Dear Reader,

Thank you for reading the Spring 2015 issue of the Journal of Undergraduate International Studies! Once again, the entire JUIS staff is happy to present the best undergraduate work in the field of international studies. We are pleased to feature the article “Threats from the Inside: An Analysis of Post-Coup Military Expenditure”, a detailed quantitative analysis of military spending in African countries. This article is an excellent representation of the benefits of collaboration, as the two authors of this paper both worked together and with JUIS editors to present a polished and innovative piece.

We are also happy to include “Complications of Collective Memory in Peru: A History of Marginalization, an Attempt at Inclusion”, written by a student at our own UW-Madison. This examination of the post-conflict creation of collective memory in Peru presents a qualitative examination of a divisive issue, and exemplifies the work done by undergraduates from the academic community that the Journal is pleased to call home.

One of the greatest benefits of the Journal is that it brings together students from a variety of institutions both nationwide and internationally, to facilitate learning, understanding, and discussion across a wide variety of issues affecting the world today. It is my hope that the Journal will continue to encourage undergraduates to put forth their best work in the field, and to improve their skills in research, writing, and critical analysis of evidence. Once again, thank you for your interest in the field of International Studies. I hope you enjoy reading!

Grace Leppanen
Editor-In-Chief
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The cover photograph was taken by Sabrina Tabone, Stanford University

San Pedro de Atacama Desert, northern Chile. This photo was taken in Chile’s Atacama Desert - the driest desert on earth. The road is used mostly by miners commuting to work, and the landscape surrounding it is humbling and magnificent.

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n his response to Anjan Sundaram’s Foreign Policy article on the strong gains made by the M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Professor James Fearon of Stanford poses a simple question: why is it that African rulers do not invest more resources in developing their militaries, so as to more easily crush potential rebel uprisings? He posits that “African presidents are so afraid of coups and attacks from inside their regime that they don’t want to support the construction of any organization that would be competent at using force.” A comparison of DRC and Namibia’s 2010 military expenditures support this hypothesis. While DRC has a history of political instability, with two coup attempts occurring within the last ten years, Namibian politics have remained fairly stable. However, while Namibia has consistently invested more than 2.5% of its GDP into its military over the past ten years (military expenditures accounted for 3.9% in 2010), DRC’s military expenditures have remained much lower (1.3% in 2010). This pattern therefore seems to support Fearon’s claim that countries with a history of coups will decrease military spending in efforts to weaken potential political rivals.

This paper investigates the relationship between a country’s history of coups and insurgencies and its military expenditure. We hypothesize that countries that have experienced coups d’état will be less likely to invest in their militaries out of fear that they will then be overthrown. On the other hand, countries with a history of armed insurgencies will be more likely to increase military spending, as governments will perceive external threats to their sovereignty as a greater risk than potential internal Insurrection.

We further hypothesize that military expenditure will vary depending on regime type, as democracies are less vulnerable to coups, and therefore have less of an interest in maintaining military weakness. Moreover, strong democracies are often associated with higher levels of GDP per capita, meaning that governments likely can afford to invest more into their militaries. Similarly, strong autocracies are also less threatened by potential military uprisings, and can therefore choose to invest in their military, a necessary element of their repression capability. We argue that democratizing countries are those most at risk of coups due to their political fragility, and that they will therefore decrease military expenditure to avoid being overthrown.

Though we find strong evidence that insurgency history is associated with an increase in military expenditure at (p<0.01), we do not find support for our hypothesis that coup history is associated with decreased military expenditure, as the finding is not statistically significant. However, our ANOVA results do support our argument that anocracies are characterized by significantly lower military spending levels than both autocracies and democracies. Our paper thus proceeds as follows: First, we evaluate the existing literature on

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coups and military expenditure. We then present our hypotheses, which we test using multiple linear regression and unbalanced one-way ANOVA. We analyze our results, and conclude by highlighting areas for future research.

Literature Review

The literature on factors affecting military expenditure and coups d’état remains relatively sparse. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argue that a country’s level of military expenditure is strongly influenced by that of its neighbors, and that “an initial exogenous increase in military expenditure by one country is more than doubled in both the originating country and its neighbor.”5 Zuk and Thompson (1982) disaggregate post-coup military spending based on regime type; however, they find no evidence to support their argument that military regimes increase military budgets more than either mixed or civilian governments.6 Powell (2012) argues that countries with higher levels of military expenditures per soldier are less likely to experience coups, as “soldiers that are better funded appear to be more content with the status quo.”7 Collier and Hoeffler (2005) also find evidence of “coup traps,” with countries that have previously experienced coups being more prone to further threats to regime stability.8 This last finding provides the basis for our argument, in that we assume that countries will recognize this increased likelihood of coup recurrence and take steps to address the issue – namely, by decreasing military spending in efforts to weaken the potential threat to their sovereignty.

However, contrary to Fearon’s argument, Collier and Hoeffler (2007) find that an exogenous increase in coup likelihood will cause governments in countries with high underlying coup-risk (defined as a function of the regime’s degree of democratic legitimacy, regime duration, repression, and the structure of the military organization) to react by increasing military spending, whereas low-risk countries decrease military expenditure.9 We test this finding using alternate measures of coup-risk – namely, a country’s history of coups and insurgencies, and a country’s regime type.

Methods and Materials

1. Hypotheses:

   We hypothesize that governments of countries that have experienced coups d’état (both successful and unsuccessful) will decrease military expenditure in an attempt to mitigate potential threats to their sovereignty.

H1: Accounting for all other predictors, post-coup governments will decrease military expenditures so as to decrease the likelihood of future coups.

However, we argue that countries that have experienced armed insurrections will choose to increase military expenditures as a way of deterring future rebellions. We posit that concerns over potential coups will be outweighed by the need to suppress rebel movements, as government weakness in dealing with a particular group could cause other factions to mobilize.10

H2: Accounting for all other predictors, post-insurgency countries will value quashing potential rebel movements over suppressing internal threats to their sovereignty, leading them to increase military expenditures as a way of deterring future uprisings.

Lastly, we argue that military expenditure differs based on regime type. While democracies and strong autocracies are able to maintain higher levels of military expenditure, as they face lower potential coup-risk, anocracies will be most threatened by increased military power, and will therefore react by curtailing military expenditures.

H3: Mean military expenditures will
differ between anocracies, democracies, and autocracies.

2. Data and methodology:

In this paper, we use the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure database in conjunction with the Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010 dataset. Our control variable data comes from the Polity IV project, the World Bank, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Onset of Intrastate Armed Conflict dataset, and the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook) dataset. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the interval-level data used in the project. Appendix A contains frequency tables for the dichotomous variables included in our robustness checks. Appendix B contains graphical representations of both individual variables and the relationships between variables used in this analysis.

We first use multiple linear regression to test our hypotheses. We chose this particular method because it allows us to evaluate the impact of our main independent variables (lagged sum of coups, and lagged sum of insurgencies) on lagged military expenditure while simultaneously taking into account our control variables, specifically lagged log US military assistance, lagged log GDP per capita, and lagged Polity IV Score. We then use unbalanced one-way ANOVA to test our hypothesis that military expenditure differs based on regime type. We use ANOVA because it allows us to compare three group means (autocracy, democracy, and anocracy).

Dependent Variable:
The data for our dependent variable comes from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, which contains time-series data on the military spending of 172 countries between 1988 and 2011. SIPRI presents the data in three formats: in local currency at current prices; as a % of GDP; and in US dollars at constant (2010) prices and exchange rates. The latter, which we use in this project, is presented according to calendar years. SIPRI data is based on open-access data, and includes “all current and capital expenditure on: (a) the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; (b) defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; (c) paramilitary forces, when judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and (d) military space activities." This definition excludes spending on civil defense and previous military activities, such as veterans’ benefits, and the costs associated with demobilization, the conversion of arms production facilities, and the destruction of weapons. We use log-transformed military expenditure as a standard correction for non-linearity in the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. This is consistent with the idea that there is a diminishing marginal effect to each dollar.

Independent Variables:
We use Powell’s Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010 dataset to generate our main independent variable — a country’s history of coups d’état. Following Powell, we define coups as “overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of state using unconstitutional means.” The unit of analysis is country-year. The data is coded in terms of categorical variables, with 0=no coup attempt per country-year; 1=failed coup attempt per country-year; and 2=successful coup attempt per country-year. We create a variable that accounts for the sum of coups and coup attempts a country has experienced between 1988 and 2010, which we lag (the lag is set to one year before military expenditure is calculated).

We also use the UCDP Onset of Intrastate Armed Conflict dataset to account for a country’s history of armed insurgency. For the purposes of our analysis, we use UCDP’s definition of armed conflict as a “contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.” We create a variable that consists of...
the sum of all conflicts a country has experienced between 1988 and 2011. This enables us to differentiate between countries that have experienced no conflicts and those that have experienced multiple conflicts within the set timeframe. We then lag this variable (the lag is set to one year before military expenditure is calculated).

Control Variables:

As per Baltagi and Wu (1999), we include a lagged version of the dependent variable, as there is likely autocorrelation in the dependent variable. Because budgets are sticky from year to year, military spending in year t is likely to be highly correlated with military spending in time t+1. This violates the assumption of error independence for ordinary least squares estimation, and will bias our estimates absent correction. This variable consists of the log-transformed military expenditure variable lagged by one year.

Control variables include a lagged version of the dependent variable, as there is likely autocorrelation in the dependent variable.23 Because budgets are sticky from year to year, military spending in year t is likely to be highly correlated with military spending in time t+1. This violates the assumption of error independence for ordinary least squares estimation, and will bias our estimates absent correction. This variable consists of the log-transformed military expenditure variable lagged by one year.

We control for US military assistance in constant $US 2010 to a country using the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook) dataset, as this allows us to control for fluctuations in the value of the dollar over time.24 Military assistance is defined as all military accounts with a “non-economic development purpose.” We use the log-transformed lagged version of the data for our analysis (the lag is set to one year before military expenditure is calculated).

We also control for countries’ economic strength, as wealthier countries would presumably be able to afford greater military expenditures. We use data on GDP per capita from the World Bank, and create a log-transformed lagged version of the data (the lag is set to one year before military expenditure is calculated).25

Fifty-two of the ninety coup events included in our data take place in Africa. Following Collier and Hoeffler (2007), we therefore create a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 for all African countries, both North and Sub-Saharan, to control for the prevalence of these events in these regions.26

Lastly, we control for a country’s level of democratization. Democracies will likely be less at risk of experiencing coups; therefore, potential coup-risk would play less of a role in determining their military expenditures. We use a country’s Polity IV score in our analysis in the form of an interval variable that ranges from -10 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic). We also lag this variable by one year.

For the purposes of our analysis, we evaluate three regime types: anocracies, democracies and autocracies. Following the Center for Systemic Peace Global Report 2014, we define anocracies as a form of government “characterized by institutions and political elites that are far less capable of performing fundamental tasks and ensuring their own continuity.”27 They are generally unstable, ineffective, and prone to outbreaks of armed conflict. Their “governments are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic but, rather, combine an often incoherent mix” of practices from both forms of government.28 Their Polity IV scores range from 5 to -5.

A fully institutionalized democracy has “institutionalized procedures for open, competitive, and deliberative political participation; chooses and replaces chief executives in open, competitive elections; and imposes substantial checks and balances on the discretionary powers of the chief executive.”29 Democracies have polity scores ranging from +6 to +10, with scores closer to +6 reflecting “weaker checks on executive power, some restrictions on political participation, or shortcomings in the application of the rule of law to, or by, opposition groups.”30

On the other hand, under fully institutionalized autocracies, “citizens’ participation is sharply restricted or suppressed; chief executives are selected according to clearly defined (usually hereditary) rules of succession from within the established political elite; and, once in office, chief executives exercise power with no meaningful checks from legislative, judicial, or civil society institutions.”31 Autocracies have scores from -10 to -6, with scores closer to -6 reflecting some space for political participation and some limits on executive authority.
Before conducting our analyses, we test our variables to ensure that they do not violate the multiple regression and ANOVA assumptions (see Appendix B). Our residual plot appears to be normally scattered, and does not thicken (Figure 2B). The independence and equal variance assumptions therefore appear to be met. The histogram of our residuals also appears to be approximately normal (Figure 3B). Furthermore, because of the size of our dataset, we can rely on the Central Limit Theorem to justify normality of our estimates. Our partial residual plot shows that all of the relationships appear to be relatively linear (Figure 4B). There are no obviously curved shapes, which means that the linearity assumption has been met. However, the lagged insurgency variable appears to contain some outliers – we therefore test the robustness of the relationship by creating a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 when a country has experienced at least one insurgency between 1989 and 2011, and 0 otherwise (Figure 5B).

The results of Model 1 are presented in Table 2. They include point estimates for the regression parameters (intercept and slopes) together with corresponding robust standard errors. The p-values are from statistical tests that a specific regression parameter equals zero, meaning that there is no linear relationship between a specific independent variable and the dependent variable.

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Based on this model, we see that, contrary to our hypothesis, a history of coups does not seem to be associated with decreased military expenditure. The Coups variable is not statistically significantly associated with military expenditure, when taking into account all other factors included in the model. We therefore fail to reject our first null hypothesis (that there is no relation).

### Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Interval-Level Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logged Military Expenditure</td>
<td>6.62</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>3057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Log US Military Assistance</td>
<td>14.01</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>7.05</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>6.163</td>
<td>2341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Log GDP per Capita</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>3463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Polity IV Score</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>46.91</td>
<td>3574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Sum of Insurgencies</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>3629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Sum of Coups</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>3629</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: The effect of a country’s history of coups and insurgencies on its military expenditure:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Military Expenditure</td>
<td>0.0246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0699)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Log US Military Assistance</td>
<td>0.0598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0377)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Log GDP per Capita</td>
<td>0.026***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Polity IV Score</td>
<td>-0.0451*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0237)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Dichotomous Variable</td>
<td>-0.798*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.402)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Sum of Insurgencies</td>
<td>0.566***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Sum of Coups</td>
<td>0.0278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (Intercept)</td>
<td>-0.497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.115)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1.697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-squared</td>
<td>0.456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A country’s history of armed insurgencies, on the other hand, is positively associated with log-transformed military expenditure (p<0.01), when accounting for all other factors in the model.

We can therefore reject our second null hypothesis (that there is no relationship between military expenditure and a country’s insurgency history, when taking into account all other factors included in the model). Lagged log-transformed GDP per capita is also positively associated with log-transformed military expenditure (p<0.01), while our Africa dichotomous variable and our lagged Polity IV variable are negatively associated with military expenditure (p<0.1).

Because there appears to be outliers in the Lagged Sum of Insurgencies data (see Figure 4B - Appendix B), we test the robustness of our findings by creating a dichotomous variable for a country’s insurgency history, with 1=country that has experienced at least one insurgency, and 0 otherwise. This causes the insurgency finding to lose some of its statistical significance (shifting from p<0.01 to p<0.05), while our Africa dichotomous variable gains statistical significance (shifting from p<0.1 to p<0.05). Overall, however, our findings prove robust (see Model 1A in Appendix C).

Model 2 presents the findings of our unbalanced one-way ANOVA. We see that there is a significant difference between group means for democracies, autocracies and anocracies (p<0.01). We can therefore reject the null hypothesis that the means of these three groups are equal. We use a post-hoc Tukey method to identify which means are different while adjusting for multiple testing. We find that the mean for autocracies (mean = 6.295, SD = 2.258) differs significantly from that of anocracies (mean = 5.608, SD = 1.902). We also find that the mean for autocracies differs significantly from that of democracies (mean = 7.155, SD = 2.369). The same is true of the difference between the means of anocracies and democracies. Because none of the 95% confidence intervals include zero, we can claim that the difference in logged military expenditure between the different regime types is statistically significant.

Based on our box-plots (see below), we...
see that anocracies do indeed seem to be associated with lower levels of logged military expenditures. This finding would seem to support our argument that anocracies would be more likely to decrease military expenditures in an attempt to limit the power of a potential threat to the incumbent’s hold on power, as they would be the most at risk of coups.

Prior to conducting our analysis, we tested our data to ensure that it did not violate the ANOVA assumptions (see Appendix B). We find that the equal variance assumption is justified, as the spreads of our box-plots are roughly equal and do not seem to change systematically with the center. We also plot a histogram of the residuals and find that the normality assumption is justified (Figure 6B). The nature of our analysis ensures that the independence assumption is not violated because the groups constitute specific regimes and do not overlap. Though it is possible that autocracies and anocracies would be less willing to report their military expenditures (a potential violation of the Randomization condition), we argue that the size of our dataset limits the impact of this effect, as we still have sufficient data to conduct our analyses.

Discussions and Conclusions

In this paper, we argue that countries that have experienced coups will tend to decrease military expenditures in an attempt to limit the military’s ability to stage coups in the future. On the other hand, countries that have experienced insurgencies will increase military spending, as they will perceive potential rebel uprisings as a greater threat than coups. We also hypothesize that democracies and anocracies will be associated with higher levels of military expenditures, as stronger governments are less likely to be overthrown in a coup. However, anocracies will be associated with decreased military expenditures due to their fragility – democratizing countries are those most at risk of coups, as leaders will yet not have had the opportunity to cement their power, either by strengthening democratic institutions to ensure the peaceful transfer of power, or by asserting their control over the state through increased centralization. We test these hypotheses using multiple linear regression and unbalanced one-way ANOVA. While we find strong support for our second and third hypotheses, we do not find support for our first hypothesis.

In the future, it will be necessary to expand our dataset to further test the robustness of our findings. Our measure of military expenditure contains a high number of missing values. The randomization assumption may be violated, as autocracies and anocracies may be less likely to report such data. Furthermore, countries that have recently experienced coups are less likely to report military expenditure data, meaning that our standard errors and coefficients are likely systematically biased. Our R2 value is also fairly low (0.458 in Model 1), meaning that our model fails to explain approximately half of the variation in our dependent variable.

Future research should also take into account such things as the severity of the previous conflict, rebel strength, and the number of potential dissident groups (to better understand why governments would prioritize quelling insurgencies over reducing the likelihood of potential coups). Disaggregating based on the type of government that emerges following these coups d’état would allow us to test whether military governments are more likely to

"Democratizing countries are those most at risk of coups, as leaders will yet not have had the opportunity to cement their power, either by strengthening democratic institutions to ensure the peaceful transfer of power, or by asserting their control over the state through increased centralization."
increase spending relative to civilian or mixed governments. Scholars should also consider testing whether there is a specific timeframe associated with the post-coup spending effect (for example, do countries either strongly increase or decrease military spending following a coup for a specific time period, after which spending returns to its average pre-coup level). Thus, though we were able to find some support for our hypotheses, much remains to be done to increase our understanding of these dynamics.

Endnotes
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
11. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.
17. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.
18. Ibid.
19. Powell and Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups from 1950-Present: A New Dataset.”
22. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
30. Ibid.

Bibliography
Appendix A

Figure 1A: History of Insurgency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% Valid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - No Conflict</td>
<td>2976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Conflict occurred</td>
<td>654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3630</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2A: History of Coup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - No Coup</td>
<td>3340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Coup Occurred</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3630</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This includes attempted coup.

Figure 3A: Regime Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy</td>
<td>778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anocracy</td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>1870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3630</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
s the Arctic icecap continues to melt at an alarming speed, the Arctic Circle has undertaken new geopolitical considerations, witnessing a significant growth in tension among the states of the region. Largely a consequence of its vanishing polar ice, the Arctic region is experiencing the introduction of new shipping lanes and access to resources, dramatically influencing both the regional and global focus on the Arctic North. However, as Arctic land and resources draw major attention throughout the world, the United States increasingly finds itself left out in the cold when it comes to its Arctic interests. Specifically, the indifferent and isolationist American foreign policy towards the Arctic region has left both a power vacuum at the North Pole and the US largely unable to pursue its Arctic interests, inviting competing superpowers and states to battle over the vast resources of the Arctic.

Through my research I hope to first, unpack the nature of contemporary Arctic politics, analyzing the implications of ongoing Arctic melt and the recent activities of the Arctic states. By better understanding contemporary Arctic politics, I will argue that a stronger American presence in the Arctic is necessary not only to consolidate American national interest, but also to curb ongoing tension, ensuring the peaceful and sustainable development of the Arctic region.

In constructing my arguments, this essay has been divided into five constituent sections. In the first section, I will establish a brief historical overview of the Arctic Circle as a region of political interest, as well as sketching the current political actors of the Arctic. In the second section, a context will be provided in order to better understand the nature of environmental change in the Arctic, focusing on the central geopolitical implications of continued Arctic melt. The third section will summarize the character of international relations in the Arctic over the last decade, focusing upon the prevailing anarchy currently emerging in the Arctic Circle. The fourth section will focus specifically on the Arctic politics of Russia and China, analyzing the roles played by two of the world’s largest superpowers in the Arctic region. And, in the fifth and final section, I will assess contemporary American Arctic policy, providing recommendations for future American policy in the Arctic Circle.

A Background of Arctic Politics

While human-induced climate change has led to a “dramatic shift” in attention towards the Arctic and its role in the international system, the economic potential of the Arctic region has long held the interest of international powers. Throughout much of the 19th century, Arctic exploration resembled “the holy-grail” of Victorian expansionism. The British Empire spared no expense in pursuing “a shortcut to rich Asian markets” through the Northwest Passage—a shipping lane connecting European and Asian markets via the Arctic Circle. Unfortunately for the British, naval explorers found not navigable waters, but rather an Arctic sea clogged by perennial ice. The failure to discover the famed Northwest Passage through the Arctic Circle largely mitigated international interest in the polar north, temporarily removing the Arctic from “power brokers’ consciousness.”

Nick Blanchette. Nick Blanchette is a senior Political Science major from Mercer Island, Washington, and studies at Colorado College. With a keen interest in strategic studies, Nick hopes to further unpack the changing character of war and security in the 21st Century. Upon graduating this spring, Nick will continue his studies at the University of Oxford where he will pursue an MPhil in International Relations.
International focus in the Arctic was revived midway through the 20th century not out of economic reasons, but for strategic purposes. In the years directly following the end of the Second World War, the Arctic emerged as perhaps the world’s most militarized air and maritime space. In the bipolar world of the Cold War, the Arctic Circle served as a central (potential) conflict zone between the US and the Soviet Union. As the closest distance between the Cold War superpowers sat through the Arctic Circle, the North Pole held major strategic importance for both superpowers throughout the late-20th century, with both states running “over-the-ice” bombing missions and “under-the-ice” nuclear-powered submarine expeditions.9 In addition to its position as a staging ground for potential superpower conflict, the Arctic Circle also underwent significant militarization through the creation of remote bases and installation of nuclear missile silos, with both the US and the Soviet Union developing their defensive infrastructure in the polar north.10 However, the 1980s and 1990s, punctuated by the fall of the Soviet Union, brought about a transition from confrontation to cooperation in the Arctic.

Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the Arctic States took steps towards establishing the Arctic as a peaceful region. In 1996, the Arctic states underlined their hope for peace in the region through the creation of the Arctic Council. While the Arctic Council’s policies are “legally non-binding and often nebulous,” the council has more particularly Iceland, have been active in pursuing their “near-Arctic” interests in surrounding waters, preparing for the coming globalization of the polar north.14

In addition to the Arctic and near-Arctic states, many global states without clear geographical ties to the Arctic region—primarily resource-hungry powers—have developed stronger interest in the North Pole. Several non-Arctic countries (China, India, South Korea, Japan, and Italy, for example) have recently gained observer status to the Arctic Council, and China, in particular, has spent billions of dollars building up their economic presence and relationships in the Arctic region.15 While the immediate post-Cold War environment suggested a spirit of cooperation between the Arctic states, the continued melt of the Arctic icecap has drastically altered the international role of the Arctic Circle, creating a region of immense competition in a region lacking binding legal frameworks.

“While the immediate post-Cold War environment suggested a spirit of cooperation between the Arctic states, the continued melt of the Arctic icecap has drastically altered the international role of the Arctic Circle, creating a region of immense competition in a region lacking binding legal frameworks.”

Arctic Melt: The Changing Role of the Arctic in the Age of Climate Change

Although the Arctic played an important strategic role throughout much of the 20th century, rapid climate change has led to significant changes in the region. As the Arctic icecap continues to melt, the role of the Arctic has become increasingly important for global climate change and for the economic and strategic interests of the states surrounding the region. The Arctic Council has been working to address these challenges, but the lack of binding legal frameworks in the region has made it difficult to achieve cooperation and coordination.

Arctic (in)Security: The United States and Polar Politics in the Age of Climate Change/Nick Blanchette
change and global warming dramatically shifted the geographical and geopolitical considerations of the Arctic Circle. While the Arctic has always experienced periods of warming and cooling, current rates of Arctic ice-melt prove exceptional by any historical comparison. In analyzing temperature trends in the Arctic over the last 60 years, average winter temperatures increased by over seven degrees Fahrenheit. The geographical position of the Arctic results in more acute warming than other regions because of the “sharper angle at which the sun’s rays strike the polar region during the summer.”

From a geographical and geopolitical perspective, rising air and sea temperatures in the Arctic hold the effect of diminishing the polar icecap, creating significantly more access to the region. Over the last three decades, the Arctic icecap has lost over half of its area and three-quarters of its volume, with the last decade in particular making up six of the top seven years of arctic melt. Further, the percentage of perennial ice—the yearlong, dense ice that serves as the primary obstacle to Arctic shipping—that blankets the Arctic Circle has plummeted from 70 percent during the 1980s to just 20 percent in 2014. Although estimations in 2007 predicted an ice free summer in the Arctic beginning in 2070, more recent observations have moved this date closer to 2035, with the most sophisticated climate technology suggesting that the Arctic could experience an ice-free summer as soon as 2020. With Arctic ice melt at a rate already allowing transarctic voyages at specific times of the year, the polar icecap looks certain to continue its hasty decline over the next several decades, eventually culminating in an ice free Arctic. While the loss of Arctic ice proves catastrophic for the fragile Arctic ecosystem, states appear far more interested in reaping the benefits of polar melt. Specifically, the continued Arctic ice melt and prospect of an ice free summer in the North presents two overarching geopolitical implications and interests for the international community: first, major economic implications in the opening up of potential shipping lanes; and second, energy implications in the possibility of mass resource extraction.

The Economic Implications of Arctic Melt

As the Arctic icecap continues to melt, the possibility of sea-lanes connecting Western and Eastern markets via the Arctic Circle (as imagined by 19th century explorers) appears increasingly likely in the 21st century, with states hopeful that new shipping lanes will compete with traditional maritime routes through the Suez and Panama Canals. While shipping lanes through the Arctic were predicted to arrive late in the 21st century, during 2007, for the first time in recorded history, large portions of the Arctic experienced an ice-free summer. As the Arctic melt occurs at a faster than expected rate, Arctic shipping lanes are becoming more commercially viable. Specifically, two major sea-lanes are set for development: the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest Passage. Although the Northwest Passage (the sea route connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans via the Canadian Arctic Archipelago) looks roughly a decade away from commercialization, the NSR (the sea route connecting the Kara Gate to the Bering Strait via the Russian Arctic Archipelago) is experiencing both significant development from the Russian Government and increasing maritime trade.
NSR in 2009, the number of Cargo ships selecting the NSR over more conventional sea routes jumped up to 71 in 2013. The NSR is only likely to become more competitive with the conventional Suez Canal, as the trip shaves roughly 30 percent off the distance required by the Suez route while avoiding the unstable waters of the Strait of Malacca and the Horn of Africa.31 Similarly, if the current Arctic melt were to reach its expected level, the Northwest Passage could become economically feasible, with the Northwest Passage cutting several days of travel off of the comparable route through the Panama Canal. Considering the more competitive shipping market saved fuel costs, and reduced travel time, the introduction of the NSR and Northwest Passage could save the shipping industry billions a year, shifting global trade patterns and fostering further economic integration between states.32

While the opening of Arctic sea-lanes provides opportunities for the global shipping industry, it more critically provides incentive for the development of the north by Arctic littoral states. In investing in infrastructure along Arctic sea-lanes, Arctic states open up massive potential revenue streams in supporting the increased passage of merchant fleets, greatly benefiting from the globalization of the polar north. In addition to monetarily benefitting from development along opening shipping lanes in the Arctic, Arctic states could also see a windfall in terms of political power by controlling the flow of the world’s goods. To illustrate, if the NSR were to make up a large portion of global shipping trade—a likely scenario—the Russian government would hold leverage over states dependent on NSR-based trade. Consequently, control of new sea-lanes in the Arctic proves to be of foremost interest to Arctic states, becoming a central point of contention among members of the Arctic Council.

The Energy Implications of Arctic Melt

Perhaps the most significant implication of continued warming in the Arctic is the increased access to natural resources (principally, hydrocarbons,) with the Arctic Circle thought to contain the world’s last great store of fossil fuels. While the Arctic has long been thought to hold large pockets of natural resources, the Arctic melt and stronger research in the region have revealed the full extent of resources in the polar north. According to US Geological Survey (USGS) estimates, the Arctic Circle could hold as much as “90 billion barrels (13 percent) of the world’s remaining undiscovered oil reserves,” and as much as 30 percent of undiscovered natural gas. Relative to Russian reports, the USGS studies appear tame, with the Russian government estimating that the underwater Arctic Region could contain upwards of 586 billion barrels of “unproven” oil reserves. In addition to the possibility of new access to hydrocarbons in the Arctic, the Arctic region may also contain vast stores of rare earth and valuable minerals, “such as gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, manganese, nickel, platinum, tin, zinc, and diamonds.” The control of rare earth minerals holds significant benefits in 21st century markets, with rising powers (China and India) and developing countries fuelling global demand for these resources. Retreating Arctic ice and the warming of the region is also massively transforming ecosystems in the High North, creating new projects for development. Specifically, as temperature increases, frozen tundra in the Arctic turns into temperate rainforests (creating vast new timber resources) and fish stocks in the warming Arctic oceans are soaring. It should thus come with little surprise that the immense presence of natural resources in the Arctic combined with rising global demand for both hydrocarbons and rare earth minerals has drawn comparisons to the various gold rushes of the 19th century.

While the riches of the Arctic become more evident each day, full-scale development of the region for resource extraction does appear to be several years off, with Arctic ice, expensive development costs, and high risks (in the form of oil spills) mitigating the total exploitation of the region. However, both states and oil companies have been busy in securing rights to future resource development throughout the region, with the energy-sector actively investing billions of dollars in Arctic research and
technology. Consequently, it appears that the Arctic Circle will soon become the nexus for global oil extraction, contributing to the very conditions that brought about the melt of the Arctic in the first place. Thus, despite the significant environmental implications of continued Arctic melt and oil extraction in the North, state acquisition of polar oil looks a much safer bet than protection of the polar bear. In a world of increasingly scarce resources and energy-hungry consumers, the international community is set to become more interested in the Arctic, prompting great competition among states to secure rights to the region’s resources.

Polar Melt in an Age of Arctic Anarchy

While the current Arctic melt creates key economic and energy opportunities for the international community, “the combination of new shipping lanes, trillions of dollars in possible oil and gas,” and a poorly defined legal structure or picture of state ownership make for a dangerous set of challenges for the international order. Perhaps most concerning for the future of the Arctic is the lack of an overarching institutional or legal structure to mediate the growing list of land claims and disputes lodged by the Arctic states. With no specific treaty concerning the Arctic, and both the Arctic Council and UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) frameworks fairly limited in their applicability to mitigate tensions in the Arctic Circle, an orderly or cooperative development of the Arctic’s resources and sea-lanes through institutional means remains elusive. Sure enough, the last decade in the Arctic region has seen a fairly ungoverned rush for Arctic land and resources, with Arctic states undertaking increasingly aggressive dispositions in the pursuit of their polar claims.

The free scramble for the Arctic was largely initiated in 2007 when Russia planted “its flag on the North Pole’s sea floor,” symbolizing a turning point in Arctic affairs. While Russia led the charge for the Arctic, with its resumption of military activity throughout the North Pole and submission of a significant 460,000 square mile land claim to UNCLOS, the rest of the Arctic states have followed suit. For example, the Norwegian government came to diplomatic blows with the Russians in 2009 over a dispute in the Barents Sea, launching several appeals to the United Nations for arbitration. Similarly, the Canadian and Danish governments have long butted heads over the sovereignty of the Hans Island—a small-uninhabited island split by the territorial line between Canada and Greenland (Denmark). Even the US and Canada, countries with historically strong ties, have run into land disputes in the Arctic, clashing over the governance of the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea. The key issue of tension in the Arctic, however, continues to concern the Lomonosov Ridge—an underwater continental ridge spanning 1800 kilometers through the Arctic Circle. If a country were to successfully demonstrate that the Lomonosov Ridge constituted a natural extension of their country’s landmass, much of the race for the Arctic would be rendered mute given the concentration of Arctic land and resources along the Ridge. First to discover the potentiality of the Lomonosov Ridge, the Russian government filed for ownership of the ridge in 2007, only to be challenged by Canadian scientists and policymakers in 2013, disputing the ridge’s connection to the Russian continent. As recently as December 16th, 2014, the Danish government lodged a claim to UNCLOS, appealing for just under one million square kilometers of land, including...
an appeal that the Lomonosov Ridge constitutes an extension of Greenland’s landmass. In short, the potential benefits of controlling the Arctic Circle have spurred great competition among the Arctic states that continue to fight for power in a region lacking authority.

While the retreating Arctic ice and opening up of resources has undoubtedly amplified tension in the region, it is important to note that states have also demonstrated a limited capacity to cooperate over the acquisition of land and natural resources. Although the Arctic Council and UNCLOS are limited in their capacity to mediate interstate sparring and disputes, several states have willingly come together in order to establish bilateral agreements in pursuit of the peaceful development of the Arctic region. For example, in 2010, the Russian and Norwegian governments settled their long-running territorial dispute over the Svalbard Islands, and the five major Arctic states came together over the Ilulissat Declaration, establishing new guidelines to the orderly development of the Arctic’s resources.

As an emerging geopolitical region, the Arctic does offer significant opportunity for compromise and joint action among Arctic states. The threat of environmental damage from oil spills, search-and-rescue missions, and the maintenance of global trading routes are all challenges that demand joint-action, and will require cooperation among Arctic states. Thus, in analyzing the overall trend of recent Arctic politics, the outcome of the Arctic scramble appears unclear, with periods of confrontation and cooperation both present among the states of the Arctic. However, much of the future of the Arctic will rest in the ambitions and actions of two Arctic powers: a resurgent Arctic Russia and an emerging Arctic China.

The Polar Bear and the Snow Dragon: Russian and Chinese Ambitions in the Arctic

Of central interest to the US in the Arctic region is the role that its two central superpower competitors—Russia and China—play in the current “Arctic Scramble.” While Russia, geographically speaking, proves to be the largest Arctic nation by some distance, China, a country with no legitimate claim to land in the Arctic, has also been busy building its economic and strategic presence in the North. Additionally, recent regressions in the relationship between Russia and the West—specifically surrounding the ongoing Ukraine Crisis—have created new complications in the Arctic region, risking both Russian aggression and an increased Chinese presence in the Arctic.

As the traditional Arctic hegemon, Russia continues to play the dominant role in Arctic affairs, increasing its involvement as the full scope of resources in the North Pole becomes clear. Among Arctic nations, Russia holds by far the most Arctic coastline, extending further than 10,000 miles, as well as claiming a roughly 460,000 square mile amount of Arctic land. Taking advantage of the opening NSR and a lack of a true Arctic competitor, Russia has taken charge of polar exploration, research, and land claims, consolidating the Russian foothold in the Arctic region. Many Western states have viewed 21st century Russian Arctic policy as a resumption of the confrontational character of the Cold War, pointing towards the Russian government’s revival of strategic bomber missions over the Arctic, and a Russian nuclear submarine’s planting of a flag under the North Pole in 2007. In a similar vein to ongoing debates over Russian intentions in Crimea, Western observers appear somewhat confused over the nature of Russia’s goals in the Arctic, with many convinced that the North Pole represents the next stage in Putinist expansion. From a Russian perspective however, the Arctic resembles a logical national interest given its connection to the Russian Archipelago and the dependence of the Russian economy on fossil fuels. Following this vein of thought, the Russians view their Arctic policy as largely defensive in nature, central to securing their most basic and immediate strategic interests. In any view, Russia looks sure to play a large role in the future of the Arctic, with the Russian government set on ensuring its ambitions in the region are met.

While largely unchallenged for much
of the last decade, Russian policy in the Arctic region ran into hurdles towards the end of the 2014 calendar year, continuing to be hampered by Western backlash against the Ukraine Crisis and dipping global oil prices. While the Russian government has been quick to establish significant deals with Western oil companies for the research and development of oil in the Arctic oceans, sanctions from Western governments (including several Arctic Council members) have nullified these opportunities for market integration between Russian and Western companies. Applying the logic of Complex Interdependence Theory, Western sanctions on Russia have not only hurt economic growth prospects for Western oil companies, but have also increased the likelihood of conflict with Russia by harming prospects of mutual dependence in the Arctic region.

Further, the economic sanctions against Russia, combined with the drastic fall in oil prices (falling below $55 a barrel), hold two profound consequences for the Arctic region at large. First, economic sanctions and falling oil prices suggest an imminent Russian recession, with the Russian economy heavily dependent on both trade and oil revenue for market vitality. In this sense, immediate Russian expansion in the Arctic looks to be slowed without a viable economy. Second, absent Western investors in its energy markets that are in need of economic stimulus quickly, the Russian government has turned eastward towards China, bringing the East Asian giant firmly into the Arctic picture. Signing a $400 billion gas deal (holding opportunities for joint Arctic exploration) with China, the Russian government has both isolated itself from Western markets and brought a new competitor into the Arctic scramble for natural resources.

As the world’s largest consumer of hydrocarbons and a country heavily dependent on maritime trade, China has expressed significant interest in the Arctic region, “engaging the Arctic through research, investment, and diplomacy.” While lacking an Arctic coastline or land-claims in the polar north, the Chinese government has made its position clear, declaring that “the Arctic belongs to all the people around the world, as no nation has sovereignty over it…China must plan an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as we have one-fifth of the world’s population.” Describing their country as a “near-Arctic state,” Chinese policymakers have been busy consolidating relationships in the Arctic, making resource extraction deals with the Danish government, investing in Icelandic oil companies, and creating the first Sino-European free trade agreement with Iceland. In addition to establishing relationships with the Arctic countries, China has also begun unilaterally pursuing its Arctic interests. Currently, the Chinese government is investing close to 60 million dollars in polar research a year, in addition to regularly performing research and rescue missions in the Arctic with its brand-new icebreaker (the largest in the world), aptly named “the Snow Dragon.” However, as mentioned, the biggest indication of China’s Arctic ambitions remains its recent energy deal with Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, an agreement putting China firmly in the Arctic frame. In consolidating its economic relationship with the Russian government, China has ensured its access to Arctic resources, with many provisions in the deal calling for joint exploration and extraction. The strengthening relationship between China and Russia, particularly in the Arctic, should serve as a warning sign for the US as its two largest global competitors continue to balance against the American hegemon. Although joint Chinese and Russian action in the Arctic could prove entirely peaceful in nature, unchecked expansion by the two powers is concerning from a geopolitical perspective for the US and its NATO allies in the Arctic, requiring balancing from the world’s preeminent power.

**Thawing the Global Hegemon: Reimagining the US Role in the Polar North**

Despite the clear geostrategic importance of the Arctic region to its national interest, the US has largely been left in the cold when it comes to the Arctic. Through both unilateral and multilateral avenues, the US has fallen behind its allies and competitors, allowing its power projection capabilities in the Arctic to...
atrophy while failing to take an active role through the few existing legal structures in the Arctic. Simply put, the US, while occasionally paying the region lip service, has ignored the significance of the Arctic and the coming rush for its resources. As a littoral Arctic nation (through the state of Alaska), the US potentially holds legitimate claim to significant tracts of land in the Arctic, and is in an ideal position to play a central role in Arctic stewardship over resource extraction and new global shipping lanes. Further, from a strategic perspective, the Arctic is a critical region for the US key to balancing against emerging intrusions in the Arctic Circle by Russian and Chinese navies. For the sake of American national interest, US policymakers can no longer afford to overlook the Arctic, a region that offers both tremendous opportunities for international cooperation and challenges in the way of potential conflict.

Of concern for the US, America has largely lost its capacity to unilaterally achieve or explore its objectives in the North Pole. As the Arctic continues its thaw, new openings in the sea ice provide ample opportunities for willing explorers, but in order to venture through the Arctic ice, the US needs icebreaking ships. Despite the American military’s “full-spectrum dominance” across air, sea, and land, currently the US only operates three icebreaker ships—a dismal number when considering that the Russians operate eighteen, with another five in production. Icebreaking ships prove critical in the navigation of current and future Arctic ice conditions, constituting a technological precondition to the pursuit of research and resources, the navigation of Arctic sea-lanes, and the security of the Arctic region. Thus, any attempt to redefine US policy in an age of Arctic ice melt must begin with the modernization of the American icebreaker fleet.

While American icebreaker production appears an intuitive first step to expanding the US role in the Arctic region, American policymakers have provided staunch opposition to development of the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet. Specifically, issues of cost and time constraints in production, as well as the pervasive interagency competition over defense budget resources, have hampered US power-projection capabilities in the Arctic. Today, a single, first-class American icebreaker ship costs an estimated $860 million and takes about ten years to produce. While other Arctic powers are able to develop icebreakers at a quicker and cheaper rate than America, the US remains hampered by the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, a law requiring naval ships to be built in the US, keeping acquisition costs high and construction times lengthy. In building the US icebreaker fleet up more quickly and cheaply, US Arctic interests can be pursued sooner rather than later, putting America in a stronger position to pursue its interests in the region. Second, American Arctic interests require a transition from interagency competition to interagency cooperation. Given a largely indifferent American policy in the Arctic over the last decade, the Coast Guard has undertaken much of the burden in conducting US Arctic affairs. However, “increased capabilities will require far more than just the Coast Guard’s limited resources and attention.” By pulling in the technical expertise and resources of a range of US agencies and departments, the US can expedite its exploration and investment in the Arctic region. Third,
and finally, the US needs to normalize its presence in the Arctic, conducting more maritime patrols and active research to establish the degree of its potential land claims in the Arctic Circle. With Arctic melt better revealing the stores of natural resources in the region, as well as the extent to which regional powers can stake claim to land, frequent US activity in the polar north is necessary to grasp the full scope of American interests in the Arctic before the regions’ resources are accounted for by other states. While American policymakers have pushed against Arctic investment largely as a result of the high costs of Arctic exploration, the likely American dividends of resource exploration and infrastructure development will far outweigh the costs of development.

Perhaps more important for the pursuit of US interests is the revival of American multilateral policy in the Arctic region. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has largely taken a backseat in international organizations and frameworks for cooperation in the Arctic Circle. Specifically, American failures to take an active role in the Arctic Council, to ratify the UNCLOS Treaty, and to actively pursue ties with friendly Arctic nations have placed US Arctic interests in jeopardy. As previously mentioned, few overarching legal frameworks for the mediation of Arctic disputes exist. For example, the Arctic Council—the only active organization of the Arctic states—is legally non-binding and purposefully avoids certain Arctic issues. Although the US played an instrumental role in the creation of the Arctic Council in 1996, the US undermined the organization from its inception by removing any ability to arbitrate potential issues of conflict among Arctic states. Similarly, the US currently finds itself unable to pursue many of its territorial claims in the Arctic, as a result of its failure to ratify the UNCLOS treaty. As the UNCLOS treaty provides the framework for states to both settle “boundary disputes and submit claims for additional resources beyond their exclusive economic zones,” American isolation from UNCLOS negates the opportunity for pursuit of American interests in the Arctic (in accordance with international law.)

Thus, in order to reestablish its position in the Arctic Circle, the US requires a majorly revamped multilateral policy. With the goal of heightened US presence and diffused tension in the Arctic, the American government ought focus on three areas of multilateral policy: first, the strengthening the Arctic Council (or erecting a competing organization); second, the belated ratification of the UNCLOS treaty; and third, the pursuit of collaborative exploration, research, and industry in the Arctic—especially with the Russian government.
A continuing issue for the orderly development of the Arctic continues to be the lack of an overarching political authority or legal structure capable of mediating the rising number of disputes in the region. While the existing Arctic Council proves helpful in providing a framework for discussion among Arctic states, the council remains extremely limited in its capacity to construct policy—particularly in disputes over land and security. Subsequently, the US, given its central role in creating the institution, should endeavor to strengthen the powers of the Arctic Council, creating new, specific guidelines for the development of the Arctic. Assuming the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2015, the US holds a tremendous opportunity to revamp the council, with possibilities for toughening the various mandates of the organization on issues such as the environment and collective security. Specifically, the US should look to construct regulatory oversight over the development of Arctic resources, better securing the protection of the Arctic environment. In pursuing clearer regulations to the development of the Arctic, the US can ease the potentiality for tension in the region by promoting standardized international policy in the Arctic region.

Perhaps the central, if initial, roadblock to stronger multilateral US presence in the Arctic remains an American unwillingness to ratify the UNCLOS treaty. Despite support from the Executive branch, the DOD, the State Department, and various environmental groups, the US Congress remains firmly opposed to the American ratification of the UNCLOS treaty. Subsequently, the US, given its central role in creating the institution, should endeavor to strengthen the powers of the Arctic Council, creating new, specific guidelines for the development of the Arctic. Assuming the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2015, the US holds a tremendous opportunity to revamp the council, with possibilities for toughening the various mandates of the organization on issues such as the environment and collective security. Specifically, the US should look to construct regulatory oversight over the development of Arctic resources, better securing the protection of the Arctic environment. In pursuing clearer regulations to the development of the Arctic, the US can ease the potentiality for tension in the region by promoting standardized international policy in the Arctic region.

By participating in the UNCLOS treaty through ratification, the United States would not only affirm its multilateral engagement to the Arctic region, but also further its territorial interests under binding international law.

Finally, the US must emerge from its Arctic isolationism through active cooperation and engagement with its Arctic neighbors, pursuing courses of shared interest in the region. With its fairly limited Arctic policy over the last decade, the US has failed to create vital partnerships in the Arctic, despite several chances for collaboration with its neighbors. First, the US should seek to mend its Arctic ties with its northern Canadian neighbor. Between the Canadian and Alaskan Archipelagos, the opening of the Northwest Passage will require significant naval policing and management, a project requiring the shared resources of Canada and the US. Similarly, joint efforts between the US and Canada can greatly aid in the sustainable commercialization of the Arctic through cooperation on issues of environmental stewardship. With the development of the Arctic posing great threats to the health of the environment, only strong multinational action will be sufficient to avoid environmental damage, and a joint US-Canada policy for handling environmental disasters will enhance the security of the region. Perhaps most importantly for the US however, bilateral...
agreements must be expanded to include other Arctic countries, principally Russia. With the goal of pursuing a peaceful Arctic region in mind, the United States ought to reevaluate its sanction policy against Russia, a move that has prohibited ties between Western oil companies and the Russian government. In restricting economic integration and interdependence between Russia and American business, the United States has deepened the line between its own bloc and the growing Sino-Russian alliance, enhancing the Chinese presence in the Arctic as a result. By lifting sanctions and promoting free market interaction between Western oil developers and Russia, the US can better foster a spirit of mutual dependency in which both parties pursue the safe and peaceful development of the Arctic. Returning to an earlier theme, the international relations theorist Alexander Wendt proclaimed that international relations is what states make of it. In the case of the Arctic, states can either embrace a confrontational or cooperative approach, each sure to condition the future of the Arctic region. By engaging in the Arctic—through both unilateral and multilateral channels—in a spirit of cooperation and peaceful development, the US can help balance against the unchecked ambitions of competing Arctic powers. With the future of the Arctic region still unclear, Arctic states ought resolve to peacefully and jointly develop the world’s final frontier, a policy that begins with the strong leadership and authority of the American superpower.

**Endnotes**

1. Admiral James Stavridis USN (RET), “High North or High Tension? How to head off war in the last frontier on Earth,” Foreign Policy, October 21st, 2013.
7. Ibid, 68.
8. Ibid, 68.
9. Vesa Virtanen, “The Arctic in World Politics: The United States, Russia, and China in the Arctic,” Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University (2013), 34.
14. Ibid.
16. Admiral James Stavridis USN (RET), “High North or High Tension? How to head off war in the last frontier on Earth.”
and Sea Temperatures Continue to Trigger Changes in the Arctic,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, December 17th, 2014.


21. Such technology, at the time of writing, appears both out of the technological capabilities and interest of the World’s governments.

22. Scott Borgerson, “The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up.”

23. Long-term data on Arctic ice melt is relatively limited, with records of Arctic ice dating back only as far as 1979.


25. Scott Borgerson, “The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up.”


27. Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that he wanted to “stress the importance of the Northern Sea Route as an international transport artery that will rival traditional trade lanes.” See Scott Borgerson, “The Coming Arctic Boom.”


29. Ibid, 10.

30. Admittedly, this number does not currently compare to the 17,000 ships that pass through the Suez Canal each year. However, heavy Russian and Chinese investment in the NSR suggests that a significant shift in global shipping is on the way (Borgerson et al).


34. A certain irony exists in the global rush to procure the very same non-renewable resources in the Arctic that proved the bane of both the polar ice and ecosystems.


36. While the Russian Government’s estimates appear extreme, it is worth nothing that Russian exploration and geospatial mapping in the Arctic is far more advanced than that of the United States (cite). Also of interest, shortly after speculating upon the potential presence of 586 barrels of oil in Arctic waters, Russia was quick to launch a lofty land claim in the Arctic to the United Nations.


41. See Scott Borgerson, “The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up.”

42. Ibid.


44. Sebastian Knecht, “Geopolitics and the (De)Securitisation of Arctic Affairs,” 34.


47. Ibid.


52. Scott Borgerson, “The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up.”

53. Ibid.


59. See Bill Powell, “From the Baltic to the
Arctic, the Russian World is at the Door,” Newsweek, October 14th, 2014.


61. Ibid, 69.


70. Andrew Trotman, “Iceland first European country to sign free trade agreement with China,” The Telegraph, April 15th, 2013.


73. Atle Staalesen, “In Russia-China alliance, an Arctic dimension.”

74. Admiral James Stavridis USN (RET), “High North or High Tension? How to head off war in the last frontier on Earth.”


76. Admiral James Stavridis USN (RET), “High North or High Tension? How to head off war in the last frontier on Earth.”

77. Ronald O’Rourke, “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” 41.

78. According to Charles Ebinger of the Brookings Institute, only one of the three US Coast Guard icebreakers would be capable of navigating the current ice conditions in the Arctic Circle, as a result of the older technology and hulls used across the current fleet.


80. Scott Borgerson, “The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up.”


82. For more on the problems surrounding the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 in relation to the Arctic Circle, see James Jay Carafano and James Dean, “Breaking an Ice-Bound US Policy: A Proposal for Operating in the Arctic.”


85. For the Coast Guard specifically, the issues of interagency and intra-agency competition for budgetary allocation arises within the Department of Homeland Security (intra-agency), and against the US Navy (interagency)—the agency the Coast Guard is most often in competition with.

86. Admiral James Stavridis USN (RET), “High North or High Tension? How to head off war in the last frontier on Earth.”

87. According to Admiral James Stavridas (ibid), potential avenues of research and exploration could include investment in satellite technology (to track Arctic developments), reconnaissance flights, and better undersea monitoring.


89. Ibid, 72.

90. Ibid, 72.


92. “China and the Arctic: Polar Bearings”.


95. Ibid.


97. Scott Borgerson, “The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up.”

98. Ibid.

99. Scott Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of
Global Warming,” 75.


102. Ekaterina Klimenko, “Interdependence, not sovereignty, is the key to the development of Russia’s Arctic Region,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2013).
Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, “independent statehood came suddenly and unexpectedly to the five former Soviet Central Asian Republics (CARs) – Kazakhstan, The Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan), Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.”

To Western observers, the collapse of this “vast, multinational state” signaled the “rejection of the Soviet system in favor of Western political and economic institutions.” However, in most of these republics, the Communist Party leadership remained in power after independence. Scholar Alexander Cooley writes that Central Asia is distinct from post-Soviet counterparts in Eastern Europe (especially Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – now European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization members) in that Central Asia has largely “failed to make meaningful progress in enacting political and economic liberalization.” Indeed, of the nine states that Freedom House classified as “the worst of the worst” in 2013, two are post-Soviet Central Asian states.

Despite this record, Kyrgyzstan stands out to some as “an island of democracy” in the region with its high liberalization ratings. Uzbekistan, on the other hand, is “one of the most repressive” regimes in the world. President Islam Karimov has retained tight, centralized authority over Uzbekistan since 1991 and continues to severely repress civil society and political opponents. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have followed wildly different paths in the post-Soviet wake: one to a more (though certainly not fully) democratic regime, another to a consolidated authoritarian regime.

Researchers Lucan Way and Steven Levitsky devise a theory that might explain these divergent political outcomes. To Levitsky and Way, Western leverage, or the “government’s vulnerability to external pressure”; and linkage to the West, or “the density of a country’s economic, political, organizational, social, and communication ties to the European Union and the United States,” determine the likelihood of democratization in a given country. High levels of Western leverage and Western linkage will generate “intense international democratizing pressures” and thus increase the likelihood of democratization, while weak leverage and weak linkage have the opposite effect and may lead to “the failure of democracy.” This paper will examine how the linkage and leverage mechanisms operate in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and then determine whether Levitsky and Way’s theory can explain the divergent political outcomes in these two countries.

Explaining the Divide: Linkage and Leverage

In their 2010 publication Comparative Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, and in preceding articles, professors Levitsky and Way outline a theory to explain the emergence of democracy in some post-Communist regions and the marked absence of democracy in others. “Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-Communist Divide” looks specifically at the regime-type discrepancy between the largely pluralistic states of Central and Southeastern Europe, and the more autocratic Soviet successor states. Levitsky and Way claim that “an important source
of the post-Communist divide... is the
different character of the international
environments in the two regions.11 They
identify two factors that differentiate the
international environments: Western
leverage and linkage to the West.

Levitsky and Way further
conceptualize leverage as “regimes’
bargaining power vis-à-vis the West,
or their ability to avoid Western action
aimed at punishing autocratic abuse or
encouraging political liberalization.” It
follows that leverage is high when states
lack bargaining power and are heavily
affected by punitive action from the West,
and that leverage is low when states
possess said bargaining power and “can
weather Western punitive action without
substantial harm.”12 Three major factors
determine the level of leverage the West
yields over a given state: the size and
strength of the state and its economy,
the presence or absence of competing
Western foreign policy objectives, and the
presence or absence of a “countervailing
power,” or, what Gary Hufbauer terms,
a “black knight.” A black knight is a
great, non-U.S. power that provides
alternative support to a country (much
like Russia does to Belarus) and, in doing
so, diminishes the effects of Western
democratizing pressure. Functioning on
its own, leverage has “rarely translated
into effective democratizing pressure”
because of its conditional application and
its inattention to non-electoral markers of
democracy, such as civil liberties.13

In light of this limitation, Levitsky and
Way describe a second factor, linkage,
which “is central to understanding
why international pressure successfully
generates democratization in some cases
but not others.”14 Linkage is the density
of economic, political, social, diplomatic,
geographic, and organizational ties,
as well as the “cross-border flows” of
capital, people, information, and goods
and services” between a state and the
United States or the European Union.15
This affects the degree of international
attention to autocratic abuses, increasing
the likelihood of Western response to
these abuses, fostering powerful domestic
actors who are invested in good Western
relations, and changing the domestic
balance-of-power within authoritarian
regimes, or making Western-supporting
opposition parties more powerful vis-à-
vis the autocratic incumbents.16 Linkage
is an especially powerful determinant of
democratization because it “operates
through domestic actors.”17 When
“economic elites, politicians... and
voters” in highly-linked states believe they
“have something to lose from international
isolation,” highly-linked governments that
violate democratic norms are vulnerable
to a “double boomerang effect” by which
autocratic abuse induces repercussion
from both international and domestic
actors.18 In this way, linkage plays a
“critical role” in democratization.19

To synthesize linkage and leverage,
Levitsky and Way provide a set of
predictions for democratization outcomes
that result from different combinations
of high and low linkage and leverage in
each of the four possible outcomes. In
countries where both linkage and leverage
are high, such as Albania, there will be
“consistent and intense democratizing
pressure.” When the West is highly
linked to a country but can exert only low
leverage, as is the case in Mexico because
of its large economy, the democratizing
pressure will be “consistent but diffuse
and indirect,” though “nevertheless
considerable.” In many sub-Saharan
African countries where linkage is low
but leverage is high, due in large part
to weak economies, pressure can be
significant but also “limited and sporadic,”
focused mainly on producing multiparty
elections but turning a blind eye to many

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other autocratic abuses. Finally, when both linkage and leverage are low, as exemplified by Russia, external pressure is minimal and weak. Punitive action, in these cases, is insignificant.20

Classifying Regime Type in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan: A Historical Review

Freedom House classifies Kyrgyzstan as a “semi-consolidated authoritarian regime,” though scholars and observers refer to the country as a “liberal outlier” in the context of its “consolidated authoritarian regime” neighbors of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.21 22 Kyrgyzstan’s growing recognition as a non-authoritarian state has its roots in post-Soviet independence but has increased substantially in recent years.23 Nevertheless, the country’s relationship with democracy has been troubled. Though the country permitted the growth of civil society and non-governmental organizations and liberalized in the early 1990s, Askar Akayev, the first president of Kyrgyzstan, steered the country toward authoritarianism in the late 1990s when he began to falsify election results and repress political opponents.24 25 Akayev was ousted in March 2005 during the Tulip Revolution by groups opposed to his increasing centralization of power.26 His successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, was later ousted in 2010 after securing a new presidential term in a flawed election.27 While these ousters in and of themselves already suggest the presence of democratic values and institutions in Kyrgyzstan, the post-Bakiyev government formalized them in a new constitution, which increased parliamentary powers and imposed presidential term limits. In 2011, Kyrgyzstan hosted its first truly competitive elections and became “the first country in Central Asia to transfer political power by means of elections.”28 Since then, the new parliamentary system has functioned peacefully under President Almazbek Atambayev.29

In 2013, Freedom House classified Kyrgyzstan as “partly free” with a freedom rating of 5.0 (on a scale of 1.0 to 7.0 where 7.0 is the least free). Kyrgyzstan is the only partly free state in Central Asia and has the best freedom rating in the region.30 Freedom House’s Nations in Transit report concludes that the post-2010 parliament can “conduct meaningful political debates around issues of national concern.”31 Civil society in Kyrgyzstan is “vibrant and diverse,” with NGOs collaborating with the government and sparking discussion on human rights.32 The mass media in Kyrgyzstan is generally free. The government occasionally attempts to ban “extremist content,” though this trend has been decreasing since 2010.33 Currently, one of the largest problems facing Kyrgyzstan’s democratization prospects is ethnic violence between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks in the southern regions of the country. This antipathy may be rooted in a decades-old decision by Joseph Stalin to divide the fertile Fergana Valley among Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, leaving behind “an ethnic patchwork.”34 In 2010, the ouster of President Bakiyev triggered violence in the city of Osh which killed over 200 Uzbeks, a minority that comprises nearly 15% of Kyrgyzstan’s total population. According to UN reports, the conflict displaced nearly 400,000 Uzbeks.35 To date, the government has not initiated any programs to reconcile interethnic tensions. In fact, the government still conceals a great deal of information surrounding the conflict, especially regarding the involvement of Kyrgyz soldiers and police.36 In a slight show of progress, however, the Kyrgyz-language newspaper Aalam began printing some Uzbek-language issues in March 2013.37

Conversely, Uzbekistan has followed a more stable post-Soviet political trajectory, though one that is laden with human rights abuses and high levels of corruption. Professor Gregory Gleason writes that, in Uzbekistan, “the transfer of power from the Soviet elite to the national elite was mainly a matter of changing the names on the office doors.”38 Indeed, former party boss Islam Karimov has ruled Uzbekistan since 1991 and remains a strong, nationalist dictator to this day.39 He won the presidency by popular election on December 29, 1991 with an alleged 88% of the vote, though political opponents and observers largely discredit this claim.40 As early as 1992, Karimov assumed control over a
By The Numbers: How Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and the West Are (and Are Not) Linked

To quantitatively determine the extent to which a country has high or low linkage to the West, Levitsky and Way test four components of linkage: economic ties, social ties, communication ties, and intergovernmental ties. After testing each of the four components of linkage, Levitsky and Way assign the country a score for each component based on its “ranking relative to all non-Western countries in the world.” The researchers then total the country’s scores and recalibrate them on a scale of 0.0 to 1.0. The exact methodology by which Levitsky and Way recalculate these scores is absent from the book. To determine the relative level of linkage in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, this paper will therefore test the four components of linkage for not just these two Central Asian countries, but also for Mexico, a country Levitsky and Way identify as “high linkage,” and Cambodia, a “low linkage” country. The comparison between Kyrgyzstan’s and Uzbekistan’s economic, social, communication, and intergovernmental ties with the West and Mexico’s and Cambodia’s same ties with the West will suggest whether Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have high or low linkage.

Levitsky and Way measure economic ties by a country’s “extent of trade” (defined as imports and exports as a portion of GDP) between 1990 and 2000 with the United States and the pre-2004 European Union member countries. During this time, the average number of exports and imports between Mexico and the United States totaled $132.116 billion United States dollars. The average GDP for Mexico over the same time period was $375.8 billion U.S.D. So, Mexico’s extent of trade with the United States was 35%. Mexico’s extent of trade with the European Union was 3.45%. The 35% figure is indicative of Mexico’s high Western linkage, while the 3.45% figure is low and indicative mostly of geography. Cambodia’s extent of trade with the United States, by contrast, was 2.98%. Its extent of trade with the European Union was 1.9%. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan’s extent of trade with the United States and the European Union was 2.4% and 3.26%, respectively. Uzbekistan’s extent of trade with the United States was .58% and its extent of trade with the European Union was 5.8%. Kyrgyzstan’s and Uzbekistan’s extents of trade with the United States and the European Union do not come close to the figures of a high linkage country, demonstrated by Mexico’s 35% extent of U.S. trade. Instead, they more closely approximate the trade figures associated with Cambodia, a “low-linkage” country, indicating the weak economic ties between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and the United States and the European Union are associated with these states’ low linkage to the West.

Social ties are determined by the “average annual number of a country’s citizens traveling to or living in” the West between 1990 and 2000 “as a share of total country population.” For this period of time, the average number of
Mexican citizens who travelled to the United States for business or pleasure per year was 2,020,057, and the average number of Mexican citizens legally admitted for residence per year was 314,018.62 As a proportion of Mexico’s average population, 2% of Mexican citizens were travelling to the United States annually and .3% was legally admitted for residence annually.64 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security did not report the numbers of Cambodians or Kyrgyz travelling to the United States between 1990 and 2000 because the numbers were inconsequential.65 During this time, about .0002% of Cambodians and about .00005% of Kyrgyz population were admitted for legal residence in the U.S.66 67 68 The portions of Uzbekistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s populations travelling and immigrating to the United States in the 1990s resemble the figures from Cambodia and are far lower than the figures from highly-linked Mexico.

Levitsky and Way measure communication ties by the “per capita average annual international voice traffic” between 1993 and 2000 and the “per capita average annual Internet access” between 1995 and 2000.71 In Mexico, the per capita average annual Internet access per 100 people was 2.6 people.72 The average international annual voice traffic, measured in minutes per person, was 41.96 minutes.73 Cambodia’s average per capita annual Internet access remained at 0.0 until 2001, when .1 people in every 100 had access to the Internet.74 Between 1995 and 2000, each person in Cambodia used an annual average of 2.28 international telephone minutes (data are not available before 1995).75 In Kyrgyzstan, .55 of every 100 people had Internet access between 1998 and 2000 (data are not available before 1998).76 Kyrgyz people used an average of 12.1385 minutes on international phone calls each year between 1995 (when the data is first available) and 2000.77 An average of .083 of every 100 Uzbeks had Internet access each year between 1995 (when the data is first available) and 2000.78 79 Once again, Levitsky and Way believe determines international democratizing pressure is Western leverage. They identify three separate and discrete categories of leverage: low leverage, medium leverage, and high

Western Leverage: The Case for Uzbekistan

The second factor that Levitsky and Way believe determines international democratizing pressure is Western leverage. They identify three separate and discrete categories of leverage: low leverage, medium leverage, and high
leverage. Low leverage countries have large economies, are major oil producers, or have nuclear weapons. Medium leverage countries have medium-sized economies, produce secondary levels of oil, receive black knight assistance, or have competing security issues for the West. High-leverage countries meet none of these criteria.83 These criteria are not scored relative to other non-Western countries and all, except for competing security issues, are measured with data from the 1990s.

In current United States dollars, Kyrgyzstan’s GDP in 1995 was $1,661,018,519 compared with Uzbekistan’s $13,350,461,533 GDP.84 Neither of these economies classifies as “large,” $100 billion total GDP in 1995, or “medium,” total GDP between $50 billion U.S.D. and $100 billion U.S.D. Kyrgyzstan produced 2,000 barrels of crude oil a day in 1995 – certainly not a major or secondary oil producer (producing more than one million barrels of crude oil a day or between 200,000 and one million barrels of crude oil a day, respectively).85 Uzbekistan was producing 115,000 barrels of oil a day in 1995.86 This figure is 885,000 barrels a day short of that of a major oil producer and does not quite make the cutoff for a “secondary oil producer.” Neither Uzbekistan nor Kyrgyzstan possessed nuclear weapons during the 1990s nor possess nuclear weapons today.87 For these reasons, Uzbekistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s economies, oil production, and nuclear weapons capacity do not qualify the states as “low leverage.” Further, their economies and oil production are not substantial enough to classify as “medium leverage,” though Uzbekistan’s oil production is significantly higher than Kyrgyzstan’s. Uzbekistan’s higher oil production might put the country somewhere between a “low” and “medium” leverage classification if the categories existed on a scale, but, because they are discrete, it is necessary to classify Uzbekistan as strictly “low leverage” in terms of oil production.

Black Knight assistance might also qualify a country as “medium leverage.” To determine Black Knight assistance, the country must have received enough bilateral aid in 1995 to comprise one percent of its GDP and “the overwhelming dominant share” of this aid must have come from a major non-U.S. or non-E.U. power (China, Japan, or Russia). In 1995, Kyrgyzstan’s foreign aid comprised 21% of its total GDP.88 89 About 7% of the aid came from the U.S., 13% came from Japan, and .2% came from France. Non-Development Assistance Committee countries (including Russia and China) donated a total of 2.3% of the aid.90 While Japan donated more than the United States, none of these countries contributed to an “overwhelming” share of aid. Uzbekistan’s aid in 1995 comprised about 3.6% of its total GDP.91 92 The United States donated 2% of this aid, Japan donated 31%, France donated 9%, and non-Development Assistance Committee countries (including Russia and China) received more money from Uzbekistan than they donated.93 Japan’s 31% share is not a majority (over 50%). Further, Japan’s donation in 1995 seems to be an outlier compared with its previous donations of $76,000 U.S. dollars and $2 million U.S. dollars in 1993 and 1994, respectively.94 For these reasons, it neither Kyrgyzstan nor Uzbekistan received Black Knight assistance in the 1990s.

To this point, it has been determined that Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan both have low linkage to the West. Further, neither country has low leverage, is a secondary oil producer, has a medium-sized economy, or receives Black Knight assistance. The final criterion for medium leverage is that there exists a “major security-related foreign-policy issue for the United States and/or the E.U.” in the state.95 During the 1990s, “the Central Asian states remained a low foreign policy priority for the United States and Europe.”96 This changed after the attacks of September 11th and the subsequent U.S. decision to launch Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.97 Uzbekistan was the first Central Asian post-Soviet state to offer its support, and it signed an agreement with the United States in October 2011 to grant basing rights to U.S. forces at the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) facility.98 In December 2001, Kyrgyzstan and the United States agreed to “establish a coalition airbase at Manas” near the capital city of Bishkek.99

While both of these states proved
useful for United States foreign policy objectives, the literature demonstrates that Uzbekistan has been much more central to the West’s goals. Alexander Cooley notes, first, that Uzbekistan was “the most eager” Central Asian country to join the War on Terror, likely because Uzbekistan has struggled with Islamic insurgence in its backyard for decades.100 Based on the October 2011 agreement, the United States could station up to 1,500 troops at Karshi-Khanabad which was located a mere 90 miles from the border with Afghanistan.101 Further, German troops have maintained a base in the city of Termez in southern Uzbekistan that is “the main forward staging facility for German troops in Afghanistan.” Around 300 German soldiers live at Termez along with five CH-53 Stallion helicopters and seven C-160 transport planes.102

Meanwhile, Russia responded to the United States’ presence in Kyrgyzstan by establishing its own base a year later in Kant, a city only twenty kilometers away from Manas. After this, Kyrgyzstan became the first country to host both Russian and U.S. military bases.103 Kyrgyzstan also has had a history of taking advantage of the United States’ presence for its own economic gains, demanding as much as $200 million U.S. dollars in rent.104 Finally, the United States presence in Kyrgyzstan is continually “challenged,” and the country does not support U.S. presence in Iraq as Uzbekistan does.105 106 The United States has sought bases in Tajikistan and Mongolia to replace its presence in Kyrgyzstan.107

Alternatively, in 2005, the United States was kicked out of the K2 military base in Uzbekistan after its eventual negative response to the Andijan massacre.108 However, the United States government still provides “non-weapons grade military equipment” to secure its route to Afghanistan despite this international fallout and abuse of human rights, and in 2008 some United States forces were allowed into Uzbekistan through the German base at Termez. Many experts believe this suggests that the United States and Uzbekistan security relationship is “deepening.”109 110 For these reasons, it is obvious that the United States’ partnership with Uzbekistan has been more strategic and essential than its relationship with Kyrgyzstan, which is comparatively lukewarm and, apparently, replaceable. In Levitsky and Way’s terms, it can be said that Uzbekistan hosts a major “security-related foreign-policy issue for the United States” and for the European Union, as evidenced by Germany’s presence, in a way that Kyrgyzstan does not.111 Because of this, Uzbekistan is vulnerable only to medium Western leverage and Kyrgyzstan, meeting none of the low- or medium- criteria, is vulnerable to high Western leverage, having less bargaining power vis-à-vis the West.

Testing the Test: How Linkage and Leverage Hold Up

Because linkage is low in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, this case study offers the opportunity to observe how leverage functions independently of linkage to bring about regime outcomes. In this case, it appears that lower level of leverage in Uzbekistan may, in fact, work not just to hinder democracy, but to enable autocracy. Indeed, researcher Enayatollah Yazdani writes that U.S. policies in Central Asia have often “not had a positive impact on democratic reforms” and have, instead “helped the leaders to establish monopoly on power.”112

The key position of Uzbekistan as a military ally to the United States illustrates this point. After the United

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States began occupying the K2 base, Karimov began “to backslide on its democratic commitments” without any consequence. Karimov extended his Presidential term in 2002 and, in the same year, the Uzbek security forces arrested and tortured hundreds of suspects in their prisons. Many believe that “Karimov violated democratic norms” because he calculated “that the U.S. would not denounce these actions in order to maintain its base access.”

The Andijan massacre proved a test of the United States balance-of-interests in Uzbekistan. The U.S. eventually denounced the Uzbek actions, though only after U.S. officials “refused to issue a joint communique calling for an international investigation” out of fear that “the Uzbek authorities might... restrict military operations.” After the eventual denouncement of Andijan, the Uzbeks evicted the Americans from K2, though evidence now abounds that the two parties are beginning to cooperate once again. In this way, Uzbekistan has not only resisted democratizing pressure by maintaining bargaining power vis-à-vis the West; this bargaining power has enabled Uzbekistan’s autocracy.

Because Kyrgyzstan, a high-leverage country, has less bargaining power vis-à-vis the West, it follows that the country would have a more democratic outcome. This is the case when comparing Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan. The West does not enable autocratic regimes in Kyrgyzstan because Kyrgyzstan is not as strategic to Western interests. Further, the democratizing pressure that the West puts on Kyrgyzstan is relatively insubstantial and fleeting because of its low linkage. The 2005 Tulip Revolution supports this prediction. The extent of the United States’ involvement in the revolution and ouster of Akayev is contested; nevertheless, any involvement was certainly minimal, and the revolution did not firmly solidify democratic institutions.

"While the theory predicts low democratizing pressure in the case of a country like Uzbekistan, which is vulnerable only to low leverage vis-à-vis the West, it ignores the fact that, in low leverage countries, the West does not simply exert low democratic pressure; rather, it can enable and even actively promote the existence of an autocracy."

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leverage, Western democratizing pressure would be “often strong, but intermittent” pressure, making democracy unlikely but not impossible. In Kyrgyzstan, the regime is relatively democratic today, but has seen tendencies toward autocracy under Presidents Akayev and Bakiyev. These outcomes square well with Levitsky and Way’s predictions. However, Kyrgyzstan has been more democratic than its neighbors since its first day of independence before the mid-1990s Western pressure took hold, and Levitsky and Way’s theory cannot explain this finding. In Uzbekistan, a country with low linkage and “medium” leverage, the table would predict that democratizing pressure would fall somewhere between the pressure identified for Kyrgyzstan and “weak external pressure” that is predicted of countries with low leverage and low linkage.121 In Uzbekistan, low leverage and low linkage would lead to a more likely failure of democratization.122 This is certainly the case, as Uzbekistan has remained one of the most repressive regimes in the world since its independence. More than preventing democratization, though, the Uzbek case suggests that low leverage may even lead to the promotion of autocracy. These cases do not refute Levitsky and Way’s theory. On the contrary, they support the theory’s predictions. However, the case of Uzbekistan highlights a shortcoming in the theory. While it predicts low democratizing pressure in the case of a country like Uzbekistan, which is vulnerable only to low leverage vis-à-vis the West, it ignores the fact that, in low leverage countries, the West does not simply exert low democratic pressure; rather, it can enable and even actively promote the existence of an autocracy.

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16. Ibid., 60

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following an atrocity, it is nearly impossible to return to normalcy. Despite the sincerest efforts of governmental and non-governmental organizations alike, careful plans to atone for and recover completely from past grievances rarely work. Nuremberg opted for trials, Turkey for reparations to Armenians, and South Africa for a truth commission. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), whose hearings begun officially in 1996, is the iconic example of a truth commission. Despite constant praise for the commission from scholars and members of the international community, certain victims of apartheid found the TRC more harmful than helpful, mainly because the TRC, in short, failed in its promise to achieve the true reconciliation it claimed it could.

The body of this paper is divided into five sections, each with relevant subsections when necessary: 1) brief history of apartheid and conditions that brought about a need for the TRC, 2) explanation of what the TRC and its goals were, 3) what government reports and official literature claimed the TRC accomplished, 4) what public opinion and victim reports claimed the TRC accomplished, and 5) a synthesis of these two conclusions, understood in the larger context of what the TRC was supposed to do. The literature review occurs in between sections 2 and 3. The section on public opinion, which represents the crux of my argument, argues that the four major complaints victims had about the TRC are as follows: too much perpetrator (read: the National Party government and its affiliates) involvement, lack of attention to racial tensions, detrimental effects of traumatic event recall, and lack of a support system to deal with the aftermath.

Why the TRC?
A Brief History of Apartheid

As the timeline below underscores, South Africa has a long legacy of British forces seizing the government, interspersed with fear of uprisings and overthrow by rightfully angry black South Africans. In 1948, the Afrikaner National Party took control of the government. Some scholars argue that the combination of these two insecurities — inferiority to the British and fear of overthrow by the black majority — led the National Party to act so aggressively and decisively. The emergence of the National Party set off the era of apartheid, which gripped South Africa from 1948 to 1994. Afrikaners, descendants of the early Dutch/Boer residents of the area, spearheaded the movement. Apartheid, a historically Afrikaans word meaning “separateness,” euphemized a social engineering scheme. Hendrik Verwoerd was responsible for constructing the term and its initial spread when he was a sociology professor at the University of Stellenbosch. Verwoerd, the future Prime Minister of South Africa, taught apartheid as a sociological concept. He claimed because those who were not white had fewer opportunities and “naturally worse skill sets,” the government should fast-track them to lower stations in life. This would deny them the hope that they could escape their predestined lifestyles and protect them from being disappointed when they could not do so, Verwoerd claimed. Apartheid, as Verwoerd put it, was merely a policy of “good neighborliness.”

Once Verwoerd’s National Party

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on what they looked like, they could apply to become a member of a more privileged class. This begs the question of the validity of these classifications at all, if they were purported to be biological but could be changed through the completion of a few forms and acceptance by government officials. In some cases, there were even families in which both the parents had the same classification, but because of historical racial intermixing during colonialism, had children of a different pigment, and the children were then classified as a different race than the parents and received fewer privileges.6

Those of a lesser racial standing, derogatorily called “non-whites,” were structurally discriminated against for the latter half of the twentieth century. Non-whites were denied jobs, streamlined into technical schools instead of being provided opportunities for “academic” education, and forced to carry dompas identification books that prohibited them from entering certain areas.7 8 During apartheid, the state of South Africa committed a multitude of egregious race-related crimes.

Apartheid rule officially ended in April of 1994, following a series of negotiations between the National Party government and the African National Congress (ANC). The importance of these negotiations was such that even Nelson Mandela, the former ANC leader, participated, despite still being in jail for his anti-apartheid activism. Mandela and then-President of South Africa, F.W. de Klerk, jointly received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993 for their commitment to eradicate apartheid.9

On April 27, 1994, Nelson Mandela was elected the first President of South Africa in the country’s first democratic election.10

Though apartheid fell in 1994, the first national recovery process, the TRC, did not begin until 1996. The decision to host a truth commission and engage in restorative justice angered some, who would have preferred a more retributive-justice-oriented solution.11 South Africa chose to avoid the “Nuremberg option” for a few key reasons:

1) No one could enact “victors’
justice” because no victors had emerged; even though apartheid rule was over, Black Africans were now in power alongside former apartheid-era Whites.

2) The former governmental officials would not have agreed to democracy had they thought they would be immediately tried and punished.

3) South Africa did not have the “time, money and personnel” to “invest in such an operation.”

4) On a subjective level, the government ruled that “such legal proceedings are also harrowing experiences for victims, who are invariably put through extensive cross-examination.”

This last point is contentious because it could easily be argued that truth commissions and the trauma they bring when victims must retell their stories is equally as damaging.

While not listed in the same section of the TRC report as the aforementioned reasons, it is important here to also explain the southern African concept of Ubuntu, a Nguni-Bantu term that translates to “human-ness,” often paraphrased as “I am, because we are.” This idea of togetherness and humanity was often cited as a reason to favor truth commissions over trials — because everyone is equally South African, everyone should be treated as equally South African. Trials enforce one societal sect’s power over another, and South Africa was looking for a way to “transcend the divisions and strife of the past.”

What Was the TRC, Exactly?

The Commission was structured so that survivors and perpetrators alike were eligible to apply to tell their stories. Perpetrators could receive political amnesty and survivors could finally tell their suppressed truths and stories.

The TRC was comprised of three separate committees: Amnesty, Reparation and Rehabilitation (R&R), and Human Rights Violations (HRV).

Survivors could apply to tell their stories and perpetrators could apply for amnesty, with the committee usually only holding hearings for high-profile or extreme cases. Those who acknowledged their wrong-doings would be granted amnesty and would not be formally punished by law, as long as they proved that they had been following orders and would not have committed such atrocious acts outside of such a specific context. 21,519 survivors submitted “statements to the TRC, but only 1,800 [were] chosen to appear for public hearings,” meaning that only 8.6 percent of survivors were able to share their stories. Few amnesty applications were addressed either; while “approximately 7,116 people applied for amnesty from the TRC, … only 1,167 amnesties were granted.” While only 16.4 percent of perpetrators received amnesty, this percentage is still double the 8.6 percent of survivor applications accepted for hearings. The TRC did not attend to all of its applications, but of the ones it did, most were perpetrator applications, bolstering the argument from survivors that the TRC favored perpetrators. The provisions available for both perpetrators and survivors, though, demonstrate the TRC’s desire to appeal to South Africa at large. The TRC, as defined officially by its creators, “was set up by the Government of National Unity to help the country deal with the aftermath of apartheid. The conflict during this period resulted in violence and human rights abuses from all sides.”
locations; the hearings were “held in large cities or small rural towns, in city halls or educational institutions or church halls.” By holding hearings in places accessible to most South Africans, the TRC implied reconciliation for most South Africans would occur as well.

Literature Review

Many authors have attempted to analyze the TRC, with their conclusions falling into three categories: those acknowledging positive aspects of the TRC but expressing frustration with negative aspects, those weighing positive and negative aspects of the TRC equally, and those claiming the TRC was iconic and overwhelmingly positive.

Priscilla Hayner is considered the leading scholar on truth commissions, and her work is cited in most related scholarly articles. She opens the conversation with her iconic book Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions. In the text, Hayner describes the histories, controversies, successes, and failures of 40 different truth commissions, beginning with Uganda in 1974 and ending with Kenya in 2009. Of all the truth commissions Hayner discusses in Unspeakable Truths, the one she dedicates the most time to is South Africa’s. She conducted ample research on the TRC and synthesized the work of many other researchers, concluding that “the majority of deponents had either a negative or an ambivalent reaction.”

Hayner’s stance is firm, but some went even farther on the negative end of the spectrum than she.

Researcher Anurima Bhargava in her text Defining Political Crimes: A Case Study of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission agrees with Hayner’s distaste for certain aspects of the TRC, though she chooses to focus specifically on the improper definition of political crimes. Bhargava contends that the TRC’s definition of “political crimes” was too narrow, which “impair[ed] the very goals of the process, [and] the resulting incoherence of the Committee’s decisions also cast a shadow upon the moral and legal legitimacy of the process.”

Bhargava extrapolates her frustrations concerning a small part of the TRC to be representative of a larger problem, calling into question the merit of the program as a whole, a viewpoint scholar Elizabeth Stanley agrees with.

Stanley, in her piece Evaluating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, takes a bolder and more combative stance than either Hayner or Bhargava, claiming that post-TRC, “group identities and status have not moved on, those who hold power have neatly managed their representations. Accounts related to the Commission may have brought cases of individual reconciliation and questioned traditional stereotypes, but collectively, nothing much has changed.” The TRC, according to Stanley, failed at the one thing it tried to do: reconcile the problems of apartheid.

Alex Boraine, deputy chair of the TRC and author of A Country Unmasked: Inside South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, provides a corollary to Hayner’s findings, reminding readers that the National Party’s remaining involvement in South African politics hindered its punishment. Their continued presence meant that “the options available to the incoming government were limited,” so critics must show mercy in their judgments concerning the outcome of the TRC.

Boraine argues that the TRC “should not be seen as a necessary evil, a second-best choice, when prosecution and general amnesty are politically problematic. It provided the only justice available in the context of a traumatic transition.” Boraine is correct in this statement and his later assertion that “the wounds on the body politic in South Africa go very deep and will take effort and time to heal. Reconciliation must be sought, encouraged, and nurtured at every level society.”

When Boraine wrote the book in 2000, not enough time had passed since the advent of the TRC that he could write about its long-term accomplishments, so while he suggests that the TRC still has much to do, he cannot evaluate what it has done.

Unlike Boraine, Bronwyn Leebaw was not an active participant in the TRC, so her book Judging State-Sponsored Violence, Imagining Political Change includes only a short section on the TRC. Despite its brevity, she effectively summarizes popular critiques of the TRC, such as its inability to hear the stories
of as many victims as it should have. She concludes that “South Africa’s TRC has become an extraordinarily influential model for those who champion restorative justice. These institutions are widely viewed as inspiration for today’s international criminal tribunals and truth commissions.” Leeuw summarizes much of what non-South Africans believe about the TRC, namely that it is a model of a truth commission. Former Minister of Education in South Africa Kader Asmal echoes Leeuw’s broad assertion, affirming that “in international debates over transitional justice, the South African experiment is increasingly seen as a rich and complex model from which much can be learned, whatever its inevitable flaws.” Asmal greatly respects the work of the TRC, though is pointedly aware of its flaws. Scholars such as Annelies Verdoolaege and Paul Kerstens have used the TRC as a model against which to analyze other truth commissions because “it has been considered fairly successful” and it is their opinion that using the TRC as a comparative factor “can only help the world’s experience in implementing conflict-resolving initiatives.” Verdoolaege and Kerstens champion the benefits of the TRC, perpetuating the public opinion that the TRC is a restorative justice beacon from which to draw counsel.

This literature review hardly scratches the surface of what could be said about the effectiveness of the TRC, but, frankly, not much scholarship about the TRC’s impact exists. These texts were selected to represent a variety of opinions about the effectiveness of the TRC and the well-respected nature of the scholars writing about them. Ultimately, further research on the topic of the TRC’s effectiveness — especially its long-term effectiveness — is necessary because the majority of sources this paper employs are informal or journalistic because of the dearth of existent scholarship. I personally encourage the reading of informal and journalistic sources, because I find they have done more on-the-ground research, which is of paramount importance when attempting to unearth the voices of the oppressed, who can be voiceless unless sought out because they have no means of spreading their stories.

The Government’s TRC

Except the official TRC report — which spans seven volumes and thousands of pages — little official, government-sponsored literature exists regarding the outcome of the TRC. Volume Five, Chapters Six and Nine (“Findings and Conclusions” and “Reconciliation,” respectively) of the official Truth and Reconciliation Report of South Africa offer the most insight about the government’s opinion of the outcome of the TRC. This report stands as a solid analysis of the government’s assessment of TRC because the Commission was created out of the South African “Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995,” so the government is inherently linked to the creation of the TRC.

The Commission refers to its “success” in the report, linking its success to “the fact that large numbers of security police members grasped at the possibility of amnesty in exchange for full disclosure.” This paints the TRC’s mission — and reason for its purported success — as “full disclosure,” suggesting that the number one objective of the TRC was truth, not truth and reconciliation. This negligence of reconciliation renders any claims of success only half-full; the commission is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, after all.

Furthermore, while the report states that the “Commission also faced a number of legal challenges, which it met successfully,” it offers no evidence in the following sentences as to how it met these challenges successfully. The frequency with which it blatantly credits its own success or describes how something it did changed South Africa for the better are few; though, the TRC spends thousands of pages listing case after case of individual scenarios it resolved. The report does not explicitly state that the TRC did a good job by hearing cases, but the sheer multitude of completed cases suggests the Commission was proud of itself for finishing all these hearings.

The international community recognized the TRC as a success. Not only does the usage of the TRC as the critical example of truth commissions speak volumes to its worldwide reception, but it is even referred to as successful in
the Encyclopedia Britannica: “Despite these challenges and limitations, the TRC was internationally regarded as successful and showed the importance of public participation in such processes, including the initial decision-making process leading up to the establishment of a truth commission.”33 The TRC’s easy acceptance in the international body proves how supportive the government was of the Commission’s success, that it publicized it to the world.

The People’s TRC
Contrary to the more positive government reception, the people of South Africa were not always so fond of the TRC. A few key complaints shone through: too much perpetrator involvement, lack of attention to racial tensions, the detrimental effects of traumatic event recall, and the absence of a support system to deal with the aftermath.

Too Much Perpetrator Involvement
Post-atrocity justice and reconciliation in South Africa was commonly understood and expected to be victim-centered.34 South Africa’s procedure of hosting an amnesty-friendly commission contradicted this fundamental aspect of truth commissions for many, because it made the process seem perpetrator-centered as opposed to victim-centered. Regrettably, “many black South Africans have been left feeling that apologies are not enough. Many are angry that the perpetrators of human rights abuse under South Africa’s former government can be granted amnesty if they make a full confession of their crimes.”35 It does not help that the word “amnesty” most closely translates to “forgiveness” in many native South Africans languages, implying that evil-doers are forgiven by the state without necessarily having shown any remorse.36

The mere existence of amnesty, to some, is a continuation of apartheid’s favoring wrong-doers. In fact, one study found “there was a perception that perpetrators have been rewarded by the system and are still benefiting from the rewards (e.g. pensions, amnesty, etc.) and that the victims are still suffering the effects of apartheid.”37 With a mentality like this in place, it appears to victims that the TRC is perpetuating the negative power structures in place since apartheid’s genesis.

The TRC’s leniency towards perpetrators was only exacerbated by the opinion that the Commission “did not do enough to encourage or even coerce most of the perpetrators to come forward.”38 It also neglected to use its subpoena and search and seizure rights in many circumstances, to “avoid upsetting various parties,” such as the time it neglected to issue a subpoena against “minister of home affairs and Inkatha Freedom Party president Mangosuthu Buthelezi, a decision based largely on the commission’s fear of a possible violent reaction.”39 40 If the Commission was not encouraging those who did wrong to own up to what they did and atone for it, what was the point of a reconciliation commission at all? Reconciliation cannot be achieved if wrongdoers do not acknowledge their actions.

Lack of Attention to Racial Tensions
This section addresses the failure of the Commission to pay due attention to the racial tensions existent during apartheid, and their role as the impetus of apartheid. Many victims felt as though race was glossed over as a motive
during TRC hearings. This is reflected in the earlier assertion that the percentage of perpetrators who received amnesty was double the percentage of victims who received hearings, and because the perpetrators of apartheid were largely white, this reinforced racial stratifications.

Despite the White favoritism present in the TRC, the majority of the perpetrators who applied for amnesty were Black, which led to criticisms from the survivor community. As one study found, the absence of white people both at the hearings and from many other TRC related activities was viewed by many as indicating a lack of interest on their part. The perception came across that blacks and whites are still living in separate worlds. This perception is based on the belief by many victims that white people are, by and large, the main perpetrators of violations by virtue of being beneficiaries of the apartheid system. (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Khulumani Support Group) In fact, although white people were the majority of the perpetrators, 80 percent of the people that applied for amnesty were white.41

According to Mathatha Tsedu, political editor of The Sowetan, a black South African newspaper, this stems from a misunderstanding about the purpose of the TRC. Tsedu explained that “Black people are the sufferers here … they saw the TRC as a mechanism to try to deal with that pain. White people have so much to hide about what they have been doing all along and they saw the TRC as some kind of witch hunt and therefore didn’t go.”42 Perhaps the issue was that the TRC was not properly explained at its beginning, so it did not get the enthusiastic participation it needed from the white community.

### Detrimental Effects of Traumatic Event Recall

While the truth-telling was designed as an emotional release to cope with the grievances apartheid brought, it opened old wounds for some that proved more detrimental than helpful. Marius Schoon, an anti-apartheid activist whose wife and daughter were killed by a letter bomb in 1984, regretted learning the name of the man who destroyed his family:

"I never really wanted to find out who sent or planted the bomb. I would prefer to hate a system rather than people, and as far as I was concerned the security forces of the National Party were responsible. That was enough for me. … [Since] I heard [Craig] Williamson [a spy for the apartheid government] was involved, it has been anything but reconciliatory for me in that things I had come to terms with, however ineptly, are suddenly very much in the forefront of my mind again. Now it's personal. There's a good chance I might actually shoot him. *(quoted, Hayner 153)*

While Schoon did not follow through on his threat to eliminate his family’s murderer, his emotion is palpable. The new information hurt him as much as the initial information did. Schoon certainly cannot be the only victim to react so violently to discovery of truth. Had reactions like Schoon’s taken place on a larger scale, the eruption of violence could destroy an already-fragile society, rendering the truth commission process, at times, unsafe.

Some reactions are not quite as aggressive as Schoon’s, but still decry a life uprooted by the TRC. For Margaret Nangalembe, a mother from the Johannesburg township of Sebokeng, legitimate physical symptoms of trauma reoccurred after she gave testimony about a massacre that occurred in her community. “My life has deteriorated since the hearing,” she said, describing an onslaught of physical symptoms, such as dizziness, headache, sleeplessness, and fatigue when she first re-watched the massacre on television.43 Though Nangalembe’s post-TRC trauma was not as societally threatening as Schoon’s, its similarity in reaction to his verifies the commonality of their experience. An anonymous participant from Johannesburg echoed this sentiment in a study commissioned by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, describing a sense of disappointment when the truth hurt more than it helped:

"When I went to the TRC I thought we would see a big change in our lives. We thought we would feel better after telling people our stories but we were wrong. Our health
deteriorated after the testimonies and it brought us more pain. We knew the people who killed our husbands and we thought after we had met them there would be a big change or difference in our lives but we were wrong, we saw no change.” (Picker 6)

As this participant explains, perhaps the most disappointing part is the elevated sense of peace people expect following truth commissions and the crippling frustration when that does not occur.

Sometimes, though, for those with the ability to quickly process their emotions, traumatic event recall, while painful, can be very helpful; a cursory analysis of the reactions of the mothers of the Gugulethu Seven reveals as much. One of the most prolific cases of police brutality during apartheid was the slaying of the Gugulethu Seven. The case was reviewed by the TRC, with the mothers of the slain men invited to attend. In the middle of the hearing, the mother of victim Godfrey Jabulani Miya began shrieking and crying, then ran out of the hearing room, with other mothers quickly and as disruptively following suit. The mass exodus of these seven women upon having to recall their sons’ early and unjust deaths clearly indicates their discomfort and emotional pain. While this would seem like a count against truth commissions, the facilitators of that day’s hearing checked back in with Miya’s mother following her drastic exit from the room. Later in the day, she had processed the event, calmed down, and was grateful the TRC gave her a chance to constructively channel her anger about what had happened.

While Miya’s mother walked away from the TRC with an ultimately positive outlook on the program, she seems to be the exception rather than the rule. For many, the lurching return of old ghosts caused more emotional harm than good.

Lack of a Support System to Deal with Aftermath

This section analyzes the failure of the Commission to set up sufficient resources for survivors who gave testimony to deal with the mental health repercussions of the TRC. Unlike other sub-Saharan African transitional justice programs, like the Tree of Life program in Zimbabwe, South Africa did not put into practice many programs to help apartheid survivors deal with mental health issues that arose in apartheid’s wake. According to Cape Town’s Trauma Center for Victims of Violence and Torture, “50 to 60 percent of the dozens of victims they have talked to in the last year said they suffered difficulties after testifying or expressed regret.” With rates like this, it is clear that many victims did not receive healing benefits from the TRC. The TRC required its participants to expose some of their most painful memories, which they were then inadvertently penalized for doing because such terrible emotions and memories resurfaced and they were given no way to recover from that.

Perhaps one of the best explanations of this phenomenon comes from Reverend Michael Lapsey, who compares the vulnerability of a truth commission to public nudity:

"If you have a physical wound, you take off the bandage, clean the wound, and re-bandage it. But people take their clothes off in front of the truth commission and don’t get an adequate opportunity to put their clothes back on…. It is naïve to think that it takes five minutes to heal. We’ll spend the next hundred years trying to heal from our history.” (Hayner 153)

It is important to note here that while the healing process in South Africa was
inadequate, it was not set up to be subpar. The TRC “attempted to set up a system
to refer distressed victims to independent
agencies for support, but this referral
system never functioned well and was
not widely used. In addition, many victims
live far from any city where such services
might be available.”49 Although the TRC
allowed victims to find healing services,
the TRC’s lack of follow-through is almost
insulting.

Furthermore, one of the largest
problems with the TRC is that it did
not follow a healthy reconciliation
process; “psychologists question the
idea of a one-time catharsis resulting
in real psychological healing. In clinical
counseling settings, in fact, most
therapists would avoid pushing someone
to address the worst of their pain too
quickly, especially if it rooted in events
of extreme trauma.”50 Obviously, the
system of stripping down to tell the truth
is inherently flawed. Moreover, “most
interviewers — perhaps lawyers, human
rights advocates, or other laypersons
hired to take testimony — have little or
no training in responding to this level of
trauma.”51 When those giving testimony
are forced to be so vulnerable and those
receiving it are incapable of dealing with
it, it can endanger their mental health.

In addition to mental health services,
some survivors assumed they would
be receiving tangible compensation for
their troubles, wanting, “and indeed expect[ing], concrete help like pensions
and job training. Early on, commission
officials had even said that they could help
victims with immediate personal needs —
medical operations, a leaky roof — but no
assistance has materialized.”52

Truth and Reconciliation

for Whom?: Conclusion
and Brief Overview of
Possible Solutions

The TRC would have been much
better received had it not set such lofty
goals for itself in idealistic language,
providing hopefuls a dream to latch
onto. It is unrealistic to expect the TRC
to have been an apartheid panacea, nor
did the funding exist for it to even attempt
that, but the way the commission was
structured, including its decision not to
force perpetrators to come forward, to
allow them amnesty, and not to remove
them from office, prevented victims from
trusting in the government’s care for their
well-being.

Twenty years post-apartheid, South
Africa is still riddled with problems. Blacks
have worse housing situations than Whites,53 perform worse in school,54 have higher unemployment rates,55
lower salaries,56 and are more at risk for
sexual assault.57 These problems cannot
be blamed on the failures of the TRC to
equalize South Africa post-apartheid, but
the TRC could have done a better job
to anticipate and address the potential
occurrence of these problems in its
reconciliation section. Using less lofty
vocabulary and setting more realistic
goals would aid this process.

While South Africa still has a long way
to go, it is important to acknowledge that
the TRC was a proactive and progressive
step by the government, which should be
applauded. The TRC turned into the iconic
example of healing processes of its kind,
particularly because it was one of the first
truth commissions in the world to include
so much victim involvement. The TRC left
much to be desired, but, to its credit, its
arbiters dedicated countless hours to its
operation, and should be respected for
that. We must now acknowledge their
hard work, learn from their shortcomings,
attempt to undo the hurts they caused,
and fix the hurts they did not attempt
to. There is nowhere to go from here but
forward.

Endnotes

1. In this paper, the following words should
be understood as such:
Reconciliation: a feeling of return to relative
normalcy following an atrocity. This feeling
cannot be confirmed as existing except by
survivor him- or herself. It is an understand-
ing that while some may not feel back to nor-
mal, they feel as though they can go on with
their day-to-day life without feeling affected.
Furthermore, they are no longer actively an-
gry at arbiters of their oppression, though not
necessarily pleased. It is comparable to the
final stage of the Kübler-Ross model of the
grief process, acceptance.
Repair: The state of things being patched to
the point of function again, on a basic, daily
level. Repair does not require reconciliation
as defined above
“White” vs. “white” and “Black” vs. “black”:
words are lowercase when used as adject-
tives and uppercase when used to refer spe-
cifically to apartheid-classified racial groups.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission: a truth
commission set up by the Government of
National Unity to help deal with the aftermath
of apartheid. The conflict during this period
resulted in violence and human rights abuses

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from all sides.

2. The University of Stellenbosch is located in Stellenbosch, a historically rich, white, Afrikaans city approximately an hour outside of Cape Town known most for its university, claimed to be the best on the African continent, and its wine; Stellenbosch is also the wine capital of Africa. The school has come under critique in recent decades for its social exclusion of women, those outside the gender binary, Black Africans, and non-Afrikaans speakers. Many residents consider it “the last stronghold of Afrikaans” in South Africa.


4. This refers to the Soweto Uprising of 1976, in which the police opened fire on a group of young students peacefully protesting being taught the language of the oppressor in school.

5. Here, “Coloured” refers to anyone who is not purely white or purely black. Unlike America, where the “one-drop” rule exists (meaning one drop of black blood in your body classifies you as black), South African race operates much more on a spectrum. “Coloured” is not an offensive term in South Africa as it is in the United States. It is comparable to our usage of the term “mixed-race.”

6. Mark A. Brooke and Anthony Fabian, Skinning the Elephant: South Africa as it is in the United States. It is comparable to our usage of the term “mixed-race.”


10. To be particular, the way South African democracy works is that the people vote for a party, which then selects a candidate to serve for it if it wins. The winner of the 1994 election was in fact the African National Congress, Mandela’s political party, but he was elected as leader and therefore served as President of South Africa.


12. This statement suggests that trials are only victors’ justice. I do not agree with this claim, nor argue its validity here; I merely intend to paraphrase the official literature put forth by the South African government, and it used the trials-as-victors’-justice excuse.


17. Leebaw 78.


27. Leebaw 85-86.


32. Ibid 204.


34. The International Center for Transitional Justice — South Africa’s website says its


38. Ibid.


42. Barrow.


44. The Gugulethu Seven refers to a group of seven young men from the Black Cape Town township of Gugulethu. They were all shot to death by police officers, and many contend that their death was unprovoked and that the police force staged much of the aftermath and made up cover stories to avoid contracting blame. Further evidence exists that the entire operation was planned and the police department was specifically instructed to kill the men, who were anti-apartheid activists. The seven men are now commemorated by a large memorial in Cape Town. http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/media%5C1997%5C9711/s971118i.htm


46. Long Night’s Journey into Day, 71:00.


49. Hayner 151.

50. Hayner 151.

51. Hayner 151.

52. Daley 2.


Bibliography


The Evolving Role of the French Language in Contemporary Parti Québécois Support

by Brett Manzer

In the summer of 2014, Canada’s only national weekly current affairs magazine published an article titled “Speak for yourself.”1 The piece’s simplistic title underscored the depth of its message: Quebec writer Martin Patriquin proclaimed that his province’s half century-old nationalist movement could no longer rely on the survival of the French language as a platform for sovereignty. The timing of Patriquin’s piece was not at all coincidental with the changing winds of the provincial political climate. Five months prior, the nineteen month-old minority government of the sovereigntist Parti Québécois (PQ) had been swept from power and replaced with a majority government of the federalist Quebec Liberal Party. The PQ won only 30 of the 125 seats in the provincial legislature, while incumbent premier and party leader Pauline Marois failed to win re-election in her own constituency. Quebec’s wholesale rejection of the PQ was consistent with Patriquin’s evaluation of the ineffectiveness of the language argument.

According to Canada’s most recent census, 85% of the 7 300 000 francophones in Canada are residents of Quebec; within the province, 79.7% of residents reported speaking French as their mother tongue.2 In strictly numeric terms, francophones are a de facto linguistic minority in nine of the ten Canadian provinces, while simultaneously forming a majority in Quebec.3 This linguistic division shows no signs of changing, nor does the discourse that French will be threatened until and unless language policy governing its use can be further devolved from Ottawa. Asymmetrical federalism has allowed Quebec to assume increasingly state-like powers, to the point that it has been described mildly as an “embryonic nation-state” and more shockingly as “perhaps the most powerful sub-national government in the world.”4 5

Nation-Building in Canada

Beginning in the early 1960s, Canada and Quebec embarked on what nationalism scholar Michael Keating has termed “two modernising, nation-building projects.”6 For Canada, the apex of the decade was Expo 67, held in Montreal to commemorate the Centennial of Confederation. Montreal was at the time the economic and cultural capital of the country. It was also a city deeply affected by economic and political discrepancies between francophones and anglophones. Linguistic inequality was not limited to what was then Canada’s largest city; rather it was a pressing concern across Quebec and throughout French Canada. In a bid to protect the two language communities and correct the under-participation of francophones at the national level, the Liberal government of Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau passed the Official Languages Act of 1969, declaring English and French to have equal status in all federal institutions. The Act was a cornerstone cultural policy of Trudeau, whose premierships (1968-1979 and 1980-1984) saw the expansion of a pan-Canadian identity. However, no mention was given to French as the “national” language of Quebec. This

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glaring omission has lead scholars to hypothesise that federal bilingualism had the ironic effect of protecting the French language while denying its status as a “national” language of Quebec.

The lack of any special status for Quebec occurred again in 1982 with the adoption of official multiculturalism as part of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Mirroring official bilingualism, “multicultural policy was seen as a way of diluting Quebec’s status as a founding nation by reducing it to the status of one cultural minority among many,” to a level of mere “ethnic folklore.”

The collective nature of Québécois identity - that is, their view of citizenship being rooted as much or more in Quebec than in Canada - was threatened by a Canadian nationalism which denied explicit recognition of Quebec distinctiveness. These alleged affronts to Quebec particularism were the result of multilevel competition between a country and a province attempting to cultivate one national identity at the expense of another. In this sense, it is argued the acceleration of Quebec’s nationalist sentiment was structurally conditioned by the federal system. Official bilingualism and multiculturalism were met with hostility because they were perceived as being insensitive to the founding ethnic-minority groups and the languages they spoke. As the primary means of communication between people, language is both a personal and political issue, with Keating going so far as to say that it “is one of extreme sensitivity, and even moderate Quebec [...] nationalists consistently demand that issues of language rights and usage should be settled within the stateless nation, with no recourse to state-wide jurisdiction.” This view can be summarised even more succinctly: “nationalism in Quebec drives language demands.”

### Nation-Building in Quebec

Just as Canadian nationalism was fostered by the federal government, Quebec nationalism was the result of a provincial nation-building project. For Quebec, one of the four original provinces to have gained constitutional powers of self-government a century prior, the 1960s ushered in ten years of intense countercultural change in every sphere of society. La Révolution tranquille (the Quiet Revolution) occurred mainly in response to the highly conservative, agrarian and staunchly traditionalist Catholic-dominated provincial governments of the post-Second World War era, a period referred to by its critics as La Grande Noirceur (the Great Darkness). The overriding consequence of the Quiet Revolution was the Catholic Church’s meteoric loss of power in the private and political lives of Quebeckers. The emergence of secularism, the welfare state and a sprint for modernity are unanimously attributed to this period. An additional trifecta of political and cultural developments may be categorised into three interconnected stages:

1. The collective identity of Quebec’s demographic majority underwent a shift, shedding its centuries-old French Canadian ethnolinguistic distinctiveness in favour of a consolidated, territorial-based identity as Québécois. There is dispute regarding the diminished importance of the French language during this time, with certain scholars arguing that language continued to be the main nationalist argument from the Quiet Revolution onwards, overtaking religion as a dividing factor.

2. Quebec’s new territorially-based identity gave birth to a nationalist movement. Prior to this time, Keating alleges the main goal of French Canadians was to safeguard their language, but that this did not motivate them to pursue political nationalism, a point supported by those who believe the former French Canadian nationalism, despite not being separatist, was based on a strong ethnic orientation.

3. Finally, the centre-left and sovereigntist Parti Québécois (PQ) was founded in 1968 by René Lévesque to advance the political nationalist cause at the provincial level. The party’s formation during the Quiet Revolution
was the political result of Quebec’s growing self-identification as a distinct stateless nation. Francophone and French Canadian Quebeckers supporting increased autonomy from Canada were able to make their preference known through electoral support for the PQ. This created a bipolar provincial party system with wholesale alternation between PQ and Liberal governments, reflecting the primary political cleavage as sovereigntist-federalist.

The PQ would go on to form majority governments in 1976, 1981, 1994, 1998, the aforementioned short-lived minority government in 2012, and would stage failed sovereignty-partnership referenda in 1980 and 1995. The supremacy of the French language forms the basis of the PQ sovereignty manifesto. Legislation reflecting its support for unilingualism remains among the most enduring and divisive legacies of PQ governments, illustrated by the 1977 Charte de la langue française. Bill 101, as it is colloquially known, declared French to be the sole provincial language. The law promotes francization in employment and education, and seeks to restrict the use of other languages, namely English monolingualism among anglophone Quebeckers.

English does not have legal status at the provincial level, but Quebec’s anglophones are protected under federal bilingualism, just as francophones are elsewhere in the country. Quebec’s official language declaration insulates it from the rest of the country, acting as a institutional barrier for the province to maintain control over its self-definition. Unilingualism was justified because it was seen as one of the few en-forceable policies which could bring together the people of a diverse society. It replaced the anti-quated view that Quebec society was composed of a poorer Catholic francophone majority and a wealthier Protestant anglophone minority, the lines between whom were increasingly blurred as religious affiliation was abandoned, wealth increased all around, and allophone immigrants settled in Quebec.

Ethnonationalism

It is this demographic diversification which has led to a re-evaluation of the current nationalist movement. At least during its earliest years, Quebec nationalism was undoubtedly ethnonational in nature. Ethnonational movements are characterised as those which rely on ethnic affiliation to pursue national statehood, with the Parti Québécois, ETA in the Basque Country, the IRA in Northern Ireland and Plaid Cymru in Wales being noteworthy examples. There is disagreement regarding whether these movements continue to rely on ethnicity to mobilise support for self-determination. Keating contradicts the established opinion by claiming that ethnic particularism existed in nascent nationalism movements in Spain, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Quebec, but that these movements have generally all undergone a process of de-ethnicisation. Ethnicity is largely a social construct and by its very definition is naturally dynamic. It encompasses seemingly limitless possibilities for shared cultural identification. A nationalist movement distancing itself from the original cultural markers its supporters used to identify with one another would be an unlikely occurrence. In the case of Quebec, ethnicity has not ceased to be important, it has evolved into a different concept of what being Québécois entails. Individuals who once identified ethnically with the movement and supported its parties now share the electorate with a substantial portion of the population which does neither. With increasing divisions within the territory itself, nationalist parties risk repelling both potential supporters and the core voters they could once count on to elect their candidates. Quebec’s nationalist
movement is portrayed outside the province as being “intolerant, ethnically exclusive, divisive and disruptive.” Embracing a more diverse support base is exemplified by the attitude that becoming a member of the Québécois “nation” should be open to anyone who wishes to be (“est Québécois qui veut l’être”).

It remains ambiguous whether the French language continues to form the basis of Quebec identifying as a nation, and potentially a more sovereign one. Language-based nationalisms in general may be on the decline because their specific language agendas have been addressed by federalism and devolution. Decentralisation, especially of cultural policy, is one of several possible strategies states may use to mitigate sub-state nationalism. Territorial politics expert Eve Hepburn provides a different angle, stating that because it has become increasingly difficult for nationalist parties to focus on the single issue of self-determination, their members have had to shift focus away from some of their founding principles.

Language policy at both the national and sub-national levels gives valuable insight into the ideological foundations of Quebec nationalism and its main political party, the PQ. I hypothesise these foundations have not remained stagnant in the past half-century. Literature published regarding the link between nationalism support and the French language does not take into account the most recent demographic and political change in Quebec, namely the PQ’s performance in the aforementioned 2014 election, a defeat so humiliating it spawned the headline “The epic collapse of Quebec separatism.” This essay therefore focusses on the contemporary role of the French language in Quebec nationalism, and the extent to which it has influenced electoral support for the PQ.

The relevance of this issue extends far beyond the borders of Canada. While its potency has been on the decline in the twenty-first century, Quebec nationalism continues to fascinate because one independence referendum, let alone two in less than two decades, is an incredibly uncommon occurrence in stable Western democracies. International interest in Quebec was resurrected in 2014, when it was the region most often compared to Scotland’s eventual failed independence referendum. Yet the two movements had little in common. Notably, there was absolutely no basis for linguistic nationalism in Scotland. In other plurinational stateless nations, the nationalist sentiment is almost entirely the result of language. These latter cases include not only Quebec, but Catalonia, the Basque Country and Flanders, where language is the main identity marker and regional nationalist parties have spawned huge language revivals to confront historically-based linguistic grievances.

Basis of Linguistic Nationalism

The essence of the linguistic attraction of Quebec sovereignty rests on two related perceptions, one positive and one negative. The first, positive perception is that the French language is unique to Quebec. Basic statistics may be used to discredit this as being mythical, as more than one million citizens outside Quebec speak French as their mother tongue. Regardless, there has been stubborn agreement between francophone Quebeckers that the French language remains the cornerstone of their provincial distinctiveness. The alleged fragility of French has always been the most important identity marker, to the extent that francophone Quebeckers “constantly refer to themselves as a territorially concentrated linguistic minority in an overwhelmingly English-speaking North America.” Whether it is perceived or factual, the linguistic alienation voters feel is advantageous to Quebec’s nationalist parties, who propose an alternative to the status quo.

The linguistic component of voters’ cost-benefit calculations, in terms of the perceived precarious status of French and the effects sovereignty would have on the language, is a premise seen frequently. One year before Quebec narrowly voted against a sovereignty-partnership agreement, a 1994 survey of francophone voters found that those identifying as sovereigntists were more likely than federalists to perceive the
"The main critique of the Liberal government was its soft stance on institutional language policy, which continued to give English a semi-official role in the province. Dissatisfied francophone voters subsequently supported the PQ, a party which promised to, and eventually carried out, a hardline linguistic policy giving French clear precedence over English."

The perceived fragility of French is a double-edged sword: while it is first used as an argument for enacting francization policies, the success of these policies means the language is no longer threatened, and further sovereignty is no longer necessary. Since the new millennium, francization efforts have been so successful that Quebec nationalists have had to "stoke the fires of linguistic tension" in an effort to resurrect grievances which no longer exist. The French language has played a consistent - albeit shifting - role in Quebec nationalism. This role can be interpreted in two distinctive ways. Firstly, French as a mother tongue influences the voting behaviour of the Quebec electorate, in terms of francophones sometimes supporting nationalist parties. Secondly, the use of the French language itself is a highly contentious core regional issue in Quebec’s provincial elections.

Linguistic Basis of Nationalism Support

There is academic divergence in quantifying just how crucial linguistic background is in voter preference. A 2003 study identified a very strong correlation between support for nationalist parties and the presence of francophones in constituency electorates. This finding was corroborated a decade later in another study which concluded that the voter’s first language was certainly of prime importance in predicting his or her support for a nationalist party, but
that language was only one variable in an ensemble which includes income, religiosity, age, gender and education. The less nuanced view is that language is far and away the strongest indicator of nationalist party support in Quebec. Vague statements such as “polls typically show that about 98% of sovereigntists are francophone” illustrate two major flaws in Quebec sovereignty polling. First, many surveys do not even include anglophone respondents because this group is linguistically assumed to be totally at odds with the movement. Second, survey findings over time tend to contradict one another. In 2001, it was argued that close to 60% of francophone voters supported the PQ. Two years later, the same percentage of Quebec francophones, 60%, refused to identify as either sovereigntists or federalists, preferring instead to place themselves somewhere between the two constitutional options, or belonging to neither.

For these reasons, the role of the French language in the PQ’s electoral history has not been as consistently prominent as one would assume. Despite having been established eight years prior, and campaigning consistently on an independence platform, it has been suggested the PQ’s 1976 victory was not the result of nationalist sentiment, but rather widespread dissatisfaction with the incumbent Liberal government’s inaction in economic and labour disputes. Although overwhelmingly iden-tifying as sovereigntists, the main campaign issues for French Canadian voters were economic management and government honesty; sovereignty and language were reported near the bottom of their list. The election of a nationalist party in 1976 may be partially attributed to widespread dissatisfaction with the previous Liberal government. The main critique of the Liberal government was its soft stance on institutional language policy, which continued to give English a semi-official role in the province. Dissatisfied francophone voters subsequently supported the PQ, a party which promised to, and eventually carried out, a hardline linguistic policy giving French clear precedence over English.

During its first years in power, the PQ was a movement with inclusive beliefs and goals, allowing for a rapidly-expanding heterogenous following based on a diversity of motivation and grievances. More than thirty years after this verdict, the PQ itself is driving the redirection of Quebec nationalism into an more civic and inclusive one. It is clear the PQ is capable of campaigning successfully on a platform of non-independence issues, and is not the single-issue party its detractors have portrayed it as. The PQ’s social democratic ideology is attractive to a province whose electoral record demonstrates it as among the most left-leaning in the country. Striking parallels are grasped between the 1976 election and the PQ’s most recent victory in 2012, the latter which saw the historic election of Pauline Marois as Quebec’s first female premier. As had been the case nearly forty years prior, the French language was far from the most salient issue at the forefront of PQ party support. The actual core issue of the 2012 election was frustration with incumbent premier Jean Charest’s third consecutive Liberal government, a short-term factor which mobilised voters to a much greater extent than strong nationalist feelings.

The 1976 and 2012 elections are examples of periods when language was a less salient issue to Quebec voters. It was highest on their list of political priorities during the period in between, from the first failed sovereignty-association referendum in 1980 to the second in 1995. Although the PQ government elected in 1976 waited until it felt conditions for sovereignty were prime in 1980, the party’s election in 1994 led to a second referendum being held only thirteen months later. The 1990s were marked by the resurrection of the sovereignty option, fuelled by the dual factors of a lack of personal attachment to Canada and the perceived fragility of the French language. These two emotion-driven factors were exploited by the nationalist option to the extent that the 1995 referendum was defeated by a margin of less than 1%. The 1994 election is comparable to the politically-ambivalent 1998 election, which saw sovereignty and language once again at the top of the campaign agenda. The assumed support of francophones for sovereigntist parties was so signifi-cant,
certain francophone voters encountered social pressures to claim to be supporting the PQ - regardless of whether they actually voted for the party.53 However, the successive PQ governments of the decade faced major challenges in implementing the further francization of Quebec society, providing an instance in which the mismanagement of language policy was a liability to the nation-alist party.54 Francization of the private sector in the 1990s not only cost millions of taxpayer dollars, it caused a mass exodus of anglophone businesses and workers, which in turn resulted in Toronto replacing Montreal as the economic capital of Canada. The PQ had lost credibility in its ability to live up to promises of making a financially-viable French society in Quebec.

Civic Nationalism

Language is perhaps not decreasing in current importance, but rather other issues challenge its supremacy. Ethnonationalism itself is being challenged by emerging civic nationalism. The transfer of language from ethnic to civic nationalism is an entirely natural development of Quebec's identity, because "while being a defining component of ethnicity, language also constitutes a public asset; a common public language is often seen as a precondition for participatory democracy [...] it seems that language cannot be separated from nationalism, whether considered 'civic' or 'ethnic.'"55 Quebec nationalism is today based on territory and a heterogenous population united by a common French language, and its neo-nationalists favour asymmetry as a means to build this “francophone global society.”56 57 The PQ has reframed its requirements for becoming a Quebec "citizen" as language and residency- but not ethnicity.58

Unfortunately for parties like the PQ which espouse a brand of language-based civic nationalism, Canadian francophones are not a homogenous group. The gradual abandonment of ethnonationalism in favour of a territorial identity has potentially isolated Quebec's francophones not only from anglophones, but from the half-million francophones in neighbouring Ontario. A comparative survey of Franco-Québécois and Franco-Ontariens concluded that 95% of Franco-Québécois and 71% of Franco-Ontariens believed the Quebec government did a better job than the Canadian government in defending the French language in Canada.59 Although the two groups are unavoidably unified by a shared language - and by partial shared history, culture and ancestry - their answers differed markedly by provincial affiliation. This was especially so regarding perceptions of the promotion of official bilingualism, the treatment of linguistic minorities - namely, their own - and the defines of the French language.60 Surveying two groups within the same linguistic demographic offers a far more nuanced view of political attitudes than what is typically presented in Quebec-only surveys. More importantly, it suggests that territorial borders have a major impact on political attitudes, especially when the territory in question is intimately linked to the concept of national identity.

Immigrant Impact on Voting

The shift from ethnic to civic nationalism is undoubtedly a partial reaction to the increasingly contentious issue of immigration. It is one power not highly decentralised to Canada's provinces - with the exception Quebec, which selects its own immigrants by taking into account their French language competence. Compared to other sub-state national regions such as Scotland and Catalonia, Quebec has by far the most immigration power.61 Due to Quebec's first-past-the-post electoral system, the PQ has little choice but to actively court what is pejoratively known as the "ethnic vote." It is within any and all parties' interests to embrace immigrants as potential supporters; this is a "catch-all" strategy of attracting as many votes from as many demographics as possible. It is unsurprising the PQ as a party originally born of ethnonationalism would have a tumultuous relationship with immigrants. Nevertheless, immigrants who were for decades viewed as accomplices to Anglo-Quebeckers in rejecting sovereignty are now being conditioned to support the cause from a very early age.

Immigrants from Francophonie
countries are generally apt to settle in Canada, and particularly in Quebec, precisely because they wish to continue living in French. Still other immigrants to Quebec are allophones whose mother tongue is neither French nor English. Immigrants’ children are required by assimilationist provincial language policy to attend French schools, spawning new generations known as les enfants de la loi 101 (the Children of Bill 101). This is done under the guise of ensuring the survival of a minority language, but the policy is convenient for nationalists who envision immigrants joining their ranks in the struggle for self-determination.62 These non-French Canadian francophones are the human products of language policy, and they illustrate a clear case of linguistic identity diverging from ethnicity. Allophone immigrants are the missing piece of the puzzle in determining whether or not mother tongue retains a correlation to the historic sovereignty-federalism cleavage. They upset the simplistic assumption that anglophones are always federalists and francophones are usually sovereigntists. Previous academic research of allophones and their natively francophone counterparts had found little, if any, difference of opinion regarding sovereignty. Both groups had in the past responded positively that Quebec as a “distinct nation” differed from other provinces primarily due to its linguistic situation. That being said, more recent surveying of allophone, francophone and allophone youth concluded that allophone respondents as a group fell somewhere between the francophones and anglophones, being less “hardline” than franco-phones by rejecting full independence - mainly due to economic fears - while echoing the anglophones’ commitment to asymmetrical federalism.63 The twenty-first century has seen near eradication of the socioeconomic gap between Quebec’s anglophones and francophones,64 but these surveys serve as evidence that a correlation remains between mother tongue and political preference.

Parti Québécois Linguistic Ideology

What remains to be seen is whether a correlation - but not necessarily a causation - currently exists between language attitudes and PQ support. At the provincial institutional level, Quebeckers indicate a clear preference for French unilingualism, but they are paradoxically increasingly interested in personal bilingualism. With more than half of francophones believing it is “very important” to know both French and English,65 it is clear Quebec’s commitment to institutional unilingualism has not been at the expense of personal bilingualism. The fine line between these two attitudes is apparent when considering that three-quarters of francophones “strongly agree” that Bill 101 continues to be necessary in Quebec, and 60% feel the state of their language has deteriorated over the past ten years.66 During this decade-long timeframe, the PQ was in power for the first two years, and the Liberals for the eight years afterwards. In other words, 80% of the period during which French had allegedly deteriorated had been under a Liberal provincial government. This dissatisfaction from a clear majority of francophone Quebeckers can be interpreted as a failing grade for the incumbent Liberal party. The PQ consistently campaigns on promises to reinforce the scope and extent of Bill 101, making the party attractive to voters dissatisfied with the Liberals’ linguistic program, regardless of their nationalist sentiments. By the same token, the PQ may point to public opinion statistics such as these to argue Quebec nationalism is in the interest of all francophones who fear for their language’s future.
Previously, “anglophone Canadian culture” and “American culture” have respectively been accorded responsibility for French’s demise by 51% and 57% of francophones. The weight of threat accorded to these two cultures is entirely understandable, given the linguistic geography of the North American continent being dominated by the English language, but what is shocking is that a far greater percentage of surveyed francophones (66%) feel that multiculturalism in Quebec constitutes the greatest threat to the French language. Because the perceived fragility of French has always been a central argument in Quebec nationalism, who or what threatens the language is of particular concern to nationalist parties, who will vilify the threat for political gain. Replacing anglophones with immigrants as the personification of French’s demise would be an uncomfortable campaign angle to carry out, yet the PQ has little choice but to respond to this reality. A majority of francophones feel the Quebec provincial government should be the main body responsible for protecting the French language, and the PQ has the reputation of being the party most capable of defending Quebec’s linguistic distinctiveness.

Unsurprisingly, the linguistic ideology of the Parti Québécois is prominent in its recent campaign literature. “We are witnessing the decline of our language” was only the third sentence in the 2012 platform guide’s introduction, and the 2014 platform included adopting a new Charter of the French language, greater French-language support to allophone children, and making French courses mandatory for all new immigrants. The power to ensure French’s predominance would preferably be secured via a “oui” vote in the PQ’s desired third referendum, an increasingly unpopular prospect. Despite the continued perception that French is threatened, this has not correlated to support for the re-opening of the “neverendum” option. In a 2012 hypothetical referendum asking “Do you agree that Quebec should become a country separate from Canada?” barely 32% of francophone Quebeckers said they would vote yes. Just over a third of respondents who intended to vote for the PQ in 2012 supported complete independence. In the 2014 election, Quebec sovereignty was the top issue for only 4% of francophones, and language for 1%. Language may exist as an issue unrelated to sovereignty, but the reverse is less likely- the support for sovereignty parties draws heavily on francophone electorates and perennial fears about their language.

### Conclusion

Recent findings from electoral results, party platforms and public opinion polls demonstrate the French language continues to have consistent place in contemporary Quebec nationalism, but the salience of language as a political issue has been dependent upon a number of exterior factors. The French language’s importance to voters was greatly overshadowed by economic and employment issues during the 1970s and 2000s. Conversely, it was a key issue for voters during the early 1980s and 1990s elections immediately leading up to, and after, the two failed referenda, when widespread feelings of a lack of attachment to Canada were compounded by the perceived threat to French alienating Quebeckers from other Canadians. Data sets from 2011 onwards indicate that a return to referenda-like levels of linguistic nationalism is unlikely in the current decade. The theoretical basis of Quebec nationalism being supported by Quebec’s French-Canadians is challenged by dynamic demographic change. Civic nationalism is employed in an attempt to attract allophone immigrants and established francophone voters who, despite their commitment to maintaining Quebec as a predominantly francophone society, are increasingly - and paradoxically - committed to French-English personal bilingualism. Their assumed support for the Parti Québécois is equally threatened by the emergence of new nationalist parties, who present similar social democratic platforms as the PQ, without the latter’s divisive hardline linguistic ideology.

### Endnotes


3. Conversely, Quebec is the only province in which anglophones form a minority rather than majority. In 2011, English was the mother tongue of 599 225 of Quebeckers, or 7.6% of the provincial population. This peculiarity provides an additional layer of complexity to Canada, and Quebec’s, linguistic situations. English unilingualism in Quebec is traditionally common, though a trend towards bilingualism is emerging among younger demographics.


8. Although the federal government recognises that its provinces and territories have their own language policies, the only province whose language regime is explicitly protected by federal legislation is New Brunswick. The 2011 census indicated that 32.5% of New Brunswick residents spoke French as their mother tongue. As Canada’s only officially bilingual province, New Brunswick’s perfect institutional equality between English and French is guaranteed in the language section of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.


15. The overlapping terminology of francophone, French Canadian and Québécois is a frustrating reoccurrence in the literature, and even among Canadians. It is erroneously presented that having one of these identities equates having all three by default. In reality, these respective linguistic, ethnic and territorial terms are neither interchangeable, nor should they be monopolised by Quebec.

16. May.


19. Party representation for Quebec sovereignity would occur much later at the federal level with the 1991 foundation of the Bloc Québécois (BQ), the informal “sister party” of the PQ. It also bears mentioning other parties which currently compete at the provincial level in Quebec can be considered nationalist.


21. Francization refers to a person or business adopting French as their primary personal or working language.


24. Allophone denotes a person whose mother tongue is neither French nor English. Like sovereigntist and francization, it is a term used frequently in Quebec, and to a lesser degree elsewhere in Canada, but rarely outside the country.


28. Self-determination does not necessarily entail pursuing political independence from an existing country; for some more moderate nationalist movements, mere recognition as a distinctive nation would constitute success. Stephen May believes these so-called “cultural nationalisms” are a reaction to shifting identities which occur within the nations, rather than a reaction aimed at outside dominance. Along with devolution, the symbolic recognition of nationhood is one of four possible strategies for dealing with the demands of nationalist movements.


31. May. 17. Keating, in: Gagnon and Tully. 28. Self-determination does not necessarily entail pursuing political independence from an existing country; for some more moderate nationalist movements, mere recognition as a distinctive nation would constitute success. Stephen May believes these so-called “cultural nationalisms” are a reaction to shifting identities which occur within the nations, rather than a reaction aimed at outside dominance. Along with devolution, the symbolic recognition of nationhood is one of four possible strategies for dealing with the demands of nationalist movements.

32. Gagnon and Tully: 68.


36. Nadeau and Fleury.


38. Tanguay: 15.


42. Latouche, in: Keating and McGarry.


45. Ibid.

46. Pinard and Hamilton: 773.

47. Latouche, in: Keating and McGarry.


53. Ibid.


57. Gagnon and Tully: 171.

58. Hepburn.


60. Ibid.

61. Hepburn: 512


63. Latouche, in: Keating McGarry.


66. Ibid.


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With the end of the Cold War, the world witnessed the rise of multilateral military interventions, often in efforts to stop humanitarian atrocities, as in the case of Serbian province of Kosovo. As Slobodan Milosevic, the leader of Serbia, eliminated autonomy of Kosovo and repressed ethnic Albanians, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began an eleven-week humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999.

A general consensus exists among scholars that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was justified, mainly because of its humanitarian cause to stop the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians. On the other hand, the moral question of NATO’s conduct of war, specifically the reliance on airpower and efforts to avoid NATO personnel causalities, remains debatable for several reasons. The concern of this paper is to explore such issues and examine whether it was ethical for NATO to intervene in Kosovo using airpower.

First, I review the literature to understand what has been said about NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. In particular, I address why many scholars agree that NATO’s decision to wage war was justified but disagree on morality of the way the war was conducted. Second, I sketch relevant aspects of just-war theory and cosmopolitan theory in examining NATO’s conduct of war. Third, I present evidence that demonstrates how this intervention in Kosovo was illegitimately and irresponsibly performed, causing more harm than good to Kosovar civilians. I conclude that NATO’s use of air bombing as the primary means of intervention was not ethical.

Review of Literature and History

Generally, scholars agree that the humanitarian imperative in Kosovo did outweigh reasons for inaction (Luban 79). There was no doubt that Milosevic’s forces were systematically persecuting the Albanian population of Kosovo with the intention of ethnic cleansing (Falk 849). Furthermore, NATO’s intervention was based on the existing idea that Serbia has made itself the subject of military intervention by committing crimes against humanity (Roberts 103). Therefore, the morality of NATO’s decision to intervene was satisfied with the just cause to protect human rights in Kosovo.

However, two major concerns about the intervention in Kosovo deal with the legality of NATO’s decision to intervene and the morality of NATO’s conduct of intervention. Although the focus of this paper is with the ethical dimension, it is important to briefly note what has been said about the legality of NATO’s intervention.

The primary argument made against NATO is its “illegal” use of force without the UN Security Council authorization. The 1945 UN Charter, which governs the threat or use of force, specifies that any use of air, sea, or land forces to maintain or restore international peace and security must be authorized by the Security Council (Schroeder 180). Consequently, NATO’s decision to intervene in Kosovo without Security Council authorization was technically a violation of international

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"NATO's intervention was based on the existing idea that Serbia has made itself the subject of military intervention by committing crimes against humanity. Therefore, the morality of NATO's decision to intervene was satisfied with the just cause to protect human rights in Kosovo."

However, states and experts supporting NATO intervention provide three legal justifications for NATO’s use of forces. First, the UN Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998 had mandated the cessation of Serbian acts of violence against the Kosovar civilian population and referred to possible further action if demands of the resolution were not satisfied (Guicherd 26). The members of NATO, led by the United States, thus argued that NATO intervened on behalf of principles implicit in UN resolution.

Second, NATO pointed to organizational ties between NATO members and other European countries adopted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which provides members of the organization a greater degree of mutual interference in each other’s internal affairs (Schroeder 182).

A third legal argument asserted that general international law allows military intervention against states responsible for causing extreme humanitarian crisis. Ethnic violence and human rights violations committed by Serbian forces constitute violations of the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1948 Genocide Convention and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, making Milosevic’s regime subject to intervention (Roberts 106). In sum, NATO had a certain degree of international legal basis for intervention in Kosovo.

Greater question surrounds the ethics of NATO’s air campaign. First, unwillingness to risk lives of NATO personnel was a political prerequisite of the intervention. Political leaders of the US cannot send soldiers into battle without convincing the public that the war is morally or politically necessary and that victory is worth American lives (Walzer, 1999, 6). Kosovo, unfortunately, did not fit the criteria. Therefore, NATO resorted to air power to minimize harm of NATO personnel. This path, however, raises morally distressing questions. For example, the reluctance to accept the risk of casualties may conflict with humanitarian objective of the intervention. Critics argue that it is unethical to say we are ready to risk “collateral damage” to Serbian, and even Kosovar, civilians but not ready to risk American soldiers (Walzer, 1999, 7).

NATO explained that it relied on air power because it believed in the strategic effectiveness of air war. In 1995 NATO had once experienced the successful result of air campaign, which contributed to the end of Serb atrocities against Bosnian Muslims (Roberts 110). In the words of the UK Defense Minis-
ter George Robertson, NATO believed that its precision-guided bombs would quickly work, as they had in Bosnia, to “avert a humanitarian disaster” in Kosovo. Critics, however, have challenged the use of air weapons, arguing that NATO bombs provided Serbian soldiers in and around Kosovo an incentive to retaliate against Kosovar civilians and refugees (Roberts 112). While NATO was certainly acting with just cause and on legal basis, NATO’s resort to air war without careful calculation and a credible land force in preparation of the Serb’s reprisal was irresponsible.

The political and strategic reasons for the high degree of reliance on air power and their consequent criticisms address the issue of morality of NATO’s actions. Was NATO responsible for its unintended consequences? Or is NATO’s just cause of intervention a sufficient justification in itself? Because the morality of NATO air campaign seems questionably ambiguous, I look at other theoretical frameworks like the just-war theory and cosmopolitan theory to consider the morality of NATO’s actions in Kosovo.

Just-War Theory

Although there was no formal
declaration of war during the intervention, I apply just-war theory to Kosovo. Just-war theory assesses the ethical nature of a war from three dimensions: the morality of the decision to initiate a war (jus ad bellum), the morality of the way in which a war is conducted (jus in bello), and the morality of the victor to contribute to justice after the war (jus post bellum). I do not further carry out the argument of jus ad bellum because I have already established that NATO intervention was justified in the context of moral imperative and general international law. I also refrain from considering jus post bellum, which is beyond the purpose and scope of this essay. Rather, I examine jus in bello in detail.

The theory of just conduct of war has three interdependent parts: necessity, proportionality, and discrimination. The principle of necessity states that a particular course of action would be considered necessary to an end if no other course is sufficient or available to improve the odds of battle (Walzer, 2000, 144). Furthermore, from a range of strategic options that could improve the odds, some of them are permitted and some are ruled out by the war convention. This way, just-war theory assures that use of force serves as a “last resort” in achieving the objective without arbitrarily causing destruction of life.

The principle of proportionality requires that destruction, if necessary, must be proportionate to the importance of objective. The goal of this principle is to place significant limitations on belligerent conduct of war by ruling out certain military objectives if they cause too much damage to civilian lives and property. Military officers must consider the means of warfare (e.g. controllability of weapons) and the conditions of the military target (e.g. proximity to civilian population) in every step of conducting the war to minimize damage (Mushkat 34). The proportionality also prompts soldiers to better implement the laws of war and stops destruction before it becomes a massacre. Proportionate use of force thus raises the level of threshold of in bello principle by asserting that a simple “necessity” of destruction does not provide sufficient grounds for causing disproportionate damage.

The principle of discrimination, or noncombatant immunity, says that noncombatants (i.e. civilians) are totally separated from combatants who include soldiers and other inanimate objects such as weapons, factories, and ships produced for the purpose of warfare. Soldiers are subject to attack at any time because war is the enterprise of their class (Walzer, 2000, 144). Whether a soldier has joined the war at his will or has been conscripted, he has been made into a dangerous man. This fact radically distinguishes soldiers from civilians, and makes intentional killing of civilians unjust and unlawful. Soldiers owe direct obligations to the civilians they leave behind, because civilians have been put in danger as a result of soldiers’ fighting.

However, the moral doctrine of “double effect” allows a moderate exception to noncombatant immunity. According to double effect, the unintentional or incidental killing of civilians, often referred to as “collateral damage,” may be permitted if four conditions hold: (1) the act is a legitimate act of war, (2) the direct effect is morally acceptable—the killing of enemy soldiers, (3) the intention of the actor is good, and (4) the good effect is good enough for allowing the evil effect (Walzer, 2000, 153). Nonetheless, noncombatant immunity is not completely separate from the principles of proportionality and necessity because double effect is defensible if there exists good intention and positive commitment to reduce foreseeable evil as far as possible.

Cosmopolitan Theory

Having examined the in bello principle of just-war theory, I now turn to cosmopolitan theory. First, it should be noted that cosmopolitan theory has two schools of thought. On the one hand, consequentialists, derived from utilitarians, argue that the moral worth of an action is determined by its contribution to overall utility. On the other hand, deontologists measure actions for their right and wrong nature, not just the consequences. In this paper, I only consider deontological cosmopolitan theory as per my focus on conduct, not...
utility, of NATO’s intervention. Also, from this point on, I use the terms “cosmopolitan” and “deontologist” interchangeably.

By making the assumption that morality is individualist, egalitarian, and universal, cosmopolitans argue that morality exists within a universal community in which state boundaries have a merely practical significance. First, cosmopolitans view individuals as the fundamental units of moral concern, not states or communities. Every individual has inherent worth derived from the ability of human beings to follow the moral law (Donaldson 135). Thus, cosmopolitan morality places equal moral worth to every individual, irrespective of group membership of cultural, ethnic, or national distinction. This way, all humans are equal regardless of state boundaries, and the rights of humans have greater moral significance than the rights of states or communities.

According to Kant, perhaps the most eminent deontologist, equal morality is possible when we behave under conditions known prior to experience. More specifically, without any prior experience, we would act on “categorical imperative” which bids us to treat others as having values in themselves and to act according to principles that are valid for everyone (Donaldson 136). In other words, it would be rational for one to act in a way in which one expects others to do the same because every individual wants to be treated as morally equal being. Therefore, Kant’s categorical imperative leads to a universal principle which all rational beings are willing to follow.

Because humans are rational beings capable of moral action who owe moral obligation to each other, cosmopolitans emphasize the significance of motive. In terms of ethics of war, motive becomes a key in evaluating an act. For example, cosmopolitans consider it illegal and immoral to target civilians with the motive of bringing a fast paced end to a war. Speeding up the path of a war by targeting civilians is not following the “categorical imperative” because this act implicitly places higher moral value to interveners over civilians (Luban 80). The motive to quickly end a war implies that civilians were sacrificed on behalf of soldiers’ return home. In cosmopolitan perspective, such motive invalidates the targeting of civilians because equal and universal moral worth of individuals has been ignored.

Strategic Airpower in Just-war Perspective

Did NATO satisfy the three aspects of in bello—necessity, proportionality, and discrimination—in conducting its war?

Necessity

Those in favor of NATO's complete reliance on airpower claim that an air campaign was necessary because it was the only available option. Without a promise that assured minimal Allied casualties, there may not have been domestic support, and without domestic support, there was no intervention (Schroeder 187). NATO governments contend that dangers of not acting far outweighed dangers of acting, because non-intervention meant either continued killings of defenseless Kosovar Albanians or a continued struggle that becomes a wider conflict dragging in the US and its allies (Power 449).

Critics, however, offer an alternative. While it was true that some kind of force was necessary to hamper the Serbs committing atrocities, it is not quite clear that use of air strikes 15,000 feet above the land was the “last resort.” In the context of just-war theory, use of air force and use of land force are not completely synonymous when one or the other can better improve the chance of victory by causing less de-

"In the context of just-war theory, use of air force and use of land force are not completely synonymous when one or the other can better improve the chance of victory while causing less destruction."
struction. Although the force itself was necessary to stop Serb atrocities, NATO should have weighed the moral worth between land force and air force, and select the method that achieves the objective that requires less damage.

According to critics, it is precisely the land force, or at least a combination of both land and air forces, that is more effective and less destructive. For example, studying the similarity and difference between US’s response to the Gulf War and the Kosovo War, scholars demonstrate the effectiveness of land force. In both cases, US and its allies intervened with a humanitarian objective (Bush administration responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, an act considered to be a violation of international law) and employed similar strategy of air bombing (Hodge 48). However, the Gulf War differed from the Kosovo War in that the air campaign over Iraq was backed by the presence of ground troops to directly attack Iraqi soldiers. In contrast, the absence of NATO soldiers in Serbian land destroyed immobile infrastructure but allowed mobile Serb soldiers to focus on killing (Roberts 112). The effectiveness of land war in Kuwait and the unexpected side-effect of air war in Kosovo reveal that NATO’s exclusive use of airpower was not the “last resort” option that was necessary to win the war. Thus, in just-war perspective, NATO’s air campaign fails to satisfy the principle of necessity.

**Proportionality**

Furthermore, NATO’s actions should be examined on the basis of proportionality. According to just-war theory, saving Allied soldiers’ lives was not proportionate to destruction. Specifically, NATO’s air strategy created problems of refugee flow and destruction of infrastructure, both of which raises the question of whether the bombing made things worse.

First, NATO’s air campaign ironically gave Milosevic the signal to begin the mass killing of Kosovar Albanians. Outraged Serbian police, military and paramilitary forces responded to NATO’s bombs by killing thousands of Kosovars who were helpless without Allied troops on ground. The Serbs in Kosovo began forcing Kosovar Albanians to flee Serbia and executed those who resisted so as to demonstrate the cost of remaining in Kosovo (Power 449). By the time bombing ended, more than 1.3 million Kosovars had become refugees, 863,000 of whom flooded into Albania and Macedonia (Schroeder 188). NATO’s air operation, without the plan to save Kosovars, created an environment for the Serbian forces to make such an attack feasible.

Second, besides the refugee flow, the bombing’s disproportionate damage on infrastructure was also evident. By late April, NATO’s combat planes far outnumbered the targets to hit. With so few targets and more planes flowing into the war, NATO increased the number of approved targets that even General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, was frustrated at performing each day’s task (Gingras 108). In the process of overwhelming air strikes, it seemed that NATO lost the stated objectives to end combat activity and remove Serb forces. Instead, NATO planes destroyed thousands of businesses, power stations, oil refineries, factories, roads, and bridges in order to match a “ratio” between combat planes and targets (Schroeder 188).

Even worse, this large-scale destruction proved to be futile because it only caused significant damage against infrastructure rather than Serbian forces. While NATO has claimed that destroyed infrastructure has degraded Serbian war-making capacity, documents and civilian testimonies reveal that Serbian military weapons were either mobile or capable of concealment, rendering NATO’s efforts useless. For example, Serb troops built fake bridges and camouflaged precious equipment to deceive Allied planes into wasting expensive missiles (Power 451). Similarly, NATO’s attempt to hinder Serbian forces’ access to Belgrade by destroying bridges in Novi Sad, hundreds of miles north of Kosovo, had no impact on forces in the province (Gingras 109). Such futility of NATO’s actions suggests that the means used during the intervention was not proportionate to the ends, as strategic use of air strikes caused upsetting damages but failed...
to weaken the Serb forces’ capacity to commit atrocities.

**Discrimination (or Noncombatant Immunity)**

NATO’s desire to avoid risks has been accused of violating noncombatant immunity. To be sure, NATO did not have the intention of killing either Serbian civilians or Kosovar civilians.

In spite of NATO’s effort to avoid civilian casualties, however, some 500 Serbian and Kosovar civilian deaths are documented (Power 462). NATO was so concerned with eliminating the possibility of Allied loss that it did not make any significant effort to address the possibility of collateral damage. For instance, one senior officer of the Air Force Doctrine Symposium planning the joint air operations in early March remarked that there was no specific discussion of the steps to ensure noncombatant protection (Gingras 109). In addition, on only 15 days of 72-day intervention did NATO planes fly at altitude low enough to reliably differentiate civilians from military targets (Hodge 48). Clearly, then, while NATO did not intentionally kill civilians, it also did not have the positive commitment to reduce collateral damage as far as possible. Therefore, in the context of just-war theory, NATO’s strategy is not justified.

**Casualty Avoidance in Cosmopolitan Perspective**

I now turn to cosmopolitan theory in evaluating the morality of NATO’s air war. Similar to just-war theory, cosmopolitan theory claims that conduct of intervention is not moral if it causes undue damage to those who were meant to be rescued from atrocities. However, cosmopolitans are more concerned about the moral implication of casualty avoidance than the effects of use of force. Unlike just-war theorists, cosmopolitans do not judge morality of NATO’s actions by proportionality or discrimination. Instead, cosmopolitans focus on right and wrong nature of NATO’s motive of casualty avoidance.

NATO’s refusal to accept the probability of losses or to begin ground invasion not only revealed the shallowness of its humanitarian commitment but also suggested its disturbing attitude—Serbian lives are expendable but Allied lives are not. Although proponents of NATO’s intervention have argued that zero-casualty politics was necessary to even begin intervention in the first place, cosmopolitans claim that casualty avoidance cannot coexist with the objective humanitarian intervention (Luban 81).

Cosmopolitans, too, agree that the Kosovo intervention was morally justified because Kosovar Albanians were treated in an uncivilized way. However, for cosmopolitans, every individual has equal moral worth, irrespective of cultural, ethnic, or national membership. Unfortunately, NATO did not attach equal moral worth to its soldiers and Kosovar civilians. By relying on airpower, which has endangered the very people the intervention was trying to defend, NATO was sending the message that Serbian and Kosovar lives were not equal to Allied lives (Luban 82).

In fact, NATO was so committed to saving the lives of its soldiers that it allowed the Kosovar killings and expulsions to be intensified. When the bombings provoked the Serb forces to carry out their ethnic cleansing scheme, General Clark attempted to shift Washington’s focus away from avoiding NATO casualties, and to planning for a ground invasion. However, this plan was rebuffed by the American government. Clark also...
tried to deploy Apache helicopters that could fly closer to the ground and target Serb paramilitaries, but Washington refused at first (Power 454). Even when Washington had finally agreed to send Clark the Apaches, the delivery of the helicopters and the permission of their use were delayed several times (Power 456). Likewise, the US and its NATO allies did not conduct their intervention in a morally consistent manner by refusing to sacrifice their soldiers for foreigners.

Conclusion

NATO’s 72-days of bombardment drove Serb forces out of Kosovo, compelled Milosevic to surrender, and stopped humanitarian disaster in the Balkans. However, an application of just-war theory demonstrates that complete reliance on airpower has caused disproportionate damage in Kosovo. Also, destroyed infrastructure had long-term consequences on the economy of Eastern Europe, as a shortage of factories and transportation had a serious impact on commerce between Kosovo and its neighboring countries (Gingras 110).

Furthermore, evidence suggests that NATO lacked the positive commitment to protect civilians and honor non-combatant immunity because it placed a greater value on its own soldiers (who are subject to killing during war) over Serbian and Kosovar civilians (who are immune to killing). In cosmopolitan perspective, NATO leaders needed to abandon the zero-casualty mentality because of equal moral worth of NATO soldiers and Serbian and Kosovar civilians. Thus, the contradiction between NATO’s willingness to kill Serb soldiers and its unwillingness to send Allied soldiers into land battle reveals that NATO’s just intervention was illegitimately and irresponsibly carried out.

Fighting justly involves more than establishing just cause. Morality requires authentic commitment to just cause by placing equal moral worth to interveners and to those who need to be rescued. Precision-guided weapons like air bombs are capable of selective application of destructive power that allows military leaders to carefully target the enemy. However, the air-only approach during the Kosovo intervention caused disproportionate harm. Humanitarian interventions need to be completely thought out and planned prior to fighting. Furthermore, interveners need to predict the potential impact on civilians, so that humanitarian objectives can be performed in a humanitarian, ethical, and legitimate fashion.

Bibliography


Complications of Collective Memory in Peru
A History of Marginalization, an Attempt at Inclusion

by Alexis Wills

An ancient proverb says, “History repeats itself.” However, the question remains, what is our obligation when history is so terrible that we cannot possibly allow it to repeat? Do we have the power to alter the current trajectory? Peruvians are struggling with this very question as they attempt to create a collective memory of the internal armed conflict that occurred from the 1980s to the 2000s between the Peruvian Armed Forces and the terrorist group Shining Path. “Para que nunca se repita,” (so that it never happens again) is the mantra that fuels this desire to retell the facts of the tragedy that ended in the death or disappearance of over 70,000 mostly-indigenous Peruvian citizens.

This phrase colors the discourse of the newest memory museum in Lima, el Lugar de la Memoria, la Tolerancia y la Inclusión Social (LUM), which opened its cultural center to the public in June of 2014, but has yet to complete a permanent exhibit. As the LUM team takes on this project, the complications of collective memory make themselves known in the controversies: in particular, whether or not to repress memory, and if not, how exactly to remember the events without introducing biased memories. The LUM highlights issues of social hierarchies, racism, and political power that contradict a sense of resolution, and ultimately, overshadow what should be at the heart of the issue – to bring a sense of peace to those who have suffered. While the LUM is in the spotlight in touristy Miraflores, another worthy memorial in Huamanga, Ayacucho—, el Santuario de la Memoria de la Hoyada (SMH)—, is in the works, and it may be able to approach collective memory in a way that avoids the controversies of the LUM.

First, it is important to understand this civil war in the context of the political history of Peru. Since the beginning of the 20th century, modern-day Peru has been shaped by corruption carried out by government officials. Since President Leguía’s eleven-year dictatorship from 1919 to 1930, which set the tone for a centralized government, Peruvian leader after Peruvian leader failed to organize and guide the country to a state of prosperity. Most proved to be shady characters with personal motives that overshadowed the needs of their country. These needs were most dire in the regions outside of the capital, most of which could not reach government and wealth generated within Lima. Anger and frustration were the consequences of questionable government ideologies and initiatives and resulted in political parties such as the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), led by Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre. Originally, APRA stood to take down the oligarchy that had existed since the beginning of organized government. Its primary purpose was to serve middle and lower class citizens whose voices had previously been stifled. However, throughout the years, this political party became divided and corrupt, causing Haya de la Torre and the leaders who followed him to lose sight of a more inclusive Peruvian government.

By 1980, Fernando Belaúnde Terry began his second term as President and another group with an even more radical ideology than the APRA had formed, bringing increased violence like the country had never seen. Shining Path, known to Peruvians as Sendero Luminoso, declared war on the Peruvian government and established their base in Ayacucho.

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committed by Shining Path – the indigenous people of the regions outside of Lima, – know that the group was active long before official declaration. In fact, during their respective terms, Fernando Belaúnde Terry and Alan García largely ignored the muffled concerns of the communities that lay outside of Lima’s boundaries. They sent out troops in response to Guzmán’s guerilla warfare, but did not truly protect the people of those outer regions.5 The general sentiment was if Limeños were not in danger, there was no need for serious alarm or action, even though refugees were flooding the city streets telling of unimaginable wrongs committed by both the Armed Forces and Shining Path.6

The Armed Forces commanded by Alberto Fujimori’s government did not put an end to the violence until after Lima was hit hard in 1992. The Tarata Bombing near Parque Kennedy in Miraflores shook the stability of Limeños and made an important statement: the threat was no longer confined to the provinces far from the nation’s capitol. Twelve years of the Peruvian government and Shining Path’s bloody disputes had gone by. It was only when significant fatal attacks were made within Lima that action was taken to end the bloodshed. Within that year, Abimael Guzmán was arrested and the worst of the internal conflict was over. However, Fujimori was not the hero he made himself out to be and the corruption inside his administration continued until he left office in 2000. As the terrorism lessened, the Armed Forces withdrew from the Andean provinces, and the country began to heal from the wounds of war. According to an article in the Peruvian Times, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission held the Armed Forces responsible for 30 percent of deaths during the conflict and attributed approximately 16 percent to government-backed peasant militias.7 Therefore, the Armed Forces were, either directly or indirectly, responsible for almost half of all deaths by the end of the tragedy. However, Fujimori continued to use his power to frame Shining Path negatively and the Armed Forces and government officials positively, granting amnesty to war criminals simply because they were on the government’s side.

Over thirty years of violence and attempts of reflection have passed and now there is a new institution that is promoting formal commemoration. LUM, located in Miraflores, is stirring up controversy as it attempts to address the past, present, and future of Peru’s communities in the wake of tragedy. LUM may be the first of its kind, but it is not the first attempt at commemorating the past. The Yuyanapaq exhibit, which is currently held in the Museo de la Nación in Javier Prado Este, inspired the concept of LUM. The exhibit was taken to Germany in 2008, a country known globally for genocide, where officials were so moved by the display, they would later insist on donating two million euros to fund a museum that would hold the Yuyanapaq Exhibit. However, they required a museum that could offer more space as well as a cultural center that would permit open discussion and reflection amongst Peruvians and foreigners.8 Without looking into the country’s complicated history and ongoing power struggle, German officials donated the money to the Peruvian government.

If one were to take a tour of the memory sites in Peru, which vary in
size, structure, and significance, one would have to set aside a significant amount of time for travel and general investigation, as these sites are hardly publicized. Those commonly known and recognized will be discussed further. Within Lima, there is a memorial that was constructed in the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú in Pueblo Libre, the Yuyanapaq exhibit— as previously mentioned—and the Memorial de Tarata in Miraflores, which are all easily accessible to the public on a daily basis. Additionally, there is the Ojo que Llora (Eye that Cries) in Jesús María, which has raised much more controversy regarding repression of memory and determining who should be considered “victims.” Therefore, it is closed off from the general public, opened only for events run by the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH) and specially requested memorial services.9 Moving outside of Lima and into other regions, one could take an eight-hour bus ride to the recently constructed museum YalpanaWasi in Huancayo, Junín. This particular museum was constructed and opened to the public within the time it has taken LUM to be completed.10 Farther south, there are memory museums in Huancavelica and Huanta. The museum in Huanta is locally run and, according to Maribel Ascarza, a representative of la Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Perú (ANFASEP), it is rarely open and does not run on a reliable schedule.11 At the heart of the tragedy, there are ANFASEP’s Museo de la Memoria of Huamanga and the up-and-coming SMH, both in Ayacucho.

The geography of Peru has played a huge role in the complication of the internal armed conflict itself and it is proving to be just as significant to the construction of memory. The indigenous have been, both historically and presently, suffering from marginalization. It is evident that those who can tell the most horrifying stories of the internal armed conflict are located outside of Lima, but the more intricately developed memorials and museums today are centralized within and around Lima. It is also clear that both Sendero Luminoso and the Armed Forces were active in a vast number of areas outside of Lima. Considering all of the spaces of memory that are currently in the country, one can see how certain memories could become misrepresented, disregarded, or incomplete because they are undervalued by those with power. In reference to LUM, former President of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Salomón Lerner Febres, said it would be a grave ethical and historical error to give a vague message that did not have the victims at its core.12 Complete memory is in jeopardy if the Peruvian state, which oversees this site, has a separate agenda from that of the victims.

LUM is the first memorial to be built by the Peruvian state. All others have been constructed and funded by private organizations or local governments. The initiative for LUM began in 2008 after German officials visited Peru during the Fifth Cumbre América Latina, el Caribe y la Unión Europea.13 Initially, Peruvian government officials were against taking on the project, but eventually accepted the donation and began construction. Alan García was President at the time of the donation and wanted to avoid taking on the project “con la excusa que el Perú tenía otros problemas más urgentes que resolver” (“with the excuse that Peru had other more urgent problems to resolve”).14 Some supported the idea that the government should be focused exclusively on issues of economy and/or infrastructure of the country. This perspective is often paired with the sentiment that it does not serve to “reabrir viejas heridas” (reopen old wounds) with the new museum.15 However, with the involvement of Nobel Prize recipient Mario Vargas Llosa, the purpose “para recordar” (to remember) resonated over any opposition.16 Alexandra Hibbett, professor at the Universidad Católica and member of the LUM team, thinks government officials see this museum as a “thorn in their side” while they are focused on other issues.17

LUM is at the forefront of publicity when it comes to the memory museums of Peru, and yet, it is still hidden from those who are not actively seeking it out. The Peruvian government accepted the donation in 2009, but when I lived
in Lima from March to July 2014, most Peruvian citizens I asked about the museum were uncertain of the project and sometimes confused it with the Yuyanapaq exhibit. This was the case with Edthy Paredes Tomairo, age 47, and a native of Ayacucho who fled to Lima during the internal conflict when she was 15. Updates on the LUM project were posted via online articles, but much of what was accessible with a computer was kept out of the printed newspapers, the most readily accessible and affordable news format for the majority of Peruvians. The new museum has not been present in the news, nor was the inauguration of its cultural center.19

On LUM’s webpage, the team introduces LUM with a video that includes perspectives from Peruvian writers, artists, economists, and even a dancer. The voices of the victims from the regions outside of Lima are not heard in this initial introduction. In the video, a thought-provoking comment was made by Augusto Álvarez Rodrich, a Peruvian economist and journalist, when asked why Peruvians have places of memory. He responded, “Porque son lugares donde todos lo que tengan una visión contradictoria incluso que se oponga sobre ese tema pueden encontrar en este espacio un lugar para tolerarse más para comprender más lo que fue un periodo tan complejo de la historia peruana.” (“Because they are places where everyone that has contradicting visions, even those that oppose each other, about this topic can find in this space a place to tolerate more in order to understand more of what was a complex period of Peruvian history”).20 This brings many questions to the forefront: whose voices are truly being heard? Whose contradictions are valid? How does LUM’s potential audience determine what memories will be portrayed? The answers to these questions become very complicated when certain perspectives are publicized and others are silenced. With each concern regarding the new museum and memorials, there is an overarching theme of inclusion. However, this does not necessarily entail social inclusion, as the name of the establishment suggests is one of their main objectives. Rather, it involves the inclusion of diverse experiences related to the internal armed conflict, experiences that have the power to influence how people interpret their history, and ultimately, their truth.

Inclusion is sought after in one of the biggest issues surrounding the new museum – its content. When discussing the content with the women of ANFASEP, they were very concerned about why it has taken so long for the museum to open its doors.21 Seemingly unbeknown to them, there is a harmless explanation for this. The Yuyanapaq exhibit is no longer going into the new memory museum because the construction of the building was underestimated and there is not enough space to hold it.22 This means that the LUM team has had to plan something entirely new, resulting in a prolonged period of planning and preparation. ANFASEP’s apprehension suggests a lack of communication between themselves and the LUM team, which is problematic because ANFASEP is a human rights organization central to the issue. Maribel Ascarza is very concerned about what the LUM team is planning, insisting that the museum should be comprehensible for all people from all social strati.23 These preoccupations – the time it has taken to plan the museum and the extent to which the internal armed conflict is being analyzed – indicate that victims feel the academic work and the bias of political authority go hand in hand, or possibly that they are linking the two unnecessarily. Either way, they call into question an issue of inclusion – that those who are from communities not greatly connected with higher education are experiencing a barrier and greatly fear that the barrier will extend into the content of the permanent exhibit of LUM.

I myself had similar concerns when attending some of the cultural events at LUM. On July 22nd there was a book talk on Poesía y guerra interna en el Perú by Paolo de Lima, a Limeño poet with a PhD in Literature. The author and other guest speakers presented on poetry theory and the theory of the sublime proposed by Emmanuel Kant. As I looked around the room, roughly thirty
people made up the audience, and from the faces I could see, they appeared bored. I began to wonder if the majority of victims of the armed conflict could read or write and if they would be preoccupied with something as trivial as poetry, assuming that they existed outside of the academic realm. That space was one of privilege and higher education. A Peruvian academic, Oswaldo Reynoso, explained to the audience that he would have called the internal armed conflict a “guerra popular” because the poor were the true victims and the most intricately involved and trapped in the conflict. In that moment, the indigenous communities from regions outside of Lima were acknowledged, but only to a certain extent. They were the “other” to be studied and commented on, but not necessarily engaged in the construction of this country’s discourse on memory. Ayacuchan citizens could educate any audience just as well if given the chance. Many tell stories that contradict LUM’s claims that the team has adequately included a wide range of perspectives, taking all experiences into account. According to Adelina García Mendoza, president of ANFASEP, the LUM team should be consulting with the 11 provinces of Ayacucho before making any final decisions on what will be presented to the public. Both her and Maribel Ascarza, whose offices are located in ANFASEP’s museum, believed that they had not done sufficient investigation. The LUM constantly updates its Facebook page with workshops and events in different regions, which would suggest they are doing a thorough job. However, when talking with the women of ANFASEP, it is clear that the communities of Ayacucho feel left out of the process. How will the LUM team meet the needs and concerns of the victims that reside in Ayacucho? How will these victims be able to tell their stories, incorporating their reality within the museum, when Lima is eleven hours away by bus? Does LUM value their contribution and presence? Many skeptics, including Rosario Narvaez (APRODEH) and Edthy Paredes Tomairo, say that the state holds the power when it comes to constructing and presenting the content of the new museum and that people should be concerned that the perspectives of the indigenous populations will be left at the wayside.

This strong desire for inclusion is evident in all regions outside of Lima, not just Ayacucho. IDEHPUCP even published a booklet that formally acknowledged how representatives from different regions would approach the content of a national museum of memory. In this booklet, entitled Criterios básicos para un espacio de conmemoración de la violencia en el Perú: La centralidad de los derechos de las víctimas (Basic Criteria for a Space of Commemoration of the Violence in Peru: the Centrality of the Rights of the Victims), victims’ associations in San Martín formally concluded that in a national memory museum there should be a number of requirements for representation, including “Que el museo tenga 24 salas en las que se muestren todos los departamentos: los que sí fueron golpeados por la violencia y los que no lo fueron” (“That the museum has 24 rooms in which all the departments are shown: those that were hit by the violence and those that weren’t”). In the Junín region, representatives imagined a “museo con pequeños espacios que sean ocupados alternadamente por las diversas regiones” (“museum with small spaces that are occupied alternately by the diverse regions”). These department representatives promote a space that is welcoming to all interpretations of the past and contributions to the col-
lective memory. In further detail, the San Martín Region noted that they would require a mural of each region that displayed the names of all those who disappeared, were murdered, incarcerated, or tortured, as well as spoken testimonies, photos of the deceased, and “then and now” photos to show how the people were moving forward after the conflict. The representatives of the Junín Region called for spaces in which the victims could develop workshops, an auditorium for victims’ events, lodging for displaced victims, photographs and materials that represented loved ones that were lost, and a list of the names of all the towns that were affected by the conflict. These regional representatives are extremely victim-oriented when considering how to construct the memory of the internal conflict. It is evident that Maribel Ascarza shares similar goals. She said that there should be people at the museum to guide visitors who are not necessarily trained to be guides for tourists, but those who have actually been affected by the political violence. These are the people who would offer the “vivencias” (“lived experiences”) and “testimonios hablados” (“spoken testimonies”). This is a reality in the case of ANFASEP’s Museo de la Memoria, where an individual guides you through an eerie, personal, and even tearful description of each display. Whether or not these requirements will be reflected in LUM is yet to be known, as little information regarding the content of the museum has been released.

If the purpose of LUM is to truly educate and bring to light what happened during the internal conflict, then no topic should be shied away from. This was highlighted in the Huancavelica Region, where they stressed the necessity to show the facts relating to the conflict so that, more than just serving to remember, the space serves to bring justice to the victims. Justice still needs to be served; there are so many families still waiting for answers. However, Edthy Paredes Tomairo, an Ayacuchano refugee who now resides in Lima, said she was sure there were things so terrible they would never come to light to the masses. For example, she told of an instance when soldiers rounded up and killed groups of men, women, children, and elderly in front of a church. LUM team member Alexandra Hibbett said that a goal was to make the content family-oriented and child-friendly so that individuals of all ages could feel comfortable visiting, learning, and reflecting. This suggests that more graphic information may be excluded.

It is hard to say if the LUM team will find a way to present all of the facts when they are faced with the challenge of catering to a broad audience. In the video on LUM’s webpage, writer and journalist Rafo León Rodríguez says, “La amnesia peruana es una marea de aceite que crece. Tenemos tantos elementos de distracción, de evasión, de negación” (“The Peruvian amnesia is a tide of oil that grows. We have so many elements of distraction, of evasion, of negation”).33 This is a comment supposedly in support of what will be taking place at LUM, but one should be wary. Considering the fact that the state – which has distracted, evaded, and negated their own responsibility for the tragedy – oversees this museum which will be open to a large audience, it is possible that details of the memory of the internal armed conflict will be manipulated. Consequently, justice that academics, activists, and conscientious Peruvians are working towards may be hindered in this space.

Why is there tension surrounding the inclusion of the victims? Throughout Peru’s history, racism has been prominent, often keeping indigenous people at a disadvantage, alienating them in the name of progress. For example, during the internal armed conflict, pueblos were cut off from help. There was no police enforcement in certain communities. Victims of the internal armed conflict felt discrimination when they fled their homes in search of refuge in Lima. The city was far from refuge, presenting its own challenges and sometimes proving too difficult for those who then chose to return to their home provinces in spite of the danger. Edthy Paredes Tomairo recalled the extreme poverty that was the reality of these people upon arrival – daily life was daunting because the city was unwelcoming and
often times impossible for those who only spoke Quechua and didn’t know how to speak Spanish. Other crimes against humanity have directly affected indigenous people as opposed to the general population. For example, from 1995-2000, while the internal conflict was still taking place, Fujimori ordered the forced sterilization of 300,000 indigenous women in the Andes region.

Time and again the people living in regions outside of Lima have learned that they are not safe when it comes to the policies of the Peruvian government.

The opening events for LUM stirred up hurt, which has carried on since the conflict. The president of ANFASEP, Adelina García Mendoza, insisted she felt that the representatives from Ayacucho didn’t exist among the authority figures. There is concern that the indigenous people who are active with LUM are being used as props rather than actual contributors. Hibbett stated that there is criticism because those who do have more say in the museum are seen as the stereotypical “caviar,” an individual who is “left-wing, but who has a good lifestyle and doesn’t really know what they’re talking about.”

ANFASEP members and other activists are making efforts to be a part of the LUM and share their experiences, but it is possible that their power is stripped from them in the gatherings where academics, government officials, and others with higher authority are present.

Issues of discrimination have and will continue to complicate the effectiveness of communication and cooperation between authority figures and human rights organizations. When questioned about LUM, Adelina García Mendoza often moved conversation to inequities that still go unchallenged or unnoticed by the general population, but greatly affect the indigenous communities. For example, the CVR promised not only symbolic reparation, but also monetary reparation to victims. The Peruvian government said they would give ten thousand soles to each family for each disappeared or murdered family member. García Mendoza said this was not necessarily agreed upon. She also noted that the victims of la Cantuta, students and one faculty member in Lima who were murdered by the Armed Forces shortly after the Tarata Bombing, received more monetary reparation than the masses of victims native to other regions.

Another issue that LUM will answer upon opening its exhibit is naming the victims. Professor Alexandra Hibbett said that she has heard of the concern that the exhibit will be “too close to state discourse, therefore defending the Armed Forces and not…criticizing with sufficient evidence the fact that their violations of human rights were systematic and not just…accidents or excesses.” There is reason to be skeptical,
as President García, who was the one to accept the donation for LUM and begin the project, has played a controversial role in other memorial sites and events. At one point he discouraged el Ojo que Llora, instead encouraging the complaints of those who opposed the memorial and favored putting the past to rest. The issue was that the names of Senderistas were included on the list of victims. Furthermore, APRODEH leader Rosario Narvaez recalled, when the first rock was laid for LUM, President García gave a speech only mentioning victims of Sendero Luminoso, not those of the Armed Forces.

Overall, the main characters in the retelling of this national tragedy tend to be the indigenous townspeople and the subversives that formed Sendero Luminoso. The indigenous are constantly being portrayed as helpless victims and the Senderistas as ruthless killers that singlehandedly created the worst period of violence Peru has ever seen. Will these identities of the “poor indígena” and the “merciless Senderista” be challenged in any way by the LUM team or will they be perpetuated through this institution? According to Edthy Paredes Tomairo, the agency of the Ayacuchan townspeople was destroyed by the political violence and today reparations are not working to restore the sense of pride that once was there. For example, food is sent to towns, but the children are not taught how to work the land or share resources like their parents and elders did. Victims like Edthy and other human rights activists are hoping that those traditions will be restored and that memorials promote a stronger, positive, and thriving image of the indígenas - people who did what they could to defend themselves against intruders that threatened their livelihoods and the safety of their communities.

The intruders were not just the Senderistas, who are repeatedly chastised and blamed for the death and destruction that was a result of the conflict. Of equal importance is the question of confronting the Armed Forces and actions of the Peruvian government. The LUM team is aware of this and has even done workshops with soldiers and police officers to acknowledge their involvement and gain their insight for the set up of the museum. Their efforts have been posted on their Facebook page. A workshop was done on December 11, 2013 and at that time it was officially stated by the president of the organization Asociación de Viudas Madres y Sobrevivientes de miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas y Policía Nacional (AVISFAIP) that, “Debería dividirse eso, que no nos pongan en el mismo costal. ¿Quiénes comenzaron? Efectivamente, hubo personas dentro de las Fuerzas del Orden que cometieron excesos, pero deberían ponerlos con nombres y apellidos y no manchar a la institución” (That should be divided, so that they do not put us all in the same
Who started it? In fact, there were persons within the Enforcement that committed excesses, but they should put them with first and last names and not stain the institution").44

It is still a priority for this group to maintain a good name for the Peruvian government and its actions, to not “stain” something. However, in order for something to be stained it would need to have been clean in the first place, which is an issue that speaks directly to the actions of the Senderistas. There was a reason that people became so frustrated with the status quo, which is why the radical group was formed– to challenge a corrupt government that marginalized those outside of the city limits and allowed for an unequal distribution of wealth. But, no one is asking the Senderistas, jailed or living freely today, to tell their stories. In that same workshop a widow of an officer said she believed her husband would want that the mission of the Armed Forces be remembered in that they sacrificed their lives in order to give Peruvians peace.45

But in order to maintain peace in Lima, a peace that a privileged society may have enjoyed, the peace of the people of the Andean provinces was compromised. Regardless of the good intentions of the individual, the government and the Armed Forces must be held accountable for the sake of correctly constructing memory and avoiding the reoccurrence of this type of extreme violence. Finally, the reality of the politics of the museum is that it does not really matter what well-intentioned intellectuals or victims of the conflict contribute to the formation of the content because, in the end, only the board of commissioners will decide what goes into the museum. These commissioners put in absolutely no work and have no real ties to the issue, but they have the final say.46 This begs the question, is having a memorial of some sort better than not having one at all? Professor Alexandra Hibbett, someone who earned her spot on the LUM team by sending her critiques of the team’s original plans directly to Museum Director Denise Ledgard, believes so.47 It is better to have the memorials in the sense that they are physical reminders to Peruvians that the tragedy happened. These constructions of memory stand tall and, hopefully, will continue to serve as warnings “para que nunca se repita.” That mantra has been the main reason activists have worked so hard to preserve the memory of the internal armed conflict. Unfortunately, for something to never happen again, it would have to be an issue that has been resolved. In this case, it is evident that racism, discrimination, centralization of wealth, and subversive action has not been settled within Peru. Currently, the group Movimiento por Amnistía y Derechos Fundamentales (MOVADEF) is tied to the ideology of Abimael Guzmán and continues to challenge the current Peruvian government while contributing to drug trafficking in the Andes region.48 Members of MOVADEF are even present in various universities across the nation.49 Those following the outcome of LUM will just have to wait and see if this place of memory distracts Peruvians from present day concerns or contributes to their awareness of them.

El Santuario de la Memoria de la Hoyada (SMH) in Huamanga, Ayacucho is another up-and-coming memorial site dedicated to remembering the victims of the internal armed conflict. La Hoyada is a terrain where the army base and prison, Los Cabitos, was once located. Not only were citizens from the area brought there to be tortured and/or murdered, but also those from surrounding provinces. To this day, there are likely hundreds or even thousands of remains left buried by the Armed Forces, but only 109 have been exhumed.50 Many more victims were cremated in the oven that still stands ominously amongst the systematically exhumed mass graves. La Hoyada has been a place disregarded by the Peruvian government, even though the women of ANFASEP and other activists have been protesting and working to gain rights to this land in order to preserve it. This has been an urgent cause, as impoverished people have been building their homes, stores, and schools on the land that still contains human remains. Trash and graffiti litter the area – people either do not know or do not care what happened there.
In July of 2014, Maribel Ascarza noted that the women of ANFASEP had gained the rights to the area and were waiting to work with relatives of victims and local authorities in order to move forward with plans for the sanctuary.

The regional government has taken over the project and also created a committee that includes some of the women of ANFASEP to oversee it. At a formal ceremony marking the protection of the land for the SMH, Executive President of IDEHPUCP and former President of the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation, Salomón Lerner Febres, stated:

“Nos toca comprobar y denunciar que, a más de catorce años del fin del conflicto armado y a once años del entregado del Informa Final de la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, son pocos los pasos que han sido dados para remediar el daño cometido. El silenciamiento, la indiferencia y la mendacidad han corrido dos de las más grandes capacitadestad

Excavated mass graves at La Hoyada (Top left)

Trash piles such as this are seen scattered around La Hoyada. (Top right)

Oven at La Hoyada where the Peruvian Army (Ejército del Perú) cremated bodies of victims during the internal armed conflict (Left)

Photos by author
que poseemos los humanos como son la Razón y la Empatía. El racismo, con sus miles de caras, sigue latente entre nosotros. El desprecio por las leyes fundamentales de convivencia democrática es todavía moneda corriente en la vida pública y el abuse de quien tiene más poder parece seguir siendo una forma común del actuar cotidiano."

("It alarms us to check and denounce that, at more than fourteen years since the end of the armed conflict and eleven years since the delivery of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, there are few steps that have been made to remedy the damage done. The silencing, the indifference, and the mendacity have corroded two of the biggest capabilities that we humans possess which are Reason and Empathy. Racism, with its thousand faces, continues latent among us. The contempt for the fundamental laws of democratic coexistence is still common currency in public life and abuse from who has more power seems to be a common form of daily action.

He continues on later to say the same mantra that LUM is proposing – “para que nunca se repita.” And although this may be categorized under that same umbrella motive, the SMH serves as memory of the internal conflict in an extremely different way than the LUM. This space holds the Peruvian government accountable for past wrongs by preserving an area where they once committed their war crimes. It will be a stepping-stone for the collective memory of the tragedy, symbolizing a movement towards a more complete truth, a triumph for the victims and their own agency.

The SMH would include a path to walk across the exhumed graves, a fountain running from the oven, a small museum for artifacts that family members would like to donate, a mausoleum for victims’ remains, and a house of reconciliation where victims could go for psychological assessment and legal advice. This place would foster the healing of a community, exactly where community was once destroyed. This would directly address a previously mentioned concern – Edthy Paredes Tomairo made it a point to talk about how current reparations do not establish self-sustaining skills in communities that were ravaged during the conflict, skills that would promote their agency in the future and create a powerful and inclusive indigenous identity. In a community effort, the SMH plans to address that: “El Santuario para la Memoria es una verdadera oportunidad de dar un mensaje a los familiares afectados por el conflicto armado interno, un mensaje profundo, que materialice una voluntad compartida, una construcción en conjunto, es decirnos a todos los peruanos que somos un pueblo con la capacidad de abrazar al pasado y construir una visión de futuro optimista y espiritual” (“The Sanctuario para la Memoria is a true opportunity to give a message to the families affected by the internal armed conflict, a profound message, that materializes a shared will, a group construction, it’s to tell all Peruvians that we are a community with the ability to embrace the past and construct an optimistic and spiritual vision of the future”).

This optimistic future depends on the ability of symbolic reparation to successfully address what happened in the country while also drawing attention to what has yet to be resolved. The women of ANFASEP as well as other activists groups know that the fight is far from over, but the victory of SMH would have the potential to bring about a sense of change and hope. When asked whether or not the LUM could give the victims what they need in terms of a peace of mind, Edthy Paredes Tomairo did not believe so. A “tranquilidad” could not be achieved there. This tranquility may be feasible in a space that grants recognition of the past wrongs, highlights the lack of resolution that remains in the present day, and values an optimistic view of the future. “Para que no se repita” is important, but Peruvians need places of memory that let new generations understand activists work “para que nos damos cuenta de la injusticia que se queda” (“so that we realize the injustice that remains”). Injustice can be overcome by the peoples’ ability to work towards a more inclusive collective memory.
Endnotes


2. Fowks, “Perú ajusta cuentas con su pasado con el Lugar de la Memoria.”

3. Movimiento Ciudadano por los Derechos Humanos de Ayacucho, “Relanzan campaña para declarar a La Hoyada santuario de memoria.”

4. Pease García and Romero Sommer, La Política en el Perú del siglo XX.

5. Ibid.

6. Tomairo, Memoria del conflicto armado en el Perú - 1.


8. Cepeda Cáceres, Entrevista con IDEHPUCP.


11. Ascarza, Memoria del conflicto armado en el Perú - 4.

12. Peru Support Group, “HUMAN RIGHTS: Bagua 5 Years On; Lugar de La Memoria Opens.”

13. Cepeda Cáceres, Entrevista con IDEHPUCP.


15. La Republica, “Para Recordar.”


18. Tomairo, Memoria del conflicto armado en el Perú - 1.

19. Narvaez, Memoria del conflicto armado en el Perú - 3; Tomairo, Memoria del conflicto armado en el Perú - 1.

20. LUM, El LUM, La Memoria Y La Cultura Por Reconocidas Personalidades Peruanas.

21. Ascarza, Memoria del conflicto armado en el Perú - 4; García Mendoza, Memoria del conflicto armado en el Perú - 5.


24. Ibid.; García Mendoza, Memoria del conflicto armado en el Perú - 5.

25. Narvaez, Memoria del conflicto armado en el Perú - 3; Tomairo, Memoria del conflicto armado en el Perú - 1.

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