residents interviewed by the NCCE said they had been sent to witch identifiers before settling at the camp.\textsuperscript{26} Victims have neither the means nor the right to prove their innocence.

The same apparent arbitrariness is found in the ceremonies that the accused undergo when they are sent to a witches’ camp. The suspect’s community members may take him or her to the camp in order to verify the guilt of the accused, or to have the accused witch cleansed by people with spiritual powers. The events that follow the alleged witches’ arrivals differ in all of the seven camps. In general, the accused go through a trial by ordeal, a ritual to determine their guilt. The person leading the trial can determine this guilt either through looking at a suspect, through special rituals or through asking the person to confess.\textsuperscript{27}

One often-cited example of those special rituals\textsuperscript{28} is that of the slaughter of a fowl. A suspect’s guilt is determined by the sacrifice of a fowl to the gods. After the neck is cut, the fowl is left to run about. If it dies facing downwards, the guilt of the accused is ‘proven.’\textsuperscript{29} A similar ceremony is that of making the accused drink a potentially lethal concoction made of chicken blood and earth,\textsuperscript{30} while animals are being sacrificed to the gods. The aim of this is to force people to confess. They are told that if they do not confess when they are guilty, the drink will kill them, but that if they are really innocent, the drink will not cause death.\textsuperscript{31} 72.6 percent of the alleged witches interviewed by the NCCE said they had taken this drink upon arrival.\textsuperscript{32}

In principle, the alleged witches can go back to their communities after having been ‘cleansed’, their witchcraft force rendered powerless. Nonetheless, the great majority does not return for fear of a continuation of the atrocities, despite his or her powerlessness.\textsuperscript{33}
to live in the camp, the human rights violations related to the exile are of various kinds. First of all, the process of exile often means that the alleged witch has to leave most of his or her property behind.\textsuperscript{34} Although some families assign the woman a child (usually a granddaughter), to aid in the daily chores;\textsuperscript{35} most camp residents lose direct family support. The assumption that they are completely cut off from their communities, however, is incorrect. Most are still visited by family members and participate in social events at home, such as funerals.\textsuperscript{36} But the majority of the women still feel shamed and excluded. All but one of the alleged witches in the Gambaga camp, interviewed by Yaba Badoe, expressed “a profound sense of loss and separation, anger and rejection, combined with a yearning for ongoing familial contact.”\textsuperscript{37} Alleged witches sometimes stay in the camps their whole lives. Of the group of camp inhabitants interviewed by the NCCE, 36.8 percent had been living in the camps for 5 to 10 years.\textsuperscript{38}

The camps form parts of ordinary villages and are not fenced off.\textsuperscript{39} Although it is often assumed that there are six camps in the Northern Region,\textsuperscript{40} the camps mentioned in various sources introduce a seventh (Kukuo, Gambaga, Kpatinga, Bonyase, Nani, Nalerigu and Nabule; see figure 1). While an eighth camp has been identified in the Brong Ahafo region (Atebubu camp, figure 1). Media sources reported that its forty-nine inhabitants were uniquely from the Northern Region.\textsuperscript{41}

The most recent estimates of the number of alleged witches living at the camps are around 800 women and 500 children.\textsuperscript{32} Camp-specific numbers fluctuate highly between different sources, recorded at different times. Many observers are concerned about the poor living conditions that are apparent in the camps: most housing, as ActionAid notes, consists of “mud huts with flimsy thatched roofs.”\textsuperscript{42} The survey conducted by the NCCE showed that 65 percent of the women in three of the camps felt they lacked basic needs such as housing, food and clothing.\textsuperscript{43} Some sources also consider the fact that the camp residents are forced to work hard at an elderly age as one of the problems related to the witches’ camps. The NCCE found that 63.9 percent of the camp inhabitants were involved in some kind of income-generating activity such as farming, fishing or trading.\textsuperscript{44}

Both the lack of facilities and the hard labor are problematic, but less severe than the three human rights abuses mentioned before: violence, lack of a fair trial and exile. This distinction is made because the first three human rights abuses distinguish the people in the witches’ camps from those in their host communities. The latter do not face violence, arbitrary trials and banishment. Northern Ghana, however, is an impoverished region where many people, including those outside the camps, face similar hardships; 45.2 percent of the houses in rural areas of Ghana have thatched roofs; 62.1 percent of households rely on a well as a main

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Locations of the 8 witches’ camps.}
\end{figure}
water supply and 68.9 percent have no toilet. These atrocities are therefore acknowledged, but not considered to be unique to the camp residents.

Methods
Now that the human rights abuses related to witchcraft accusations have been presented, this paper will review the different kinds of policy that have been executed and recommended in order to find out which one has the most potential to curb the human rights abuses. This section will use reports from non-governmental and governmental organizations, media reports, conference proceedings and academic articles to examine the types of interventions. Next, it will present the different policy alternatives that are available, with the types of interventions grouped together according to the four different root causes they are targeting. Finally, the potential to curb the human rights violations will be discussed for each of the policy alternatives.

Types of Policy
A first analysis of the different interventions that have been proposed shows that efforts are directed at very different roots of the human rights abuses. Some interventions try to soothe the pain of the poor living conditions in the camps, while others attempt to eliminate the belief in witchcraft and stop accusations in that way. The different policy alternatives will thus be presented according to the source of the problem they are targeting. A model has been developed in order to clarify (see Figure 2).

Most experts agree that the alleged witches live in abominable circumstances. Many of the interventions proposed by the state, NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), researchers and journalists have therefore focused on ameliorating the poor living circumstances in the camps. This will be called intervention level 1. It can be regarded as ‘the tip of the iceberg,’ or the most visible manifestation of the problem. It is therefore on top of the triangle in Figure 2.

Others, however, do not see the living circumstances in the camps to be the main problem, but view the mere existence of the camps as the root problem. If the camps were eliminated, there would be no chance of bad living conditions and other human rights abuses within them. The policy proposed by this group is therefore the closure of the camps. This will be referred to as intervention level 2, represented by the second layer in Figure 2.

A third type of policy claims that if there were no accusations of witchcraft, camps would no longer be necessary and human rights violations in the camps would thus also cease. It takes accusations to be the root of the problem. This will be considered intervention level 3 (third layer of the triangle).

A fourth kind of policy is that which strives to annihilate the belief in witchcraft. The underlying line of thought is that there would not be any accusations or human rights abuses if there were no witchcraft belief. This will be called intervention level 4 (bottom layer of the triangle).

Intervention level 1: Policies addressing human rights violations in the camps
Almost all NGOs, CBOs, researchers and journalists recommend raising the standards of living in the camps. This level of intervention was the earliest to be implemented and is still the one in which the most organizations are involved. The types of interventions that flow from this logic can be grouped into three categories.
The first are the direct livelihood improvements, the second are indirect livelihood improvement through female empowerment and the third is the reintegration of women into their own communities.

The earliest intervention in the witches’ camps was that of the Presbyterian Church of Ghana. Reverend P.Y. Anane, the first district pastor, asked his congregations to donate used clothes in the early 1960s. The program was expanded in the seventies through the efforts of Reverend E.K. Osei, who established the Local Council of Churches at Gambaga and advocated for the Home to receive monthly rations of maize and oil from the Catholic Relief Service.49

The second half of the 1990s through the 2000s was marked by the establishment of many more NGOs that took part in the improvement of living conditions in the camp. Since 1996, at least six NGOs have started programs striving to directly ameliorate the situations in which the alleged witches live. This sudden upsurge could be related to a particularly severe outbreak of Cerebro-spinal meningitis (CSM) in 1997, which led to a great number of witchcraft accusations and exiles.50 Interventions include the introduction of income-generating activities such as shea butter production and poultry rearing,51 the construction of new housing, boreholes, and toilets and the provision of corn mills, education for children, clothes, health insurance, insecticide-treated bed nets, and others.52 Most of these NGOs operate from a human rights framework53 and tend to focus on the most essential needs, for the initiatives that are most often undertaken are the provision of water sources and food, and of sources of income.

A second type of policy at the first level of intervention is that of indirect livelihood improvement, namely through the empowerment of the alleged witches. Since the late 2000s, there has been a shift in focus from the bare survival of the outcasts to their empowerment. Instead of just fulfilling their material needs, NGOs started to implement programs that aim to give alleged witches (especially the women) more self-confidence to organize themselves and to have a strong collective voice. Organizations supporting this often operate within a gender framework. The efforts aimed at empowerment include the establishment of a network of alleged witches called Tibo (meaning ‘let’s support each other’ in the local Dagbani language). Through this network, members have been able to register for the National Health Insurance scheme and to obtain food aid without the intervention of an NGO.54 Similarly, literacy and awareness groups were set up in the Gnani and Kuko camps55 and women organized a march through Tamale, the regional capital, in December 2011.56 During this demonstration, they tried to raise awareness for the rights of accused women.

The last type of policy at the first level of intervention is the aim to reintegrate the alleged witches into their communities. The reasoning behind this is that the problem goes deeper than material needs; the accused should also regain unrestrained access to their families, their property and their social position. The Go Home Project, which still exists today, has long been one of the leading actors in the struggle against accusation-related human rights abuses. It aids in the reconciliatory process between the alleged witch and the community and presents the host community with some material support when it agrees to take the accused back. It aims to let accused women enjoy a meaningful life as active members of their communities again. Between 1998 and 2002 it succeeded in reintegrating an average of thirty-nine alleged witches per year. Between 2003 and 2006, however, the average dropped to an annual seven witches.57 This, according to the director of the program, Mr. Ngota, was largely due to lack of funding.

Reintegration is complex. Many of the returnees have been away from their communities for several years, some even up to thirty years. Their huts are often degraded and their roles within the communities have changed.58 Successful reintegration has not proven to be easy; ActionAid found that of all the alleged witches that returned, forty percent had to return to the camp again within one year.59 Earlier, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) reported, “the case of a woman who returned to her village and was found dead the following morning... her body burnt. Another old woman had her ear chopped off with a cutlass on her return home.”60
Intervention level 2: Policies addressing the witches’ camps

Although no measures have been taken that would lead to the actual closure of the camps, the Ghanaian Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs (MOWAC) has made such proposals. A sharp debate emerged in the media from 2011 onwards, as a response to a statement by the ministry’s Deputy Minister, Ms. Hajia Hawau Boya Gariba. She said that “the incarceration and confinement of women into camps by society and community members, constituted gross violations of their human rights, freedoms and (was) against the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women, (of) which Ghana is signatory.” She does not refer to the human rights abuses in the camps (intervention level 1) or the accusations itself (intervention level 3) as the heart of the problem. She views the “incarceration and confinement,” or the existence of the camps themselves, as the problem that should be solved. Consequently, the ActionAid news report states “MOWAC in collaboration with other stakeholders is working assiduously to disband all “witches” camps in Ghana.” According to various NGOs, the minister also mentioned a timeframe in which the camps were to be close: early 2012 was to be the deadline.

It is this addition that provoked NGOs and camp residents to respond. Various organizations expressed an opinion similar to that of the Southern Sector Yough and Women’s Empowerment Network (SOSYVEN), which stated that it “reveals a lack of understanding of how deeply engrained the beliefs are in those communities and the difficulties being faced to encourage them to accept accused ‘witches’ back home.” The NGOs expressed that they are not against disbanding the camps in general, but that they believe they should not be closed on the short term. The alleged witches agreed with that opinion.

The Ministry consequently agreed to the fact that disbandment should be gradual and that sensitization efforts should be paramount. One and a half year later NGOs note that the government has done very little to move towards closure of the camps. Although NGOs have continued to reintegrate accused witches, new arrivals have equally come.

Intervention level 3: Policies addressing the accusations

All of those arguing against immediate disbandment of the camps in fact demand a guarantee of security for the alleged witches. They would support the closure of the camps, but only if accused witches no longer face the risk of being exiled, assaulted or stigmatized. They thus call on communities to find alternative ways to deal with suspicions of witchcraft. The policies flowing from this argument form a third level of intervention.

A very early example of policy aimed at stopping accusations can be found in the colonial laws prohibiting the anti-witchcraft cults. Anti-witchcraft cults are cults led by priests who solve misfortunes. The cause they most commonly found for people’s marital, financial, immigration or physical troubles, was witchcraft, which therefore led to frequent accusations. In an attempt to curb accusations, colonial legislation outlawed the movements in 1908. This did not prove effective, however, because adherents of the cults resorted to secret worship of the god of the anti-witchcraft movement. Consequently, the law was soon adapted to allow for voluntary confessions and cleansing of witchcraft.

Another type of program, which aims to tackle the problem at the level of accusations, is that of raising awareness of women’s rights and offering alternative ways of dealing with suspicions of witchcraft. Organizations promote this awareness through workshops on health, human rights and welfare of the aged, sensitization training for NGO staff, educational programs, photo exhibitions on the lives of women in the camps, and the SOSYVEN documentary titled “What I Used To Know: The Road to Ghana’s ‘Witches’ Camps.” Simultaneously, a book was published that compiled the best essays on witchcraft accusations, written by some of the students that had participated in the educational program. A number of NGOs, CBOs and women’s groups have also come together to form the Anti-Witchcraft Allegiation Campaign.
Coalition. Their aim is to "make witchcraft accusations issues a national issue and get legislators/policymakers to support the campaign" through posters, radio jingles and radio drama in three Northern districts.

Intervention level 4: Policies addressing the witchcraft belief

Lastly, some NGOs and researchers recommend improving healthcare and education as a solution to the human rights abuses. These kinds of recommendations are often framed in very general terms, not explaining exactly how an advance in healthcare or education would reduce the number of accusation-related human rights abuses. What they actually attempt to do, however, is to decrease the belief in witchcraft by substituting the logic of magic with a scientific logic. Ultimately, they strive to convince people of the fallacy of witchcraft. Others do not even propose an alternative logic, but simply recommend making people understand that witchcraft is superstitious. Mensah Adinkrah, for example, proposes “the Ghanaian authorities should mount a massive aggressive public service campaign […] to educate the Ghanaian public about the fallacy of witchcraft beliefs and accusations.”

Because the correlation between an advance in healthcare and a decrease in accusation-related human rights abuses is often so unclear, this article will suggest three possible logics behind it. Firstly, advanced healthcare would bring down the number of early deaths, which would consequently reduce the number of mishaps in need of a supernatural explanation, such as witchcraft. Secondly, better and more widespread knowledge on common causes of death renders inexplicable deaths explicable. Thirdly, an increase in medical knowledge offers a better understanding of mental disorders, which would replace the need for a supernatural explanation for ‘asocial’ behavior by ‘witches’. An example can be found in a documentary made by SOSYWEN, in which one of the staff members of the Ghana Health Service (GHS) does a presentation for a group of middle-aged women in order to make them aware of the medical reasons for their potentially ‘asocial’ behavior. He explains:

“The period even before the menopause what we call the pre-menopausal era, you will go through a lot of tension, you sweat a lot (and) you complain (about) a lot of very little things, you shout at your children… sometimes you will say things and they will happen. In the same way, if a relative of yours has been accused, send the person for medical check-up, it is most likely that this person is having a medical condition that makes him or her behave in such a manner that people will call (them) a witch.”

What these three correlations illustrate is the fact that there are two conditions that need to be satisfied before a person can be branded a witch. First of all, there needs to be a conducive environment for the accusation. This is a long-term condition that makes certain people more vulnerable to witchcraft accusations than others, mostly because they diverge from what is normal or expected of their age group, gender or general status as a community member. However, these conditions alone are not sufficient to make an accusation. It takes a spark to transform it into an accusation. This spark may take the form of a mishap of some kind. The last mechanism, pertaining to the asocial behavior that may be displayed by some alleged witches, takes away the ‘conducive environment’; People are offered a scientific explanation for the abnormal behavior they will not need to resort to magical explanations anymore. The first two mechanisms relate not to the conducive environment but to the spark. Fewer early deaths mean fewer mishaps for which a scapegoat must be sought. Similarly, if people know that a certain disease causes a death, there will be no need for a magical explanation anymore. The spark is thereby eliminated.

Note that these policies rely on the assumption that scientific and magical explanations for certain events are mutually exclusive. Moreover, it is taken for granted that, if people are presented with a choice between scientific and magical logic, they will doubtlessly choose the scientific, thereby abandoning their belief in witchcraft.
Apart from the recommendation of advanced healthcare, intervention level 4 also calls for improved education. Adinkrah, for example, says that: “formal education may have the potential of eradicating such [witchcraft] beliefs” for “illiteracy may have contributed to witchcraft beliefs.” Adinkrah does not clarify how a higher level or more widespread education will lead to a decrease in the human rights abuses related to witchcraft accusations. A possible explanation is that educated people are more likely to report violence and exile to the police and will therefore be less vulnerable. Another explanation is again the assumption that education trains people in a certain mode of thinking that is believed to be non-compatible with magical explanations.

Discussion

Now that the logic behind the different intervention levels has been clarified, it can be contrasted with some of what is already known about the nature of witchcraft beliefs and the related human rights abuses. In doing so, it becomes clear that certain kinds of policy are based on assumptions that have been proven to be wrong.

Starting with intervention level 4, eradicating the belief in witchcraft, it is possible to find two major flaws in the assumptions on which these types of policy interventions rest. A policy of this kind assumes that scientific analogy and magical analogy are mutually exclusive. It assumes that the problem lies in the fact that people lack scientific explanations for certain mishaps. It supposes that, when people are provided with scientific explanations, in the form of more education and medical knowledge, they will gladly accept it and abandon their old belief system. This assumption fails to recognize that scientific analogy and magical analogy answer two different questions and can therefore co-exist. A scientific explanation does not eliminate the need for a magical explanation. Ever since Evans-Pritchard (1937), anthropologists have understood that the scientific explanation answers the ‘how’ of a misfortune. The magical explanation answers the ‘why.’ It is not enough just to know the disease that killed someone; many Ghanaians want to know why it had to be this person that fell victim to that particular disease at that particular time. Evans-Pritchard calls these the universal and the particular explanations.

Understanding this invariably leads to the conclusion that policy aimed at replacing magical analogy by scientific analogy would be futile; more widespread medical knowledge will not lead to the abandonment of the witchcraft belief because the scientific complements the magical instead of substituting it. Even if people were perfectly aware of the “how” - for example how malaria kills people - and could be absolutely sure that this is the scientific cause of someone’s death, a witch could still be accused of having caused it. Similarly, improved education may also make students more aware of scientific explanations, but does not eliminate the need for magical explanations either.

There may be one case, however, where science has more of a chance at substituting magical analogy. In the cases discussed so far, the reason why a ‘witch’ is accused is because of some unfortunate event that has happened to the victim (the spark). Usually the victim or one of the victim’s relatives makes the accusation of witchcraft. However, in the case where science is used to give an alternative explanation for asocial behavior, no harm has been done yet. It merely displays people’s fears on community members who behave abnormally. The stakes for believing that abnormal behavior is due to a mental illness or aging process are therefore less high.

The second flaw in the assumptions of policy at intervention level 4 is the fact that no distinction is being made between accusations and belief. It fails to realize that these are two independent concepts and that the belief can continue to exist without forcibly causing human rights violations. It is the way in which people handle suspicions of witchcraft that poses the problem; these actions are not inherent in the belief. The European history of witchcraft also illustrates that belief and accusations are two independent things. Even though, in the 18th century the accusations of witchcraft had stopped, the writings of many great intellectuals such as Isaac Newton and Robert Boyle demonstrate that they continued to believe in the existence of witchcraft. There is evidence of the same taking place in contemporary Western societies. Stopping the violence does not require uprooting a belief. The accusations and the belief should therefore be considered
as separate.

Another flaw can be found in the assumptions of policies at intervention level 2, which support the closure of the camps. The proposal to close the camps rests on the supposition that the camps are inherently bad, or that they are the cause of the problem. This is also reflected in the statement of the deputy minister of Women and Children’s Affairs Ms. Haija Hawau Boya Gariba, regarding “the incarceration and confinement of women into camps.” Even though some have assumed that camp residents have no freedom of movement and experience forced labor, these claims have continually proven false. 92.6 percent of the alleged witches in the camps stated, for example, that they were free to visit their relatives. It would be more accurate to view the camps as ‘safe havens.’ They constitute a refuge for many alleged witches. After all, the NCCE has found that 41 percent of the people in the camps went there out of free will, because of fear of further accusations and of stigmatization. Moreover, 89.6 percent of the camp residents want the camps to be maintained.

Devising an inclusive, long-term plan, which finally arrives at the closure of the camps, as some NGOs have proposed, seems a good solution. However, the final objective should not be to close the camps, but to halt exile and violence related to witchcraft accusations. After all, the closure of the camps only means the disappearance of an institution; it disregards the problem that the camps tried to solve: taking care of abandoned alleged witches. When exile and violence stop, however, camps would close naturally, because they would no longer be needed.

Now that the defects in the assumptions of policy at intervention level 4 and 2 have been pointed out, this article will look at the policies at intervention level 1: improving the living conditions in the camps. Rationally, taking care of the camp residents is not going to contribute to the final goal of stopping the human rights abuses. It is not a structural solution to the problem. However, one cannot attempt to prevent new cases of violence and banishment, while neglecting the fate of those who have already undergone atrocities and are living in a witches’ camp.

All three types of policy at intervention level 1 (improving living conditions, reintegration and empowerment) are indispensable in serving the needs of the camp residents. Adequate living conditions are necessary as the earliest response to exile; the accused need protection, shelter and food.

However, the stay at the camp does not need to be a permanent solution. Both the alleged witch and his or her community have a stake in reintegration when tensions have decreased. The alleged witch has a chance to be reunited with his or her family, to retake his or her place in the community and not to be stigmatized any longer. For the community, it proves that people can really be ‘exorcised’ from witchcraft. It sets an example that could be beneficial to future accused witches, because the community might have realized that people can be welcomed back without fear of new witchcraft practices.

Empowerment is particularly important in the long-term. Having self-confidence and being ready to stand up for one’s rights may prove useful whether people stay at the camp or are reintegrated into their communities. In the camps, as has been shown before, alleged witches have formed networks with a strong collective voice. When reintegrated, more empowered women might be less vulnerable to new witchcraft accusations since one characteristic of alleged witches is their weak social protection. It should be noted, however, that it has also been observed that women who divert too much from gender standards form another group that is vulnerable to accusations. If women are thus so independent from men, they risk being accused again, just through a different mechanism.

The first level of intervention is the oldest and the one in which the largest number of organizations are involved. This may be explained by the fact that the problem, as well as the results of interventions, are the most visible and
even the most tangible at this level. The needs of the group can be easily surveyed, and since those are largely material needs, they are also more easily solved than the problems found at other levels of intervention. Furthermore, the effects of an intervention are easily investigated because all exiled witches live in geographically demarcated areas, unlike the effects of educational campaigns that are aimed at large and spatially scattered audiences. The number of beneficiaries can also be accurately measured. All of this is of particular importance to those NGOs dependent on funding agencies that demand measurable outputs.

However, one should be careful not to focus too much on policy with highly measurable outcomes. A healthy balance between level 1 and level 3 (aimed at the accusations) should always be maintained for two reasons. First, intervention level 1 targets only the ‘symptoms’, but not the root cause. When nothing is being done about the accusations, which form the root of the problem, alleged witches will continue to be assaulted and exiled. Second, policy at the first level of intervention only captures a fraction of the victims. After all, a number of victims are assaulted in their communities, but never live in witches’ camps. Identifying this group of accused witches who remain in their home communities, however, is much harder because they are often unknown (unless victims report to the police) and dispersed over large areas. This makes it difficult to draw conclusions on the extent of the problem and the success of interventions.

A final aspect of the first intervention level is the abundance of faith-based organizations. At least four organizations, including the Presbyterian Church of Ghana, the Catholic Relief Service, the Assemblies of God and the Christian Fellowship Outreach have religious backgrounds and are or have been working to stop human-rights abuses in the camps through direct livelihood improvement or reintegration. However, they are not operating on any other level of intervention. Churches do not engage in advocacy, and they do not support projects that actually take a stance against human rights accusations, even though they might be well positioned to do so.

It is possible to draw a number of conclusions concerning the preferred level of intervention from the preceding sections. First of all, policy should be preventive rather than focused on symptoms of the problem. Its primary goal should not be to ameliorate the living standards in the witches’ camps (intervention level 1) but to prevent alleged witches from being assaulted or banished in the first place. Second, policy-makers should understand that camps are safe havens and not prisons. Although the camps do not always offer adequate facilities, the alleged witches at least receive protection from violence and are provided with basic necessities. The fact that the camps exist is not the root of the problem and closing the camps (intervention level 2) will therefore not prevent exile and violence. Third, one should distinguish between the accusations and the belief. Although the accusations stem from a certain belief, the violence and exile are not inherent in the belief. The belief can exist without these harmful practices. Therefore, it is not necessary to try to demonstrate the fallacy of the belief or to try to replace magical analogy by scientific analogy (both intervention level 4).

Based on these conclusions, intervention level 3 has the most potential to stop human rights related to witchcraft accusations. If these policies work, the occurrences of exile and violence will diminish and the need for the camps will be gradually reduced. This means that the need for supply of basic needs, empowerment of camp residents and reintegration will become less relevant and that camps will not need to be closed, they will naturally cease to exist. As long as the harmful practices related to accusations are stopped, the belief can continue to exist harmlessly.

As has been shown before, there are different types of policies aimed at the accusations (intervention level 3): law, raising awareness of women’s rights and offering alternative ways of dealing with suspicions. The last two seem to have the most potential to curb human rights violations. If there is one thing that researchers have agreed on, it is that “the arms of the law are too short to reach the realm in which witchcraft operates” as stated by former Chief Justice of Ghana, Justice Apaloo. It is simply impossible to bring alleged witches to court and give them a fair trial. Another purpose of law, to make accusations illegal by law, is also highly
problematic, as has been demonstrated by the example of the prohibition of anti-witchcraft cults by colonial legislation. This law virtually meant a prohibition against witchcraft accusations, since that was one of the main activities of the anti-witchcraft cults. The fear of accusations greatly increased as a consequence of this law because people felt they were left helpless in the clutches of witches now that they had no way to expose them.04

This example shows that increasing the fear of witchcraft should be avoided. Policy should therefore be made with the perspective of a believer in mind. Unbelieving policymakers cannot assume that they can simply eradicate a belief or practice, without offering believers an alternative they have confidence in. In the words of Ter Haar: “If it is to be effective and lasting, [development] should build on people’s own resources.”05 What should be outlawed are not the accusations but the harmful practices (exile and violence) that are often part of it. In fact such legislation exists already. Article 26(2) of the 1992 Ghanian Constitution states that “all customary practices which dehumanize or are injurious to the physical and mental well-being of a person are prohibited.” Advocacy for a more stringent implementation of this law and a program to encourage victims to report to the authorities thus seems to have more potential than a prohibition of accusations in general.

The policy alternatives with the most potential seem to be both raising awareness of human rights, and offering alternative ways of dealing with suspicions. It is important that communities and leaders realize that violence against and exile of alleged witches is against the laws of their country and against the dignity of the man or woman concerned. What is needed is a change in the mentality towards the perceived rights of ‘witches.’ Right now, a person loses all rights when he or she is deemed a witch.06 Policy should strive to get communities to agree that even ‘witches’ have basic human rights. Rather than simply imposing universal human rights, the local understanding of the human rights of alleged witches and their universal human rights should be made synonymous.07

Witchcraft is not something of which the existence should simply be acknowledged, but something that deserves consideration when looking at the consequences of new policy. If a certain intervention means that it will increase people’s fears of witchcraft, it is not beneficial. The downside of this, however, is that it requires one to take seriously believers’ perceived need for control over witchcraft through accusations (and ensuing exorcism). Peter Geschiere posits this paradox well in saying:

“How can one understand the thrill and excitement they [images of witchcraft] promise, if one’s point of departure is that they are not real and, therefore, should be explained away by reducing them to other terms? But, on the other hand, affirming their reality might mean in practice affirming that monstrous accusations are well-founded.”08

Accusations serve a purpose. A recommendation that policymakers find ways to stop the violence and the banishment, but not necessarily the accusations themselves, seems fitting in this situation. Believers should be provided with alternatives to violence. These should be sought within the communities, not outside. It has been shown that legislation made by

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unbelievers has not had the desired effect. Within the communities, however, one can find numerous examples of people and institutions in which believers have confidence.

One alternative policy could be that employed by a community called Kalande, close to Salaga in the Northern region of Ghana. Their example is cited as a counterexample to the witches’ camps in the report by the NCCE. Instead of banishment and violence, they only exorcise people nonviolently and then treat them as a regular person again. If people actually believed that harmless exorcism, for example through prayer, can be effective, there would be no need for human rights violations. Communities who send alleged witches away are already familiar with exorcism and many spiritual leaders are able to exorcise witches peacefully. After that, witches are believed to have lost their powers. If communities would thus trust in their own fetish priests, chiefs or whomever is responsible for deliverance, there would be no reason to fear the alleged witches after this ritual. The leaders of the Kalande community could thus play a crucial role in changing other communities’ attitudes. It is indispensable that the Ghanaian state and NGOs invite such people to conferences and workshops, in which they address human rights and witchcraft accusations and that they give them an opportunity to teach others.

Another alternative policy is that utilized by church and mosque leaders. With 71.2 percent of Ghanaians identifying themselves as Christians and 17.6 percent as Muslims, the church is arguably the most important form of associational life. Individuals’ religious beliefs shape, to a great extent, their mentalities towards daily events. Churches and mosques are therefore ideally placed to do just that when it comes to witchcraft accusations. Believers voluntarily come to church, and one of the reasons might be to be morally educated. Church leaders can therefore “provide people with the moral guidance and inspiration to try and change their lives for the better” as stated by Ter Haar. In the case of witchcraft beliefs and practices, they can perform harmless exorcisms through prayer and can teach their believers that the alleged witches are innocent afterwards. Like traditional religious leaders, this stance would not only benefit the alleged witches, but would also strengthen the church’s own position. If they prove that the power of their God is greater than that of the witches, and that after deliverance by a pastor, alleged witches present no danger for the community anymore, they reinforce the power of their God. The Ghanaian pastor Himmans, who was interviewed by Ter Haar, gives an example of such a doctrine. In his view, “Christian believers […] should be so convinced of the supreme power of the Holy Spirit that there is no need for them to be afraid of evil powers that can harm them, and they should certainly not retaliate by engaging in acts of violence.”

Key opinion leaders such as pastors, traditional religious leaders, traditional political leaders, and others should be employed by NGOs and the state to raise awareness of human rights and to offer alternative practices to communities that are known to banish and assault many alleged witches. They could also play a role in educational campaigns for the youth, such as the one organized by SOSYWEN, in which students are taught and later invited to participate in an essay competition. The best essays are then compiled in a book, which can again serve as a resource for other students, opinion leaders, communities at large and also as a way for (unbelieving) NGO staff, policy-makers and researchers to better understand the belief and the witchcraft practices.

Conclusion
This article has attempted to analyze the varying kinds of policy that aim to curb the human rights abuses related to accusations of witchcraft in Ghana, particularly violence and exile to witches’ camps. It has found that the interventions are many, but all target different root causes. A first category of policy is aimed at reducing the poor living standards within the witches’ camps, by providing for material needs, by empowerment, and by the reintegration of camp residents into their home communities. A second category views the existence of the camps to be the heart of the problem and thus advocates for closure of all camps. A third type of policy

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understands the accusations to be the cause and tries to change the nature of accusations through advocacy and other interventions. The fourth category of policy sees the belief in witchcraft to be the root cause and tries to eliminate it by showing the fallacy of the belief and by replacing it with scientific knowledge.

The policy that seems to have most potential is aimed at the accusations. It treats not just the symptoms (the camps), but the root cause of the problem (the accusations) without destroying anything that is not in itself harmful (the belief). It captures not just the problem of accusation-related exile but also that of violence within the communities. The victims that are helped by such policies are both the alleged witches in the camps and those that have been assaulted but have never been banished.

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The Bushehr Delays: Did the Iranians Abandon Their Financial Obligations?

by Matthew Michaelides

Operation of the Russian-built Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran was recently handed over officially to the Iranian side. Yet, the struggle to understand why it took so long – over 15 years – to complete the plant remains up for discussion. This article argues that the delays were caused by a combination of two factors: the dominance of commercial interests in Russian involvement in the project and Iranian payment shortfalls. Using oil price data and current events as proxies for the fiscal health of the Iranian government budget, this article demonstrates a strong correlation between the delays and periods of troubled government finances in Iran.

On January 8, 1995, Iran and Russia signed a landmark nuclear cooperation agreement under which MinAtom, then the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy, would complete the long-halted construction of the first reactor at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Bushehr, Iran. Construction on the plant had started in the 1970s by Siemens Corp., but had been halted under U.S. pressure on the German contractor following a series of overdue payments after the Iranian Revolution. This original 1995 contract called for the plant’s first reactor to be built in 55 months and to be commissioned in 2001. Yet, fifteen years later, these plans for the reactor had still not been realized. Only in September 2011, after numerous delays, did Atomstroyexport, which had inherited the contract from the defunct MinAtom, officially connect the plant to the Iranian national power grid.

Most agree that prior to the February 2005 P5+1 fuel swap agreement, a concerted U.S. effort to halt the Bushehr project was the chief reason for delays. For instance, after a Russian request for manuals and design information for equipment installed by the Germans in the 1970s, the Germans refused to assist the Russians under Western pressure, particularly from the United States. Similarly, the United States succeeded in encouraging states such as Ukraine and the Czech Republic, which otherwise would have supplied materials and technology for the plant, to prevent such sales to Iran.

Following the 2005 deal, the U.S. government slowly stopped exercising the same pressure to delay or stop the plant that it once did. For example, in December 2006, the United States approved sanctions on Iran that provided an exception for trade related to the construction of the Bushehr plant. Furthermore, Stuxnet, the computer virus widely believed to have been manufactured in part by the United States, did not target Bushehr during its 2009-2010 attacks on the Iranian nuclear program. And later, in October 2010, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced decisively that the plant was “not a problem” for the White House.

This has given rise to a new debate over the cause of the delays after

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2005. Some have emphasized the unique technological aspects of the project in explaining the delays. In particular, the contract required the Russians to synthesize the original German construction with the new Russian machinery. Other technical explanations proffered, to evaluate what actually caused these delays, circumstantial evidence suffices in telling the crux of the story. In particular, the correlation traced in this article between the timing of the delays at the Bushehr plant and events indicative of budgeting problems in Iran suggests that

"While a lack of detailed direct evidence from individuals associated with the plant’s construction makes it difficult to evaluate what actually caused these delays, circumstantial evidence suffices in telling the crux of the story."

which are generally amalgamated in different ways to cover each delay that occurred, relate to funding shortfalls, difficulty in finding qualified subcontractors, and sanctions on Iran that prevented the importation of needed materials. Still, others have sought to connect the delays in different ways to ongoing sanctions and fuel enrichment debates between Iran and the West.

This article offers a different understanding of the delays at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Its argument is that more than anything else the delays were caused by a combination of two factors: the dominance of commercial interests in Russian involvement in the project and Iranian payment shortfalls. While a lack of detailed direct evidence from individuals associated with the plant’s construction makes it difficult

the immediate cause of the delays was Iranian nonpayment. Thus, by placing an important emphasis upon Russian commercial interests, this article serves as an empirical example of recent literature that ascribes causal power to individual and corporate commercial interests in the determination of Russian foreign policy.

From the nonpayment perspective, there are a few important predictions that can be made and that should be reflected in the empirics of this case. First, the delays would be expected to correlate with periods of a precarious government budget in Iran. Relative changes in international oil prices are the primary metric used in this study for discerning the health of the government budget, given that between 50-60% of Iranian government revenues come from oil sales. In addition, key decisions by top Iranian officials that demonstrate concern about the health of the Iranian government budget should be correlated with periods of delay on the project. Similarly, periods in which the budget is healthy should feature less government preoccupation with the health of the government budget, and consequently fewer controversial measures aimed at decreasing subsidies or increasing taxes.

Second, the Russian contractor should have slowly pushed back the deadlines and/or slowed construction, and then taken drastic measures such as completely – or nearly completely – halting construction on the plant or postponing construction indefinitely, after continued defiance by the Iranians. The reasoning behind this prediction is that if financial motivations truly dominated Russian interests in the construction of the plant, then the Russian contractor should have been willing to deal with a slight inconvenience in the payment schedule as long as the management still thought they would be paid eventually. If, however, they had serious doubts about whether they would in fact be paid, they should have preferred to reallocate their energy to other international projects with more consistent financing, leading to a stoppage of progress at Bushehr.

Figure 1 gives data on the pricing of BRENT crude from January 2005 to April 2013—the international oil price data that is used in this report.
Figure 2 plots each of the key delays in the post-2005 period alongside these prices. The remainder of this article examines each of the five key delays announced by Rosatom in the post-2005 period to demonstrate a connection between Iranian ability-to-pay and the progress at the Bushehr plant.

Delay 1: September 2006

The first delay of the post-2005 period occurred in September 2006. The plant had previously been expected to be commissioned by the end of 2006; however, the delay postponed the construction deadline to September 2007 and the plant’s launch date to November 2007. At the time, Atomstroyexport President Sergei Shmatko announced that the delay was the result of “technical difficulties” of an unspecified nature.

Yet, this delay is well-correlated with the rapid drop in oil prices from $73.23 per barrel to $57.81 that occurred between August and October 2006. While the latter price of $57.81 is still significantly higher than prevailing oil prices just five or ten years earlier, the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June 2005 had also inaugurated a tremendous increase in fiscal spending for which greater oil revenues were needed. In particular, from 2005-2006, government spending rose by a whopping 25 percent, while government spending from 2006-2007 was even larger than in 2005-2006. This financial over-commitment by the Iranian government helps to explain how a sizeable $15 per barrel drop in oil prices could generate a fiscal crunch.


The second delay at the Bushehr plant, which occurred from February to December 2007, was unique, because it was the only delay of the period for which the officially-stated reason was actually payment difficulties. The Russian side claimed that the Iranians were behind on payments, while the Iranians publicly disagreed vigorously. The resulting drama forced the delay of the delivery of nuclear fuel that is needed for launching the plant from March 2007 until December 2007, after which time the payment problem was finally resolved.

Again, this delay began just as international oil prices were bottoming out, this time even lower at $53.68 in January 2007. It also ended after oil prices had risen significantly, easing the pressure on the government budget.
The government’s budget woes at this time were also expressed in an important measure taken domestically with regard to oil and gas consumption. In May 2007, in the midst of the payment dispute with Russia, the government first imposed an oil and gas rationing system and raised domestic oil and gas prices by 25 percent. These measures curtailed relatively low-priced domestic purchases of oil and gas, allowing the government to sell these commodities at much higher rates internationally.

The timeline of this delay also conforms perfectly to what would be expected of a long, drawn-out delay under the Iranian ability-to-pay perspective. Russia initially responded to this delay only by stating that the fuel delivery would not take place on schedule; however, as the quarrel increased in duration and tensions heightened, Russia began to pull workers out of Iran by the hundreds, from a peak of 3000 to just a mere 800, and even contemplated cancelling the project. This step-by-step decision-making by the Russians shows that they were frustrated by an Iranian action. Rather than acting upon a preconceived political objective that was isolated from the payment dispute, the Russian side was responding to Iranian nonpayment.

**Delay 3: November – December 2008**

Delay 3, announced in late November 2008, was officially explained as the result of arbitrary technical difficulties resulting from the need to incorporate the old German technology. Because of the delay, the launch date was pushed back from the end of 2008 until the end of 2009. Just prior to the delay, oil prices had cascaded down from $132.72 in July 2008 to just $39.95 in December 2008. Moreover, in October 2008, the government had supported an unpopular tax hike in order to make up for the tremendous drop in oil revenues. While the measure ultimately did not pass due to protests from the merchant class, this government re-evaluation of its finances demonstrates that the Iranian government budget faced serious problems at the time.

In an isolated report, Intelligence Online published an article in December 2008 that claimed that Saudi Arabia was paying workers at the Bushehr plant to quit and leave in an effort to delay progress at the plant. With just the one author-less report to go off of, Mark N. Katz’s assessment is more sensible—that “it’s unclear whether this astounding report is accurate.” Given the high publicity of the Bushehr plant at
the time, it remains possible that this report was planted by a foreign intelligence organization.

**Delay 4: November 2009**

In similar style to past delays, Sergei Shmatko announced that the delay in November 2009 was also the result of “technical issues.” This delay pushed the launch date for the plant back from the end of 2009 to March 2010, by which time the plant had previously been expected to be operational.

At a first glance, it may not seem as if the international oil prices seen in November 2009 would be correlated with a fiscal crunch at home. In fact, while one could call the oil prices seen during the majority of 2009 “stable,” the descriptor “stagnant” is perhaps more accurate. Even though oil prices experienced a slight rise through the period, they remained far below the highs of early to mid-2008, which experienced a slight rise through the period, they remained far below the highs of early to mid-2008, which excessive government spending regimes from 2005-2008 had come to depend upon. For instance, in November 2009, the price of a barrel of BRENT crude was $76.66, compared to $132.72 posted in July 2008. A November 4, 2009 article from the LA Times duly asserted that “oil prices are down” in a depressed economic environment.

As such, late 2009 also saw the heightening of a debate over a new plan aimed at halting government oil and gas subsidies in Iran in an effort to increase oil and gas revenues for the government. In addition to oil and gas, the Iranian government provides subsidies on food, medicine, and other basic necessities that in all accounted at their peak for more than 25 percent of the Iranian GDP. Oil subsidies, specifically, were so excessive that gasoline prices in Iran often fell below $0.40 per gallon. The plan called for the elimination of these subsidies to free up oil and natural gas for international export at several times the domestic price, thereby assisting the government in its efforts to balance its budget. In early January 2010, the subsidy reform bill was officially passed by the Iranian Parliament. Thus, the Iranian government’s fiscal agenda demonstrates a direct concern with the viability of the Iranian budget, just as the simultaneous delay at the Bushehr plant would imply.

**Delay 5: August – November 2010**

On August 13, 2010, Rosatom announced that by August 21, 2010 the first reactor at Bushehr would start being loaded with nuclear fuel, a process which was expected to only take 7-8 days. The reactor was expected to come online by September 2010. However, the fuel was not completely loaded into the reactor until November 27, 2010.

The dates for this delay fit international oil prices well. The delay began during a period of stagnant international oil prices – and it ended after they had begun to rise. However, most telling about the timing for this delay are two important budgetary events that occurred concurrently. First, in July 2010, Ahmadinejad and his government proposed a second tax hike that, like the one proposed in October 2008, was eventually beaten back by angry merchant protests. Later, in early December 2010, the government, led by Ahmadinejad, hastily initiated the widely unpopular subsidy reform plan passed in January 2010 against the advice of his top economic advisors in an effort “to boost revenue.” Both show the
Another Delay: February – April 2011

A final delay to the project, which is not noted in Figure 2, occurred in February 2011. At that time, Iran told the IAEA that the delay was the result of a broken pump in the reactor’s cooling system. As a result, Iran was forced to unload nuclear fuel from the reactor to fix the cooling system, before reloading the fuel once again. In their May 2011 report, the IAEA confirmed that the reloading of the plant had been completed in mid-April.

Yet, the February 2011 delay stands out from the others for a few significant reasons. First, the delay was announced by the Iranian side, rather than the Russian side. This indicates that this particular delay was not an output of Russian foreign state policy; rather, the delay was Iranian state policy.

Second, the official reason for the delay was—unlike those of previous delays—verifiable, accurate, and based on a truly unpredictable variable. In addition to making this delay less suspicious, this also helps to further separate this delay from the others.

As a result, there is little expectation for this delay to conform to the pattern seen in the other delays. The delay was not planned by the Russians, so why would it conform to a theory for Russian foreign policy decision-making? Indeed, the delay came as BRENT crude prices were rising to some of the highest prices seen in years.

It is also worth pointing out some suggestive events that occurred after the delays ran their course. For instance, the plant’s launch only came after international oil prices had stabilized at the $100+ barrel prices last seen before mid-2008. This would seem to suggest that real progress on the plant was only possible in years when the Iranian government budget was relatively healthy. In addition, the subsidy reform pushed in late 2009 and through 2010 in spite of tremendous political opposition was abandoned in 2012 with little explanation after oil prices rebounded. This verifies the link posited in this paper between the Iranian government’s decisions on subsidy reform, international oil prices, and the economic health of the Iranian budget.

Conclusion

This study offers a new interpretation of the delays at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in the post-2005 period. While the previously-mentioned alternative explanations for the delays are purely descriptive and lack an objective test, this article draws upon quantitative data evaluated using a consistent test with a predictive capability to draw its conclusions. The result raises questions about the nature of Russia’s Iran policy and challenges expert understandings of Russian foreign policy itself.

First, this article demonstrates that analyses asserting that Russian-Iranian relations are based on a strategic foundation have no basis. Instead, the finding that the financial benefit of the project to the Russian side was the key motivator for the plant’s construction suggests that commercial interests underpin the Russian-Iranian relationship. Furthermore, there is little evidence of any sort of ‘alliance’ behavior between Russia and Iran. Such cannot be the case when cooperation is based upon financial gain and intersecting, rather than parallel, interests.

On a broader scale, one interpretation of this evidence is that the foreign policy logic of the Russian state has shifted to prioritize economic concerns over their geopolitical counterparts.

Yet, while this perspective would conform with much of the literature on Russian foreign policy towards Iran – and Russian foreign policy in general – it may not be correct. Realistically speaking, it seems truly puzzling that Russia would be willing to compromise its political orientation towards the Iranian nuclear program based on economic interests. If state economic interests are the basis of the Russian-Iranian relationship, why has bilateral trade remained insignificant to Moscow at a mere $4 billion per year?

More likely, the dominance
of commercial interests in the construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant indicates the presence of associated individual interests in the profitability of the plant. High-ranking executives in Atomstroyexport and parent Rosatom, such as Sergey Kirienko and Sergei Shmatko, link into a complicated, interconnected patronage network that includes Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, among others.32

Endnotes

3. Ibid.
5. Ralph Langner, Email Communication, July 29, 2013.
7. This is the official explanation from Atomstroyexport President Sergei Shmatko and his Kremlin superiors.
15. Mark N. Katz, "Russia and Iran," Middle East Policy 19.3 (Fall 2012): 64 – 64.
23. Ibid.
28. Some have argued that the delays could have been caused by damage that resulted from the Stuxnet virus, however, this seems unlikely for a few reasons. First, Stuxnet experts such as Ralph Langner have concluded that Bushehr was not the target of the virus at all and, second, the February delay came months after Stuxnet was discovered and halted.

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The Journal of Undergraduate International Studies, published at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, presents a compilation of essays and photos from undergraduate and postgraduate students from around the world. Publications document a wide variety of socio-political issues ranging from international conflict and diplomacy to environmental issues to international economics. Most importantly, the Journal of Undergraduate International Studies is intended to serve as a platform for global discussion and the open exchange of ideas, in effect, expanding our understanding of global interactions.
Dear Reader,

It is with great pleasure that we present the Fall 2013 edition of the Journal of Undergraduate International Studies. Our editorial staff strived to locate the most compelling arguments among a plethora of impressive, sophisticated, and engaging submissions. Our final selection reflects both our goal to showcase the world’s premier undergraduate research and our mission to explore the depth and breadth of International Studies.

The production of this edition is the result of an exceptional editorial staff and the widespread support of the L&S Honors Program and the Coddon Family Foundation. Additionally, it is the fruit of over a decade’s worth of work from numerous UW students, faculty, and staff. To all those that have contributed to the journal both this year and in years past, we would like to offer our most sincere thanks.

The seven submissions we have selected include research from across the globe. Together, they comprise one of our most diverse editions to date. As you read, we hope you find that this semester’s edition of JUIS is as exceptional as we believe it is.

Alex Reed and Sophia Jones
Editors-In-Chief
Journal of Undergraduate International Studies

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The Journal of Undergraduate International Studies would like to acknowledge its founder and first editor-in-chief, David Coddon. The first two issues of this journal were published with the generous support of the University of Wisconsin-Madison Leadership Trust and continued publication is made possible through the Coddon Family Foundation. Additional support is provided by the University of Wisconsin-Madison College of Letters and Science Honors Program, the Office of the Vice Provost for Teaching and Learning, the Department of Political Science, the Global Studies Program, Publications Committee, and the University of Wisconsin-Madison Library System.

The cover photograph was taken by Kelliann Blazek, University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Don't Look Down: I saw a poster in a Norwegian train station that described Norway as "unspoiled, uncrowded, unequaled." I could not agree more, especially after hiking two hours to arrive at this view of Preikestolen's impressive 604 meter drop.

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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19-30</td>
<td>2. Delegation from Regional to Global: ASEAN and the UN in Conflict Intervention</td>
<td>Audrye Wong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-41</td>
<td>3. Turkey and the Post-Cold War Politics of Energy</td>
<td>Michael Goldstein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42-51</td>
<td>4. The February 28 Incident: An Economic Perspective on the Decolonization of Taiwan</td>
<td>James Meresman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52-55</td>
<td>5. Undifferentiated Citizenship for All, and All For One United India</td>
<td>Nina Assadi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-71</td>
<td>6. Targeting Different Root Causes: An Analysis of Policies Curbing Witchcraft Accusations in Ghana</td>
<td>Dorien Venhoeven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72-79</td>
<td>7. The Bushehr Delays: Did the Iranians Abandon Their Financial Obligations?</td>
<td>Matthew Michaelides</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The prevailing literature on stateless organizations often attributes rebel group formation and recruitment to “greed or “grievance,” while attributing the terrorism to relative deprivation or a “culture of violence.” By analyzing Lashkar-e-Taiba (Lashkar), a group that fails to fit exclusively into the “rebel group” or “terrorist group” taxonomy, this paper posits hypotheses on the causal mechanism of Lashkar recruitment. This paper utilizes empirical evidence on Lashkar militants to argue the centrality of public goods provision and the legitimacy spillover in recruitment. Furthermore, it argues that these hypotheses can be validly applied to a geopolitically significant subset of other terrorist groups.

The popular perception that the collapse of the Soviet Union marked an explosion of violence by non-state actors, specifically insurgent and terrorist organizations, initiated considerable academic interest in these conflicts and their participants. Empirical analysis has generated many possible theories explaining why individuals take up arms against powerful and weak states alike. Out of conflicting accounts of violence arises the greed-grievance debate, whether grievances arising from injustices perpetrated by the state induce the formation of rebel groups and motivate participation within them or whether the many material opportunities civil wars bring attract less-scrupulous groups and participants.\(^1\) While applicable to insurgencies seizing territory, recruiting members, and fighting state forces in their respective countries, the vast majority of these theories fail to apply to insurgent groups operating in and recruiting out of one state, while engaging in irregular warfare and terrorist attacks in another. Lashkar-e-Taiba (Lashkar), a Pakistani militant group fighting for the secession of Indian Kashmir and Jammu, exemplifies this type of categorically ambiguous group. Exhibiting many of the characteristics of both insurgent and terrorist groups, Lashkar fails to neatly fit into the prevailing theoretical frameworks of either insurgent or terrorist recruitment. This paper attempts to rectify this gap in the literature by examining the institutions and membership of Lashkar, utilizing recent empirical data gathered on more than 900 Lashkar militants.\(^2\) Drawing upon these empirics this paper both challenges the applicability of prevailing theories of terrorist recruitment, and illustrates the geographic and educational similarity...
among Lashkar’s membership. Lashkar’s institutions and provision of public goods act as key causal factors in recruitment. The first section sets forth some basic definitions relevant to the discussion of terrorism and insurgency, it then details the background of Lashkar. Introduced in the second section is descriptive statistics of Lashkar recruitment that refute much of the current literature on terrorist recruitment. The third section, argues that Lashkar’s successful creation of civil society institutions and provision of public goods allows for the recruitment of Pakistanis into the group. The fourth section provides some empirics that support my theory of Lashkar recruitment and details the limitations of this theory and of the empirical evidence. The fifth section concludes by illustrating the relevance of this analysis to the study of terrorist and rebel group recruitment.

I. Definitions and the Background of Lashkar-e-Taiba

To a certain extent, categorizing the militant nature of Lashkar becomes more a semantic question of definitions than a substantive debate. The similar tactics, motivations, and structures of many insurgent and terrorist groups, coupled with media narratives that apply labels of terrorism more for their connation rather than their academic accuracy, make the categorization of Lashkar complicated. John Lynn in *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*, argues terrorism and insurgency exist on the same progression of violence and organization, and the level of material and human resources available to the group determines the nature of its violence and thus its classification.\(^3\)^\(^4\)

This paper focuses on the definition of insurgency from James Fearon and David Laitin’s “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”; “insurgency is a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerilla warfare from a rural base area.”\(^5\) Other accounts of insurgency stress the importance of rebel governance, with Zachariah Mampilly arguing the centrality of rebels as counterstate sovereigns\(^6\) and Ana Arjona emphasizing the role of rebel institutions in civil war.\(^7\) Bruce Hoffman\(^8\) in *Inside Terrorism*, defines terrorism as the “deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.” Lynn builds upon this definition to include the inducement of outrage in the target audience as an additional goal of terrorism.\(^9\) Alexander Lee characterizes terrorist organizations as engaging in violence, which prioritizes the inducing of a psychological effect over an immediate military gain.\(^10\) Thus the literature primarily differentiates insurgent and terrorist groups by examining the goal-orientation of the group’s violence. Synthesizing these definitions classifies a terrorist group as one engaging in violence for the purpose of political change through the mechanism of inducing psychological effect, either fear or outrage, not through tactical military gain. The background and methods of Lashkar will illustrate how placing Lashkar into such neatly delineated categories proves challenging.

Following the instigation of the most recent face of the Kashmir conflict by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in 1989, Markaz Daawat wal Irshad, an organization led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and propagating scriptualist Sunni Islam, established Lashkar as its militant wing to engage Indian security forces in Kashmir. Four Lashkar military compounds train recruits in guerilla warfare and combat tactics, signaling the insurgent and terrorist nature of the organization’s strategy for eliminating the Indian military presence in Kashmir.\(^11\) Tariq Ali argues the Pakistani Army provided critical support in the founding of Lashkar, to the extent that a counterfactual absence of Pakistani state patronage would have precluded the establishment of the organization.\(^12\) Additionally, Ashley Tellis in “The Menace that is Lashkar-e-Taiba” argues that even following the initiation of the US War on Terror in 2001, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence has maintained extensive, though increasingly clandestine, support of Lashkar in the form of safe havens, training, equipment, and, most critically, funding. He also asserts the
external patronage of Lashkar goes far beyond that of the Pakistani Army and ISI; Tellis argues Lashkar raises funds from businesses, transnational organized crime groups, and Islamic NGOs and charities.\textsuperscript{13} Stephen Tankel asserts Lashkar currently derives much of its funding from the remittances of the Pakistani diaspora and wealthy Salafists in the Persian Gulf.\textsuperscript{14} Leaked US diplomatic cables offer support to these arguments; Declan Welsh notes Saudi front companies and charitable networks have laundered substantial funds to Lashkar, and Saudi donors were the “most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide.”\textsuperscript{15} These transnational actors may be playing a growing role in funding Lashkar; Tankel argues the initiation of the U.S. War on Terror in 2002 has severely constrained Pakistan’s ability and resolve to support terrorist organizations, forcing Lashkar to seek funding elsewhere.\textsuperscript{16}

This substantial patronage, coupled with Lashkar’s strict hierarchical leadership and militaristic discipline and precision, has propelled Lashkar to the zenith of Kashmir militancy. Often characterized as one of the most powerful militant groups in South Asia,\textsuperscript{17} Lashkar has carried out terrorist attacks and paramilitary raids on Indian military personnel and civilians alike. Though these attacks had historically been confined to Indian Kashmir and Jammu, Lashkar has more recently stepped up attacks in major Indian cities, including the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks where 10 Lashkar gunmen killed more than 160 civilians and raised tensions between India and Pakistan to alarming levels.\textsuperscript{18} Lashkar more commonly engages in guerilla attacks against Indian security forces in Kashmir and indiscriminate violence against non-Muslims in Kashmir. Lashkar, by massacring Hindu and Sikh villagers in remote hill villages and executing high-profile and well-planned attacks on military bases and convoys, maximizes the publicity of its attacks and generates a climate of fear within Kashmir and Jammu.\textsuperscript{19} By creating a climate of fear and insecurity, while simultaneously raising the costs of Indian governance, Lashkar is attempting to remove the Indian military and civilian presence in Kashmir and Jammu and facilitate the Pakistani annexation of the region. This strategy illustrates the difficulty in classifying Lashkar as an organization; Lashkar’s strategy includes both the use of terrorism: inducing political change by mechanisms of fear or outrage, and insurgent tactics: guerilla warfare to make the Indian presence in Kashmir too costly to maintain. Lashkar as an organization is not entirely terrorist or insurgent and thereby necessitates further study to understand its recruitment and the recruitment of similar groups.

\section*{II. Literature on Terrorist Recruitment}

The material weakness of terrorist and insurgent groups and their susceptibility to defection makes the nature and quality of membership critical.\textsuperscript{20} This centrality of membership and recruitment to violent conflict makes the study of recruitment particularly salient in understanding violent groups and understanding the factors that predict conflict to ultimately prevent further bloodshed. This paper aims to show that institutions and networks of Lashkar in Pakistan have a causal effect on recruitment. Figures 1, 2, and 3 provide data on the education, home provinces, and recruitment channels of 900 Lashkar militants.\textsuperscript{21} Before incorporating these descriptive statistics into this analysis, outlined below are common hypotheses on terrorist and rebel recruitment.

Scholars often trace the origins of terrorist groups and subsequently their recruitment to the psychological effect of relative deprivation. Caroline Ziemke in \textit{The Same Light as Slavery: Building a Global Antiterrorist Consensus} argues globalization opens up much of the world’s populace to images of wealth and prosperity that these people will never experience. She argues many of these individuals perceive themselves as oppressed, and combatting this “culture of violence” in Pakistan will take defining the national role of Islam and creating a unifying national vision through this definition.\textsuperscript{22}

The literature also focuses on the opportunity costs of participation, arguing participants join based on a rational assessment of incentives of joining and opportunity costs of engaging in insurgent or terrorist violence. Concordantly, recruitment can be predicted by individuals with reduced opportunity costs relative to others who engage in violence as a means of rent-seeking. Eleonora Nilsson and Philip Verwimp argue reduced opportunity costs of violence by means
of reduced crop output increases rebel recruitment.\textsuperscript{23}

Lee synthesizes elements from the two previous frameworks, arguing that there exists a set socioeconomic threshold, below which member’s wealth and education preclude the necessary level of education to engage in political activism or violence. Above this threshold, Lee argues, individuals will weigh the opportunity costs of engaging in political violence and ultimately those who experience economic deprivation relative to the other members of this informed group will engage in political violence or terrorism.\textsuperscript{24}

Finally, media outlets and certain authors often propagate the hypothesis that there exists a link between Islam and terrorism, thus implying that an individual’s religiosity or lack thereof causally influences their participation in a terrorist group. Historian Bernard Lewis, in linking the historical role of Islam and Islamic fundamentalism to modern Islamic terrorism lends credence to hypotheses that religious radicalization induces participation in terrorism.\textsuperscript{25} Appeals to religion would therefore be effective in recruitment and more religious individuals would have a significantly higher likelihood of joining Islamic terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{2}

**Contrasting Descriptive Statistics**

These four theories of terrorist and rebel recruitment fail to accurately explain participation in Lashkar. Though these arguments offer forth many useful methods of conceiving terrorism, they do not match the empirics of Lashkar recruitment and therefore lose some external validity as theories applicable to the broad spectrum of terrorist and rebel recruitment. These empirics disprove these theories as externally valid in regards to Lashkar and terrorist groups with a symbiotic or complementary relationship with their host state; though this paper characterizes Lashkar as a terrorist group, Lashkar does exhibit many of the traits of both an insurgent group and a terrorist group, and thus these authors would argue against the applicability of their frameworks to Lashkar, not the invalidity of their theories. These empirics demonstrate these theories must be further developed to encompass the vast majority of cases they wish to explain.

A comparison of figure 1 and statistics on the education levels of Pakistani males challenge the validity of Ziemke’s and opportunity cost arguments; the members of Lashkar possess a significantly higher level of secular education than the Pakistani male population on average.\textsuperscript{27} Were relative deprivation a compelling theory of terrorist recruitment, in this case why would the less educated members of Pakistani society, who have seen fewer of the fruits of globalization, take up arms. Relative deprivation also fails to explain the findings of figure 2; the vast majority of Lashkar fighters are from the Punjab region of Pakistan, not from Indian Kashmir. If individuals experienced relative deprivation, they would often lash out at those they deem culpable of the deprivation. This theory could fit with fighters from Indian-Kashmir rebelling based on deprivation-based grievances, but it fails to explain the geographic trends of Lashkar membership. Ziemke argues Pakistan’s (and therefore Lashkar’s) “culture of violence can be diminished by defining the national role of Islam;”\textsuperscript{28} ironically, it is one of the more compelling national Islamic visions, Lashkar’s goal of a greater Islamic Pakistan containing Kashmir and
Jammu, that fuels much of the violence in the region. The arguments focused on the opportunity costs of participants similarly fail to explain the empirics; the cadres of Lashkar have achieved higher levels of education than the greater Pakistani male population. This higher level of education equates to higher opportunity costs associated with joining a terrorist or insurgent group. Having demonstrated that the membership of Lashkar have higher opportunity coast than the average noncombatant, opportunity cost-based theories of recruitment cannot explain the empirics of Lashkar.

Lee presents a more complex theory of terrorist recruitment, but his postulation of a socioeconomic framework derived from an informational asymmetry between social classes does not reflect the empirics of Pakistani society and likely much of the globalized world. The informational asymmetries that Lee asserts prevent much of a society from engaging in political activism and violence exist only as an anachronism of Lee’s case study. Lee tests his hypotheses with data from early nineteenth century Bengal, a case not representative of the effects of modern globalization and technology on communication and propaganda. In the Pakistani case, Tankel argues the government has exposed Pakistani youths to intense propaganda about the Kashmir issue and militarism. The Pakistani government saturates the country’s television stations with images of Indian soldiers assaulting Kashmiri citizens and disseminates stories of the murder, rape, and immolation of Kashmiris by Indians. Recent polls support this notion, noting that 73 percent of Pakistan believes the Kashmir situation remains a problem and 79 percent view the Pakistani Army as positively influencing the country. We can assume the great majority, if not the entirety, of the Pakistani population possess the information necessary to engage in political activism or terrorism. The lack of an informational asymmetry reduces Lee’s argument to a basic opportunity cost model of terrorist recruitment, one which the empirics of Lashkar membership refute.

Finally, it is thought that religiosity and Islamic fundamentalism predict participation in Islamic terror groups. Again, what is an intuitively compelling theory does not stand up to additional scrutiny with Lashkar empirics. One percent of Pakistan believes the Kashmir situation remains a problem and 79 percent view the Pakistani Army as positively influencing the country.

"Lashkar acts within the boundaries of a sovereign state and does not seek to supplant the institutions of the state; rather, it provides supplementary public goods in areas of inadequate or nonexistent state provision of public goods."
completion of a defined religious curriculum”) and each had only spent fewer than three years at a madrasa, on average. Though religious education cannot irreproachably proxy for religious fundamentalism, these empirics lead one to believe the prediction of Lashkar recruitment requires more than hypotheses of levels of religiosity and religious fundamentalism.

III. A Theory of Lashkar Recruitment

This article argues individual interaction with Lashkar through exposure to public goods provided by the group increases the likelihood of an individual’s participation in Lashkar. Interaction with the group via its institutions proves to be central; Lashkar recruits by means of its institutions and pre-existing social networks, enhanced by legitimacy gained through the provision of public goods. Counterintuitively, this argument discounts the role of: individual ideology, support for Kashmiri liberation, opportunity costs, and selective incentives for joining the group. Building on the theoretical framework of Arjona, who argues the nature of rebel governance in an area predicts recruitment levels, differences in Lashkar’s situation from a classic insurgency necessitate a different approach and therefore a different theory of recruitment. Lashkar acts within the boundaries of a sovereign state and does not seek to supplant the institutions of the state; rather, it provides supplementary public goods in areas of inadequate or nonexistent state provision of public goods. Additionally, Lashkar coopts or mimics many of the networks used by the state in military recruitment; I assert that Lashkar membership more resembles the make-up of the Pakistani army than it does a group of those aggrieved by the government. In the following section, I will illustrate the centrality of public goods provision and social networks with empirics from Lashkar recruitment and literature describing Lashkar institutions and organization in Pakistan.

Provision of Public Goods

Lashkar engages in a variety of social and political activities beyond those directly related to execution of terrorist and guerilla attacks in Kashmir, Jammu and greater India. Lashkar, including its umbrella organization MDI, has developed institutions in Pakistan devoted to the provision of the public goods the state fails to adequately supply. The al-Dawa Medical Mission, an organization under the direct hierarchical control of Saeed, the MDI, and Lashkar, has provided medication, check-ups and, in many cases, medical camps and hospitals in areas of Pakistan in severe need of health services. Specific to rural areas, where the absence of the state can be felt more saliently, Lashkar operates ambulance services, mobile clinics, and blood banks. Unlike many major Islamic organizations associated with terrorism, MDI, and by transitivity Lashkar, operate both religious and secular schools; by 2001, MDI’s school system consisted of 127 schools educating more than 15,000 students. These schools, currently operating during a time of systemic decline in Pakistani public education, propagate the Lashkar interpretation of Jihad and the Kashmir conflict in a secular setting.

The provision of public goods induces participation in Lashkar through multiple, complementary mechanisms. Though the schools primarily attempt to prepare their students to become productive members of Pakistani society, the intense propaganda to which MDI schools expose their students shapes their view of the Kashmir conflict and of the national vision of Pakistan. This process, independent of religious education or radicalization, may act as a formative experience in these individuals’ lives and cause participation in Lashkar; anecdotally, this hypothesis is in line with the secondary intent of the MDI school system. Saeed Athar, Lashkar’s provincial chief of Balochistan, illustrates this intent, arguing “Children are like clean blackboards – whatever you write will leave a mark on them forever.”

From the above mechanism, I provide my first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: If an individual has received secular education from an MDI or Lashkar-sponsored school, he will have a higher chance of participating in Lashkar terrorism.

The provision of public goods also generates a sense of legitimacy surrounding Lashkar and concurrently spurs recruitment. In developing health and education services, Lashkar provides the technical services that constitute part of the
organizations necessary to govern a civilian populace. In reference to the governance structure of territorial insurgent groups, Mampilly classifies these technical services as a causal factor in the formation of counterstate sovereignty. Lashkar’s symbiotic relationship with the state precludes any formation of a counterstate, but the mechanisms involved in this formation are still at work; in the light of inadequate Pakistani state provision of public goods, the technical services legitimate Lashkar as an organization and, through this, legitimate Lashkar’s use of force to annex Pakistan, an aspect of legitimacy reserved for sovereign states. If individuals come to view Lashkar as a legitimate actor within the state, garnering what could be perceived as a degree of sovereignty or authority, these individuals will perceive Lashkar’s militant activities as legitimate, by the mechanism legitimacy spillover. In this well-documented psychological phenomenon, an individual’s beliefs of legitimacy, concerning one section of an organization “spillover,” causes the individual to view other sections of the organization as legitimate. From this concept, stems a second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: If an individual or his family has benefitted from Lashkar or MDI’s provision of public goods, he will be more likely to participate in Lashkar terrorism.

Additionally, because legitimacy spillover positions the militant actions of and membership in Lashkar as legitimate as state military actions and service, the same mechanisms that contribute to military recruitment will contribute to Lashkar recruitment. These include areas of heavy military recruitment and propaganda as well as areas with historically high levels of military service. This paper operationalize these mechanisms as:

Hypothesis 3a: If an individual lives in an area with high military recruitment, he will be more likely to participate in Lashkar terrorism.

Hypothesis 3b: If an individual has friends or family members who serve or have served in the military, he will be more likely to participate in Lashkar terrorism.

Finally following the aforementioned reasoning, comes the following intuitive hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: If an individual has friends or family who participate in Lashkar, he will be more likely to participate in Lashkar terrorism.

IV. Applying Empirical Evidence

Recent breakthroughs in compiling the biographies of Lashkar cadres have allowed for unprecedented analysis into the background and characteristics of those who choose to engage in Lashkar terrorism. This empirical evidence, in its limited capacity, supports the hypotheses of the proposed theory. Figure 2 illustrates the geographic commonalties of the Lashkar cadres; the vast majority of Lashkar recruits hail not from Kashmir or Jammu, but rather from the Punjab region of Pakistan. Congruent to these hypotheses, Lashkar and MDI operate the majority of their offices and institutions in the Punjab region. The recent study by the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point concurs, noting that Lashkar has developed infrastructure in Punjab at higher levels than any other region in Pakistan. The saturation of Lashkar institutions in Punjab increases the likelihood relative to other regions that its inhabitants have attended Lashkar and MDI-affiliated schools and benefitted

![Nonreligious Educational Attainment Levels of LeT Militants (n=154)](image_url)

**FIGURE 3.**
from Lashkar and MDI’s provision of public goods. This relationship tentatively supports hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2.

Furthermore, Mariam Abou Zahab argues the sociological profile of Lashkar recruits bare a remarkable similarity to those of non-commissioned officers in the Pakistani Army. The areas of high recruitment by the Pakistani Army also share considerable overlap by the areas from which Lashkar recruits many of its membership.48 These congruencies support hypothesis 3a and hypothesis 3b, with the “dynamics of the Indo-Pakistan security competition” that Christine Fair argues contributes to Lashkar recruitment also contributing to Army recruitment,49 making the mechanism of recruitment for both similar.

Finally, figure 3 illustrates the feasibility of hypothesis 4, showing that 25 percent of Lashkar members in this sample were recruited by family members or friends. Though this relationship seems obvious, it is important to note the role of social networks in recruitment. Furthermore, this relationship shows the centrality of personal relationships in terrorist recruitment.

Caveats and Limitations

This theoretical framework is not without its caveats, the primary one being the sample of empirical evidence. Rassler et al compiled this data from the biographies of 900 Lashkar militants translated from Urdu-language publications published by Lashkar and its associated organizations; one cannot assume this sample is representative of Lashkar as a whole.50 Without random sampling and regression analysis of the Pakistani population and the members of Lashkar, no conclusive evidence supporting or refuting this argument exists. This data provides a useful starting point for the crafting of a framework to be tested later, and for challenging the previous theories of Lashkar and terrorist recruitment. The second major caveat concerns possibility of bias in the sample; Rassler et al compiled these biographies from publications produced and disseminated by Lashkar;51 thus, there exists the possibility that Lashkar manipulated the biographies for its own purposes. The direction of this bias would be the opposite of what has been observed; had Lashkar manipulated these biographies, the organization would have emphasized the role of Kashmir nationals in the struggle. Publishing that a higher percentage of the Lashkar fighters hailed from Kashmir would support the group’s central claim that Kashmiris want to be liberated from India and absorbed into a greater Pakistan. The study observes little, if no, bias in the direction that one would assume it to be. Thus research incorporating the geographical empirics of this study can disregard the possibility of systematic bias in this characteristic of the fighters.

A possible limitation of this theory is the narrow scope to which the theory may apply. The relationship of Lashkar to the Pakistani state, the organization’s extensive social institutions, and Lashkar’s use of terrorist and insurgent tactics positions Lashkar as a special case of terrorism and therefore terrorist recruitment. Though the theory here developed to explain the recruitment of Lashkar cannot be generalized to the vast spectrum of terrorist organizations that operate throughout the world, this theory can be applied to a small, yet geopolitically significant, subset of terrorist groups. Terrorist organizations that provide substantial public goods to their host societies while maintaining a symbiotic or, at the very least, amicable relationship with their host states have emerged as a very serious international problem. Eli Berman and David Laitin argue the provision of public goods allows religious terrorist organizations to prevent defection and therefore maximize the lethality of the group’s actions.52 Berman and Laitin highlight the provision of public goods by Hamas, the Taliban, and Hezbollah, organizations that share many characteristics with Lashkar in terms of institutional development and relationships to their host states. In arguing that terrorist organizations follow a club framework, they assert that the sacrifices these groups require to attain the club goods fundamentally defines the membership (and therefore the recruitment) of the organization.53 Berman and Laitin’s theory does not, however, account for situations where the attainability of goods does not depend on membership in the club; their theory does not explain why Pakistanis join Lashkar when they benefit from Lashkar public goods, regardless of their status in the “club.” This paper’s theory can be applied to groups whose provision of goods does
not follow the “club model,” making the implications of the theory critical to understanding the recruitment within this growing category of institutionally active terrorist organizations.

V. Conclusion

The empirical evidence from the Lashkar case illustrates the role of public goods provision in terrorist recruitment. Though developed with Lashkar as its ideal-type, this theory explains the recruitment patterns of other terrorist groups with substantial public goods provision and amicable relationships with their host states. The education levels, geographic concentration, and sociological similarity of Lashkar militants to military officers support the argument that Lashkar’s provision of public goods facilitates its recruitment through direct and indirect mechanisms. Direct methods include the role of formative education on shaping one’s views of Lashkar terrorism. Examination of the indirect mechanisms of Lashkar’s public goods provision challenges the prevailing assumption that the psychological phenomenon of relative deprivation motivates terrorism, and supports increased study into the role of legitimacy spillover in the context of terrorist organizations. The tentative support of the theory outlined in section 3 provides motivation for further study of the role of public goods in terrorist recruitment, specifically in the Lashkar context. Theories of recruitment based on relative deprivation, opportunity costs, socioeconomic thresholds, and religious fundamentalism do not predict terrorism in the Lashkar context and cannot be applied to many terrorist organizations. The provision of public goods by terrorist organizations does provide multiple empirically supported mechanisms for terrorist recruitment, with those directly benefitting from the public goods and those experiencing legitimacy spillover more likely to participate in terrorism. These results argue that, in reference to organizations that provide public goods and operate in external military conflicts, the proximity and intensity of public goods, social institutions, and military recruitment predict participation in terrorist organizations. This theory provides an array of implications for further research and policy-making, most notably supporting the argument that counterterrorism requires strengthening and legitimating weak states, while competing with terrorist organizations in providing much-needed public goods to local populations.84

Endnotes

4. Lynn argues that terrorism exists as a fourth stage, preceding guerilla, mobile, and positional warfare on the three staged framework of revolutionary violence originally developed by Mao Zedong.
tvarist_outfits/lashkar_e_taba.htm


39. Ibid.


42. The classical formulation of state sovereignty is that of Max Weber: “[the] state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. See Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited by Hans Heinrich Gerth and Charles Wright Mills (Abingdon: Routledge, 1948), 78.


51. Ibid.


53. Ibid.


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Delegation from Regional to Global: 
ASEAN and the UN in Conflict Intervention

by Audrye Wong

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is often derided as a toothless talk shop incapable of managing regional conflicts, but interventions in Cambodia and East Timor suggest that ASEAN has been able to demand international action and use the UN to further its own interests. When limited by resources or divided by heterogeneous interests, ASEAN states have also directly delegated conflict intervention through the United Nations (UN). At the same time, ASEAN has attempted to minimize loss of control by leveraging the General Assembly as an institutional check and balance. While the UN remains dominant, regional organizations pursue complementary relationships and delegation can occur in both directions.

Introduction

As attention turns to regional organizations as an alternative mechanism of dealing with specific conflicts and issues, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is often derided as unable to effectively manage conflicts in its own backyard, in contrast to organizations such as the African Union (AU), which, together with the UN, recently sent peacekeeping troops to Darfur. A scholarly consensus has attributed such inaction to the colonial past of Southeast Asian member states, the resultant fundamental principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, as well as the “ASEAN Way” of consensus based decision making. For example, although Asia accounted for 40 percent of armed conflict in the period 1990-2005, multilateral peacekeeping operations in the region constituted just 13 percent (the corresponding figures for Europe were 8 percent and 41 percent respectively).¹

Indeed, post-Cold War multilateral peacekeeping operations in Southeast Asia have been rare, essentially limited to Cambodia in the early 1990s and East Timor since 1999. At the same time, ASEAN as a regional organization acted differently in each case. It actively lobbied on Cambodia through the UN and formulated a peace process, but declined the opportunity for a collective initiative against the atrocities in East Timor, leaving Australia to take the lead. How then can one explain the dynamic between the UN and regional organizations such as ASEAN in conflict intervention – under what conditions do they work together, what form does collaboration take, and when does a regional organization seek UN involvement? How much initiative does a regional organization have as an actor, versus as a forum, or resource? Applying the theoretical framework of principal-agent theory, when and why would ASEAN delegate regional conflict management to the UN, and under what circumstances might states delegate to ASEAN versus the UN?

This paper seeks to go beyond the usual region-based generalizations to develop a more nuanced perspective of the relationships between international and regional organizations in issues of conflict management and peacekeeping.

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While there has been considerable analysis of regional actors directly engaged in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, such as the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the nature of ASEAN involvement remains understudied. Although ASEAN has not yet developed the capacity to field its own regional peacekeeping force, it remains important to understand its differing stances – and underlying motivations – on engaging the UN or other actors, to formulate an international response toward a regional conflict, as well as any eventual deployment of a peacekeeping operation. There has also been little explicit comparison of Cambodia and East Timor cases. In place has been the prime upholder of non-intervention norms, this paper hopes to explore its nuanced machinations within the international community in tackling regional conflicts and challenge the notion that ASEAN is an inconsequential regional institution – in fact, at times it has been an important regional actor using the UN as a resource to achieve its objectives.

Conventionally, the interaction processes between the UN and regional actors is modeled as a vertical hierarchy, in which regional organizations are subordinate to the UN, which chooses to subcontract or outsource certain peacekeeping operations to the former. Article VIII of the UN Charter leaves room for the involvement of regional organizations in maintaining “international peace and security,” but conditioned on the following: (i) the activities are “consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”; (ii) no enforcement action shall be taken “without the authorization of the Security Council” (although regional organizations are encouraged to contribute to the “peaceful settlement of disputes”); and (iii) the Security Council must “at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies.”

Thus, these legal provisions emphasize the centrality of the UN and the Security Council in determining and responding to threats to international peace and security, as laid out in Chapter VII.

The 1992 Agenda for Peace document, written under then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, acknowledged the potential of regional organizations in contributing to conflict management and peacekeeping that could “not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.” Although, he reiterated that the “primacy of the UN…must be respected,” thus maintaining a top-down delegation of conflict management tasks by the UN to regional organizations.

To reduce agent slack, he outlined key principles of UN-regional cooperation in his 1995 Supplement as a rules-based (although admittedly vague) form of delegation, including the need for agreed mechanisms for consultation and a clearly defined division of labor. Areas of coordination would range from diplomatic consultations to mutual operational support and deployment of field missions.

Alternatively, global-regional cooperation could also be based on horizontal partnership. This model recognizes that regional organizations can acquire greater agency as an actor in the international arena, complementing the role of the UN in maintaining international peace and security. Some have further suggested that the subordination of regional organizations to the UN is becoming outdated in the face of an emerging “regional multilateralism.”

Amidst an increasingly post-Westphalian logic that moves toward the pooling of sovereignties, “regions” become the most relevant actors, obtaining legitimacy and authority as Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum note from “below and within” states and civil societies. Thus, regions or regional organizations could also act as a principal: delegating tasks to their appointed agent, the UN. Although this reverses the conventional model of interaction, this paper argues that ASEAN has managed to play the role of the principal, albeit with varying degrees of success.

Why might regional institutions seek to cooperate with or delegate tasks to their international counterparts? The most obvious motivations are the gains from specialization and division of labor; conflict management or intervention via a peacekeeping force is likely to incur high costs that member states are unwilling to bear, and delegation to the UN provides needed resources and expertise. Scholars have also proposed that delegation by state actors to an international organization (IO) can bring
several benefits, including: managing policy externalities through information provision and lowered transaction costs, enabling collective decision-making via an agenda-setting IO, resolving disputes through arbitration, enhancing the credibility of long-term policies, and creating a policy bias effect that “locks in” preferred domestic agendas through an international-level agreement. However, in the presence of heterogeneous preferences, or great power states, delegation to a third-party agent becomes less likely. Using this broad framework of principal-agent theory, this paper will analyze the dynamics of ASEAN-UN collaboration in the cases of Cambodia and East Timor and the nature of their roles as principal and agent.

Cambodia: An Activist ASEAN

The Cambodian conflict was sparked when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, overthrowing Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime and installing a new Hanoi-backed government: the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). From the start, ASEAN had vocally and forcefully opposed Vietnam’s invasion as a violation of Cambodia’s sovereignty and self-determination. A statement issued in January 1979 during the Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia and requested the UN Security Council to take immediate steps to end the conflict. Subsequent joint statements and communiqués into the 1980s continued to reiterate the Cambodian people’s right to self-determination and demand the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. This swift response was all the more remarkable given the lack of any formal conflict prevention, containment, or resolution roles delineated by the still-embryonic association, particularly toward non-member states. ASEAN states shared fears of an expansionist Soviet-backed Vietnam that could spread the communist threat to the region. Despite (or perhaps because of) the lack of a well-institutionalized secretariat, their convergent interests mobilized a united response.

Given the context of the Cold War, the UN Security Council predictably met with stalemate over any response. The Soviet Union vetoed resolutions against its Vietnamese ally, while China continued to support the previous Khmer Rouge regime and engaged in border conflicts with Vietnam. As the issue moved to the UN General Assembly, ASEAN stepped in as the leading actor, successfully shaping the international community’s view of and response to the Cambodian conflict (on ASEAN’s desired terms). In November 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted an ASEAN draft resolution that had been tabled by the Security Council in January, as well as another ASEAN-sponsored resolution in October 1980 calling for an international conference on the Cambodian issue. The declaration issued at this ASEAN-initiated, UN-sponsored International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK), which took place in July 1981, was then endorsed by the UN and, as stated by Muthiah Alagappa, constituted “the basis for international consideration of the conflict.”

Why did ASEAN turn to the UN? Implementing a comprehensive peace settlement as it envisioned was well beyond ASEAN’s limited capabilities – after all, the organization was barely a decade old. Lacking a collective self-defense arrangement as well as adequate military capabilities to respond to Vietnamese aggression (including incursions into Thai territory), collective diplomacy and ultimately intervention through the UN was the best way for ASEAN member-states to address the Cambodian issue. The UN umbrella would provide much-needed expertise and resources for peacekeeping as well as electoral supervision. Indeed, from February 1992 to September 1993, the UN Transitional Administration of Cambodia (UNTAC) deployed 22,000 personnel at a cost of over $1.5 billion, and ASEAN member-states were “relieved” to rely on UN assistance. ASEAN’s diplomatic lobbying provided valuable information to other actors, got the General Assembly to adopt sponsored resolutions, and the ICK declaration provided an institutionalized global mechanism to monitor compliance at lower transaction costs. For over a decade, the UN served as an important forum for consultations on the Cambodian conflict; “shuttle diplomacy” during intra-ASEAN meetings as well as with extra-regional actors generated critical momentum and sustained political will among the international community to participate in resolving the crisis.

Moreover, to the Vietnamese, the Association was far from an impartial party, and they were unwilling to accept any ASEAN-dictated terms. The UN’s high degree of agent autonomy, with an established bureaucracy and the Security Council’s powerful mandate, also empowered it to induce an equilibrium solution between the ASEAN-backed
Delegation from Regional to Global: ASEAN and the UN in Conflict Intervention / Audrye Wong

Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea and the Vietnamese-installed PRK regime (and by extension, between ASEAN and Vietnam). Despite an intensive flurry of ASEAN-driven diplomacy through the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs), the first Paris peace conference in 1989 had ended in a deadlock. Following this setback, the three major powers in the Security Council – the United States, China and the Soviet Union – wielded their individual, as well as joint leverage to push for a comprehensive political settlement. From 1990-1991, direct involvement and cooperation between the Permanent Five of the UN Security Council was key in overcoming obstacles, such as distrust among the Khmer factions and Vietnam, verifying Vietnamese withdrawal, that had stalled the peace process and the formation of a transition government. After a series of meetings, the Paris Peace Agreements signed on 23 October 1991 endorsed an overarching mandate for the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Thus, ceding the driver’s seat to the UN was critical in providing a neutral political framework for the PRK and Khmer factions to come to the table and accept a negotiated settlement.

At the same time, these political breakthroughs contrasted with and undermined ASEAN’s original hardline position, and ASEAN was compelled to moderate its stance to avoid falling out of line. Delegation to the UN, a much more powerful agent, inevitably entailed some loss of principal control, and the Security Council’s actions also strongly influenced the Association’s positions. ASEAN’s attempts at an intermediary role were only successful under the aegis of the UN. While all ASEAN members were signatories to the Paris Agreements, recognition of Southeast Asia’s stake in the process was increasingly given to individual countries that displayed more moderate positions. For instance, Jakarta was made co-chair of the Paris peace conferences and participated in Security Council discussions on operationalizing the UN settlement framework.

In this sense, many would argue that ASEAN ceded initiative to the highly autonomous and influential UN Security Council in a classic illustration of agent slippage. After all, scholars have conventionally argued that the role of great power interests was crucial for eventual conflict settlement. Alagappa in “Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict” noted that ASEAN was most effective in conflict containment, but not conflict termination, since it played a marginal role in the Paris Peace Conferences and eventual peacekeeping operations. It was only with the thawing of the Cold War and other changes exogenous to ASEAN’s role that allowed concrete progress in a peace process after 1987. In fact, there also appears to have been a re-delegation of tasks from the UN to ASEAN in what Alagappa called a “de facto division of labor.” While the Security Council hammered out the comprehensive framework agreement, ASEAN had the smaller responsibility of organizing the JIMs (still under the authority of the Paris Peace Conference interim committee), which focused on achieving national reconciliation and the formation of the Supreme National Council.

For all its diplomatic activism, ASEAN as a regional grouping was ultimately subject to extra-regional decisions implemented via the UN Security Council. This suggests the relatively low autonomy of regional organizations within a vertical hierarchy of competence and power, with the UN as a global institution at the apex. Yet, this paper would argue that this does not necessarily imply that upward delegation was a futile choice for ASEAN. In fact, awareness of its own minimal clout spurred the Association to reach out to the UN and the international community as a source of political authority and power. ASEAN was most effective as a mediator and source of information, ideas, and initiatives on how to deal with the Cambodian issue – the heavy lifting had to be left to the great powers. For a regional body such as ASEAN to act as an effective player, it needed to rely on an internationalization strategy in order to bandwagon with the resources of external powers and elicit a solution. Delegation to a more powerful and autonomous agent was hence the necessary and deliberate choice.

While it was broader geopolitical changes that ignited the Cambodian issue and enabled the deployment of UNTAC in 1992. ASEAN as the principal agent did not entirely lose its control – it still sought to shape the scope of UN responses. Since the 1980s, it had been instrumental in institutionalizing its concerns with the conflict management process. ASEAN did not merely seek to spotlight the Cambodian issue on the UN’s agenda, but also to actively internationalize the conflict as a means to mobilize widespread support and make the “cost of dominance in Cambodia unbearably high for Hanoi,” using what
Alagappa terms “coercive diplomacy.”

In particular, using the General Assembly mechanism as a sort of institutional check and balance against the eventual decisions by the UN Security Council, the Association sought to frame the debate according to its own terms, lobby major powers, deny diplomatic recognition of the Vietnamese-installed PRK government, and consolidate support for Khmer resistance forces.

Controlled delegation to the UN was a means for ASEAN to lock-in its preferred policies and interests. For example, the ICK declaration essentially articulated the Association’s principles on the Cambodian people’s right to self-determination and its goals for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces. It also incorporated ASEAN’s proposal for a comprehensive peace settlement, including a ceasefire by all parties, arrangements to prevent armed Kampuchean factions from disrupting Meetings and multiple ASEAN proposals were ultimately reflected in the Paris Peace Agreements of 1991. This included the implementation of a ceasefire, a transitional coalition involving all four political factions, as well as UN oversight of demobilization, supervision of administrative structures, and the administration of national elections.

In addition, the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea was an ASEAN-driven initiative. Although the three Khmer resistance groups were operating independently and essentially agreed to a marriage of convenience, such coordination served to present to the international community a legitimate representative for the Cambodian people that was capable of replacing the PRK government. ASEAN was also able to politicize Cambodia’s seat at the UN, normally a purely rubber-stamping process. Mobilizing other Third World states in the at the UN, which was unprecedented for an overthrown government. This was an important step in isolating the Vietnamese-installed PRK regime and denying its internal and external consolidation of power. It was also remarkable given the genocidal activities of the Khmer Rouge, which lent an undeniable humanitarian justification for Vietnam’s intervention.

While ASEAN was unable to fully control UN actions or alter the conflict dynamics, it was successful in restructuring the terms under which eventual peace process negotiation and conflict settlement took place. In effect, ASEAN was using the global reach of the UN as an instrument to promulgate its views and interests in the conflict, as well as legitimize its own goals. This was in fact a larger-scale reflection of how ASEAN member-states were using the regional Association to amplify their voices on the international stage, enabling ASEAN to function as a coherent actor with the ability to delegate. At the same time, the legal and political capacities of the UN (and the Security Council in particular) enabled it to respond as an independent actor.

“For a regional body such as ASEAN to act as an effective player, it needed to rely on an internationalization strategy in order to bandwagon with the resources of external powers and elicit a solution. Delegation to a more powerful and autonomous agent was hence the necessary – and deliberate – choice.”

or controlling election outcomes, a UN peacekeeping force to ensure law and order, and the holding of free elections under UN supervision. Similarly, the priorities outlined through the Jakarta General Assembly, using the rhetoric of non-intervention, it successfully campaigned every year to maintain the Khmer Rouge – now called the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) – as the Cambodian representative

East Timor: A Stymied ASEAN

In December 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor in the wake of Portugal’s withdrawal during the decolonization process. This was condemned by the UN Security Council and General Assembly, but no concrete action was taken until 1999, when Indonesia and Portugal finally signed the 5 May agreements, entrusting the UN to conduct a “popular consultation” for the East Timorese to vote between independence and autonomy as an Indonesian province.
After the overwhelming vote in favor of independence, pro-integration militias with the support of Indonesian armed forces carried out a retaliatory terror campaign, leading to mass violence and internal displacement. Ultimately, a Security Council Resolution on 15 September 1999 authorized a multinational humanitarian intervention force (INTERFET) to East Timor, led by Australia. Subsequently, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established on 25 October 1999 as a peacekeeping force responsible for the administration of East Timor during the transitional period.33

Traditionally, scholars have classified the Association as a passive bystander in the East Timor crisis, paralyzed by a firm adherence to the regional norms of sovereignty and non-interference, part of the “ASEAN Way.” According to Alan Dupont, ASEAN countries saw the Chapter VII mandate given to INTERFET and UNTAET as “a slap in the face” to Indonesia, which had not yet formally ceded its claim to sovereignty over East Timor at the time of deployment. They feared that such action would set an unwanted precedent for Western intervention in the internal affairs of other member-states.30 However, this constructivist argument falls apart when we consider ASEAN’s previous readiness to meddle in the Cambodian conflict. How then can we explain the Association’s apparent inaction, and why did it not play as active a principal role in delegating to the UN?

ASEAN’s suppression of the East Timor issue had begun well before the referendum and UN-endorsed intervention in 1999. In the early 1990s – and indeed since the 1970s – ASEAN’s main objective was to de-internationalize the conflict. This entailed vigorous diplomacy at the UN to keep the issue off the agenda. ASEAN member-states tabled annual motions, postponed relevant debates, and lobbied Western powers to downgrade UNCHR resolutions to weaker, non-binding chairman’s statements. They consistently voted with Indonesia in the UN General Assembly, or at most abstained, as Singapore did in 1975 and 1976.31 At the Asia-Europe Meeting, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and a 1994 ASEAN informal summit, the Association successfully condemned and blocked attempts by the EU and Portugal to discuss the East Timor issue, threatening a suspension of dialogue and membership.32

Such support from Jakarta’s neighbors stemmed from the historical specter of communism that preoccupied the region in the 1970s – in that context, Indonesian annexation of East Timor was seen as the best way to prevent the emergence of an independent state (and a base for communist subversion) under the left-leaning FRETILIN guerrillas. ASEAN’s stout defense of Indonesia’s heavy-handed actions stood in stark contrast to the opposition by other Third World countries.33 Continued internal conflicts and social unrest into the 1990s raised concerns that East Timor separatism would trigger a “Balkanization” of Indonesia alongside refugee spillovers.34 As a result, ASEAN states sought to preserve political and socioeconomic stability in the region by preventing East Timorese independence.

That the East Timor conflict involved Indonesia also complicated the regional response. One of the main reasons behind ASEAN’s creation in 1967 had been to promote reconciliation with Jakarta in a regional community framework, following the latter’s violent “Konfrontasi” policy toward its neighbors.35 In contrast, neither Vietnam nor Cambodia was a member of ASEAN during the Cambodian conflict in the 1980s and early 1990s. Furthermore, as ASEAN’s largest member-state, Indonesia, did not hesitate to wield its clout via issue linkage and the mobilization of transnational politico-business networks, placing economic and political pressure on neighboring governments. For example, the Philippines, which was highly reliant on Indonesian mediation to handle the Mindanao Muslim insurgency in the south, caved to Jakarta’s demands to ban a planned conference by the Timorese resistance in 1994.36 Thailand and Malaysia both took similar steps in preventing meetings by pro-independence activists and civil society groups.37 This lack of impartiality greatly hindered any sort of effective ASEAN response to the situation in East Timor, and certainly inhibited any intervention or delegation of conflict resolution to the UN.

ASEAN’s paralysis eventually led some member-states to directly seek out the UN as an alternative venue for action, catalyzed by the flagrant violence by pro-Indonesian militias after the 1999 ballot results in East
Timor. This was also facilitated by external changes in the geopolitical environment, providing ASEAN states with more room to maneuver. During the Cold War, Western powers such as the US and Australia had been equally complicit in muting any international response to East Timor because of Indonesia’s strategic value as a pro-Western, anti-Communist ally in Southeast Asia. As the communist threat evaporated in the 1990s, and public opinion grew in favor of East Timor independence, as a result of media and NGO coverage, there was reduced incentive to maintain a Jakarta-first policy.

Amidst this convergence of preferences, ASEAN countries quickly spoke in favor of the ballot outcome supporting East Timor independence. Even before Western countries, Malaysia and Thailand were the first to publicly offer troops for an international intervention force, with Singapore and the Philippines soon following suit. That this occurred despite voiced threats from Indonesia – Foreign Minister Alatas warned, “Do not talk about peacekeeping…unless you want to shoot your way into East Timor” – suggests that ASEAN was not completely opposed to the ideas of humanitarian intervention or international peacekeeping, but rather had been stymied by Jakarta’s bullying influence. Although analysts, like Jürgen Haacke, pointed out that ASEAN governments would not have participated in INTERFET “had it not been for Jakarta’s explicit consent,” other Western countries similarly emphasized the importance of obtaining Indonesian assent, in UN Security Council meetings and elsewhere.

Because ASEAN lacked the capacity to marshal a multilateral peacekeeping force, immediate and direct delegation to the UN was the most efficient choice. Not only was ASEAN unable to compel Jakarta to accept a Southeast Asian-led force in East Timor, ASEAN member-states were also aware that they quite simply lacked sufficient experience and resources. Their contributions to INTERFET ultimately depended upon financial assistance from great powers; Australia already bore a significant portion of mission costs, and a $107 million INTERFET Trust Fund was established to cover developing country expenses, with Japan contributing 100 million USD. Infantry units as well as critical communications, and intelligence support came from other Western powers such as the US, UK, Canada, and France. For the UN and international community, entrusting ASEAN to organize or operationalize multilateral intervention was scarcely a feasible option, especially when ASEAN Regional Forum had failed to even discuss the East Timor issue on its annual agenda. Acknowledging this reality, Southeast Asian states such as Singapore and the Philippines immediately highlighted at Security Council meetings the need for international assistance through the UN, rather than calling for an ASEAN-led alternative.

Indeed, a change in Indonesia’s position was achieved not through ASEAN but through pressure from UN-linked institutional mechanisms. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis had devastated Indonesia’s economy and left it dependent on Western fiscal donors, opening room for coercive leverage on the East Timor issue. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank froze loans and aid packages, while the US and EU threatened to suspend military assistance and impose an arms embargo, unless Indonesia accepted a foreign intervention force. The relative power endowed to the UN Security Council allowed it to act as an effective agent in enforcing a multilateral solution of humanitarian intervention. The authority of the UN umbrella further provided credible shelter for individual ASEAN states to advocate for East Timor states to advocate for East Timor peacekeeping against Jakarta’s desires.

Interestingly, after Indonesian officials bowed to extra-regional pressure, they quickly sought to boost ASEAN participation – a pretense of voluntary delegation to the regional organization, as its preferred agent. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas arranged for his well-respected Thai counterpart, Surin Pitsuwan (who was also chair of the Standing Committee of ASEAN), to meet with General Wiranto, the Indonesian military commander, on 14 September 1999, and obtain his agreement for deployment of ASEAN troops as part of INTERFET. On the same day, Indonesian president Habibie formally requested help in organizing an ASEAN military contribution.

Clearly, despite its low institutionalized capacity, ASEAN still retained an important legitimating role. As a regional body that counted Indonesia as a member, it lent credibility to domestic nationalistic sentiment against foreign intervention in East Timor, still seen as Indonesian territory. A UN-endorsed solution, by virtue of Security Council and Western power, carried imperialist overtones, but ensuring ASEAN involvement could provide a
veneer of Southeast Asian ownership, as well as Jakarta’s willing consent. On its part, the UN also attempted to acknowledge regional preferences. While Australia took the lead in INTERFET, ASEAN was not relegated to the bylines. The Deputy Commander was a Thai Major-General, and ASEAN represented slightly over a quarter of the 9,900 personnel deployed in September 1999.\(^{49}\) In a compromise, Filipino Lieutenant-General Jaime de los Santos was also appointed to lead UNTAET with an Australian deputy, while the next commander was also from Thailand. Thus, even if a regional organization remains ineffective or subordinate to the UN-led hierarchy of decision-making and conflict intervention, its willing involvement remains a potential source of legitimacy for action by the international community.

All the same, ASEAN members constantly wrestled with the secondary role and the challenge that this posed to the organization’s legitimacy as the driver for regional action. Tensions between the regional and international levels were evident in Southeast Asian responses to the Australian-led, UN-sanctioned forces, especially under perceptions that Australia saw itself as the deputy to the United States in policing the region. Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi countered by saying, “we do not wish to see any country appointing itself the protector or leader for this region,” while a Thai foreign policymaker also emphasized that ASEAN “must play the primary role in Southeast Asia.”\(^{50}\)

While scholars such as Lee Jones have claimed active Southeast Asian intervention in the East Timor conflict, these were not always as an ASEAN bloc. INTERFET and UNTAET contributions were under individual country flags, and limited to the major member-states (and founding members), namely Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia. In a revealing remark, Rodolfo Severino, the ASEAN Secretary-General at that time, said that the absence of collective ASEAN peacekeeping is “not so much because of its policy of non-interference as because of its member-states’ aversion to investing the Association with any kind of supranational power, particularly one involving military force.”\(^{51}\) Southeast Asian states remain wary of delegating too much institutional power to ASEAN that may infringe upon their own national interests in the future. Because they continue to view multilateral institutions as a resource to be selectively employed, rather than a beneficial actor in its own right, organizational solidarity has been limited.

Moreover, one major change between the earlier Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict and the East Timor intervention was the expansion of ASEAN to include the Indochina countries Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar in the 1990s. This increased the heterogeneity of member-state preferences, particularly as the Association had sought to speed their inclusion through a low bar of accession, despite significant economic differences and criticisms of human rights violations in the CLMV countries. Widened membership thus led to diverging policies and further accentuated intra-ASEAN divisions on how to respond to developments in East Timor. In fact, observers have suggested that ASEAN leaders were initially most concerned with the potential impacts on the Association’s unity, instead of the unfolding humanitarian crisis.\(^{52}\) While the Thai Deputy Foreign Minister declared that, “the time has come to show that we can solve the region’s problems ourselves with the cooperation of countries outside the region,” other ASEAN members such as Vietnam and Burma displayed little enthusiasm and strongly disapproved of any external intervention.\(^{52}\) During a Security Council meeting on September 11, 1999, statements by Cambodia and Laos contrasted with declarations by Singapore and the Philippines regarding international assistance in Indonesia.\(^{54}\)

A parallel can be drawn with the ASEAN response when Cambodia again faced civil war between rival political factions in 1997. In this case, the Association became the delegated agent. The major powers – the European Union, Japan, and especially the United States – had little stomach for further first-hand intervention and pressured ASEAN to act. This was a reverse of the situation in the 1980s when ASEAN had lobbied for global involvement. Because its previous success in the Cambodian case had been the core of the Association’s claim to manage regional order, ASEAN had little choice but to respond to its Western partners in order to preserve its reputation and credibility as a regional body, especially in the wake of international outcry over its decision to admit human rights violator
Myanmar as a member. An ASEAN Troika, consisting of the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, was appointed to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis. But a sustained response was now far more difficult in the late 1990s, after Vietnam joined as member in 1995, and Laos and Myanmar were admitted in 1997. The civil war in Cambodia effectively pitted the ASEAN-backed FUNCINPEC against the Vietnam-backed CCP. Intra-ASEAN divisions, with the newer members less disposed to continued diplomatic intervention, led to a somewhat bizarre compromise. Cambodia was admitted to ASEAN in 1997, with its formal admission ceremony postponed until after certain conditions were met, including the holding of free and fair elections, and formation of a senate. Moreover, Indonesia was also struggling with international pressure on the East Timor conflict. Using the rhetoric of non-interference, it increasingly opposed further ASEAN involvement in the Cambodian issue. As member-states sought to protect their own national interests and limit institutional mandates when they were no longer conducive for the former, delegation to the regional association declined markedly.

Conclusion

The delegation of conflict resolution or peacekeeping operations to a multilateral institution is most likely to occur when state preferences are closely aligned. But contrary to the UN Charter’s top-down model of delegation, in which the UN decides to subcontract certain tasks to regional organizations, the dynamics of the interventions in Cambodia and East Timor suggest that ASEAN has also been able to bring issues to the global level and demand international action via the UN. When member-states’ interests are homogeneous, ASEAN has been a cohesive regional actor, effectively using the UN as a global-level resource to further its own interests, be it intervention in the Cambodian conflict or initial non-intervention in East Timor. Expanded membership and heterogeneous state interests has limited ASEAN-initiated delegation in the 1990s. When Southeast Asian states were willing to take action against a fellow ASEAN member – Indonesia – despite stymied action at the regional level, they also chose to support intervention directly through the UN, particularly when great power interests became more aligned.

Delegation to the UN and its Security Council was usually unavoidable because of ASEAN’s limited clout and resources, making ASEAN highly reliant on extra-regional actors for concrete action. As a mechanism of control, ASEAN sought to leverage the General Assembly as an institutional check and balance. But when preferences diverge, as in the Cambodian case, the more powerful UN Security Council has been able to act as an autonomous agent. By virtue of the Association’s relative lack of institutionalization and collective capacity, ASEAN still remains largely subordinate to the UN as an interventionist actor. However, delegation flows can occur in both directions, and ASEAN has also assumed the role of principal.

Interestingly, there also appears to be an element of mutual legitimation between the international and regional organizations. UN involvement lent powerful international legitimacy and support to ASEAN’s interventionist goals in Cambodia, as well as enhanced the Association’s reputation as a regional institution. Even when Western powers and the UN took the lead in intervening in East Timor, ASEAN’s presence served to “regionalize” and, hence, legitimize their actions, even if on a superficial level. Ultimately, the two types of institutions are complementary - while preferences may not always be aligned, and the UN remains dominant, sustained regional-international interactions help to safeguard international peace and security, as so optimistically stated in the UN Charter.

Endnotes


7. At that time, ASEAN member-states comprised: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (the five founding members). Brunei joined in 1984.


15. This was a political coalition of the three Khmer resistance groups: Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, Prince Norodom Sihanouk's National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), and former Prime Minister Son Sann's Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF).


19. Ibid., 439-467.

20. The SNC, comprised of both government and resistance party representatives, would serve as the official Cambodian decision-making body under UNTAC.


22. Ibid.


38. Ibid.

39. This was additionally catalyzed by the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991, in which Indonesian forces killed and wounded hundreds of unarmed East Timor civilians during a demonstration in Dili.


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his paper will address the role that the energy trade has played in shaping Turkish Foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. The role of energy is most notable in two arenas of policy: relations in the Caucasus and with the European Union (EU). Each arena is marked with its own significant challenges and policy nuance. Turkey’s EU accession hopes and its competition with Russia in the energy market are inherently tied to the issue of Eurasian relations, while debates over Turkey’s role as an “energy hub” bring serious questions to its relationship with the EU.

Furthermore, the effects of US policy have shaped Turkish policy in both of these arenas, providing an outside force to ensure that Turkey is not the sole player in the rich energy markets of the Eurasian region. Turkey has undoubtedly shown that it is willing to emerge as a major participant in the region and engage the surrounding resource rich countries in what can be described as “oil politics.” The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union mark an important transition phase for Turkey’s role in the Eurasian energy market. Fiona Hill in “Caspian Conundrum: Pipelines and Energy Networks,” finds that Turkey’s main objectives since the early 1990’s, and in the wake of the USSR’s collapse have been “to secure new energy supplies, and to establish [Turkey] as the transit country for energy flows from the Caspian to consumer markets in Europe.” This two-pronged approach marks the beginning of Turkey’s desire to make significant forays into the Eurasian energy market in the modern era for a number of reasons.

1

The first reason is the emergence of the Newly Independent States (NIS) after the collapse of the USSR, which created significantly larger number of parties to deal with in terms of energy agreement. Many in Turkey were quite hopeful that the cultural ties between themselves and the NIS could be the backbone for favorable relations. However, the emergence of the NIS marks a turning point in Russian-Turkish relations, and Turkey soon found itself in direct competition with the Russian Federation for spheres of influence over the Caucasus and Central Asia.

2

Turkish policy in the initial stages was characterized by a zero-sum approach, meaning theoretically a larger Turkish role in the energy market inevitably meant a minimization of the Russian sphere of influence. Therefore, Russian competition from the outset was unavoidable. The degree to which Turkey and Russia would cooperate in the coming years has been shaped by both necessity and mutual economic benefit. This cooperation will be elaborated upon in depth later.

Turkey’s Policy Motives and Energy Objectives

One cannot address Turkey’s forays with the NIS without addressing the debate over Turkey’s policy motives. There are significant questions as to whether or not Turkey’s assertiveness represents an emerging trend of Neo-Ottoman behavior in Turkish

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policy, or a pursuance of cooperation and agreement on the basis of mutual economic benefit. The true characterization of Turkish policy in this region is perhaps a moderation of these two views, yet there are camps within Turkey that fall on both sides of the argument. Whereas the traditional Kemalist elites, often found in the military establishment, are strong non-imperialists and would denounce any

characterizes Turkey’s engagement. Energy agreements have been some of the most evident areas of cooperation and negotiation for Turkey in Eurasia.

How have energy agreements and projects shaped Turkey’s policies in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and has “oil diplomacy” been either a positive or limiting factor for policy decisions? The areas of most notable concern are Turkey’s negotiations with Azerbaijan,

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Turkey’s main objective in pursuing energy agreements with these countries in recent years has been to ensure that the primary route for the export of oil from the Caspian is through overland pipelines in Turkey (oil will eventually end up in the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan). Turkey stressed this route for security reasons, yet Turkey’s motivations and preferences for this route are far more numerous. First, there are many in the Turkish policy establishment that recognize the minimized role of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in aligning Turkey with the West since the collapse of the USSR. If Turkey becomes a major component in the safety and security of oil exports in the region, then it is in the interest of major importers such as the United States, to protect their investments. Seeing the increased role of Turkey in oil exportation through a Ceyhan pipeline, the relationship between Turkey and the US did in fact become an area for mutual cooperation. Turkey and the US formalized a “strategic energy alliance” in 1997 to “promote energy diversity and security, develop Caspian resources… transport oil and gas through Turkey…and facilitate international investment,” according to Hill. Second, beyond the obvious economic benefits for Turkish construction companies and industry employees, overland oil routes, which end up at a Black Sea port, must pass through the Bosphorus. Financially, this is an unattractive option for Turkish policy, as tariffs and taxation on ships passing through the Bosphorus are limited and controlled by the 1936 Montreux Convention. Culturally, the Bosphorus represents an important issue for the elites of Istanbul, who hold the straits as a significant part of Turkish cultural identity. The idea of the straits becoming an overpopulated shipping route represents an anathema for many in the Turkish elite. This is best exhibited by the protests of 2000 over an oversized Romanian freighter’s attempt to pass through the straits. The controversy was resolved through negotiations with the Romanian Foreign Ministry, yet the matter of the Bosphorus as a shipping route still remains a contentious issue.

"There are significant questions as to whether or not Turkey’s assertiveness represents an emerging trend of Neo-Ottoman behavior in Turkish policy, or a pursuance of cooperation and agreement on the basis of mutual economic benefit."
The BTC Pipeline

Thus, the best option in the eyes of Turkish policy makers was a pipeline that had the port of Ceyhan as its final destination. In 1999 it was decided that the pipeline would be routed through Georgia and became known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. Throughout its planning stages and construction the BTC pipeline was faced with several challenges. Russia opposed the early stages of the process. The “near abroad policy” stressed in Moscow, as Melina Altunisik points out, “emphasized Russia’s vital political, economic, and military interests” in the Caucasus. The Russian firm Lukoil was motivated by financial incentives. In 1993, the President of Lukoil as well as the minister of fuel and energy visited Baku to negotiate a Russian role in Caspian oil deals. This visit resulted in the allocation of 10 percent of Azerbaijani shares to Lukoil, while Turkish shares only achieved a maximum level of 6.75 percent.12

Iran and Russia also backed their positions by disputing the legal status of the Caspian Sea. The Caspian during BTC construction was essentially divided under a non-spoken agreement of territorial sovereignty.13 Iran and Russia opposed many of the agreements and held a number of territorial disputes in the Caspian, though by 1994 Russia mostly backed away from its opposing stance on the BTC, and Iran was left as the largest opponent of the plan.14

Iran, who holds significant interest of its own in being the sole exporter of regional oil, was effectively countered by the support of the US and the EU to move forward on the BTC pipeline.15 The pipeline also faced significant challenges due to high construction costs matched with unstable oil prices.16 Instability caused by regional conflict was also a major issue, yet the Turks insist, mostly to appease US concerns, that routing oil through a NATO country is the most stable option. However, Turkey was not without its own problems of instability in terms of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), who had committed terrorist acts before on Turkish oil pipelines. Although after the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, the Kurdish concerns were largely overcome.17

Construction began in 2002 on the BTC pipeline and the pipeline became functional in 2006.18 Through the acquisition of the BTC pipeline, Turkey showcased its determination to become an “East-West energy corridor,” as well as its viability and stability as an energy source, garnering US support. US support for the BTC pipeline was critical, especially in countering the political motivations of Iran to have a pipeline of Caspian oil routed through Iranian territory.

Iran and the US: Energy Oppositions

Although the ability of the Turks to negotiate with the US on this issue is particularly encouraging, it remains problematic that the Turks are unable to gain significant leverage in lobbying against the Iranians for the BTC without the backing of the US. This is perhaps one of the first major limitations and challenges to Turkey’s role to become a major energy hub. Economically, there is a general consensus that Iran represents the cheapest and most viable long-term option to route oil from the Caspian.19 While the advocates of the BTC pipeline highlighted the security of the pipeline operating in a NATO country’s territory, many industry experts also note that an Iranian pipeline would represent a relatively secure option.20 Seemingly, the Turkish position in lobbying for Caspian oil relies heavily on US backing. If US opposition against the Iranians shifts in the future, then Turkey’s assertiveness in the oil sector may become problematic.

There is prior evidence that the US is willing to lift economic sanctions on Iran. In 1998, when the Russian company Gazprom was developing several oil fields in southern Iran, the US decided not to impose sanctions on Gazprom. This was in direct contradiction to the 1996 law requiring sanctions on companies that invested over $20 billion in Iranian petroleum industries.21 There has also been instances of countries disregarding the possible penalties for cooperation with Iran. In 1997 Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Iran announced plans to construct a pipeline from Kazakhstan to the Persian Gulf. The US company ExxonMobil lobbied the US government for permission to participate in the construction of an Iranian pipeline from Neka to Tehran.22 If US opposition to Iran erodes in the future, and there is a rapprochement, this could severely undermine Turkey’s advantage in being a major player in Caspian oil.
There are instances of cooperation between Iran and Turkey over energy issues, yet those occurrences seem to be heavily influenced by the position of the United States. Iran, holding the world’s second largest natural gas reserves, represents a viable option for Turkey in its desire to diversify sources of natural gas. Plans to construct a natural gas pipeline from Iran to Turkey were strongly opposed by the US in 1997. The US also opposed Turkish plans to import natural gas from Turkmenistan routed through Iranian territories. Although these deals went forward without the approval of the US, this could represent a pattern in Turkish-US relations. While Turkey’s maneuverability on many oil issues is seemingly dependent on the US for support, there is also significant opposition by the US to any Turkish efforts of cooperation with Iran. Why is the US willing to allow non-Turkish cooperation with Iran, yet opposes many Turkish efforts for economic cooperation? Seemingly, the answer is a geo-strategic one. If Turkey is able to significantly diversify its energy portfolio, perhaps the US risks having Turkey develop too much of a role in the Caspian energy trade. Hill notes that “Although Turkey is central to US Caspian policy, its energy needs, geographic position, and regional relations point to a different set of partners from US preferences in future energy calculations.” US embargoes and sanctions stem primarily from its opposition to the Iranian Nuclear program. Because the Iranian resolve on possessing a nuclear weapon is strong, and there is unwillingness on the US side to negotiate, the US is bound to have strong effects on Turkish energy policy for years to come.

**Russian Energy Politics**

The Russian opposition to the BTC pipeline in its early planning stages represents a pattern of relations in the Caucasus that from the end of the Cold War until 1997 was marked by disagreement. Russian objectives at this point were defined in the “near abroad policy.” Seeing the Caucasus as an area in which it was essential to promote themselves, the new Russian government sought to oppose any Turkish efforts to expand Turkey’s sphere of influence. According to Tannisever, Turkey’s objectives in the early post-Soviet era were defined by a desire to “solidify the newly gained independence of the Caucasian states… and to become a major actor in the region to secure economic and security benefits.” In order to fully capitalize on new financial opportunities Turkey looked to the BTC pipeline and other energy deals with Caucus countries. A move to diversify Turkish sources of energy would mean less reliance on Russian oil and gas. Good relations with the states of the Caucasus would also mean an expansion of Turkish allies in the direction of Russia, thereby creating a “buffer zone” of states between Russia and Turkey. In addition to the early rivalry over the BTC pipeline and the issues regarding the Caspian, the Russians accused the Turkish government throughout the 1990s of supporting the rebels in Chechnya through “clandestine activities.” In return, there were accusations by the Turkish government, especially under the Ciller administration, that Moscow was supporting the PKK. These accusations were perhaps not unfounded, as Russia allowed the meeting of the “International Congress of Kurdish Organizations,” in which the PKK was an active participant. Despite the signing of agreements in 1995 and 1996 between Moscow and Ankara to cooperate on matters of terrorism prevention, the Russians did nothing to prevent PKK lobbying and participation in politics.

The year 1997 marks a turning point, in which Russian-Turkish cooperation began to increase, based on mutually beneficial economic relations. A November 1997 meeting of the Turkish-Russian Joint Economic Council was the starting point for a number of natural gas agreements between Turkey and Russia. The most important agreement of these talks was the Blue Stream natural gas project, which established plans to build underwater pipelines in the Black Sea. The Blue Stream Pipeline was completed in 2003 and became fully operational in 2010. Furthermore, the 1997 meeting marked a series of cooperative agreements over the BTC pipeline in which the two countries, Tannisever notes, agreed to “abstain from actions likely to harm each other’s economic interests or threaten…territorial integrity.” As a result, Turkey promised to hire a number of Russian companies in order to build the BTC, and Lukoil...
expressed interest in having a stake in the pipeline. Since 1997 the Russian-Turkish relationship has largely been based on mutual economic benefit. Despite the modest gains Turkey has made in the Caucasus, projection of political influence in this region still remains a “zero sum game.” In this type of environment, especially when the relationship is based on economic incentives, future cooperation between the Russians and the Turks remains extremely fragile. Unilateral decisions as seen in the 1998 Russian financial crisis, in which Russia devalued the ruble, caused Turkish businesses to suffer, and prices of Turkish goods in the Caucasus to increase dramatically. A relationship based strictly on economics is subject to extreme change in the event of a downturn or depression. Furthermore, even two decades after the collapse of the USSR, a period in which Turkey made it one of their main goals to diversify their energy portfolio, the majority of energy imports still largely come from Russia. Turkey in 2008 imported 93 percent of their oil and 97 percent of their natural gas, both of which were disproportionately made up of Russian imports. A reliance on Russian energy not only constrains Turkish policy decisions towards engaging Moscow, but also reduces the ability of Turkey to project influence in the Caucasus.

Throughout the 1990's, Turkey was only able to make modest gains in the Caucasus, largely due to their reliance on Russian energy as well as the Caucasus’s “unwillingness to consider Turkey their ‘new big brother.’” Despite the strong rhetoric in Turkey to present itself as the regional protector for the NIS, there were serious limitations in Turkey’s ability to project economic and political influence over the Caucasus. Turkey was limited by the simple unwillingness of the Caucasus to accept another “big brother” having seen the failure and collapse of the USSR. Also, Turkey failed to make significant inroads politically in areas where Soviet ties had previously been so strong. In fact, the rivalry between Turkey and Russia had the effect of strengthening ties between NIS states, to ensure their stable economic trade. Since the end of the Cold War the countries of the NIS had made more progress diplomatically together then Turkey, which failed to represent itself as a model for the NIS. Turkey’s initial approach after the collapse of the USSR was to represent itself as a viable and successful economic model, an option which was largely supported by the United States, who was worried about the increased political influence of Iran. However, the Turkish policies in the Caucasus cannot be considered an outright failure, and success can be seen in a number of areas. Turkey saw modest success in increasing ties with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and the numerous countries with which it holds profitable, albeit fragile, energy agreements. In the coming years, Russia and Turkey may face a serious challenge to their relationship, as their zero-sum Eurasian connection may also carry over into their alliance with the EU.

**Turkey as a European Energy Hub**

Turkey’s hopes of EU accession are largely intertwined with their goal to become an “energy hub” or transit point to connect Eastern energy pipelines and networks with the West. However, it should be noted that there is a large difference between Turkish energy “transit” behavior and “brokerage” behavior, as noted by Ali Tekin and Paul Andrew Williams in *Geo-Politics of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus.* As an energy transit country Turkey would refrain from imposing exorbitant fees and duties for transporting energy from the East to EU nations, while “brokerage” behavior will entail Turkey “capitalizing on its transit position to obtain parochial rent-seeking advantages.” If Turkey hopes to represent itself as a country with European interests at heart, it would of course assume the former position, providing an option for European energy that carries less political baggage than the current pipelines, which pass through Belarus and Ukraine.

Turkey is put in a unique position to provide another avenue by which the EU can receive its required energy resources. Since 2006, when Russia cut off gas supplies to Europe due to a pricing dispute with Ukraine, the EU has been looking to diversify its sources of energy. France, Germany, and Italy believe the disputes with Russia can be solved with the construction of pipelines that bypass Belarus and Ukraine. The newly inducted EU states are willing to turn away from Russian energy in a move towards greater association with Europe and a disassociation with
2008 South Ossetia war highlighted the relative instability of the Caucasus and the willingness of Russia to still engage in the ongoing regional ethnic disputes. While the Georgian-Russian conflict did not affect the supply of natural gas significantly, it still emphasized the relatively fragile environment that exists in much of the Caucasus. Because of the risks associated with a project so large, the Nabucco pipeline requires significant governmental commitments regarding credit. Since the 2008 conflict, many governments in the region are hesitant to give such assurances, an obstacle that Turkey must overcome.

Turkey also faces obstacles in meeting adequate supply for the Nabucco pipeline. The planners of the project have made it part of their mission statement as Tekins and Williams state not “to exclude any supply sources.” However, the choosing of suppliers is of geopolitical consideration for Turkey. Even though there are doubts as to whether or not it will be able to provide an adequate supply of gas in surplus to its already massive export portfolio, Iran has emerged as a potential supplier for the project. However, the inclusion of Iran in the project would be met with protest by the US, and perhaps the EU nations, which have aligned with the US in opposition to Iran's nuclear program. The US would far prefer the inclusion of the northern Iraqi oil fields under Kurdish control as a major source for the project, yet this poses political challenges on both the Turkish and Iraqi side. The Iraqi central government, which does not fully recognize the northern autonomous Kurdish region, would prefer that the gas be sourced from oil fields other than those in Kirkuk, as the northern fields are a source of constant tension between Baghdad and the Kurds. Although the AK party administration under Erdogan has seen rather peaceful relations with the Kurds of northern Iraq, there is still great hesitancy to include the Kurds in the Nabucco project at the expense of the central Iraqi government.

The Shah-Deniz natural gas field in Azerbaijan is also a possible prospect for supply to the Nabucco pipeline, but shaky relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan beginning in 2009 (regarding the Armenian-Azeri conflict) have brought doubts to the willingness of Azerbaijan to support a Turkish centered energy project.

Turkey’s maneuverability on the Nabucco project is severely limited by its ability to resolve conflicts that pose such

"The debate over potential supply and security issues still rages and many are skeptical as to whether construction on the pipeline will ever begin. "

their former Soviet partners. Both of these outlooks work to the advantage of Turkey in increasing its ties to the EU. Geographically, Turkey is in the perfect position to emerge as a European energy hub, and economically Turkey has the infrastructure and developed economy necessary to begin such a large project. The Nabucco pipeline project is at the head of Turkey’s hopes to be an energy transit hub.

The Nabucco Project

The Nabucco project is a proposed gas pipeline, which will run from the eastern Turkish border with Iran and Georgia to Baumgarten, Austria. As a whole, the project’s mission is to diversify European energy sources away from Russia, but there are several other goals defined by the consortium in charge of the pipeline. The Naabucco project aims to increase supply, security, and prominence for the parties involved. The Nabucco pipeline is seen by many as an alternative to the Gazprom South Stream project, which would only serve to increase EU reliance on Russian natural gas. Seeing the BTC pipeline as the beginning of an “erosion of Russian leverage,” Russia hopes to prevent the construction of the Nabucco project, which has emerged as a major political concern for the future of the project. Russia has used disputes over the legal status of the Caspian, and whether it is considered a “Sea” or a “Lake” according to international law. This has largely prevented the building of Trans-Caspian pipelines, which are essential to future phases of the Nabucco project. Furthermore, the
great stumbling blocks. The prospects of Turkey resolving the disputes over the Caspian are low, and seemingly, it would be in Turkey’s best interest not to involve itself in an international dispute. Turkey needs to prove that the relative security risks of the Caucasus are low, in addition to convincing the EU that there is significant enough supply to meet the energy needs of Europe. It has been generally established that a diversification of European energy would be a positive step for the EU. Pavel Baev and Indra Overland emphasize that “liberalization may appear to be an economically sounder policy, as its main thrust goes in the direction of creating a real market for natural gas in the EU in place of the system of non-transparent bilateral deals and fixed prices.”

However, in order for Turkey to capitalize on this move towards diversification, it must present the Nabucco project as a more favorable option than the South Stream project, which has the strength of providing guaranteed sources and a stronger backing because of Gazprom’s prominence in the energy industry. It remains to be seen which project will take center stage, as construction on the Nabucco pipeline was scheduled to begin in 2010, yet no construction has taken place. The debate over potential supply and security issues still rages and many are skeptical as to whether construction on the pipeline will ever begin.

**Competing Policy Objectives**

The United States also plays an important role in Turkey’s current relations with the EU. While Turkish hopes of EU accession are assisted by the United States, Russia hopes to counter the United States through improved relations with the EU. This represents an important dichotomy that places Turkey in the middle of a flurry of competing policy objectives. It should be noted that the US and the EU agree with the need for European energy diversification. The American perspective opposes the enlargement of the Iranian energy industry because of the Iranian nuclear program, and disavows Russian supply for the Nabucco program from a pragmatic geopolitical standpoint. American support for the BTC pipeline was critical, and if one accepts the premise that the building of the Nabucco pipeline represents a positive step in closer associations for Turkey with the EU, then US support for the Nabucco project will be an important element.

An expanding natural gas industry and the global economic downturn in 2008 both raise questions as to whether the US will fully support the project. Richard Morningstar and Senator Dick Lugar did attend the signing ceremony of the Nabucco project in 2009, but this is only a minor sign of encouragement in a series of possible sources of tension between the US and Turkey. Turkey and the US have been at odds in recent years due to Turkey’s growing hostile relationship with Israel because of the leadership of the AK party, as well as the ambivalence in Ankara towards Iranian nuclear ambitions. Since the Nabucco project relies on Iran as a potential supplier, there could be consequences for Turkey’s relationship with the US. The US would prefer Middle Eastern or Caspian sources of gas for the Nabucco project. Turkey will need to weigh the consequences of confrontation with the US over this issue with its energy relationship with Russia and Iran.

Those in Turkey who continue to hope for EU accession place great emphasis on Turkey’s ability to represent itself as an alternative energy option for Europe. However, the people who ascribe to the traditionalist Kemalist mindset of insularity, note that EU membership, while theoretically attainable under closer inspection, may not be the preferable option. There are some calls among Kemalists for a “privileged partnership” EU relationship with Turkey in terms of energy, which would entail essentially the same benefits Turkey holds now under the Customs Union. Those in Ankara who subscribe to the same school of thought established under the Ozal administration feel as though increased economic ties between the EU and Turkey would only help Turkey’s chances for membership. Essentially, Tekin and Williams summarize the two competing schools of thought as “assum(ing) Turkey’s energy role to be simply an alternative transit route for supplies not controlled by Russia, while the other one interprets it as an important contribution to European energy security through the country’s accession to the EU.”

Overall, in the current atmosphere, Turkish hopes for full membership in the EU are dim. The rejection of Turkey’s EU hopes in 1987 at the Luxembourg Summit still holds resonance in the
minds of many elites in Ankara.\textsuperscript{59} Turkey’s negative relations with the EU can be traced back to Luxembourg, which marks an important turning point for serious anti-European sentiments in Turkey.\textsuperscript{60} Although accession into the EU attempts at membership combined with the current atmosphere in both Turkey and EU are not promising. Two thirds of German and French citizens oppose an enlargement of the EU. Even though the majority of Turkish citizens support EU membership\textsuperscript{61} there are questions as to the cultural significance of Turkey’s accession into the EU, as well as hesitancy on the part of the EU to accept a country with an Islamic cultural background.\textsuperscript{52}

**Turkey’s Hopes For EU Accession**

Turkey’s hopes to emerge as an “energy hub” for the EU is reflected in the “bridge theory,” in which Turkey becomes an important mediator between East and West providing both a material and diplomatic bridge. The bridge theory has been a common theme in Turkish politics, because of Turkey’s geopolitical advantage. Those who desire to capitalize on this innate strategic benefit cite increased cooperation and integration as the primary route for success. This has been a cornerstone of Ahmet Davutoglu’s foreign policy, and as a result Turkey has seen significant strides in cooperation and integration with several regional actors such as Russia and Iran.\textsuperscript{63} Turkey has essentially sought a normalization of relations, Israel perhaps being the largest exception, because of Davutoglu’s policies. However, because of the significant challenges Turkey faces, its relationship to the EU still hangs in the balance. At this point, the leading school of thought in Turkey emphasizes that the primary way to achieve European integration is to use Turkey’s geopolitical advantage, and embrace the bridge theory.\textsuperscript{64}

Murat Soysal highlights the biggest challenge to this theory in stating that “for such a role to be convincing and effective, the essential requirement is a political and ideological neutrality towards different worlds, namely the Western or European nations on the one side and the Asian or Middle Eastern countries on the other.”\textsuperscript{65} Ideologically, for the bridge theory to hold, Turkey’s own culture, which is heavily tilted towards the Western ideals of secularism since the days of Kemalism, must embrace the East so as to not present itself as a tool for the promotion of Western values.\textsuperscript{66} While the secularism and Western orientation of Turkey is arguably changing towards a more Islamic direction under the Erdogan administration and the politics of the AK party, it is unlikely that close to 90 years of a secular foundation will be shaken by the administration of a single party. In this environment, many advocates of the bridge theory emphasize the need for increased economic integration with Europe in a move towards greater institutional ties and economic liberalization.\textsuperscript{67} The need for Turkey to emerge as an energy hub is one of the most crucial elements of this theory. An integrationist theory is a far cry from the “zero-sum” attitudes that characterized the Kemalist foreign policies of the past, which viewed cooperative gains as exactly that which is lost by Turkey.\textsuperscript{68} Perhaps those who ascribe to the tenets of the bridge theory and its guiding principles view energy policy as a primary route, despite its historic limitations in the Caspian and Caucasus regions.

**Conclusion**

What do Turkey’s energy policies since the end of the Cold War tell us about the future of its foreign policy? Furthermore, what does Turkey’s energy policy tell us about its interactions with three of its largest political concerns: Russia, Iran, and the US? In terms of Russia, Turkish energy policies have seen the greatest limitations, but perhaps also the greatest gains. Competition over the Caspian and NIS characterized the early interactions between Russia and Turkey, but their relationship slowly moved to cooperation. The main theme in European energy politics today is the need for energy diversification, which in many cases means a diversification and exploration of options at the expense of Russia. Turkey has a constantly growing economy, and Russia is its largest trading partner. In this framework, Russia supplies 63 percent of Turkey’s natural gas, and 23 percent of its oil. Turkey’s hopes for diversification must be balanced with the need to meet its
energy requirements.\textsuperscript{59} Because of the unwillingness of Turkey to sacrifice its energy requirements and the relative willingness of Russia to manipulate the energy market for political gains, it is in Turkey’s best interest to seek cooperation with Russia rather than conflict. Within this environment, as many experts have indicated, it is foreseeable that both the South Stream and the Nabucco pipeline may be built, for they are not mutually exclusive projects. Although there are significant questions as to whether there would be substantial supply for both pipelines to operate at full capacity, this would be a preferable option as compared to outright competition with Russia and Gazprom.\textsuperscript{70} This must be reconciled with the desire of the EU to seek alternative energy avenues as well, and policymakers in Ankara must decide whether European integration through the use of energy avenues is a viable option. Energy security and EU integration are not entirely conflicting ideas, but they certainly do not complement one another. Turkey has shown willingness in the past to forego areas of conflict with Russia for the sake of economic cooperation, and it is foreseeable that it may do so again.

Relations with Iran and the United States are inherently tied together, as long as Iran continues their current nuclear program. Even under the leadership of the AK party and a relative improvement in their relationships with Iran, Turkey has faced serious limitations on the supply of energy from its Eastern neighbor. Iran has not only continued to embrace a conflicting stance on the status of the Caspian Sea, but also has failed to commit to a significant supply of gas to Turkish projects.\textsuperscript{71} Even if Turkey were able to secure these commitments, there would be serious opposition by the United States, which has remained the most vocal opponent to the Iranian nuclear program. However, Iran represents a real opportunity for Turkey to explore diversified options of energy supply if they are willing to forego the potential consequences to their relationship with the US. As of 2007, Turkey and Iran had reached several agreements regarding the supply of gas to Turkey, but once again, nothing capable of forgoing Turkey’s reliance on Russia for their energy needs.\textsuperscript{72} Turkey is faced to choose EU accession and their western relationships, or to focus on their Eastern relationships and secure domestic energy to meet Turkey’s energy needs. However, Davutoglu’s policies do not see these two ideas as mutually exclusive. Through his “zero-sum” approach, the AK party has simultaneously placed an emphasis on the formulation of stable relations with all of Turkey’s neighbors, while continuing to place emphasis on the emergence of Turkey as a strong regional actor and major power in the energy transport arena.\textsuperscript{73} In response to whether or not Turkey was moving away from its Western orientations and alliances, President Gul noted that:

“A country’s direction is determined by its values, and not by its relations. The Important point is in which direction Turkey’s values develop. These are democratic values, respect for law, equality of men and women, liberal economy and so on. These better show in which direction Turkey is going.”\textsuperscript{74}

There is a strong indication that Turkey is approaching its relationship with Iran carefully and cautiously, yet for the sake of its own regional security and energy objectives Turkey hopes to be a mediator in the major issues between the US and Iran.

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s relative stance in regards to matters of foreign policy has been “rational realism” reconciled with a desire to capitalize on the new opportunities brought on by the collapse of a regional rival.\textsuperscript{75} Energy policy has consistently remained one of the cornerstones with which Turkey formulates an assertive regional policy, and it seems likely to remain that way for the coming years. A full revision of Kemalist tendencies seems not only unlikely, but an impossibility, given the integration and cooperative relationships Turkey has formed with other countries. In many cases, energy trade and policy has formed a fundamental part of many of Turkey’s relationships. Energy policies of course, like many other elements of Turkey’s strategic plans, are not without their limitations. These limitations were highlighted in Turkey’s modest successes in the NIS after the collapse of the USSR. As seen in the limited successes in the Caucasus, the building of pipelines and economic agreements may result in increased cooperation, but
does necessarily mean a rise in Turkish political hegemony. Energy policies are therefore an important factor but cannot be the only avenue by which Turkey approaches integration with the EU. If the "bridge theory" is fully embraced, energy linkages with Europe must be part of a larger package of increased ties with the EU, both culturally and economically. Popular sentiment for the EU in Turkey is waning however, and the current pattern of relations with the EU may in fact remain the status-quo for quite some time. In this atmosphere, the Nabucco pipeline could be an important step towards energy diversification, but does not necessarily mean increased chances for Turkey’s EU accession. Turkish policy makers face a real challenge in the coming decades, as energy policy and the questions that come with it remain a complicated and vexing issue affecting all areas of Turkish foreign policy.

Endnotes


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7. Altuniski 168.

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The February 28 Incident: An Economic Perspective on the Decolonization of Taiwan

by James Meresman

his paper examines a crucial time in the history of Taiwan – decolonization. It addresses the problems and solutions surrounding Taiwan during Japanese and Chinese rule from an economic perspective. In particular, it uses a watershed event in Taiwanese history – the February 28 Incident – and places this event in the context of Taiwan’s growth into an independent nation.

On February 28, 1947, an uprising in Taipei, Taiwan quickly spread to the rest of the island and brought yet another case of a messy decolonization process to the forefront of international politics. A mere two years earlier, the Potsdam Declaration was signed by Allied powers, ensuring that once World War II ended, so would Taiwan’s period of colonization under Japanese rule. The Retrocession Day that followed on October 25, 1945 officially ceded Taiwan to the Republic of China, yet the day’s celebrations would provide an ominous contrast to the violence and bloodshed that took place only sixteen months later. But what went wrong with the transfer of power from the hands of Japanese imperialists to those of the Chinese nationalists? In trying to understand this tumultuous period in Taiwanese history, it is helpful to take an economic perspective. The conflict between the Taiwanese population and the Chinese nationalists spurred a newfound conversation concerning Taiwanese independence, stemming from immediate economic woes rather than political matters. Furthermore, the economic problems that sparked this conflict do not have one clear cause or source. Instead, it was a combination of three factors – Japanese short-sightedness, Chinese economic mismanagement, and a postwar context – which sparked the February 28 Incident, and ultimately changed the course of Taiwanese history – economically, politically, and socially.

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Taiwan’s History

In order to understand Taiwan’s position internationally after World War II, it is helpful to clarify the island’s history. The multitude of the Taiwanese population is made up of Han Chinese immigrants who came to the island under the administration of the Dutch East India Company. However, the earliest known inhabitants of the island are an aborigine population closely related to the natives of other islands.

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in Southeast Asia.\(^1\) Between 1624 and 1662, while China was in the turmoil of dynastic change from the Ming to the Qing Dynasty, the Chinese population in Taiwan quadrupled, as mainlanders fled political disorder.\(^2\) Taiwan became a prefecture of China’s Fujian province of the Qing Dynasty in 1684, and a full-fledged province in 1885.\(^3\) So began the island’s long history of subordination to foreign rule.

In 1895 Taiwan became a Japanese colony, which it remained until 1945, when it was ceded to the Republic of China after World War II. Thus, the Taiwanese have dealt with three different central governments over the course of their history – the Qing Empire, the Japanese colonial regime, and the Nationalist Chinese nation-state – and all of these regimes governed from afar. In short, the Taiwanese population effectively never had the opportunity to govern themselves. Nevertheless, and perhaps ironically, as we shall see, the surge of decolonization movements that shook empires around the globe in the 20th century did not animate the colonized Taiwanese – until the February 28 Incident.

**Japanese Colonization**

The time of Japanese colonization was a period of tremendous economic growth for Taiwan. Economist Samuel Ho explains that Taiwan’s transition from a neglected Chinese province to a Japanese colony turned the island from an essentially closed economy to an open economy.\(^4\) At the onset of colonial rule, Taiwan lacked almost any measure of modern or industrial development, but this quickly changed. Agriculture was by far the most important employer and producer in the economy throughout colonial rule, yet over time industry and modern infrastructure also began to play a crucial role.

Beginning in 1898 the Japanese made major improvements in sanitation and health care. For instance, in 1904 Governor-General Kodama Gentara took great pride in the fact that the island had 180 doctors trained in Western medicine.\(^5\) Education through primary and technical schools became widely available, and the Japanese began to create a foundation for sustained economic growth. They unified measurements and currency, created postal, banking and telegraph systems, built infrastructure including harbors, railroads, and power plants, and ultimately developed industry in sugar, aluminum, cement, iron, chemicals, textiles, and lumber.\(^6\) In his comparison of the economic situations in Japanese and French colonies, historian Bruce Cumings calls Taiwan a model for export-led development.\(^7\) He goes on to describe Japanese rule as more of a modernization effort than a colonization effort. The 1930s and 40s, even compared with the “economic miracle” of Taiwan in the 1960s and 70s, which was Taiwan’s period of greatest material progress, as Japan taught the island how to export and protected the domestic market.\(^8\)

As economically progressive as Japanese colonization proved to be, there was a catch. In the words of Samuel Ho, by becoming a colony of Japan, Taiwan “traded political independence for stability and economic progress.”\(^9\) The colonial government’s objectives in Taiwan were not only to found and stimulate an economy, but also to keep economic power in Japanese hands. The government enacted strict regulations on Taiwan’s economy, encouraging the concentration of economic power in the corporate sector and ensuring that this sector was owned and controlled by Japanese officials. The Farmer’s Association, for example, which was founded in 1900 at the initiative of wealthy farmers and landlords, soon became an arm of the government. By the 1920s the Japanese had in the Farmer’s Association the type of institution needed to bring scientific farming to Taiwan, while at the same time maintaining the central government’s stake in Taiwan’s enormous agricultural sector.\(^10\)

The government also encouraged Japanese migration to the island, and
through institutionalized discrimination practices severely limited upward mobility for the Taiwanese population.\(^{11}\) The Japanese colonists dominated the economy through state-sanctioned monopolies, and in the end, Japanese goals on Taiwan differed little from those of European imperialists in their own colonies. The island was to become a cheap source of raw materials and labor, and thus develop as a crucial economic support structure for the Japanese Empire.\(^{12}\) This style of colonial development, which included high tariffs to promote exports over imports and brought wealth from the colonies to the metropole, hearkens back to the Western European system of mercantilism. In fact, during Japanese rule about 85 percent of the island’s exports went to the home islands of Japan’s Empire.\(^{13}\) 

Thus, historian Steven Phillips calls Japan’s rule a “progressive despotism” that promoted political stability and economic development, yet crushed dissent and maintained a Japanese power structure.\(^{14}\) Similarly, Samuel Ho explains that perhaps the most serious of the intangible costs of Japanese colonization was that it prevented the emergence of a dynamic Taiwanese entrepreneur-capitalist class. Consequently, an element crucial to sustained economic growth was absent in the Taiwanese population, and if Japan suddenly decided to withdraw from Taiwan, economic growth would stall.\(^{15}\) This was, ultimately, what happened in 1945 when Japanese entrepreneurs and capitalists were hastily repatriated from Taiwan, after Japan’s defeat in the war. The Japanese did not put enough economic or political power in the hands of the Taiwanese population, and thus when the Japanese left, so did Taiwan’s wealth and human capital.

The role of the remnants of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan’s economic collapse is succinctly shown by none other than Chen Yi himself, Taiwan’s Governor-General during the February 28 Incident. On December 31, 1946, just two months prior to the uprising, Chen Yi gave a radio speech directed to the people of Taiwan. In his speech he reviews the past year’s accomplishments, and sets out goals for the New Year. He recognizes the need for “economic and psychological reconstruction” of Taiwan, yet he blames the problems of Taiwan on the “vicious policies” of Japanese imperialists “to keep our Taiwan brethren ignorant and restrict their opportunity to…achieve elevated positions in society.” He goes on to describe his “Five Year Economic Reconstruction Plan,” proclaiming 1947 as the “Production Year” for Taiwan. He explains that Chinese rule has instituted equal opportunity and incorporated the Taiwanese into government, and explains how the Chinese economic policy is different from that of the Japanese, “which was designed only to rob profits from the people in order to support Japanese military aggression.”\(^{17}\)

First and foremost, it is telling of the social situation in Taiwan that prior to the February 28 Incident, Governor-General Chen Yi identified the faltering economy as a primary target for governmental action. The Taiwanese population was clearly distressed from the postwar economic situation, and Chen Yi recognized this. More importantly, though, is the fact that he connects the current economic woes to the past remnants of Japanese rule. Although much of his speech is Chinese nationalist propaganda – as we will see, Chinese administration was just as, if not more oppressive than that of Japan. The economic failure in Taiwan after World War II was not caused solely by Chinese mismanagement. Both Japanese and Chinese occupation of Taiwan was exploitative, and Japan’s failure to prepare the Taiwanese economy to be self-sufficient definitely played a large role in the subsequent financial crisis. Chen Yi’s view, though obviously biased and somewhat misleading, conveys an important aspect of the cause of the rebellion. To make matters worse, this was only the first of the three primary causes of the economic downturn that led to the February 28 Incident.

The Chinese Nationalists’ Economic Mismanagement

On the surface, the structure of the Chinese nationalists’ economy in Taiwan was not all that different than the Japanese approach. The Kuomintang government of the Republic of China continued the Japanese legacy of strict state control of the economy. Governor-General Chen Yi’s system of
“necessary state socialism” consisted of monopoly regulations that took control of nearly all Taiwanese corporations.\(^{18}\) Moreover, just as the Japanese had maintained control of high governmental and economic offices, the Chinese nationalists also assumed leadership in Taiwan. Thus, it was not the Taiwanese population in charge of the economy, but “carpetbagging” mainlanders who migrated to fill the void left by the Japanese.\(^{19}\)

Ultimately, the only real difference between the structure of the Taiwanese economy before and after Retrocession Day was the central government’s stated values and principles. Japan ruled Taiwan as a traditional colony, supporting the Empire that was centralized in the metropole. In contrast, the Kuomintang’s ideology was grounded in Sun-Yat Sen’s Three Principles of the People, which emphasized the unity and nationalism of the Chinese people. In governing Taiwan, the Chinese called the Taiwanese their “brethren” and implemented their nationalist ideology by favoring national capital over private investment.\(^{20}\) Governor-General Chen Yi took Sun-Yat Sen’s economic policies seriously, interpreting them to justify his administration’s intervention in all economic activities.\(^{21}\) He claimed that the purpose of his economic planning was the people’s welfare, and by the end of 1946, his administration controlled even more economic activity than the Japanese had.\(^{22}\)

Even though the Chinese nationalists’ economic structure in Taiwan did not differ greatly from that of the Japanese, economic conditions under Chinese rule nevertheless plummeted. The year of 1946 was one of unrelieved economic disaster. Prices rose steadily, production fell, and unemployment among the Taiwanese became a grave problem.\(^{23}\) In 1939 Taiwan produced in excess of 1,400,000 metric tons of sugar; in contrast, in 1947, the first full crops produced under Chinese management yielded only 30,000 metric tons, about the same amount which had been produced in 1895 before the Japanese developed the industry.\(^{24}\) Manufacturing industries before the war had employed between 40,000 and 50,000 Taiwanese; fourteen months after Japan’s surrender, fewer than 5,000 Taiwanese were employed.\(^{25}\) The cost of foodstuffs, building materials and chemical fertilizers rose, and Taiwanese workers could not meet the rising cost of living in the cities. As a result, many drifted back to their ancestral homes in the countryside, and the small, but prosperous Taiwanese middle class began to vanish.\(^{26}\) Even public health deteriorated. In middle of 1946, four cases of the bubonic plague were discovered, and as summer approached cholera reappeared on the island, a disease which had not been known in epidemic proportions since 1919.\(^{27}\)

Yet if the economic structure in Taiwan was not dramatically changed after the transfer of power in 1945, where was the Republic of China’s fault in causing this severe economic downturn? Corruption among many of the ruling Chinese nationalists was the second primary cause for Taiwan’s economic collapse. In the words of American diplomat George Kerr, efficient Japanese ownership and management had been “replaced overnight by inefficient Chinese ownership and management.”\(^{28}\) Bribery was pervasive among Chinese officials, and because of the political and economic structure, the Taiwanese population was unable to rehabilitate their own small industries and commercial enterprises. The governing mainlanders held the licensing power, controlled transport, and manipulated capital and credit sources.\(^{29}\) The Taiwanese were overwhelmed by the red tape of the governmental bureaucracy, finding themselves at the mercy of three corrupt principal agencies: the Finance Commission, the Department of Transport and Communications, and the Taiwan Trading Bureau.\(^{30}\)

Contempt for the ruling class grew as the Taiwanese experienced nationalist corruption first-hand, recalling fondly the rule of law under the strict, yet predictable police state of the Japanese. Mainland Chinese at all levels were in a position to vote themselves salaries, bonuses, and perquisites.\(^{31}\) New extremes of wealth and poverty appeared. Men and women from Shanghai set unprecedented standards of luxury, and ragged peddlers and beggars became a common sight.\(^{32}\) The Taiwanese joked about passing
the Five-Part Imperial Exam, referring to the five things officials craved: gold, automobiles, rank, homes, and women. They mocked Sun-Yat Sen’s Three Principles, since his face was on the currency that so many officials demanded as bribes. Due to this government corruption, the schism between the Taiwanese and their Chinese nationalist superiors was exacerbated.

At the same time, Kuomintang soldiers looted every city street and suburban village unfortunate enough to have a Nationalist Army barracks or encampment nearby. These underpaid and undisciplined conscripts became objects of scorn and contempt among the Taiwanese population in much the same way as the government officials. As mainlanders flooded the island, they looted war-damaged buildings and unguarded property. It soon became common for the Taiwanese to refer to the Japanese as exploitative ‘dogs’, and to the mainland Chinese as greedy and uncultured pigs. The Taiwanese complained that for every shipload of commodities that left the ports they received in return only a shipload of greedy mainlanders. American diplomat George Kerr offers countless anecdotes of atrocities committed by mainlanders upon the Taiwanese population. Yet what becomes clear from these stories is not only the social and political schism in Taiwan at this time, but also a deep-seated corruption among the ruling class. Chinese mainlanders in both high official positions and low-level military ranks drained Taiwan of its economic potential through dishonest leadership and maladministration.

General Albert Wedemeyer, a United States Army commander who served in Asia during World War II, provides a condemning view of Chinese nationalist rule in the wake of the February 28 Incident. On August 17, 1947, he reported to Secretary of State George Marshall on the state of Chinese rule in Taiwan, and his discussion stresses the Chinese nationalists’ blame in causing the economic ruin and political chaos that led to the February 28 Incident. He explains the following:

“The Central Government [of the Republic of China] lost a fine opportunity to indicate to the Chinese people and to the world at large its capability to provide honest and efficient administration... Chen [Yi] and his henchmen ruthlessly, corruptly and avariciously imposed their regime upon a happy and amenable population...[the Taiwanese] fear that the Central Government contemplates bleeding their island to support the tottering and corrupt Nanking machine and I think their fears are well founded.”

Later in his report, he mentions the abundance of natural resources on the island and the previously impressive record of Taiwan’s commercial production.

Wedemeyer’s view in his report is of twofold importance. First, he describes that the Taiwanese population is not distressed due to a lack of independence, but rather primarily because of the economic ruin that has plagued their country. Months after the event, Wedemeyer interpreted the main concern in Taiwan as economic more so than political. Second, he argues that the Taiwanese unrest that was brought to the world stage was a direct result of the incapability of Chinese leadership to sustain the island’s economy. He points to the economic potential of Taiwan as a nation, and denounces the Chinese
nationalists for wasting that potential. Another American perspective of the troubles in Taiwan is provided in an article published in The New York Times on March 4, 1947, entitled “Formosan Rebellion is Quieted by Chinese Governor’s Promises.” In the article, columnist Tillman Durdin describes the tense situation in Taiwan over the week that followed the February 28 Incident, and corroborates Wedemeyer’s opinion. Referencing the 32 Demands and Governor-General Chen Yi’s “promise to organize a joint Kuomintang-military-civilian inquiry board to investigate causes of Formosans’ clashes with ‘outsiders’,” Durdin attempts to provide information on a still-unclear situation in Taiwan. He then goes on to calm the American sentiment that the Taiwanese rebellion may be addressed towards the United States, because America through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). He explains that these fears are unfounded, saying that local assurances indicate that the uprising had no anti-foreign motive. Instead, the rebellion was due solely to the economic corruption of the local government in Taiwan:

“Reliable informants said the open revolt started when Chinese authorities, who have been clamping on economic controls, searched for smuggled cigarettes… [The Taiwanese] labeled the Chinese administration ‘a corrupt bureaucracy’ that had strangled the formerly prosperous island with monopolistic controls over industry and commerce.”

Like General Wedemeyer’s opinion in The China White Papers, Durdin’s analysis of the situation in Taiwan demonstrates two important things about the views concerning the uprising. First, the original motive of the revolt was chiefly, if not completely, economic distress. He does not phrase his summary of the situation in words one would find in descriptions of other countries undergoing decolonization, where political independence and social inferiority were the primary reasons to revolt. Second, in the week following the incident, Durdin certainly sees the economic distress – at least through Taiwanese eyes – as an immediate result of corruption among the Chinese nationalists.

Though not completely comprehensive and ‘fair’ to the Chinese nationalists, both General Wedemeyer and Tyler Durdin convey an understanding of the situation in Taiwan after the uprising that is common among historians past and present. Specifically, they see the cause of the economic woes in Taiwan, and thus the ensuing incident, as results of the Chinese National Government’s faults. Though these views are those of Americans insulated from the conflict, they are close to the event in time. This perspective is thus crucial to understanding the causes and effects of the February 28 Incident. Economic mismanagement on the part of the Kuomintang was not the only cause of the uprising, but it was certainly a critical factor.

The Post World War II Context of Taiwan

A third source of Taiwan’s economic downturn can be attributed to the context of the end of World War II. In a sense, this factor made much of the economic causes of the February 28 Incident rather unavoidable. The Chinese nationalists inherited an industrial infrastructure that was worn down from the demands of the Japanese war effort. Allied bombing of the island during the war devastated industrial facilities, and to make matters worse, work on repairs of damaged areas ceased upon Japan’s surrender as Japanese technical experts and managers returned home. Steven Phillips maintains that “in such a situation, any government would have had a difficult time managing the island’s resources.” It also certainly did not help that there was a dramatic difference in the economic power of Japan and the Republic of China while they ruled Taiwan. Since the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, which enabled Japan to annex Taiwan, the island nation was no longer tied to a chaotic and crumbling China, but became part of an
increasingly powerful and economically developed Japan. In contrast, the mainland economy of the Republic of China struggled heavily during its recovery from World War II. Cold War competition with its communist neighbors and expenses in the Second Sino-Japanese War hindered the Republic of China’s ability to support Taiwan’s economy.

The horrific economic conditions in Taiwan came to a head in early 1947. On the evening of February 27, six police officers attempted to arrest a woman selling cigarettes illegally in Taipei. After a policeman struck the woman, an angry crowd gathered and violence broke out after an officer fired his weapon, killing a bystander. The next day, 2,000 to 3,000 Taiwanese marched to the Monopoly Bureau Headquarters, and hundreds moved on to Governor-General Chen Yi’s office. Besides the beating and shooting, what the islanders protested was not political dependence on foreign rule necessarily, but rather unemployment, food shortages, inflation, and corruption. That afternoon either a soldier or police officer fired into the crowd, sparking an island-wide uprising against police, soldiers, bureaucrats, and any mainlanders unfortunate enough to be on the streets. It was in the wake of this disaster that many different Taiwanese groups used the opportunity created by the temporary power vacuum to pursue their own agendas, which included the traditional demands of a colonized population – independence, self-determination, and the like.

Within a week of the February 28 Incident, there was an immediate outcry against the Chinese nationalist regime. On March 7, a Settlement Committee composed of senior economic and professional men on the island, presented to Governor-General Chen Yi a petition known as the 32 Demands. This list of demands, grouped into six general categories, appealed not for an overthrow of the Chinese nationalist government, but rather a reform of their policies. For instance, it insisted that “the Office of Governor-General shall be reorganized by the Settlement Committee…so that righteous and able officers can be appointed.” Items such as these called for continued Chinese nationalist involvement in government, and a removal of the maladministration that had contributed to the uprising. The demands also included a reduction in taxes, the reduction of state interference in industries, the advent of a Committee for Inspecting Public Enterprises to prevent corruption, the abolition of the Monopoly and Trading Bureaus, and repayment for lost wealth from exported sugar and food. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, the 32 Demands offered more relaxed appeals than may be seen in other countries’ decolonization efforts. The Taiwanese demanded not a full-fledged change in regime, but rather the reorganization of government policies, largely economic, that caused the conditions that led to the February 28 Incident.

In 1951, years after the uprising, columnist Han Lih-wu published an article in Taiwan Today, a weekly newspaper based in Taipei, about the interconnectedness of the Taiwanese population, the Chinese nationalists, and the previous Japanese colonizers. His discussion is remarkably non-partisan, and provides a view of the February 28 Incident that points to the complexities and contingencies of the Taiwanese situation. Lih-wu argues that “due credit should be given to the Japanese for their achievements during their occupation of Taiwan…” because a general foundation had been well laid in local economy…[and] life was regulated, stable and fair. He attributes the ensuing economic downturn on the stresses that World War II brought upon the island. As a result of the war, “Taiwan was at its low ebb when returned to the Chinese national fold” – not only was the economy’s infrastructure crippled, but the Taiwanese people were used to being servile subjects. The need to find enough trained personnel after Japanese withdrawal was aggravated by the Chinese government’s problems on the mainland, and ultimately, the problem of governing Taiwan was not too much government centralization, but rather a shortage of people with sufficient experience and understanding, “which came with years of servitude” to the Japanese.

Later in the article, Lih-wu speaks rather well of the Chinese nationalists’ efforts, saying that while the government had good intentions and honest purposes, “there were bound to be petty opportunists and unscrupulous
politicians." But regardless of the violence and conflict in 1947, Taiwan was making a quick recovery, even compared to the mainland and other war-affected areas in the Far East. He declares that Taiwan is no longer a colony but an "island fortress" that has forged on through hard times. Just as both the Japanese colonists and the Chinese National Government set Taiwan up for economic failure and the ensuing uprising, these parties, with the advent of the new Provincial Government, set the island up to flourish. He goes on to explain that this unlikely and unintended cooperation between the Japanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese laid the foundations for the island to ultimately gain self-rule.

It is important to take Lih-wu’s characterization of Taiwan in 1951 with a bit of skepticism. On May 19, 1949, Chairman of the National Government of the Republic of China, Chiang-Kai Shek, declared martial law in Taiwan, which extended until 1987. This period of strict political suppression and prosecution of opposition (real or perceived) to the Kuomintang was known as the White Terror. Thus, Lihwu’s ability to speak out against the National Government was undoubtedly limited. Nevertheless, he offers many critical insights into the period of transition from Japanese to Chinese rule in Taiwan. His article conveys many of the various views on why the transition in the late 1940s was so difficult. He makes clear that the February 28 Incident was not caused by any single facet, but was rather a combination of a number of economic contexts – namely, post-World War II economic distress in both mainland China and the island of Taiwan itself, the remnants of Japan’s colonization that limited the preparedness of the Taiwanese to revive their economy, and the Chinese nationalists’ mismanagement of the island’s economic, political, and societal situation. In fact, concerning the bright economic future of Taiwan, Lih-wu was certainly right. Taiwan’s remarkable development into a substantial East Asian economic power would be largely due to international aid – particularly from the United States – over the decades following the February 28 Incident. Taiwan’s swift economic development after the 1950s is known to many as the “Taiwan miracle.” Bruce Cumings emphasizes that the foundation for Taiwan’s economic growth in the 1960s was ultimately established in the 1950s, agreeing wholeheartedly with Lih-wu.

**Conclusion**

It is important to recognize the fact that taking a purely economic view of the February 28 Incident does not give the full picture of the problems of decolonization in Taiwan. There are very fine lines and a grey area between economic, social, and political problems of the decolonization era, and often it is difficult to separate one from the other. Nevertheless, the history of Taiwan, as well as the events surrounding the incident itself seems to point to economic problems as a crucial factor in the February 28 Incident. George Kerr goes so far as to say outright that Chen Yi’s economic policies based on “Necessary State Socialism” were the ultimate causes of the 1947 rebellion. Similarly, Steven Phillips spends much time discussing the two economic transitions that Taiwan was facing in late 1945: the movements from Japanese to Chinese societal influence, and from wartime mobilization to peacetime reconstruction. Moreover, political grievances, though fiercely present after the uprising, seem to be much more subtle prior to the event. The vast majority of the Taiwanese – up to 80 percent – were rural folk who played no role in the uprising. Of the remaining 20 percent, only a fraction played little if any role, and of those who participated, only some had serious political grievances. In *A Tragic Beginning*, the authors state that there is no compelling evidence that the uprising was deliberately organized by Taiwanese who planned to turn Taiwan into a separate, sovereign nation. Ultimately, of the problems facing Chen Yi’s administration, none was more serious than the economic crisis.

In studying the complicated and deep-rooted economic issues that plagued Taiwan after decolonization, it should be emphasized that these problems did not stem from any one source. Rather, they were the combination of an unsustainable Taiwanese economic infrastructure created by Japanese colonists, Chinese
nationalists’ mismanagement of their newfound territory, and the general economically debilitating post-World War II context. Thus, to focus only on one of these causes does not give a complete picture of the situation in Taiwan. Though the Taiwanese often look back with nostalgia at Japanese rule, Bruce Cumings’ argument that the Japanese era was more modernization than colonization is a somewhat superficial view. Both regimes were exploitative in their own manner, and each contributed to Taiwan’s economic disaster in different ways. On the other hand, American perspectives from George Kerr, General Albert Wedemeyer, and columnist Tillman Durdin, insist that Taiwan was a “clean slate” for the Chinese nationalists, and “under proper management [Taiwan’s] modern economy could have been made to generate great surpluses needed in the rehabilitation program for China proper.” This view, too, tends to look at the Taiwanese problem only at a surface level. Neither offers a comprehensive understanding, and both omit fundamental aspects of Taiwan’s decolonization.

The mid-20th century brought with it a wave of decolonization that passed over nearly the entire globe and tore down long-established Empires. While economic conditions played a large role in decolonization, many were sparked by the worldwide emergence of concepts such as human rights and self-determination. Taiwan however, was not a typical case. Instead of political ideologies spurring the realization of economic oppression, in Taiwan it was the other way around. Although not formally a colony under the Chinese Nationalists, Taiwan experienced the direct consequences of a ruined economy that are characteristic of colonization. The fact that these economic conditions were at their height preceding the February 28 Incident was no coincidence – it was the true cause of the uprising. Consequently, it was not until after the uprising that many political demands became public. The forum for political independence, formerly underground, was thus drawn to the surface, and Taiwan’s course of history was permanently altered.

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This article considers the prevailing argument that democracies within multi-ethnic societies, including India, are majoritarian governments, where institutionalized discrimination becomes likely, and under a partisan state could degenerate into a mobocracy. Examined is the current debate surrounding Indian Prime Ministerial candidate Narendra Modi. This paper addresses the question of whether or not a Hindu nationalist such as Modi is an electorally viable choice within a multi-cultural, multi-faith, and multi-lingual state such as India.

There is a prevailing argument that democracies within multi-ethnic societies are at best majoritarian governments in which institutionalized discrimination is likely. While some even argue majoritarian governments can potentially collapse into a mobocracy under a partisan administration, in which the state becomes complicit of mass terror inflicted upon religious minorities. India, a nation where majoritarianism remains the norm, regardless of the political party in power, is certainly no exception to this rule. For this reason there is quite a heated debate currently surrounding Indian Prime Ministerial candidate Narendra Modi, namely over whether a Hindu nationalist such as Modi is even an appropriate or electorally viable choice within a multi-cultural, multi-faith, and multi-lingual state such as India.

This electoral debate emerged following Modi’s recent appointment as head of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) opposition campaign in the general elections in 2014. Most arguments in support of Modi have focused on his economic achievements as Chief Minister of Gujarat. He has undoubtedly become the epitome of economic growth following the immense success of the northwestern state of Gujarat during his administration. Therefore the contentious issues surrounding Modi are chiefly political, with many worried that his potential ascendance to a role in national politics challenges the very idea of an India in which diversity should be recognized. Many fear that if Modi becomes Prime Minister he will employ his position of dominant power and influence to pursue a policy of assimilation towards religious and linguistic minorities, instead of striving for public policies that embrace diversity and integration.

For this reason, this central electoral debate has elicited many important political questions related to the state of Indian politics, including whether: India should follow a French or American model of secularism, what the role of group identities should be, and whether minority groups should be afforded special rights above the established individual rights of all citizens. These concerns are certainly not unrealistic either, as Hindu nationalists have always sought a European style of nationhood predicated upon a notion of uniformity as opposed to integration. Thus, Modi’s Hindu nationalist platform seems to conflict with modern Indian secularism, which was essentially founded on the political compromise that neither the majority nor the minority should feel its rights becoming subservient to another. Modern Indian secularism insists that the government remain equally distant from

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all religions. After all, group identities have become so entrenched within Indian society, since the time of Partition that it has since been the prevailing notion within national politics to protect group religious identities as paramount to effectively governing a democratic India.

Given the significance of group identities within India, there is some debate as to whether a Hindu nationalist such as Modi is even an electorally viable choice regarding the upcoming 2014 general elections. While Modi’s Hindu majoritarian platform may succeed in galvanizing a large portion of the electorate, it could also inadvertently polarize the nation, and as a result make him an unacceptable candidate for most non-Congress parties. This issue becomes salient upon further examination of a few fundamental realities of Indian politics. For example, while small communities can largely be ignored by candidates in bipolar elections, as exemplified by the case of Gujarat, they become far more consequential once electoral contests become multipolar. Therefore Modi is likely to be unsuccessful in states that provide a majority of the seats to the Lok Sabha because these are states where Muslims have become electorally significant, either because of their numbers or due to the multipolarity of the party system. Given these fundamental realities of Indian politics, and the fact that campaign platforms directed towards economic growth have invariably reached a limited portion of the overall electorate, many agree that Modi’s impressive record of economic development does not offset the need to issue an official apology regarding the riots that occurred under his administration. Thus, it is becoming increasingly apparent that Modi must take responsibility for the violence that occurred during his administration, implement ideological moderation, and establish a multi-party alliance in order to become a viable candidate.

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Another important political question that has emerged in the wake of Modi’s recent appointment as head of the BJP opposition campaign is whether India should follow a French or American model of secularism, with the former approach premised on a “melting pot” theory of assimilation and the latter premised on a “salad bowl” theory of integration. Some argue that the French model would force the minority to assimilate within the majority, essentially commanding a type of cultural hegemony in which individual sub-identities would no longer be allowed and citizens would instead be forced to become “Indian” in an undifferentiated way. For this reason there has been mounting support for an American model of secularism, which some argue allows sub-identities to exist and achieves undifferentiated citizenship, while respecting the individual liberties of each citizen. This has given rise to the notion that a “salad bowl” is better suited for Indian society because it celebrates diversity and provides ample political space to religious group identities, such as those of Hindus and Muslims.

Although some scholars would agree that the United States has achieved a terrific balance between...
allowing minority groups to make social, economic, and political progress, while remaining strong as a nation, others point out that, historically speaking, religion as a social institution has never been as deeply rooted within the identity of American citizens as it has been for Indian citizens. Furthermore, there has never existed any open hostility between religion and the state as that which currently exists in India. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that implementing the American model would hardly yield the same results in India as it did in the United States.

For these reasons, India should not attempt to replicate either a French or American model of secularism in order to acquire national purpose and strength, especially when considering the impracticalities associated with implementing either of these models. Instead, any prime ministerial candidate should be inclined towards the traditional Indian model of secularism, in which the state maintains equal distance from all religions but reserves the right to intervene in issues regarding religion, if either public order or the personal security of individuals becomes threatened. Such a model serves to recognize the individual’s connection with religion as uniquely different from the individual’s relationship to the state. Establishing a system of undifferentiated citizenship, in which Indian society would not be forced to become either homogeneous or majoritarian, would allow for citizens to personally identify with any group and enjoy many sub-identities, while at the same time officially recognizing citizens as equal and free individuals. By doing so, the government would be able to assume an active role in breaking down deeply rooted religious group identities that have caused social and political divisions for decades.

For example, the existence of personal laws have long been a hotly contested issue, because of their tendency to privilege group identities. This contradiction is perhaps best illustrated in the case of Shah Bano, whereby the state privileged her identity as a Muslim woman over her identity as an individual Indian citizen. This policy seems to contradict India’s uniform civil code and the idea of a liberal democracy, in which group identities are meant to take a secondary role to the political identity of an individual. Those in favor of affording special rights to minority groups insist that it leads to redistribution from the majority and therefore improves discrimination, well those against affording special rights to minority groups argue it creates political tension within the majority community and weakens inter-caste relations.

While the interests of minority groups should be protected, granted they do not infringe upon the rights of individuals or minorities, group rights should not be given greater importance over individual rights. It is impossible to ignore the political tension that modern Indian secularism has created between the rights of individuals and the rights of minority groups. This is because affording special rights to minority groups based on identity has several negative implications for Indian society as a whole. First, imposing additional restrictions forces individuals to either accept the state’s definition of their faith or to effectively reject their own personal religious beliefs. Thereby restrictions promote a discriminatory framework of differentiated citizenship based primarily upon an individual’s ascriptive status. Second, any such rights should either be extended or denied to all citizens equally, otherwise they serve to create resentment within the majority community and worsen communal relations. Third, minority rights promote further identity entrenchment. Rather than fighting that which already exists by promoting the introduction of religious quotas, it ignores the fact that caste cannot be changed (unlike religion). Muslims in India have not experienced the historical context of discrimination that OBCs (Other Backward Classes) have experienced, in which state policy was legitimately needed to correct for societal bias.

For these reasons, state welfare programs should not be based upon caste or religious identity, but rather simply targeted towards those in legitimate economic need. Therefore, undifferentiated citizenship should be promoted as a tangible way to separate individual and group identities and the state. While some scholars would argue that such a policy could have terrible implications on the nation as a whole, including the precipitation of untold violence on minorities, such an argument fails to recognize that the
current model of Indian secularism has the same propensity for conflict and violence, by incentivizing deeply rooted religious identities, namely through the existence of personal laws.

Conclusion

Regardless of the polarizing nature of these important political questions, most seem to agree that above all India needs to focus on strengthening the rule of law, so that violence does not go unpunished and that institutionalized discrimination comes to an end. Therefore Modi, having been blamed for his complicity in the brutal 2002 Gujarat riots that occurred during his administration, hardly seems an appropriate candidate to carry out this pressing task. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the long-term development of India’s democracy will rest upon its ability to maintain an unwavering commitment towards civil liberties, constitutional governance, and the universal principles of human rights, instead of devotion to sharply divided group identities. Thus, a Hindu nationalist such as Modi does not seem to be an ideal choice to represent the multi-cultural, multi-faith, and multi-lingual state of modern India.

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Targeting Different Root Causes: 
An Analysis of Policies Curbing Witchcraft Accusations in Ghana

by Dorien Venhoeven

Ghana enjoys a status as one of the role model states of the African continent, due to its sustained political stability, democratic advancement and human rights conditions. One issue that continues to stain its human rights record, however, is that related to accusations of witchcraft.¹ In Ghana, as in many other African countries, it is believed that unfortunate events such as premature deaths, sicknesses, job failures, and others are caused by witches: people with evil intentions and special spiritual powers.²

After such a mishap occurs, individuals, especially women with weak social protection, may be accused.³ The alleged witches are often assaulted and may then be banished to so-called “witches’ camps.” There is no fair trial in which they are able to defend themselves against the accusations.

In recent times, there has been an increased amount of attention for these human rights abuses in national and international media⁴, by governmental and non-governmental institutions⁵ and in academia.⁶ The need for intervention has been widely recognized and many non-governmental organizations and religious organizations have started to combat the human rights violations in various ways. There are also a number of recommendations that have been made by independent researchers, NGOs and various governmental institutions, but not yet executed.⁷ This article will offer an inclusive analysis of these varying efforts in order to see which has the most potential to curb the problems of human rights abuses in Ghana. In order to do so, it will first provide an overview of the Ghanaian witchcraft beliefs, the accusations, the witches’ camps, and the human rights accusations. It will then present a categorization of the types of policy that have been recommended and executed so far. This section will also introduce a model by which the different kinds of policy can be analyzed based on the perceived root cause of the problem. Finally, the potential of the different policy options will be discussed.

Background
A belief in the existence of a spiritual world that includes forces of witchcraft is extremely widespread in all layers of Ghanaian society, “cut[ting] across divisions of class, age and gender.”⁸ A survey by the Ghanaian National Centre for Civic Education (NCCE) found that 89.37 percent of the interviewees in the Northern region believe that witchcraft exists.⁹ It can be defined as, according to the definition of Evans-Pritchard: “a natural philosophy by which the relations between men and unfortunate events are explained […] embracing a system of values which regulate human conduct.”¹⁰ In Ghana, witches are held responsible for all sorts of disease, death and misfortune in the form of: addiction, drunkenness, poor academic performance, insanity, accidents, loss or destruction of property, drought, floods, fire, snake bites, relationship failures, parenting problems, and more.¹¹

Whenever such an unfortunate event occurs, many Ghanaians seek

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to find an explanation for the ‘why’ question, as well as answering the ‘how’. The anthropologist E.E. Evans-Pritchard gives a particularly fitting example of this, in his book on the Azande people living in central Africa. He explains the kind of questions that will be asked in the event of an old wooden shelter collapsing and injuring people sitting under it;

"Now why should these particular people have been sitting under this particular granary at this particular moment when it collapsed? That it should collapse is easily intelligible, but why should it have collapsed at this particular moment when these particular people were sitting beneath it?"[12]

He acknowledges that the Zande, like the Ghanaians, are aware of the direct processes that cause the construction to collapse (the degradation of the wood). He goes on to explain that this causal mechanism would have sufficed as an explanation for most Europeans. They would have attributed the fact that these particular people were sitting under it, at this particular time, to bad luck. More often they would not even bother to ask that question. Zande and Ghanaians alike, however, see witchcraft to be that ‘missing link,’ explaining the particulars of a mishap. Suspicions of witchcraft are thus very likely in a society that has been socialized into this kind of thinking.

Once suspicions are raised, they are the subject of continuous gossip and conversation. These are largely muted until consensus is reached among community members, and a public accusation follows.[13] Both people with special spiritual gifts, such as pastors, church leaders and fetish priests,[14] and ‘lay’ people, those without special spiritual gifts, take part in the process leading up to an accusation. Lay people may identify certain traits and behavior that are held to be typical of witches. In Ghana, these traits may include red eyes, light skin, blindness, lameness, old age, displaying extreme anti-social behavior, excessive poverty, excessive wealth, and wretchedness.[15] Another commonality among the accused is their gender. Although some men have also been accused and exiled, the great majority of the accused witches are female, due to their inferior social status.[16] People without special spiritual powers may also ‘expose’ witches through dreams and revelations, or do so because they know that an alleged witch has given a gift to a person, just before the misfortune occurred.[17] Dreams and revelations or the presentation of a gift may serve as legitimate reasons to accuse a person. Accusations are made because it gives victims perceived control over the source of evil that they believe has caused the misfortune.

Confessions are habitually demanded of accused witches because the confessions are considered necessary for successful healing. In order to exorcise someone of a witchcraft spirit, a victim first needs to acknowledge that they are under the influence of that force.[18] The confession

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is important because if someone has confessed, the community can bring him or her to a witches’ camp, a prayer camp, a witch doctor, or some other kind of person with the power to neutralize the witch powers.\textsuperscript{19}

**Human Rights Abuses**

There are three kinds of human rights abuses that are linked to the accusations: violence, exile to the witches’ camps and the lack of a fair trial. Victims may suffer from one or more.

The violence most often occurs within the communities in which the accused live and may precede exile to the witches’ camps. In the course of accusation, alleged witches are sometimes beaten, burned, mutilated or subjected to other kinds of pain.\textsuperscript{20} This is done for different reasons. First, violence may be used to force the accused to confess. For this reason, a woman was showered with kerosene and set on fire in Tema, Greater Accra region in 2010.\textsuperscript{21} Second, violence may also be used for direct elimination of the perceived source of the victim’s suffering, by murdering the witch, or to avenge the suffering inflicted upon one’s community member. In 2012, for example, a group of youths attacked a congregation of around 40 suspected witches in the Northern region. The youths claimed that this group of elderly people was responsible for the sudden deaths of a number of young people in the area. The mob searched houses and threw stones at the group of alleged witches.\textsuperscript{22}

A third category of violence is that of exorcism. This is less common since exorcism is usually left unto outsiders with supernatural powers. However, the national media has reported such cases. One example is that of a couple and a student in the Western region, tried in September 2012. The student was accused of having “inflicted severe wounds on the face” of a 7-year old girl whom she suspected of being a witch living in her house. The 19-year old used a kitchen knife to remove the witchcraft powers from the child.\textsuperscript{23} There seems to be little recognition of this type of violence in the academic literature.

The first instance of human rights abuse is the perpetration of violence itself, but in all of these cases, the accused are also faced with a lack of a fair trial. Hearsay and dreams are regarded as proof of a person’s guilt.\textsuperscript{24} The judgment of a person with powers to ‘see’ witches is considered irrefutable. As illustrated by an address of a chief from the Northern Region:

“All of us in Mamprugu know that the chief is ancestrally bequeathed with the powers to see witches and know them immediately.”\textsuperscript{25}

Eighty percent of the witches’ camp residents interviewed by the NCCE said they had been sent to witch identifiers before settling at the camp.\textsuperscript{26} Victims have neither the means nor the right to prove their innocence.

The same apparent arbitrariness is found in the ceremonies that the accused undergo when they are sent to a witches’ camp. The suspect’s community members may take him or her to the camp in order to verify the guilt of the accused, or to have the accused witch cleansed by people with spiritual powers. The events that follow the alleged witches’ arrivals differ in all of the seven camps. In general, the accused go through a trial by ordeal, a ritual to determine their guilt. The person leading the trial can determine this guilt either through looking at a suspect, through special rituals or through asking the person to confess.\textsuperscript{27}

One often-cited example of those special rituals\textsuperscript{28} is that of the slaughter of a fowl. A suspect’s guilt is determined by the sacrifice of a fowl to the gods. After the neck is cut, the fowl is left to run about. If it dies facing downwards, the guilt of the accused is ‘proven’.\textsuperscript{29} A similar ceremony is that of making the accused drink a potentially lethal concoction made of chicken blood and earth,\textsuperscript{30} while animals are being sacrificed to the gods. The aim of this is to force people to confess. They are told that if they do not confess when they are guilty, the drink will kill them, but that if they are really innocent, the drink will not cause death.\textsuperscript{31} 72.6 percent of the alleged witches interviewed by the NCCE said they had taken this drink upon arrival.\textsuperscript{32}

In principle, the alleged witches can go back to their communities after having been ‘cleansed’, their witchcraft force rendered powerless. Nonetheless, the great majority does not return for fear of a continuation of the atrocities, despite his or her powerlessness.\textsuperscript{33}
to live in the camp, the human rights violations related to the exile are of various kinds. First of all, the process of exile often means that the alleged witch has to leave most of his or her property behind. Although some families assign the woman a child (usually a granddaughter), to aid in the daily chores; most camp residents lose direct family support. The assumption that they are completely cut off from their communities, however, is incorrect. Most are still visited by family members and participate in social events at home, such as funerals. But the majority of the women still feel shamed and excluded. All but one of the alleged witches in the Gambaga camp, interviewed by Yaba Badoe, expressed “a profound sense of loss and separation, anger and rejection, combined with a yearning for ongoing familial contact.”

Alleged witches sometimes stay in the camps their whole lives. Of the group of camp inhabitants interviewed by the NCCE, 36.8 percent had been living in the camps for 5 to 10 years.

The camps form parts of ordinary villages and are not fenced off. Although it is often assumed that there are six camps in the Northern Region, the camps mentioned in various sources introduce a seventh (Kuku, Gambaga, Kpatinga, Bonyase, Gnani, Nalerigu and Nabule; see figure 1). While an eighth camp has been identified in the Brong Ahafo region (Atebubu camp, figure 1). Media sources reported that its forty-nine inhabitants were uniquely from the Northern Region.

The most recent estimates of the number of alleged witches living at the camps are around 800 women and 500 children. Camp-specific numbers fluctuate highly between different sources, recorded at different times.

Many observers are concerned about the poor living conditions that are apparent in the camps: most housing, as ActionAid notes, consists of “mud huts with flimsy thatched roofs.” The survey conducted by the NCCE showed that 65 percent of the women in three of the camps felt they lacked basic needs such as housing, food and clothing. Some sources also consider the fact that the camp residents are forced to work hard at an elderly age as one of the problems related to the witches’ camps. The NCCE found that 63.9 percent of the camp inhabitants were involved in some kind of income-generating activity such as farming, fishing or trading.

Both the lack of facilities and the hard labor are problematic, but less severe than the three human rights abuses mentioned before: violence, lack of a fair trial and exile. This distinction is made because the first three human rights abuses distinguish the people in the witches’ camps from those in their host communities. The latter do not face violence, arbitrary trials and banishment. Northern Ghana, however, is an impoverished region where many people, including those outside the camps, face similar hardships; 45.2 percent of the houses in rural areas of Ghana have thatched roofs; 62.1 percent of households rely on a well as a main

![FIGURE 1. Locations of the 8 witches' camps.](image-url)
water supply and 68.9 percent have no toilet. These atrocities are therefore acknowledged, but not considered to be unique to the camp residents.

**Methods**

Now that the human rights abuses related to witchcraft accusations have been presented, this paper will review the different kinds of policy that have been executed and recommended in order to find out which one has the most potential to curb the human rights abuses. This section will use reports from non-governmental and governmental organizations, media reports, conference proceedings and academic articles to examine the types of interventions. Next, it will present the different policy alternatives that are available, with the types of interventions grouped together according to the four different root causes they are targeting. Finally, the potential to curb the human rights violations will be discussed for each of the policy alternatives.

**Types of Policy**

A first analysis of the different interventions that have been proposed shows that efforts are directed at very different roots of the human rights abuses. Some interventions try to soothe the pain of the poor living conditions in the camps, while others attempt to eliminate the belief in witchcraft and stop accusations in that way. The different policy alternatives will thus be presented according to the source of the problem they are targeting. A model has been developed in order to clarify (see Figure 2).

Most experts agree that the alleged witches live in abominable circumstances. Many of the interventions proposed by the state, NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), researchers and journalists have therefore focused on ameliorating the poor living circumstances in the camps. This will be called intervention level 1. It can be regarded as ‘the tip of the iceberg,’ or the most visible manifestation of the problem. It is therefore on top of the triangle in Figure 2.

Others, however, do not see the living circumstances in the camps to be the main problem, but view the mere existence of the camps as the root problem. If the camps were eliminated, there would be no chance of bad living conditions and other human rights abuses within them. The policy proposed by this group is therefore the closure of the camps. This will be referred to as intervention level 2, represented by the second layer in Figure 2.

A third type of policy claims that if there were no accusations of witchcraft, camps would no longer be necessary and human rights violations in the camps would thus also cease. It takes accusations to be the root of the problem. This will be considered intervention level 3 (third layer of the triangle).

A fourth kind of policy is that which strives to annihilate the belief in witchcraft. The underlying line of thought is that there would not be any accusations or human rights abuses if there were no witchcraft belief. This will be called intervention level 4 (bottom layer of the triangle).

**Intervention level 1: Policies addressing human rights violations in the camps**

Almost all NGOs, CBOs, researchers and journalists recommend raising the standards of living in the camps. This level of intervention was the earliest to be implemented and is still the one in which the most organizations are involved. The types of interventions that flow from this logic can be grouped into three categories.
The first are the direct livelihood improvements, the second are indirect livelihood improvement through female empowerment and the third is the reintegration of women into their own communities.

The earliest intervention in the witches’ camps was that of the Presbyterian Church of Ghana. Reverend P.Y. Anane, the first district pastor, asked his congregations to donate used clothes in the early 1960s. The program was expanded in the seventies through the efforts of Reverend E.K. Osei, who established the Local Council of Churches at Gambaga and advocated for the Home to receive monthly rations of maize and oil from the Catholic Relief Service.40

The second half of the 1990s through the 2000s was marked by the establishment of many more NGOs that took part in the improvement of living conditions in the camp. Since 1996, at least six NGOs have started programs striving to directly ameliorate the situations in which the alleged witches live. This sudden upsurge could be related to a particularly severe outbreak of Cerebro-spinal meningitis (CSM) in 1997, which led to a great number of witchcraft accusations and exiles.50 Interventions include the introduction of income-generating activities such as shea butter production and poultry rearing,51 the construction of new housing, boreholes, and toilets and the provision of corn mills, education for children, clothes, health insurance, insecticide-treated bed nets, and others.52 Most of these NGOs operate from a human rights framework53 and tend to focus on the most essential needs, for the initiatives that are most often undertaken are the provision of water sources and food, and of sources of income.

A second type of policy at the first level of intervention is that of indirect livelihood improvement, namely through the empowerment of the alleged witches. Since the late 2000s, there has been a shift in focus from the bare survival of the outcasts to their empowerment. Instead of just fulfilling their material needs, NGOs started to implement programs that aim to give alleged witches (especially the women) more self-confidence to organize themselves and to have a strong collective voice. Organizations supporting this often operate within a gender framework. The efforts aimed at empowerment include the establishment of a network of alleged witches called Ti-gbubtaba (meaning ‘let’s support each other’ in the local Dagbani language). Through this network, members have been able to register for the National Health Insurance scheme and to obtain food aid without the intervention of an NGO.54 Similarly, literacy and awareness groups were set up in the Gnani and Kuku camps55 and women organized a march through Tamale, the regional capital, in December 2011.56 During this demonstration, they tried to raise awareness for the rights of accused women.

The last type of policy at the first level of intervention is the aim to re-integrate the alleged witches into their communities. The reasoning behind this is that the problem goes deeper than material needs; the accused should also regain unrestrained access to their families, their property and their social position. The Go Home Project, which still exists today, has long been one of the leading actors in the struggle against accusation-related human rights abuses. It aids in the reconciliatory process between the alleged witch and the community and presents the host community with some material support when it agrees to take the accused back. It aims to let accused women enjoy a meaningful life as active members of their communities again. Between 1998 and 2002 it succeeded in reintegrating an average of thirty-nine alleged witches per year. Between 2003 and 2006, however, the average dropped to an annual seven witches.57 This, according to the director of the program, Mr. Ngota, was largely due to lack of funding.

Reintegration is complex. Many of the returneess have been away from their communities for several years, some even up to thirty years. Their huts are often degraded and their roles within the communities have changed.58 Successful reintegration has not proven to be easy; ActionAid found that of all the alleged witches that returned, forty percent had to return to the camp again within one year.59 Earlier, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) reported, “the case of a woman who returned to her village and was found dead the following morning... her body burnt. Another old woman had her ear chopped off with a cutlass on her return home.”60
Intervention level 2: Policies addressing the witches' camps

Although no measures have been taken that would lead to the actual closure of the camps, the Ghanaian Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs (MOWAC) has made such proposals. A sharp debate emerged in the media from 2011 onwards, as a response to a statement by the ministry’s Deputy Minister, Ms. Hajja Hawau Boya Gariba. She said that “the incarceration and confinement of women into camps by society and community members, constituted gross violations of their human rights, freedoms and (was) against the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women, (of) which Ghana is signatory.” She does not refer to the human rights abuses in the camps (intervention level 1) or the accusations itself (intervention level 3) as the heart of the problem. She views the “incarceration and confinement,” or the existence of the camps themselves, as the problem that should be solved. Consequently, the ActionAid news report states “MOWAC in collaboration with other stakeholders is working assiduously to disband all “witches” camps in Ghana.” According to various NGOs, the minister also mentioned a timeframe in which the camps were to be close: early 2012 was to be the deadline.

It is this addition that provoked NGOs and camp residents to respond. Various organizations expressed an opinion similar to that of the Southern Sector Yough and Women’s Empowerment Network (SOSYVEN), which stated that it “reveals a lack of understanding of how deeply engrained the beliefs are in those communities and the difficulties being faced to encourage them to accept accused ‘witches’ back home.” The NGOs expressed that they are not against disbanding the camps in general, but that they believe they should not be closed on the short term. The alleged witches agreed with that opinion.

The Ministry consequently agreed to the fact that disbandment should be gradual and that sensitization efforts should be paramount. One and a half year later NGOs note that the government has done very little to move towards closure of the camps. Although NGOs have continued to reintegrate accused witches, new arrivals have equally come.

Intervention level 3: Policies addressing the accusations

All of those arguing against immediate disbandment of the camps in fact demand a guarantee of security for the alleged witches. They would support the closure of the camps, but only if accused witches no longer face the risk of being exiled, assaulted or stigmatized. They thus call on communities to find alternative ways to deal with suspicions of witchcraft. The policies flowing from this argument form a third level of intervention.

A very early example of policy aimed at stopping accusations can be found in the colonial laws prohibiting the anti-witchcraft cults. Anti-witchcraft cults are cults led by priests who solve misfortunes. The cause they most commonly found for people’s marital, financial, immigration or physical troubles, was witchcraft, which therefore led to frequent accusations. In an attempt to curb accusations, colonial legislation outlawed the movements in 1908. This did not prove effective, however, because adherents of the cults resorted to secret worship of the god of the anti-witchcraft movement. Consequently, the law was soon adapted to allow for voluntary confessions and cleansing of witchcraft.

Another type of program, which aims to tackle the problem at the level of accusations, is that of raising awareness of women’s rights and offering alternative ways of dealing with suspicions of witchcraft. Organizations promote this awareness through workshops on health, human rights and welfare of the aged, sensitization training for NGO staff, educational programs, photo exhibitions on the lives of women in the camps, and the SOSYVEN documentary titled “What I Used To Know: The Road to Ghana’s ‘Witches’ Camps.” Simultaneously, a book was published that compiled the best essays on witchcraft accusations, written by some of the students that had participated in the educational program. A number of NGOs, CBOs and women’s groups have also come together to form the Anti-Witchcraft Allegiation Campaign.
Coalition. Their aim is to “make witchcraft accusations issues a national issue and get legislators/policymakers to support the campaign” through posters, radio jingles and radio drama in three Northern districts.

Intervention level 4: Policies addressing the witchcraft belief

Lastly, some NGOs and researchers recommend improving healthcare and education as a solution to the human rights abuses. These kinds of recommendations are often framed in very general terms, not explaining exactly how an advance in healthcare or education would reduce the number of accusation-related human rights abuses. What they actually attempt to do, however, is to decrease the belief in witchcraft by substituting the logic of magic with a scientific logic. Ultimately, they strive to convince people of the fallacy of witchcraft. Others do not even propose an alternative logic, but simply recommend making people understand that witchcraft is superstitious. Mensah Adinkrah, for example, proposes “the Ghanaian authorities should mount a massive aggressive public service campaign [...] to educate the Ghanaian public about the fallacy of witchcraft beliefs and accusations.”

Because the correlation between an advance in healthcare and a decrease in accusation-related human rights abuses is often so unclear, this article will suggest three possible logics behind it. Firstly, advanced healthcare would bring down the number of early deaths, which would consequently reduce the number of mishaps in need of a supernatural explanation, such as witchcraft. Secondly, better and more widespread knowledge on common causes of death renders inexplicable deaths explicable. Thirdly, an increase in medical knowledge offers a better understanding of mental disorders, which would replace the need for a supernatural explanation for ‘asocial’ behavior by ‘witches’. An example can be found in a documentary made by SOSYWEN, in which one of the staff members of the Ghana Health Service (GHS) does a presentation for a group of middle-aged women in order to make them aware of the medical reasons for their potentially ‘asocial’ behavior. He explains:

“The period even before the menopause what we call the pre-menopausal era, you will go through a lot of tension, you sweat a lot (and) you complain (about) a lot of very little things, you shout at your children… sometimes you will say things and they will happen. In the same way, if a relative of yours has been accused, send the person for medical check-up, it is most likely that this person is having a medical condition that makes him or her behave in such a manner that people will call (them) a witch.”

What these three correlations illustrate is the fact that there are two conditions that need to be satisfied before a person can be branded a witch. First of all, there needs to be a conducive environment for the accusation. This is a long-term condition that makes certain people more vulnerable to witchcraft accusations than others, mostly because they diverge from what is normal or expected of their age group, gender or general status as a community member. However, these conditions alone are not sufficient to make an accusation. It takes a spark to transform it into an accusation. This spark may take the form of a mishap of some kind. The last mechanism, pertaining to the asocial behavior that may be displayed by some alleged witches, takes away the ‘conducive environment’; People are offered a scientific explanation for the abnormal behavior they will not need to resort to magical explanations anymore. The first two mechanisms relate not to the conducive environment but to the spark. Fewer early deaths mean fewer mishaps for which a scapegoat must be sought. Similarly, if people know that a certain disease causes a death, there will be no need for a magical explanation anymore. The spark is thereby eliminated.

Note that these policies rely on the assumption that scientific and magical explanations for certain events are mutually exclusive. Moreover, it is taken for granted that, if people are presented with a choice between scientific and magical logic, they will doubtlessly choose the scientific, thereby abandoning their belief in witchcraft.
Apart from the recommendation of advanced healthcare, intervention level 4 also calls for improved education. Adinkrah, for example, says that: “formal education may have the potential of eradicating such [witchcraft] beliefs” for “illiteracy may have contributed to witchcraft beliefs.” Adinkrah does not clarify how a higher level or more widespread education will lead to a decrease in the human rights abuses related to witchcraft accusations. A possible explanation is that educated people are more likely to report violence and exile to the police and will therefore be less vulnerable. Another explanation is again the assumption that education trains people in a certain mode of thinking that is believed to be non-compatible with magical explanations.

Discussion

Now that the logic behind the different intervention levels has been clarified, it can be contrasted with some of what is already known about the nature of witchcraft beliefs and the related human rights abuses. In doing so, it becomes clear that certain kinds of policy are based on assumptions that have been proven to be wrong.

Starting with intervention level 4, eradicating the belief in witchcraft, it is possible to find two major flaws in the assumptions on which these types of policy interventions rest. A policy of this kind assumes that scientific analogy and magical analogy are mutually exclusive. It assumes that the problem lies in the fact that people lack scientific explanations for certain mishaps. It supposes that, when people are provided with scientific explanations, in the form of more education and medical knowledge, they will gladly accept it and abandon their old belief system. This assumption fails to recognize that scientific analogy and magical analogy answer two different questions and can therefore co-exist. A scientific explanation does not eliminate the need for a magical explanation. Ever since Evans-Pritchard (1937), anthropologists have understood that the scientific explanation answers the “how” of a misfortune. The magical explanation answers the “why.” It is not enough just to know the disease that killed someone; many Ghanaians want to know why it had to be this person that fell victim to that particular disease at that particular time. Evans-Pritchard calls these the universal and the particular explanations.

Understanding this invariably leads to the conclusion that policy aimed at replacing magical analogy by scientific analogy would be futile; more widespread medical knowledge will not lead to the abandonment of the witchcraft belief because the scientific complements the magical instead of substituting it. Even if people were perfectly aware of the “how”—for example how malaria kills people—and could be absolutely sure that this is the scientific cause of someone’s death, a witch could still be accused of having caused it.

Similarly, improved education may also make students more aware of scientific explanations, but does not eliminate the need for magical explanations either.

There may be one case, however, where science has more of a chance at substituting magical analogy. In the cases discussed so far, the reason why a ‘witch’ is accused is because of some unfortunate event that has happened to the victim (the spark). Usually the victim or one of the victim’s relatives makes the accusation of witchcraft. However, in the case where science is used to give an alternative explanation for asocial behavior, no harm has been done yet. It merely displays people’s fears on community members who behave abnormally. The stakes for believing that abnormal behavior is due to a mental illness or aging process are therefore less high.

The second flaw in the assumptions of policy at intervention level 4 is the fact that no distinction is being made between accusations and belief. It fails to realize that these are two independent concepts and that the belief can continue to exist without forcibly causing human rights violations. It is the way in which people handle suspicions of witchcraft that poses the problem; these actions are not inherent in the belief.

The European history of witchcraft also illustrates that belief and accusations are two independent things. Even though, in the 18th century the accusations of witchcraft had stopped, the writings of many great intellectuals such as Isaac Newton and Robert Boyle demonstrate that they continued to believe in the existence of witchcraft. There is evidence of the same taking place in contemporary Western societies. Stopping the violence does not require uprooting a belief. The accusations and the belief should therefore be considered
as separate.

Another flaw can be found in the assumptions of policies at intervention level 2, which support the closure of the camps. The proposal to close the camps rests on the supposition that the camps are inherently bad, or that they are the cause of the problem. This is also reflected in the statement of the deputy minister of Women and Children’s Affairs Ms. Hajja Hawau Boya Gariba, regarding “the incarceration and confinement of women into camps.” Although there is no doubt that certain human rights abuses (such as the lack of a fair trial and the means used to make an alleged witch confess) are taking place in the camps, the camps as institutions do not constitute the problem. It is incorrect to view the camps as ‘prisons.’ Even though some have assumed that camp residents have no freedom of movement and experience forced labor, these claims have continually proven false. 92.6 percent of the alleged witches in the camps stated, for example, that they were free to visit their relatives. It would be more accurate to view the camps as ‘safe havens.’ They constitute a refuge for many alleged witches. After all, the NCCE has found that 41 percent of the people in the camps went there out of free will, because of fear of further accusations and of stigmatization. Moreover, 89.6 percent of the camp residents want the camps to be maintained.

Devising an inclusive, long-term plan, which finally arrives at the closure of the camps, as some NGOs have proposed, seems a good solution. However, the final objective should not be to close the camps, but to halt exile and violence related to witchcraft accusations. After all, the closure of the camps only means the disappearance of an institution; it disregards the problem that the camps tried to solve: taking care of abandoned alleged witches. When exile and violence stop, however, camps would close naturally, because they would no longer be needed.

Now that the defects in the assumptions of policy at intervention level 4 and 2 have been pointed out, this article will look at the policies at intervention level 1: improving the living conditions in the camps. Rationally, taking care of the camp residents is not going to contribute to the final goal of stopping the human rights abuses. It is not a structural solution to the problem. However, one cannot attempt to prevent new cases of violence and banishment, while neglecting the fate of those who have already undergone atrocities and are living in a witches’ camp.

All three types of policy at intervention level 1 (improving living conditions, reintegration and empowerment) are indispensable in serving the needs of the camp residents. Adequate living conditions are necessary as the earliest response to exile; the accused need protection, shelter and food.

However, the stay at the camp does not need to be a permanent solution. Both the alleged witch and his or her community have a stake in reintegration when tensions have decreased. The alleged witch has a chance to be reunited with his or her family, to retake his or her place in the community and not to be stigmatized any longer. For the community, it proves that people can really be ‘exorcised’ from witchcraft. It sets an example that could be beneficial to future accused witches, because the community might have realized that people can be welcomed back without fear of new witchcraft practices.

Empowerment is particularly important in the long-term. Having self-confidence and being ready to stand up for one’s rights may prove useful whether people stay at the camp or are reintegrated into their communities. In the camps, as has been shown before, alleged witches have formed networks with a strong collective voice. When reintegrated, more empowered women might be less vulnerable to new witchcraft accusations since one characteristic of alleged witches is their weak social protection. It should be noted, however, that it has also been observed that women who divert too much from gender standards form another group that is vulnerable to accusations. If women are thus so empowered that they start living very independently from men, they risk being accused again, just through a different mechanism.

The first level of intervention is the oldest and the one in which the largest number of organizations are involved. This may be explained by the fact that the problem, as well as the results of interventions, are the most visible and
The needs of the group can be easily material needs, they are also more easily investigated because all exiled witches live in geographically demarcated areas, unlike the effects of educational campaigns that are aimed at large and spatially scattered audiences. The number of beneficiaries can also be accurately measured. All of this is of particular importance to those NGOs dependent on funding agencies that demand measurable outputs.

However, one should be careful not to focus too much on policy with highly measurable outcomes. A healthy balance between level 1 and level 3 (aimed at the accusations) should always be maintained for two reasons. First, intervention level 1 targets only the ‘symptoms’, but not the root cause. When nothing is being done about the accusations, which form the root of the problem, alleged witches will continue to be assaulted and exiled. Second, policy at the first level of intervention only captures a fraction of the victims. After all, a number of victims are assaulted in their communities, but never live in witches’ camps. Identifying this group of accused witches who remain in their home communities, however, is much harder because they are often unknown (unless victims report to the police) and dispersed over large areas. This makes it difficult to draw conclusions on the extent of the problem and the success of interventions.

A final aspect of the first intervention level is the abundance of faith-based organizations. At least four organizations, including the Presbyterian Church of Ghana, the Catholic Relief Service, the Assemblies of God and the Christian Fellowship Outreach have religious backgrounds and are or have been working to stop human-rights abuses in the camps through direct livelihood improvement or reintegration. However, they are not operating on any other level of intervention. Churches do not engage in advocacy, and they do not support projects that actually take a stance against human rights accusations, even though they might be well positioned to do so.

It is possible to draw a number of conclusions concerning the preferred level of intervention from the preceding sections. First of all, policy should be preventive rather than focused on symptoms of the problem. Its primary goal should not be to ameliorate the living standards in the witches’ camps (intervention level 1) but to prevent alleged witches from being assaulted or banished in the first place. Second, policy-makers should understand that camps are safe havens and not prisons. Although the camps do not always offer adequate facilities, the alleged witches at least receive protection from violence and are provided with basic necessities. The fact that the camps exist is not the root of the problem and closing the camps (intervention level 2) will therefore not prevent exile and violence. Third, one should distinguish between the accusations and the belief. Although the accusations stem from a certain belief, the violence and exile are not inherent in the belief. The belief can exist without these harmful practices. Therefore, it is not necessary to try to demonstrate the fallacy of the belief or to try to replace magical analogy by scientific analogy (both intervention level 4).

Based on these conclusions, intervention level 3 has the most potential to stop human rights related to witchcraft accusations. If these policies work, the occurrences of exile and violence will diminish and the need for the camps will be gradually reduced. This means that the need for supply of basic needs, empowerment of camp residents and reintegration will become less relevant and that camps will not need to be closed, they will naturally cease to exist. As long as the harmful practices related to accusations are stopped, the belief can continue to exist harmlessly.

As has been shown before, there are different types of policies aimed at the accusations (intervention level 3): law, raising awareness of women’s rights and offering alternative ways of dealing with suspicions. The last two seem to have the most potential to curb human rights violations. If there is one thing that researchers have agreed on, it is that “the arms of the law are too short to reach the realm in which witchcraft operates” as stated by former Chief Justice of Ghana, Justice Apaloo. It is simply impossible to bring alleged witches to court and give them a fair trial. Another purpose of law, to make accusations illegal by law, is also highly
problematic, as has been demonstrated by the example of the prohibition of anti-witchcraft cults by colonial legislation. This law virtually meant a prohibition against witchcraft accusations, since that was one of the main activities of the anti-witchcraft cults. The fear of accusations greatly increased as a consequence of this law because people felt they were left helpless in the clutches of witches now that they had no way to expose them. This example shows that increasing the fear of witchcraft should be avoided. Policy should therefore be made with the perspective of a believer in mind. Unbelieving policymakers cannot assume that they can simply eradicate a belief or practice, without offering believers an alternative they have confidence in. In the words of Ter Haar: “If it is to be effective and lasting, [development] should build on people’s own resources.” What should be outlawed are not the accusations but the harmful practices (exile and violence) that are often part of it. In fact such legislation exists already. Article 26(2) of the 1992 Ghanian Constitution states that “all customary practices which dehumanize or are injurious to the physical and mental well-being of a person are prohibited.” Advocacy for a more stringent implementation of this law and a program to encourage victims to report to the authorities thus seems to have more potential than a prohibition of accusations in general.

The policy alternatives with the most potential seem to be both raising awareness of human rights, and offering alternative ways of dealing with suspicions. It is important that communities and leaders realize that violence against and exile of alleged witches is against the laws of their country and against the dignity of the man or woman concerned. What is needed is a change in the mentality towards the perceived rights of ‘witches.’ Right now, a person loses all rights when he or she is deemed a witch. Policy should strive to get communities to agree that even ‘witches’ have basic human rights. Rather than simply imposing universal human rights, the local understanding of the human rights of alleged witches and their universal human rights should be made synonymous.

Witchcraft is not something of which the existence should simply be acknowledged, but something that deserves consideration when looking at the consequences of new policy. If a certain intervention means that it will increase people’s fears of witchcraft, it is not beneficial. The downside of this, however, is that it requires one to take seriously believers’ perceived need for control over witchcraft through accusations (and ensuing exorcism). Peter Geschiere posits this paradox well in saying:

“How can one understand the thrill and excitement they [images of witchcraft] promise, if one’s point of departure is that they are not real and, therefore, should be explained away by reducing them to other terms? But, on the other hand, affirming their reality might mean in practice affirming that monstrous accusations are well-founded.”

Accusations serve a purpose. A recommendation that policymakers find ways to stop the violence and the banishment, but not necessarily the accusations themselves, seems fitting in this situation. Believers should be provided with alternatives to violence. These should be sought within the communities, not outside. It has been shown that legislation made by
unbelievers has not had the desired effect. Within the communities, however, one can find numerous examples of people and institutions in which believers have confidence.

One alternative policy could be that employed by a community called Kalande, close to Salaga in the Northern region of Ghana. Their example is cited as a counterexample to the witches’ camps in the report by the NCCE. Instead of banishment and violence, they only exorcise people nonviolently and then treat them as a regular person again. If people actually believed that harmless exorcism, for example through prayer, can be effective, there would be no need for human rights violations. Communities who send alleged witches away are already familiar with exorcism and many spiritual leaders are able to exorcise witches peacefully. After that, witches are believed to have lost their powers. If communities would thus trust in their own fetish priests, chiefs or whosoever is responsible for deliverance, there would be no reason to fear the alleged witches after this ritual. The leaders of the Kalande community could thus play a crucial role in changing other communities’ attitudes. It is indispensable that the Ghanaian state and NGOs invite such people to conferences and workshops, in which they address human rights and witchcraft accusations and that they give them an opportunity to teach others.

Another alternative policy is that utilized by church and mosque leaders. With 71.2 percent of Ghanaians identifying themselves as Christians and 17.6 percent as Muslims, the church is arguably the most important form of associational life. Individuals’ religious beliefs shape, to a great extent, their mentalities towards daily events. Churches and mosques are therefore ideally placed to do just that when it comes to witchcraft accusations. Believers voluntarily come to church, and one of the reasons might be to be morally educated. Church leaders can therefore “provide people with the moral guidance and inspiration to try and change their lives for the better” as stated by Ter Haar. In the case of witchcraft beliefs and practices, they can perform harmless exorcisms through prayer and can teach their believers that the alleged witches are innocent afterwards. Like traditional religious leaders, this stance would not only benefit the alleged witches, but would also strengthen the church’s own position. If they prove that the power of their God is greater than that of the witches, and that after deliverance by a pastor, alleged witches present no danger for the community anymore, they reinforce the power of their God. The Ghanaian pastor Himmans, who was interviewed by Ter Haar, gives an example of such a doctrine. In his view, “Christian believers […] should be so convinced of the supreme power of the Holy Spirit that there is no need for them to be afraid of evil powers that can harm them, and they should certainly not retaliate by engaging in acts of violence.”

Key opinion leaders such as pastors, traditional religious leaders, traditional political leaders, and others should be employed by NGOs and the state to raise awareness of human rights and to offer alternative practices to communities that are known to banish and assault many alleged witches. They could also play a role in educational campaigns for the youth, such as the one organized by SOSYWEN, in which students are taught and later invited to participate in an essay competition. The best essays are then compiled in a book, which can again serve as a resource for other students, opinion leaders, communities at large and also as a way for (unbelieving) NGO staff, policy-makers and researchers to better understand the belief and the witchcraft practices.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to analyze the varying kinds of policy that aim to curb the human rights abuses related to accusations of witchcraft in Ghana, particularly violence and exile to witches’ camps. It has found that the interventions are many, but all target different root causes. A first category of policy is aimed at reducing the poor living standards within the witches’ camps, by providing for material needs, by empowerment, and by the reintegration of camp residents into their home communities. A second category views the existence of the camps to be the heart of the problem and thus advocates for closure of all camps. A third type of policy
understands the accusations to be the cause and tries to change the nature of accusations through advocacy and other interventions. The fourth category of policy sees the belief in witchcraft to be the root cause and tries to eliminate it by showing the fallacy of the belief and by replacing it with scientific knowledge.

The policy that seems to have most potential is aimed at the accusations. It treats not just the symptoms (the camps), but the root cause of the problem (the accusations) without destroying anything that is not in itself harmful (the belief). It captures not just the problem of accusation-related exile but also that of violence within the communities. The victims that are helped by such policies are both the alleged witches in the camps and those that have been assualted but have never been banished.

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Did the Iranians Abandon Their Financial Obligations?

by Matthew Michaelides

Operation of the Russian-built Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran was recently handed over officially to the Iranian side. Yet, the struggle to understand why it took so long – over 15 years – to complete the plant remains up for discussion. This article argues that the delays were caused by a combination of two factors: the dominance of commercial interests in Russian involvement in the project and Iranian payment shortfalls. Using oil price data and current events as proxies for the fiscal health of the Iranian government budget, this article demonstrates a strong correlation between the delays and periods of troubled government finances in Iran.

On January 8, 1995, Iran and Russia signed a landmark nuclear cooperation agreement under which MinAtom, then the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy, would complete the long-halted construction of the first reactor at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Bushehr, Iran. Construction on the plant had started in the 1970s by Siemens Corp., but had been halted under U.S. pressure on the German contractor following a series of overdue payments after the Iranian Revolution. This original 1995 contract called for the plant’s first reactor to be built in 55 months and to be commissioned in 2001. Yet, fifteen years later, these plans for the reactor had still not been realized. Only in September 2011, after numerous delays, did Atomstroyexport, which had inherited the contract from the defunct MinAtom, officially connect the plant to the Iranian national power grid.

Most agree that prior to the February 2005 P5+1 fuel swap agreement, a concerted U.S. effort to halt the Bushehr project was the chief reason for delays. For instance, after a Russian request for manuals and design information for equipment installed by the Germans in the 1970s, the Germans refused to assist the Russians under Western pressure, particularly from the United States. Similarly, the United States succeeded in encouraging states such as Ukraine and the Czech Republic, which otherwise would have supplied materials and technology for the plant, to prevent such sales to Iran.

Following the 2005 deal, the U.S. government slowly stopped exercising the same pressure to delay or stop the plant that it once did. For example, in December 2006, the United States approved sanctions on Iran that provided an exception for trade related to the construction of the Bushehr plant. Furthermore, Stuxnet, the computer virus widely believed to have been manufactured in part by the United States, did not target Bushehr during its 2009-2010 attacks on the Iranian nuclear program. And later, in October 2010, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced decisively that the plant was “not a problem” for the White House.

This has given rise to a new debate over the cause of the delays after

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2005. Some have emphasized the unique technological aspects of the project in explaining the delays. In particular, the contract required the Russians to synthesize the original German construction with the new Russian machinery. Other technical explanations proffered, to evaluate what actually caused these delays, circumstantial evidence suffices in telling the crux of the story. In particular, the correlation traced in this article between the timing of the delays at the Bushehr plant and events indicative of budgeting problems in Iran suggests that the immediate cause of the delays was Iranian nonpayment. Thus, by placing an important emphasis upon Russian commercial interests, this article serves as an empirical example of recent literature that ascribes causal power to individual and corporate commercial interests in the determination of Russian foreign policy.

From the nonpayment perspective, there are a few important predictions that can be made and that should be reflected in the empirics of this case. First, the delays would be expected to correlate with periods of a precarious government budget in Iran. Relative changes in international oil prices are the primary metric used in this study for discerning the health of the government budget, given that between 50-60% of Iranian government revenues come from oil sales. In addition, key decisions by top Iranian officials that demonstrate concern about the health of the Iranian government budget should be correlated with periods of delay on the project. Similarly, periods in which the budget is healthy should feature less government preoccupation with the health of the government budget, and consequently fewer controversial measures aimed at decreasing subsidies or increasing taxes.

Second, the Russian contractor should have slowly pushed back the deadlines and/or slowed construction, and then taken drastic measures such as completely – or nearly completely – halting construction on the plant or postponing construction indefinitely, after continued defiance by the Iranians. The reasoning behind this prediction is that if financial motivations truly dominated Russian interests in the construction of the plant, then the Russian contractor should have been willing to deal with a slight inconvenience in the payment schedule as long as the management still thought they would be paid eventually. If, however, they had serious doubts about whether they would in fact be paid, they should have preferred to reallocate their energy to other international projects with more consistent financing, leading to a stoppage of progress at Bushehr.

Figure 1 gives data on the pricing of BRENT crude from January 2005 to April 2013—the international oil price data that is used in this report.
Figure 2 plots each of the key delays in the post-2005 period alongside these prices. The remainder of this article examines each of the five key delays announced by Rosatom in the post-2005 period to demonstrate a connection between Iranian ability-to-pay and the progress at the Bushehr plant.

**Delay 1: September 2006**

The first delay of the post-2005 period occurred in September 2006. The plant had previously been expected to be commissioned by the end of 2006; however, the delay postponed the construction deadline to September 2007 and the plant’s launch date to November 2007. At the time, Atomstroyexport President Sergei Shmatko announced that the delay was the result of “technical difficulties” of an unspecified nature.

Yet, this delay is well-correlated with the rapid drop in oil prices from $73.23 per barrel to $57.81 that occurred between August and October 2006. While the latter price of $57.81 is still significantly higher than prevailing oil prices just five or ten years earlier, the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June 2005 had also inaugurated a tremendous increase in fiscal spending for which greater oil revenues were needed. In particular, from 2005-2006, government spending rose by a whopping 25 percent, while government spending from 2006-2007 was even larger than in 2005-2006. This financial over-commitment by the Iranian government helps to explain how a sizeable $15 per barrel drop in oil prices could generate a fiscal crunch.

### Delay 2: February 2007 – December 2007

The second delay at the Bushehr plant, which occurred from February to December 2007, was unique, because it was the only delay of the period for which the officially-stated reason was actually payment difficulties. The Russian side claimed that the Iranians were behind on payments, while the Iranians publically disagreed vigorously. The resulting drama forced the delay of the delivery of nuclear fuel that is needed for launching the plant from March 2007 until December 2007, after which time the payment problem was finally resolved.

Again, this delay began just as international oil prices were bottoming out, this time even lower at $53.68 in January 2007. It also ended after oil prices had risen significantly, easing the pressure on the government budget.

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Source: United States Energy Information Administration

**FIGURE 1.** The different levels of intervention at which policies take place.
The government’s budget woes at this time were also expressed in an important measure taken domestically with regard to oil and gas consumption. In May 2007, in the midst of the payment dispute with Russia, the government first imposed an oil and gas rationing system and raised domestic oil and gas prices by 25 percent. These measures curtailed relatively low-priced domestic purchases of oil and gas, allowing the government to sell these commodities at much higher rates internationally.

The timeline of this delay also conforms perfectly to what would be expected of a long, drawn-out delay under the Iranian ability-to-pay perspective. Russia initially responded to this delay only by stating that the fuel delivery would not take place on schedule; however, as the quarrel increased in duration and tensions heightened, Russia began to pull workers out of Iran by the hundreds, from a peak of 3000 to just a mere 800, and even contemplated cancelling the project. This step-by-step decision-making by the Russians shows that they were frustrated by an Iranian action. Rather than acting upon a preconceived political objective that was isolated from the payment dispute, the Russian side was responding to Iranian nonpayment.

**Delay 3: November – December 2008**

Delay 3, announced in late November 2008, was officially explained as the result of arbitrary technical difficulties resulting from the need to incorporate the old German technology. Because of the delay, the launch date was pushed back from the end of 2008 until the end of 2009. Just prior to the delay, oil prices had cascaded down from $132.72 in July 2008 to just $39.95 in December 2008. Moreover, in October 2008, the government had supported an unpopular tax hike in order to make up for the tremendous drop in oil revenues. While the measure ultimately did not pass due to protests from the merchant class, this government re-evaluation of its finances demonstrates that the Iranian government budget faced serious problems at the time.

In an isolated report, Intelligence Online published an article in December 2008 that claimed that Saudi Arabia was paying workers at the Bushehr plant to quit and leave in an effort to delay progress at the plant. With just the one author-less report to go off of, Mark N. Katz’s assessment is more sensible—that “it’s unclear whether this astounding report is accurate.” Given the high publicity of the Bushehr plant at
the time, it remains possible that this report was planted by a foreign intelligence organization.

**Delay 4: November 2009**

In similar style to past delays, Sergei Shmatko announced that the delay in November 2009 was also the result of “technical issues.” This delay pushed the launch date for the plant back from the end of 2009 to March 2010, by which time the plant had previously been expected to be operational.

At a first glance, it may not seem as if the international oil prices seen in November 2009 would be correlated with a fiscal crunch at home. In fact, while one could call the oil prices seen during the majority of 2009 “stable,” the descriptor “stagnant” is perhaps more accurate. Even though oil prices experienced a slight rise through the period, they remained far below the highs of early to mid-2008, which excessive government spending regimes from 2005-2008 had come to depend upon. For instance, in November 2009, the price of a barrel of BRENT crude was $76.66, compared to $132.72 posted in July 2008. A November 4, 2009 article from the LA Times duly asserted that “oil prices are down” in a depressed economic environment.

As such, late 2009 also saw the heightening of a debate over a new plan aimed at halting government oil and gas subsidies in Iran in an effort to increase oil and gas revenues for the government. In addition to oil and gas, the Iranian government provides subsidies on food, medicine, and other basic necessities that in all accounted at their peak for more than 25 percent of the Iranian GDP.

Oil subsidies, specifically, were so excessive that gasoline prices in Iran often fell below $ 0.40 per gallon. The plan called for the elimination of these subsidies to free up oil and natural gas for international export at several times the domestic price, thereby assisting the government in its efforts to balance its budget. In early January 2010, the subsidy reform bill was officially passed by the Iranian Parliament. Thus, the Iranian government’s fiscal agenda demonstrates a direct concern with the viability of the Iranian budget, just as the simultaneous delay at the Bushehr plant would imply.

**Delay 5: August – November 2010**

On August 13, 2010, Rosatom announced that by August 21, 2010 the first reactor at Bushehr would start being loaded with nuclear fuel, a process which was expected to only take 7-8 days. The reactor was expected to come online by September 2010. However, the fuel was not completely loaded into the reactor until November 27, 2010.

The dates for this delay fit international oil prices well. The delay began during a period of stagnant international oil prices – and it ended after they had begun to rise. However, most telling about the timing for this delay are two important budgetary events that occurred concurrently. First, in July 2010, Ahmadinejad and his government proposed a second tax hike that, like the one proposed in October 2008, was eventually beaten back by angry merchant protests. Later, in early December 2010, the government, led by Ahmadinejad, hastily initiated the widely unpopular subsidy reform plan passed in January 2010 against the advice of his top economic advisors in an effort “to boost revenue.” Both show the preoccupation of the government with the budget, indicating that financing the nuclear power plant would have been increasingly difficult.
Another Delay: February – April 2011

A final delay to the project, which is not noted in Figure 2, occurred in February 2011. At that time, Iran told the IAEA that the delay was the result of a broken pump in the reactor’s cooling system. As a result, Iran was forced to unload nuclear fuel from the reactor to fix the cooling system, before reloading the fuel once again. In their May 2011 report, the IAEA confirmed that the reloading of the plant had been completed in mid-April.

Yet, the February 2011 delay stands out from the others for a few significant reasons. First, the delay was announced by the Iranian side, rather than the Russian side. This indicates that this particular delay was not an output of Russian foreign policy; rather, the delay was Iranian state policy.

Second, the official reason for the delay was—unlike those of previous delays—verifiable, accurate, and based on a truly unpredictable variable. In addition to making this delay less suspicious, this also helps to further separate this delay from the others.

As a result, there is little expectation for this delay to conform to the pattern seen in the other delays. The delay was not planned by the Russians, so why would it conform to a theory for Russian foreign policy decision-making? Indeed, the delay came as BRENT crude prices were rising to some of the highest prices seen in years.

It is also worth pointing out some suggestive events that occurred after the delays ran their course. For instance, the plant’s launch only came after international oil prices had stabilized at the $100+ barrel prices last seen before mid-2008. This would seem to suggest that real progress on the plant was only possible in years when the Iranian government budget was relatively healthy. In addition, the subsidy reform pushed in late 2009 and through 2010 in spite of tremendous political opposition was abandoned in 2012 with little explanation after oil prices rebounded. This verifies the link posited in this paper between the Iranian government’s decisions on subsidy reform, international oil prices, and the economic health of the Iranian budget.

Conclusion

This study offers a new interpretation of the delays at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in the post-2005 period. While the previously-mentioned alternative explanations for the delays are purely descriptive and lack an objective test, this article draws upon quantitative data evaluated using a consistent test with a predictive capability to draw its conclusions. The result raises questions about the nature of Russia’s Iran policy and challenges expert understandings of Russian foreign policy itself.

First, this article demonstrates that analyses asserting that Russian-Iranian relations are based on a strategic foundation have no basis. Instead, the finding that the financial benefit of the project to the Russian side was the key motivator for the plant’s construction suggests that commercial interests underpin the Russian-Iranian relationship. Furthermore, there is little evidence of any sort of ‘alliance’ behavior between Russia and Iran. Such cannot be the case when cooperation is based upon financial gain and intersecting, rather than parallel, interests.

On a broader scale, one interpretation of this evidence is that the foreign policy logic of the Russian state has shifted to prioritize economic concerns over their geopolitical counterparts.

Yet, while this perspective would conform with much of the literature on Russian foreign policy towards Iran – and Russian foreign policy in general – it may not be correct. Realistically speaking, it seems truly puzzling that Russia would be willing to compromise its political orientation towards the Iranian nuclear program based on economic interests. If state economic interests are the basis of the Russian-Iranian relationship, why has bilateral trade remained insignificant to Moscow at a mere $4 billion per year?

More likely, the dominance
of commercial interests in the construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant indicates the presence of associated individual interests in the profitability of the plant. High-ranking executives in Atomstroyexport and parent Rosatom, such as Sergey Kirienko and Sergei Shmatko, link into a complicated, interconnected patronage network that includes Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, among others.32

Endnotes

3. Ibid.
5. Ralph Langner, Email Communication, July 29, 2013.
7. This is the official explanation from Atomstroyexport President Sergei Shmatko and his Kremlin superiors.
10. Ibid.
15. Mark N. Katz, “Russia and Iran,” Middle East Policy 19.3 (Fall 2012): 64 – 64.
23. It was discovered and halted.
28. Some have argued that the delays could have been caused by damage that resulted from the Stuxnet virus, however, this seems unlikely for a few reasons. First, Stuxnet experts such as Ralph Langner have concluded that Bushehr was not the target of the virus at all and, second, the February delay came months after Stuxnet was discovered and halted.

Bibliography


Langner, Ralph. Personal Communication with Author.


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