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
Dear Reader,

It is my hope that the Journal of Undergraduate International Studies will stimulate international dialogue on our campus and beyond. I also hope that the work we publish will highlight international themes in a different perspective, or bring to your awareness global situations that are new for you. Toward these ends, it is my privilege to present to you the unique and insightful essays contained in our Fall 2007 issue. What you hold in your hands would not have been possible without the support of many individuals on campus. Though too numerous to mention everyone, I would like to thank a few in particular. I would like to thank Jeff Shokler and Mary Czyszczak-Lyne for being unswerving guides and for putting up with my many questions. I would like to thank Professor Scott Straus for providing key advice when I needed it. I would also like to thank Professor John Coleman, the University of Wisconsin Foundation, the Coddon Family Foundation, Aaron Brower and Steve Smith for offering their support and encouragement.

To all those authors that submitted and that we were privileged enough to read this year: once again, there were far too many excellent papers. Regrettably we could not take them all. Thank you for sharing your intellectual pursuits and gifts with us. I also would like to extend a debt of gratitude to my staff. I could not have asked for a more committed, perceptive and intelligent group. Without your work and patience this would not have come off nearly as well as it did.

Most importantly thanks to you the reader, for your continued interest.

Daniel J. Knudsen, Editor-in-Chief.



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
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Blood on the Pitch

By Daniel Consorte Widis

“...these absurd football warriors’ turned almost overnight into soldiers in a cruel war. The symbolism of fan aggression was easily transformed, first into aggressive political symbolism, then into military symbolism, demonstrating that ‘it is possible to die by symbolism and that this was not purely symbolic at least for the dying ones”¹

Yugoslavia: The Brazil of Europe²

Inside Dinamo Zagreb’s historic Maksimir stadium stands a memorial carrying the inscription: “To the fans of this club, who started the war with Serbia at this ground on 13 May 1990.”³ On that day, two years before war “officially” broke out, Dinamo Zagreb was set to play their Yugoslavian rivals, Red Star Belgrade. Over 25,000 fans entered the stadium and within their ranks were two of the Federation’s most notorious football hooligan groups: Dinamo Zagreb’s “Bad Blue Boys” (BBB) and Red Star Belgrade’s Delije⁴. A fortnight before the Maksimir riot, the ultra-nationalist Franjo Tudjman was elected president of Croatia. Calling upon Ustaše symbols and myths, Tudjman fashioned himself as Croatia’s foil to Slobodon Milošević, who two years prior rose to power in Serbia with the help of similar nationalist rhetoric. The political atmosphere surrounding the stadium was understandably tense.

Within minutes of the game starting both groups of fans began hurling invectives across the pitch; the Delije chanting such antagonizing slogans as “we will kill Tudjman”, and the BBB responding with a shower of rocks and stones.⁵ Eventually, both groups decided

to tear down the fences separating them from the pitch and charged the field. The result was a battleground. The climax of the riot, and the one that most strikingly paralleled the dire situation within the dissolving Federation was when Dinamo captain Zvonimir Boban assaulted a police officer who was beating a Dinamo fan⁶. The actions of the BBB and the Delije were in no way a spontaneous expression of frustration, but were instead part of an elaborately prearranged showcase of violent political, prearranged choreography. Both groups strategically placed acid (to burn through the fences) and stones throughout the stadium prior to the match⁷. The BBB and the Delije were ready and prepared for their transition from symbolic, ritualistic actors of ethnic hatred, to actual violent actors well before the match began. It was a transition that Yugoslavia would not recover from and one that would play a terrifying role in the coming conflict.

As demonstrated by the Maksimir riot, sports have a striking ability to give a public forum for nationalistic, racial, and ethnic sentiments. Hitler’s Third Reich used sports not only for physical fitness, but also to justify the inherent superiority of the German and Aryan race.⁸ The 1936 Olympics held in Berlin were characterized and presented by Hitler as a showcase of Aryan superiority and physical prowess.⁹ Football specifically was used by Mussolini as a medium to illustrate fascist solidarity and to distribute a collectivizing sense of Italian identity.¹⁰ Allen Sack and Zeljan Suster note the homogenizing and ideologically galvanizing aspects of football, asserting that it “...provides opportunities for thousands of spectators to collectively reaffirm their commitments to beliefs, values, and myths that underlie their cultural identity... Although ideologically neutral, sport often reflects and reinforces national rivalries and age old grievances that project from sources far beyond the playing field.”¹¹ This ability to create

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Photo by Michal Zacharzewski from www.sxc.hu

national narratives and emanate questions of ethnicity and identity proved particularly useful in the former Yugoslavia. Under the watchful eye of Milošević, the storied club Red Star Belgrade became first a bastion of support and propaganda and later a population ready

The most fanatic supporters of Red Star are the Delije, an “Ultra” group of hooligan fans. Ultra organizations are characterized by groups of supporters located in certain, prearranged sections of the stadium that carry out extensive choreography, usually in the form of chants, flags, banners and flares.

to kill for “greater Serbdom”. The Delije, the fanatical hooligan fan group of Red Star, would soon make up one of Serbia’s most feared and violent paramilitary units. The Tigers, as their leader Željko Ražnatović (more informally known as Arkan) would call them, committed atrocities throughout Yugoslavia, and were involved in some of the most infamous and well documented genocides of the war¹². Red Star Belgrade, a team with a glowing history

and past, became a team synonymous with virulent ethnic nationalism and genocide.

From its inception in 1945, Red Star Belgrade has known only success. Within the Yugoslav league, Red Star won eighteen league titles,

twelve league cups, and numerous European trophies. The most fanatic supporters of Red Star are the Delije, an “Ultra” group of hooligan fans. Ultra organizations are characterized by groups of supporters located in certain, prearranged sections of the stadium that carry out extensive choreography, usually in the form of chants, flags, banners and flares. Members of these groups experience the pitfalls and success of the team in a more

acute and exaggerated way than ordinary fans, creating a feeling of intimacy and closeness with the team.¹³ Chants and banners directed at opposing players, many times describing gruesome acts of violence or ethnic slurs, are common and are meant to demoralize the opposition as much as they are designed to galvanize the local team. Many challenge the authenticity of this display, arguing instead that this action is mainly “ritualistic” and exists primarily on a “symbolic plane.” Simply put, the vast majority of choreography carried out by Ultra groups in the stands is for show and public display rather than physical action. Therefore, Ultra members come to represent symbolic actors carrying out performances within a hyper-dramatized and elaborate setting. Thus, some would argue that football hooliganism is merely performative. Though fighting and action does take place between rival Ultra groups, it is usually on a small scale and is governed by explicit rules that limit fatalities.¹⁴ The Delije was almost identical



to other ultra groups across the globe, except in one key aspect; the Delije left the stands, rejected symbolic action, and went to war.¹⁵

A local sports writer attached to the Tigers wrote during the conflict in 1992: “I wind back the film of my memories and distribute these brave boys through all the stadiums of Europe. I know exactly where each of them stood, who first started the song, who unfurled his flag, who lit the first torch. The Delije have left their supporters’ props somewhere under the arches of Marakana stadium and have set off to war with rifles in their hands.”¹⁶ The transformation is astonishing. Nationalistic chants, which rang from the Marakana stadium since the death of Tito, suddenly turned into action. Banners and songs, which depicted and described horrific actions against Croatian civilians and political leaders, came to life. In short, symbolism and symbolic action turned into reality. The question then is why. What prompted the Delije to leave the stands and fulfill the horrible fantasies of their hooligan dreams?

The role of paramilitary forces in Yugoslavia has been well documented and explored. John Mueller explores the impacts such groups have on ethnic conflict and specifically ethnic cleansing. He argues that, historically, ethnic cleansing lacks public support and is not a widespread populace uprising but rather the actions of small isolated groups. He specifically looks at the role the Tigers played in jumpstarting and continuing the war in Yugoslavia.¹⁷ Peter Andreas examines the situation through a much broader lens, looking at the role the criminal underworld played in the conflict. He argues that the criminal underworld provided the former Yugoslav republics with valuable supplies. Without these supplies, the war effort would have been impossible.¹⁸ Both of these authors look at the role of the Tigers, but neither asks the crucial question of why the transition took place. Neither tackles the subject of paramilitaries epistemologically; rather, both present their arguments with the existence of paramilitaries already established. Ivan Čovolić explores Yugoslavian football from an anthropological perspective and presents a lucid analysis of the transformation of Red Star hooligans into soldiers.¹⁹ Čovolić describes the transformation, but again fails to

ask the crucial question of why. Hooligan fans exist throughout the world; what made the Delije act so distinctly?

In this paper I will seek to find the answer to this question. I will examine not only the motivations for the Delije in joining the conflict, but also analyze the specific conditions within Yugoslavia that might help to explain the Delije’s unique transformation. Two travelogues will be primarily used throughout the paper: Franklin Foer’s *How Soccer Explains the World* and Jonathan Wilson’s *Behind the Curtain: Travels in Eastern European Football*. Foer’s work is based on his travels in early 2000, and is an attempt to observe and critique the failures and successes of globalization through the medium of football. Foer travels throughout the world examining the delicate interplay between culture, government, economics, and football.²⁰ Wilson’s travelogue is based on his lifelong work covering eastern European football and his travels in the area in late 2001. His work is far more narrow in scope and less intimidating in its aims. Wilson explores the former USSR satellite states and republics, describing the impact its dissolution has had on the countries and their football leagues. Though the author argues that eastern European culture, politics, and society are important, the focus is primarily on football.²¹ Both authors attempt to take an argumentative position throughout their work, but this never comes to fruition. Instead, they present narrative accounts of their travels, making occasional insights to broader social and cultural conditions; under the guise of journalistic profundity, both authors live out their football fantasies.

This paper will move in three parts. The first will explore the historical background of the former Yugoslavia beginning in World War II. The atrocities and actions of the Tigers will be detailed up until 1995.²² Second, the paper will explore the unique role Red Star Belgrade played in Serbian political mythology and its contribution to Serbian nationalism. This section will analyze the motivations of the Delije and will utilize Foer and Wilson to present contrasting opinions of Red Star’s political and symbolic importance within Serbia. The last section will examine the character and conditions surrounding the war

in the former Yugoslavia. This portion will rely heavily on John Muller’s argument that the apparent populist ethnic war that erupted in the former Yugoslavia was an illusion constructed by Tudjman and Milošević. Widespread support for the war was lacking, and this in turn may help to explain the transformation of the Delije from symbolic actors into paramilitary soldiers. Foer and Wilson are used throughout the section to provide further warrants and new insight into Muller’s argument.

Delicate Foundations: The Formation and Dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia

The Balkan wars of the early and late 1990’s, in which the Tigers were to play a major role, have their foundations in the ethnic hostilities of the Second World War. Even within this supposed backdrop of ethnic hostility following the death of Tito, the dissolution of Yugoslavia was not inevitable. Instead, its tragic demise was the work of power hungry leaders who were set to gain more from the country’s collapse than its smooth transition into democracy.²³ Though political manipulation was needed to tear the nation apart, the seeds of its demise were sewn nearly fifty years earlier, during World War II and the Nazi occupation of the Yugoslav Republic. During World War II and Nazi occupation, Ante Pavelić, exiled since 1929, was allowed to fulfill his political ambitions and established an independent Croatia under fascist Ustaše rule. The atrocities committed by the Ustaše against Serbians living within Croatia are simply horrifying; “the Ustaše turned the country into one great slaughterhouse.”²⁴ Death squads moved throughout the region either killing indiscriminately or transporting civilians to concentration camps scattered throughout the region, the most notorious being Jasenovac.²⁵ The seemingly limitless brutality of the Ustaše only swelled the ranks of the local resistance movements, mainly the Serb royalist Chetniks and the Yugoslav communist Partisans.²⁶ The Partisans under the command of Josip Broz Tito represented the “Yugoslav” ideal to the fullest, and found themselves at the end of the war in control of the rump Federation.



Photo by Michal Zacharzewski from www.sxc.hu

Communist Yugoslavia, under the Tito dictatorship, took a surprising turn in 1948 with the sudden break with Stalin and the Comintern. This dissociation with Stalin and the Communist bloc placed Yugoslavia within a precarious but beneficial situation; it gave Tito the freedom to implement aggressive economic reforms and allowed him to construct an aura of political infallibility that was usually only reserved for the Russian despot. Freed from Stalinism, Yugoslavs were able to look at Tito for guidance and, rather than worshiping Stalin, Tito became the benevolent patriarch of Yugoslavia. Tito was able to successfully suppress the question of national identity, or use competing nationalist movements against each other to keep the fragile nation together and thereby enhance his own power. During the 1974 “Croatian Spring”, a period of intense Croatian nationalism, Tito was able to pit Zagreb and Belgrade in such a way that suppressed the potency of both camps, but further enflamed ethnic sentiments; Tito was able to enhance his power, but set the stage for

The country was nearing a **breaking point**, and it would only take the shrewd dealings of a Serbian **demagogue** to bring the Yugoslavian **dream** crashing down.

tragedy.²⁷

With Tito’s death in May of 1980, the glue holding together the republics of Yugoslavia began to disappear. At the time of Tito’s death, Yugoslavia was divided into six republics and two autonomous provinces. Each area was represented on the eight-bodied Yugoslavian Presidential Council, which was the most powerful political organ within the Yugoslavian bureaucracy.²⁸ The leader of this council changed annually and cycled through each of the republics, ensuring ethnic equality. Tito’s political legacy, the Constitution of 1974, was incomprehensible and created nothing more than a giant power vacuum. While he was alive, Tito acted with absolute power, leaving the exact workings of legislative and executive organizations horribly convoluted.²⁹ The economic situation facing the nation at the time of Tito’s death was also grim. Slovenia and Croatia continued to economically out-produce their southern counterparts, and both republics saw disproportionately large amounts of their GDP going to help the poorer southern regions.³⁰ The country was nearing a breaking point, and it would only take the shrewd dealings of a Serbian demagogue to bring the Yugoslavian dream crashing down.

On September 24, 1986 the Yugoslavian

newspaper *Večernje Novosti* released the “Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts”. The document claimed that Serbs throughout Yugoslavia faced rampant political and economic discrimination and, in Kosovo, faced outright extermination.³¹ Members of Serbia’s Communist party rallied against the memorandum and its nationalistic message. The leader of the Serbian Communist party, however, remained silent. Rather than speak out publicly against the memorandum, Slobodan Milošević let others condemn the article for him. Milošević’s political aspirations were much grander than just local Communist leader; he dreamed of becoming the next Tito and expanding his power over the whole of Yugoslavia.³² To achieve this end Milošević needed to tap into a resource whose political power was farther-reaching and more potentially destructive than the current Communist apparatus offered: ethnic nationalism.

Milošević found his opportunity on April 24, 1987 on a visit to Kosovo. Going there to discuss relations between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs, Milošević orchestrated a political masterpiece. Kosovar Serbs began to scuffle with local Albanian police outside the discussion hall. The conference was halted, and Milošević went outside to observe the



situation. After watching the violence briefly, Milošević addressed the Kosovar Serbs with a statement that would irreparably alter Yugoslavian politics: “No one should dare to beat you.”³³ Thus began Milošević’s political career as Serb nationalist. This transition was not spontaneous, but instead was very much premeditated. Milošević’s supporters had traveled beforehand to strategically place rocks and other weapons for the Kosovar Serbs to use against the police force.³⁴

The next few months would see Milošević sharpen his nationalist message and expand his base of support. By December of 1987, Milošević had become President of Serbia. For the next two years Milošević held rallies galvanizing Serbian support for Kosovo and expanding his support throughout the Yugoslavian bureaucracy. By installing loyalists on the Yugoslavian Presidential Council, Milošević was able to control half of the eight votes on the council, giving him almost complete control.³⁵ Milošević’s nationalist goading succeeded in riling up both Slovenian and Croatian nationalism. On May 30th 1990, the Croatian nationalist Franjo Tuđman was elected president of Croatia. Tuđman used many of the same nationalist tricks as Milošević, calling on Ustaše imagery and myths to incite feelings of Croatian nationalism and separatism. As dissolution seemed more and more likely in the summer of 1990, Slovenia and Croatia began seizing arms from the local Territorial Defense bases. These regional outposts, which were unaffiliated with the Yugoslavian army (JNA), were constructed to arm the local republics in case of foreign occupation. Designed to maintain the sovereignty of the state, these depots would now be used to arm nationalist republics in their drive to rip Yugoslavia apart.³⁶

Milošević continued to use the Yugoslavian federal system and the Presidential Council to keep Croatia and Slovenia in line and to paint them as ethnic agitators and secessionists. It was through this stance that Milošević was able to paint himself as the true “Yugoslav”, fighting the forces of Croatian and Slovenian nationalism.³⁷ Milošević, by co-opting and controlling the JNA, attempted to suppress Slovenian and Croatian movements for autonomy in a futile attempt to keep the

dissolving republic together.³⁸

It was clear by January 1991 that Croatia and Slovenia were determined to leave Yugoslavia, and the dream of maintaining the state had disappeared. Thus, Milošević gave up on his Tito-esque aspirations and instead focused on achieving “all Serbs in Yugoslavia in one state.”³⁹ To this end, Slovenia’s secession mattered little. Croatia’s independence though would result in the loss of territory dominated by ethnic Serbs, a proposal that clashed with Milošević’s dream of “greater Serbia.”⁴⁰ On the June 25, 1991 both Croatia and Slovenia elected to leave Yugoslavia. The “Ten Day War” between the JNA and Slovenia started immediately, and saw the JNA’s sound defeat. With Slovenia officially removed from Yugoslavia, Milošević was able to focus on Serbs within Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and their inclusion and protection within a greater Serbian state. It was within this context that Arkan’s Tigers, formerly the Ultra group Delije, committed their campaign of terror.

Željko Ražnatović, or Arkan, the official leader of the Tigers rose to prominence in 1986 as an undercover agent and assassin for the Yugoslav State Security Service (UDBA).⁴¹ It was while employed by the UDBA that Arkan met Milošević and was asked to channel the nationalistic, yet apolitical ethnic passions of the Red Star Belgrade’s Ultras into Milošević loyalists.⁴² Since the mid-1980’s Serbian football fans had brought ethnic and nationalist sentiments into the stands. For Serbs, ethnic identification trumped club loyalty.⁴³ Because Red Star operated between two spheres, a popular Serbian football club and an important symbol within Serbian political mythology, Milošević had to earn their support. At the time of Arkan’s arrival, various competing Ultra groups existed at Red Star. Arkan immediately transformed and standardized the various groups into one super Ultra, the Delije.⁴⁴ The group saw further changes when Arkan transformed them from drunken hooligans into an organized and strictly regimented Ultra.⁴⁵ Drawing heavily from the ranks of the Delije, the Tigers were officially formed on October 11, 1991, and began training at a government supplied station in Erdut, Croatia later that month. The Serbian government had made the explicit decision to

begin arming the Delije.⁴⁶

From the beginning, the Tigers took part in Serbian offensives into Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. The Tigers’ fighting strength was constantly in flux. At the most, they constituted a force of 200 men. Most sources, though, place their regular fighting strength around sixty.⁴⁷ This paramilitary force terrorized, murdered, and looted civilian targets throughout the region. Most notoriously, the Tigers took charge at the genocides in Vukovar, Bijeljina, and Sasina. On November 20, 1991, at Vukovar, the Tigers assisted in the murder of 255 Croatian civilians.⁴⁸ In March and April of 1992 the Tigers besieged the town of Bijeljina. Photographs taken during this attack, most specifically the shot of a Tiger kicking in the skull of a Muslim woman, created immediate political backlash and dramatically altered the West’s perception of Serbian aggression.⁴⁹ In September of 1995, the Tigers entered the town of Sasina and murdered 65 non-Serbian civilians.⁵⁰ Between 1991 and 1995, the Tigers were also active in the Knin and Krajina, and the cities Brcko and Zvornik. Within these locations, the Tigers either took a leading role in the local population’s displacement or were under the command of the JNA.⁵¹ When the Dayton agreement was signed in December of 1995, ending the conflict, the Tigers had been responsible for the deaths of at least 2,000 people.⁵²

“Mes que un Club”⁵³

Red Star Belgrade is unique within the pantheon of European football. Besides being a perennial domestic and European powerhouse, Red Star represents far more than just leisurely activity on a Saturday afternoon. Much in the same way that FC Barcelona has come to represent the political and social cause of Catalan independence, Red Star Belgrade has found itself as the symbolic embodiment of “Serbdom.”⁵⁴ This symbolism is not contrived nor is in any way the result of political manipulation; instead, the vibrant nationalism that reverberates around Marakana stadium stems from the founding and history of the football club.⁵⁵ Though outright expression of nationalism was held in check during Tito’s

From the very beginning Red Star held a unique political space within Yugoslavian football. As was the norm within Communist countries, each football team was created and supported by some arm of the vast communist government bureaucracy. The patrons of Red Star were not the JNA or a specific trade union, but was instead the local Belgrade police.

reign, his death and the accession of Milošević removed any barriers to vocal self-expression: “We are the Valiants from proud Serbia/Come on to the terraces, greet the Serbian race/ From Kosovo to Knin, Serbs stand shoulder to shoulder...”⁵⁶ This inherent nationalism may help to explain why the Delije were so motivated to leave the safety of the stands of Marakana stadium for the battlefield.

From the very beginning Red Star held a unique political space within Yugoslavian football. As was the norm within Communist countries, each football team was created and supported by some arm of the vast communist government bureaucracy. The patrons of Red Star were not the JNA or a specific trade union, but was instead the local Belgrade police. Having such close ties to the Serbian dominated police had a drastic impact on the political character of the club. Franklin Foer notes that Red Star had no choice but to accept the cause of Serbian nationalism:

In Belgrade, the army supported Partizan and the police backed Red Star. To Serb nationalists, the army represented the enemies of their cause. The ideology of the communist army rejected any notion of separate Serb identity as anathema to worker solidarity and ethnic harmony. Tito's partisans, the namesake of the army club, had murdered, jailed, and beat the Chetniks, the army of Serb nationalists ... It had suppressed the Serbian Orthodox church. With such odious opponents Red Star became a home for those Serbs with aspirations of reclaiming their nation.⁵⁷

Thus, the historical injustices of the past came to be retold within the stands of Marakana stadium. Each victory that Red Star achieved was a victory not only for the fans, but for Serbs nationalists everywhere who dreamed of an independent Serbian state.

For Jonathan Wilson, this revisionist history rings hollow. Wilson paints Red Star as a club founded by Communists and deliberately named after Communist iconography, thus making it anything but an inherently “Serbian”

institution. Though Red Star did represent a bastion of “anti-Tito and anti-federalist” feelings, it acquired this identity because of its attraction by “the poor and the disaffected” within Yugoslav society.⁵⁸ But Wilson’s observations seem to ignore the role the Serbian police played in the founding of the club, and the impact their political beliefs had on shaping its character. Throughout Tito’s reign, it was the local police forces that caused the most political agitation because of their predominately homogenous ethnic makeup. Within this environment, ethnic grievances trumped greater Yugoslav concerns. Thus, as the local republics became more ethnically aware throughout Tito’s rule, so did their police forces. Though the political alignment was most likely more covert than Foer describes, believing that Red Star operated within a sphere of ethnic neutrality is a mistake.

The Serbian nationalism that Red Star harbored fully blossomed in earnest after the death of Tito. The literary critic Petar Džadžić highlighted the importance of supporting Red Star Belgrade, claiming that it was one of four key tenets in projecting true Serbian identity.⁵⁹ For Serb parents, true education involved not just enrolling their children in local schools, but a type of social education that could only be achieved through Red Star matches. One instance of this behavior saw a child miss two days of school to return only carrying a note from his father: “Madam, I took my son to the Red Star game in Bulgaria in order to give him some practical lessons in patriotism, and its up to your conscience to decide whether to consider those lessons administratively justified or not.”⁶⁰ For Serbs living outside the republic of Serbia, supporting Red Star was an expression of an otherwise closeted identity: “For Serbs from Croatia, Red Star is practically a part of their national identity! Until recently they did not dare to say aloud what they were by nationality, but they could say who they supported—always!”⁶¹ Red Star operated as a covert vehicle for nationalist passions, allowing individuals to conceal their greater visions of “greater Serbdom” under the red and blue of

Red Star.

This authentic nationalism throughout the stands of Marakana stadium was not initially siphoned through any particular political lens. Red Star prided itself as the apolitical expression of Serbian nationalism. Instead of despising a specific political party, Red Star fans insisted on hating only one group: FC Partizan.⁶² Once dormant, from the early eighties on, Marakana stadium was transformed into an unfiltered expression of Serbian nationalism. Various Chetnik and Serbian Orthodox iconography was showcased throughout the stands as was a plethora of Serbian politicians and historical figures. Vuk Drašković, the leader of the Serbian Renewal party, was a favorite of the Marakana faithful. It’s important to understand that the nationalism present within Marakana stadium was in no way wholly supportive of Milošević; Red Star represented Serbian nationalism in its purest and most apolitical form. Thus when Arkan was hired to transform the eclectic passions of Red Star into the unified pro-Milosevic Delije, he was dealing with fans that were truly committed to the cause of nationalism, but simply lacked political direction. Through clever manipulation Milošević filled this void, but he would not be able to control the authentic nationalistic passions of the Delije forever.

Following the conclusion of the Kosovo War in June of 1999, Milošević’s “greater Serbdom” campaign left Serbia in an unfortunate position. His actions had resulted in NATO bombings that left the country’s infrastructure and economy in shambles. Serbian opposition to Milošević continued to harden up until 2000, but fear kept public displays underground and hidden.⁶³ All of this changed though at the most unlikely of place: Marakana Stadium. The Delije, the group that had just a few years earlier carried out Milošević’s plans of genocide, rose up in protest. Jonathan Wilson captures this remarkable and politically profound reversal:

“I was there,” Ljiljana told me. “What happened was unbelievable. You have to understand that before that day, even if



we didn't like Milosevic, we wouldn't dare say that." As Red Star romped to a 4-0 win, the Delije shouted, "Do Serbia a favour, Slobodan, and kill yourself" – a taunt with a particular bard given the history of suicide in Milosevic's family. The police weighed in, but the Delije fought back. A Red Star banner was seized, and two policemen trampled on it. As they did so, though, they were approached by the Red Star coach, Slavoljub Muslin, who persuaded them to give him the flag, and threw it back over the restraining hedge and into the crowd. Symbolically, Muslin, and thus Red Star, were seen to have joined the protest.⁶⁴

From that point on every Red Star game became a political rally against Slobodan Milošević.⁶⁵ The climax was to come in September of 2000 after Milošević's apparent defeat to Vojislav Koštunica. After demanding a recount, and then skewing the results, Milošević was declared the winner, though his victory though would be short lived. Protests immediately broke out throughout Serbia and the Delije found themselves at the front of the resistance movement. Joined by thousands of other opposition members, they immediately

Red Star's long **history** as a bastion for Serb nationalistic feelings and the Delije's role in disposing Milošević, goes a long way in **validating** their authenticity as **nationalists**.

set fire to the state television station and after hours of tension, stormed the parliament building on a search for evidence of Milošević's corruption.⁶⁶ Hours later Koštunica addressed the Delije and the thousands of other rebels: "Good evening, liberated Serbia."⁶⁷

In this way, the Delije operated within Serbian politics in a profound and effective way. From the beginning, Red Star and her fans represented the most authentic form of Serbian nationalism within the country. Though not immune to political manipulation, the Delije acted in what they believed to be the best interests of Serbia. When Milošević came to power guaranteeing "greater Serbdom" and "all Serbs in Yugoslavia in one state", the Delije were quick to respond. Not only did they fully embrace this idea in the stands, but they actually turned their sentiments into physical action. Much of Ultra displays are hyper-

dramatized and lack true authenticity; the Delije were unique in their full commitment and passion for Serbian nationalism. They rejected symbolic action alone because their beliefs were not just symbolic. Once it was apparent that Milošević was solely interested in promulgating and sustaining power, and not concerning with improving the conditions within Serbia, the Delije responded. Resisting Milošević showed that their true commitment lay not with the Serbian demagogue, but with the protection and vitality of their nation.

This being said, not all the Delije were nationalists, and not all the Delije joined the Tigers. Other factors outside of nationalism played a significant role in convincing members of the Delije to join up with the paramilitary force. The actions of the Tigers during the Balkan wars paints a picture of a group inspired by more than just ethnic nationalism. Looting and burglary were commonplace when the group arrived in a new town. Stealing jewelry, furniture, or other valuables, became just as important as capturing territory for the Tigers.⁶⁸ Describing the looting, a witness told an American reporter that, "When they

entered a cleansed Muslim house, a couple of them would head for the kitchen and start moving out kitchen appliances. Others would go for the television and the VCR. Somebody else would start digging in the garden, looking for buried jewelry. You could always recognize Arkan's men. They had dirty fingernails from the digging."⁶⁹ Thus the impetus to join the Tigers was not solely based on some morally righteous conception of Serbian nationalism, but also to make a quick buck within an environment that afforded limited economic opportunities. John Mueller agrees, believing that acting under the guise of nationalism was a gross misrepresentation: "In the end, the wars rather resembled the movie images of the American Wild West or of gangland Chicago, and often had far less to do with nationalism than with criminal opportunism and sadistic cruelty, often enhanced with liquor—liquid courage."⁷⁰ Though Muller makes a valid

point, and there were economic benefits to joining the Tigers, the vast majority of the Delije simply believed in the goal behind the Serb offensive: reclaiming displaced Serbs and land for Serbia. Red Star's long history as a bastion for Serb nationalistic feelings and the Delije's role in disposing Milošević, goes a long way in validating their authenticity as nationalists. Though economic opportunism may have played a role, one should not be quick to discount the impact nationalism had on members of the Delije to leave the stands of Marakana stadium for the battlefields of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Balkan Gerrymandering: The War in Yugoslavia

The Balkan war of secession which consumed the countries of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina was the first of its kind within Europe. Rather than focusing on the eradication of either nation, the war instead focused on the redrawing and reconfiguring of the boundaries between the nations in an attempt to create more homogenous ethnic states. After Milošević realized his inability to keep the Yugoslav republics united, he accepted that his only viable chance of expanding his power was to increase the territory of Serbia to include ethnic Serbs living within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. This meant not only conquering territory that officially belonged to the other republics but also entailed moving populations of ethnic Croats and Muslims out of "Serbian areas." Thus, the war was more about population transfers than it was defeating conventional forces. It was within this context that the war between the Yugoslav republics began in 1991.

The character of the war in the former Yugoslavia precipitated the need for a different type of military force. Since the emphasis was on population transfers and the deportations or removal of thousands of undesirables, conventional armies would be ineffective. The government needed relatively small-sized forces that could enter into enemy controlled villages, terrorize and harass the local constituency, and use any means necessary

to force the local non-Serbian population to leave. The Delije were perfect for this task.⁷¹ Thanks to their weekly clashes with the police, the Delije were accustomed to violence and knew how to handle themselves within urban environments. Once the Serbian government realized the potential for paramilitary groups in the coming conflict, Arkan was instructed to begin training and transforming the Delije into the Tigers.⁷² The small size of the force allowed it to move effortlessly throughout the former Yugoslavia. Thus, the type of conflict in Yugoslavia created a niche for an unconventional type of military force, one which the Delije perfectly filled.

Though the character of the war necessitated the use of paramilitary forces such as the Tigers, the most persuasive and pressing reason for their use during the war was that no other military force existed. Before the war, Yugoslavia was protected by the JNA, a multi-ethnic apolitical organization. None of the republics were supposed to have explicit control over the army, but Milošević's tainting and political manipulation of the institution turned it into an arm of the Serbian political machine. The army leadership though, which was created and raised in an environment without ethnic barriers or distinction, encountered major problems when the conflict began in earnest.⁷³ Non-Serbian generals were uncomfortable carrying out Belgrade's offensives and the military bureaucracy quickly completely broke down after the war began.⁷⁴

Resistance to Serbian military expansion within the JNA was not just limited to the military elite, disenchantment also effected ordinary soldiers. The most common perception of the conflict in Yugoslavia paints it as a populist war between enraged ethnic groups ready to repay past injustices. This perception is grossly inaccurate. The overwhelming victories that both Tudjman and Milošević achieved were misrepresentative of the constituent's true feelings.⁷⁵ Though Tudjman won almost 70% of the seats in the Croatian parliament, he only received 42% of the vote. Milošević's support was even more overrepresented, winning 78% of the seats in parliament with less than a majority of the votes.⁷⁶ The rallies that Milošević held throughout Yugoslavia were more indicative of his ability to contrive

and corrupt than of his ability to awaken the Serbian ethnic conscience.⁷⁷ The results of one public opinion poll from that election year further showcased the ethnic passivity within Yugoslavia. When asked the question, "Do you agree that every (Yugoslav) nation should have a national state of its own?", many responded in a way that opposed the commonly inferred nationalistic fervor that was "sweeping the nation": 16% percent completely agreed, 7% agreed to some extent, 10% were undecided, 6% did not completely agree, and a massive 61% did not agree at all.⁷⁸ These statistics call into question the expansive and overwhelming support the local nationalist leaders actually garnered in their respective countries. This lack of support would manifest itself most

In other words, the lack of support for the war, and the inability of Milošević to effectively create a conventional armed force necessitated the formation and transformation of the Delije into the Tigers. Paramilitaries were the only force that Belgrade was able to easily and effectively recruit and deploy throughout the region.

acutely when the war, and subsequent calls for conscription were announced.

It soon became strikingly apparent that finding men willing to go off to war for the cause of "greater Serbia" was going to be difficult. Mutinies against conscription were prevalent throughout Serbia and some 150,000 young males immediately went underground after the war began. In the end, "only 50 percent of Serbian reservists and only 15 percent in Belgrade obeyed orders to report for duty."⁷⁹ Foer gives a more personal depiction of the draft dodging and the extent people would go to avoid service:

Romantic trappings of war could be found everywhere... But Serbia didn't have enough men its army willing to go off and do the dirty work. Draft dodging became a rite of passage. My translator described to me how he faked insanity and created pus-filled infections on his face to end his service after fifty two days. Young men slept in different apartments each night, hoping to evade the conscriptor. At one desperate point, police began pulling men from restaurants in Belgrade and shipping them to the front.⁸⁰

The lack of support which was prevalent

throughout Serbia, made fielding a conventional army impossible. Left with literally no alternative, Serbia was forced to recruit thugs, criminals, and hooligans.⁸¹ In other words, the lack of support for the war, and the inability of Milošević to effectively create a conventional armed force necessitated the formation and transformation of the Delije into the Tigers. Paramilitaries were the only force that Belgrade was able to easily and effectively recruit and deploy throughout the region.

The character of the war in Yugoslavia as well as the conditions surrounding the conflict, made the emergence and transformation of Delije possible. The way in which the war was

fought meant that Serbia needed a special type of military force. It needed to be small enough to move effortlessly across the region, but also had to be capable of forcibly removing populations of non-ethnic Serbs out of specific territories. The Delije and other paramilitary groups, because of their non-conventional formations and training were perfect for this type of military display. Even if Serbia had wanted to use a more conventional force, the JNA had completely dissolved by the time war officially began. This coupled with the widespread lack of support for war, meant that there was a crippling shortage of soldiers available for Milošević's realization of "greater Serbdom". All of these individual conditions combined to create a perfect scenario for the Delije's transformation.

Closing Thoughts

The reasons behind the unique transformation of the Delije from symbolic to physical actors rely heavily on the conditions within Yugoslavia and Red Star Belgrade. Red Star Belgrade's unique position within Serbian political mythology laid the groundwork for the Delije's recruitment and transformation.



It was within Red Star that Milošević was able to find the most ardent supporters of Serbian nationalism. Furthermore, as war became more likely, the use of paramilitary forces seemed increasingly advantageous. As it became apparent that recruiting soldiers throughout Serbia was going to be difficult, Milošević turned his attention to the fanatical Delije and transformed their symbolic action into actual physical violence. The transformation simply would not have taken place or even had been possible if it were not for two specific conditions within Yugoslavia: the widespread desertion and draft dodging throughout Serbia and the authentic nationalism of the Delije. Without the first, Milošević would have never looked to use paramilitaries and criminals for the war aims of the state and without the later, it is unlikely the Delije would have actually rejected symbolic action and left the stands.

Even though it is obvious that unique conditions within Yugoslavia were essential in the Delije's transformation, it is worth wondering whether or not this model can be replicated outside of the Balkans. In other words, could other states co-opt the fervent nationalist passions of similar Ultra hooligan groups for the purposes of war? Ivan Čovolić believes that including hooligans within the state's war machine apparatus creates a mutually beneficial relationship: "The regime in power acquires fighters, demonstrably fierce and fanatical, who, according to a widely-held belief, are better able to carry out the 'dirty' business of war than the regular army, and at the same time it offers an opportunity for such hooligan-fan-fighters to redeem their peace time transgressions and, sacrificing themselves for the Fatherland, to return under its wing and earn the love served for the penitent Prodigal Son."⁸² Thus, recruiting from the ranks of Ultra groups presents the opportunity for hooligans to find redemption within the state system but also gives the state access to a vast pool of fully committed soldiers. Though the Delije represents a unique case within European hooliganism, its replication seems extremely plausible. It's too early to tell whether Milošević's corruption and manipulation of Delije is an anomaly within military strategy, or the beginning of a possible trend. Who knows whether Catalan rebels will look to the stands of Barcelona's Camp Nou if conflict ever

breaks out in Spain? What is known is that a dangerous precedent was set with the Delije's transformation and their departure from the stands of Marakana stadium. Judging from the violence inflicted by the Tigers, one should hope that the transformation is not repeated elsewhere. ■

Endnotes

1. Quoted in Srdjan Vrcan and Drazen Lalic, "From Ends to Trenches, and Back: Football in the Former Yugoslavia" in *Football Cultures and Identities*, eds. Gary Armstrong and Richard Giulianotti, 176-185 (London: Macmillian Press, 1999), 178.
2. This comparison, as Jonathan Wilson explains, is more about the free flowing style of football that the Yugoslavian national team saw themselves as practicing, than their actual results. Brazil has won five World Cups while Yugoslavia has never finished higher than fourth. Jonathan Wilson, *Behind the Curtain: Travels in Eastern European Football*. London: Orion Publishing, 2006, 98.
3. *Ibid*, 109.
4. The decision was made to use the term "football" rather than "soccer" in order to maintain the authenticity of the sources cited and consulted.
5. *Ibid*, 311.
6. Franklin Foer, *How Soccer Explains the World*. New York: Harper Perennial, 2004, 16.
7. Wilson, *Behind the Curtain*, 110.
8. Arnd Krüger, *Strength through Joy: the Culture of Consent under Fascism, Nazism and Francoism*, in *International Politics of Sport in the Twentieth Century*, eds. James Riordan and Arnd Krüger, 67-89. New York: E & FN Spon, 1999, 69.
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11. Allen L. Sack and Zeljan Suster. "Soccer and Croatian Nationalism", *Journal of Sport & Social Issues* 24 2000, 306.
12. Wilson, *Behind the Curtain*, 112.
13. Alessandro Dal Lago and Rocco De Biasi, "Italian football fans: culture and organization" in *Football, Violence and Social Identity*, eds. Richard Giulianotti, Norman Bonney and Mike Hepworth, 73-89. London: Routledge, 1994, 80.
14. Ivan Čovolić. *Politics of Identity in Serbia*. Translated by Celia Hawkesworth. New York: New York University Press, 2002, 284-285.
15. Vrcan and Lalic, *From Ends*, 178.
16. Foer, *How Soccer*, 22.
17. John Mueller. "The Banality of the Ethnic War", *International Security* 25, no. 1 2000, 42-70.
18. Peter Andreas. "The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia", *International Studies Quarterly* 48, 2004, 29-51
19. Čovolić, *Politics*.
20. Foer, *How Soccer*.
21. Wilson, *Behind the Curtain*.
22. This essay will only cover the Tigers actions up to 1995, since the paper deals only with why the transformation took place.
23. Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*. New York: Penguin Group, 1996, 25.
24. Misha Glenny, *The Balkans*. New York: Penguin Group, 2001, 486.
25. Glenny, *The Balkans*, 500.
26. *Ibid*, 486.
27. *Ibid*, 574.
28. The six republic were Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. The two autonomous provinces were Vojvodina and Kosovo.

29. Ibid, 623.
30. Ibid, 625.
31. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 31.
32. Ibid, 25.
33. Ibid, 37.
34. Ibid, 39.
35. Ibid, 58.
36. Ibid, 105.
37. Ibid, 123.
38. Ibid, 169.
39. Ibid, 113.
40. Ibid, 117.
41. Wilson, Behind the Curtain, 111.
42. Ibid, 106.
43. Čovolić, Politics, 272.
44. Delije means something close to “heroes” in Turkish. Considering the hundreds of Bosnian Muslims Arkan and the Tigers were to later kill, the irony is almost overwhelming.
45. Foer, How Soccer, 22.
46. The United Nations, “Annex III. A Special Forces.” The Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, December 28, 1994. <http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/ANXIII-A.htm> (accessed on October 15, 2006).
47. Ibid.
48. The United Nations, “The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic,” The International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia Indictment, <http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/sta-ii030501e.htm> (accessed on October 15, 2006).
49. Foer, How Soccer, 23.
50. The Prosecutor.
51. Annex.
52. Foer, How Soccer, 24.
53. The popular and famous saying that captures the political and social importance of FC Barcelona to the cause of Catalan independence. In many ways, Red Star occupies this same political niche.
54. Čovolić, Politics, 266.
55. Though Milošević did manipulate and channel the political attitudes of Red Star, the Serbian nationalism was
56. Čovolić, Politics, 273.
57. Foer, How Soccer, 19.
58. Wilson, Behind the Curtain, 105.
59. Čovolić, Politics, 268.
60. Ibid, 267.
61. Ibid,
62. Wilson, Behind the Curtain, 106.
63. Ibid, 115.
64. Ibid, 115-116.
65. Ibid, 116.
66. Ibid,
67. Ibid, 117.
68. Ibid, 112.
69. Foer, How Soccer, 24.
70. Mueller, The Banality of Ethnic War, 53.
71. Foer, How Soccer, 21.
72. Ibid,
73. Ibid,
74. Mueller, The Banality of Ethnic War, 47.
75. Ibid, 45.
76. Ibid, 45-46.
77. Ibid, 46.
78. Ibid, 48.
79. Ibid, 48.
80. Foer, How Soccer, 21.
81. Mueller, The Banality of Ethnic War, 47.
82. Čovolić, Politics, 286.

A Lonely Walk to Ruin

By David Livingston

An Analysis of Robert Mugabe Using Erikson's Psychoanalytic Framework

The next article provides a psychoanalysis of Robert Mugabe, the President of Zimbabwe. The Mugabe administration has been criticized around the world for corruption, racism, repression, economic mismanagement, and human rights abuses. Mugabe's policies have led to economic collapse (including the world's highest inflation and an 85% unemployment rate), massive starvation and controversial land reform projects that have stripped white farmers in Zimbabwe of their land and given it to native Africans. Despite the corruption and criminality of his regime, Mugabe is hailed by many Africans as a hero in the fight for independence. He is currently one of the world's most controversial figures.

Adam Lichtenheld, JUIS Editor



Robert G. Mugabe speaking at the 13th plenary meeting of the World Summit on Sustainable Development.

Photo Courtesy of www.un.org/events/wssd

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Curious boys, 'hanging' off a wall, lined up to see the foreigners in a remote village in Zimbabwe.

Photo by babasteve, www.flickr.com/photos/babasteve

The purpose of this essay is to examine the root causal factors behind Robert Mugabe's entrance into politics as well as his marked shift in leadership style occurring in the early 90's. I will apply Erik Erikson's first, third, fifth, and eighth theoretical stages of identity formation in order to recognize recurring patterns of isolation in Mugabe's psyche, and their subsequent impact upon his leadership behavior.

Erikson defines a man's development as the product of eight distinct stages of development in which "the individual demonstrates that his ego, at a given stage, is strong enough to integrate the timetable of the organism with the structure of the social institutions."¹ In the case of Mr. Mugabe's development, the stages which must be examined in detail include: early adolescent-parent relations (trust vs. mistrust – stage 1), the introduction of a strong replacement father figure as well as an introduction to a hostile environment, (initiative vs. guilt – stage 3), the solidification of identity through the discovery of a life-partner (identity vs. role confusion – stage 5), and the subsequent chaos resulting from the loss of this life-partner (ego integrity vs. despair – stage 8). The accumulation of these stages and their respective denouements has, in this case, led to a leader who suffers from a "patienthood" of solitude which ultimately, in the words of Erikson, is "a kind of unconscious motivation [which] may lend itself to the invention, the initiation, and the widespread

acceptance of totalitarian methods."²

The case of Mugabe's childhood relationship with his parents forms the first and most significant patterns of identity development in the man. Though relatively little explicit detail about his early life exists, it is clear that Mugabe developed a dual track of admiration for his mother and disdain for an absent father. Before Mugabe was ten years old, hardship fell on the family when his father, Gabriel, deserted his family for another woman – an offense which family cousin James Chikerema explains, "Mugabe never forgave him for."³ The impact of such a dramatic loss at the beginning of adolescent consciousness is highlighted by Erikson as a fundamental variable in identity development. Indeed, the sudden abandonment of the family by Gabriel Mugabe deepened Mugabe's adolescent tension by forcing his capitulation towards the negative potential of this stage, the "powerful combination of a sense of having been deprived, of having been divided, and of having been abandoned."⁴ Andrew Norman, a Mugabe biographer, notes that Mugabe "agonized as to whether his father Gabriel would return;" Norman further hypothesizes that "a trait of a child who has been cut off from a parent is detachment: because he or she is unwilling to risk being let down again, he or she becomes self-sufficient and is able to relate to others only on a superficial level."⁵ As a result, Mugabe's caring mother fulfilled Erikson's theoretical requirement that "...the first of maternal care...[is] the firm establishment of enduring patterns for the solution of the

nuclear conflict of basic trust versus basic mistrust," though surely this was not a comprehensive salvation of a young Mugabe's trust.⁶ This early trauma also reiterated its impact, however subtly, throughout Mugabe's life, and it must be noted that in later speeches and interviews Mugabe has "lavished fulsome praise" on his mother, while virtually never mentioning his father in any fashion.⁷ In the very first of Erikson's stages of development, Mr. Mugabe conclusively tipped towards the dark shadows of mistrust and oedipal hatred, possibly creating a deeply etched need to compensate for his own injustices through his eventual pursuit of power for himself and "justice" against what he likely perceived as malevolent colonial patriarchy.

The paradox of his father's desertion is that Mugabe was without an individual to directly confront or hold accountable for his internal suffering, but his introduction in 1934 to Father O'Hea, the new head of the Jesuit mission, would reshape the direction of Mugabe's previously patriarch-devoid life. Mugabe was essentially left completely companionless by the deaths of his two older brothers at this time, and expectedly, he spent increasing time under the tutelage of Father O'Hea. O'Hea served as a surrogate father to the young boy, and he increasingly focused Mugabe's anger and confusion towards an exigent societal inequality in the country. Father O'Hea was a sympathetic ally of the inhabitants of the mission, and he "championed the cause of black education by adding at his own expense a teacher-training college and a technical college



to the existing primary facilities.”⁸ O’Hea began to strengthen the fragile psyche of the young man by instilling in him a self-righteousness founded on a view of religion inextricably tied to the relentless pursuit of social justice, and later O’Hea described Mugabe as possessing, “an exceptional mind and an exceptional heart.”⁹ As Mugabe would later write of his own ideology, “It has always been my firm belief that socialism has to be much more Christian than capitalism.”¹⁰ O’Hea instructed him in catechism and Cartesian logic, but also vividly relayed the struggle that his own Irish had sustained in their quest for independence from Britain.¹¹ An impressionable and friendless Mugabe must have presumably been enrapt at these stories of Irish legend and revolution.

Within Erikson’s framework, this third period of development was utterly essential to the formation of Mugabe “the totalitarian”, as it was here that he, under the careful watch of Father O’Hea, escaped from the skittishness of an early life marked by abandonment into a world of determined initiative. Erikson defines this period by highlighting that “... a crisis, more or less beset with fumbling and fear, is resolved, in that the child suddenly seems to “grow together” both in his person and in his body.”¹² Just as Mugabe was growing in confidence and expanding his worldview, he likewise became increasingly aware of the oppression that surrounded him. For example, all black males in Rhodesia (later to become Zimbabwe) were called “boy,” regardless of their age.¹³ Wages were kept so low for black workers that in order to purchase the common dream of a bicycle, groups of workers would often have to pool their wages so that the worker at the top of the list could purchase one; often, the periods in between stretched beyond five months.¹⁴ As Robert Mugabe became more cognizant of these societal conditions, Erikson’s theories transformed into a tangible prescription, describing that throughout Mugabe’s stage of initiative vs. guilt, “[He] can gradually develop a sense of moral responsibility, where he can gain some insight into the institutions, functions, and roles which will permit his responsible participation.”¹⁵ Mr. Mugabe’s moral responsibility, however, is only part of the equation of identity which is to be assembled throughout this stage of development.

In the very first of Erikson’s stages of development, Mugabe conclusively tipped towards the dark shadows of mistrust and oedipal hatred, possibly creating a deeply etched need to compensate for his own injustices through his eventual pursuit of power for himself and “justice” against what he likely perceived as malevolent colonial patriarchy.

Erikson also notes the potential dangers in the assertion of initiative – dangers that this analysis of Mugabe seems to demonstrate lucidly. Erikson predicts the possibility of “the inner powerhouse of rage which must be submerged at this stage, as some of the fondest hopes and the wildest fantasies are repressed and inhibited. The resulting self-righteousness... can later be most intolerantly turned against others.”¹⁶ These implicit development templates were further intensified by Mugabe’s absorption of Father O’Hea’s often violent glorifications of Irish revolt. The extent of the absorption would become readily apparent as a major foundation to Mugabe’s ideology later when, as President, he delivered a sobering manifesto:

It may be necessary to use methods other than constitutional ones. Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have shall have been the product of the gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer – its guarantor. The people’s votes and the people’s guns are always inseparable twins.¹⁷

Through the prism of Erikson’s framework, Mugabe’s development of initiative is clearly marked by a cognizance of societal conditions that defined his environment and his subsequent tendency to validate violent solutions to these social ills.

If it was Father O’Hea who cultivated a tenuous political confidence in the boy, it was Mugabe’s first love, Sally Heyfron, who in the fifth of Erikson’s stages mirrored an activist identity upon Mugabe, cementing his life trajectory of leadership. Erikson concisely summarizes the crux of this process as he states that “to a considerable extent love is an attempt to arrive at a definition of one’s identity by projecting one’s diffused ego image on another and by seeing it thus reflected and gradually clarified.”¹⁸ Sally, a Catholic convert from Ghana, certainly filled this role as a force for consolidation and moderation of Mr. Mugabe’s own character. What their courtship lacked in traditional romance, it compensated for in unique and invaluable intellectual partnership. As Martin Meredith describes, “Sally recalled that they had never been to see a




Photo By Robin Hammond, www.robinhammond.co.uk

movie together. Politics was their main source of enjoyment. ‘He became my inspiration,’ said Sally. ‘He politicized me.’¹⁹ Before long, she became intimately involved not only in furthering her husband’s anti-imperialist endeavors, but she also immersed herself in a plethora of public and charitable services. It is indeed the nature of this highly purpose driven relationship which, in the words of Erikson’s psychoanalytical musings, “signifies that the respective identities fit sufficiently to make of two persons a pair, and out of pairs, promising affiliations in productive and procreative life.”²⁰ Mr. Mugabe’s dependence on Sally, in both a tangible and abstract emotional context, would only escalate over time.

Sally was a lifeline for the leadership of Mugabe which, borne of family tragedy and ideological élan, could often find itself in need of aid or correction. Later, when Mr. Mugabe was imprisoned in Rhodesia, it was Sally who carried on his political work from which he was so abruptly removed. Mugabe sent weekly requests to Sally for documents he required, and even though she was living in London at the time, she would tirelessly track them down, transcribe them line by line, and send them back to him at the end of each week.²¹ While in London she eventually came to work for the Runnymede Trust - an organization devoted to fighting racial discrimination and social injustice - which she used as a platform throughout the mid-1970s to continually lobby members of Parliament for the release of her husband.²² Once Mugabe came into office in the newly created Zimbabwe, he instructed the media to refer to Sally as “Amai,” meaning “mother of the nation,” (reinforcing the respect he still had for his own mother even when he blocked out thoughts of his father) and he also gave her a place on the politburo as his most - and possibly only - trusted advisor.²³ A biography of Mugabe asserts that “[Sally] also acted at crucial times as an anchor in reality for Mugabe. A formidable woman in her own right, she managed to curb some of the wilder excesses of his anger and ambition.”²⁴

Sally was a lifeline for the leadership of Mugabe which, borne of family tragedy and ideological élan, could often find itself in need of aid or correction. Later, when Mr. Mugabe was imprisoned in Rhodesia, it was Sally who carried on his political work from which he was so abruptly removed.

The context for Mr. Mugabe’s period of restraint and spouse-mediated pragmatism is evidenced by the well-placed optimism regarding his initial behavior as Prime Minister. Upon being elected to the position of Prime Minister on the fourth of March in 1980, Mugabe could feel surprisingly secure in his command of a reliable constituency - the crux of which was his own Shona tribesmen.²⁵ As Xan Smiley of London’s Africa Confidential described in 1980, “he had incontestably become the dominant nationalist figure, because his guerillas, rather than Nkomo’s [of the rival ZAPU party] had borne the greater share of the fighting and were - for the first time - clearly under Mugabe’s control.”²⁶ Although Mugabe was in a position of power to impose an aggressive policy of reverse discrimination, he instead extended a series of expiatory offerings to the very same white community which had often used unbridled violence to confine 500,000 black farmers to 40 million acres, while giving over 35 million acres to a mere 7,000 white farmers.²⁷ The newly elected Prime Minister oversaw the implementation of a new constitution that guaranteed 20 parliamentary seats to white politicians, and Mugabe personally oversaw the appointment of two white ministers, David Smith and Dennis Norman.²⁸ Perhaps the outlook for Mugabe in those early years of the 1980s can be best captured in Martin Meredith’s description of the white farmers’ receptivity: “They were amazed... was this the ogre they had heard about? Here they were seeing a man who was articulate, warm, and anxious for a full understanding.”²⁹

Amidst this flurry of moderation was the constant, implied presence of Sally Mugabe, someone who understood the necessity of providing for white farmers, and as a result, she operated as a reassuring but nonetheless “moderating influence on [Mugabe’s] behavior.”³⁰ The policies which Mugabe introduced in his first years as Prime Minister, including a guarantee that no white farmers could be expropriated for at least ten years,

revealed a mediation of identity characteristics which, without the presence of his wife, could easily have resulted in personal insecurity and violent solutions due to injustices and perceived enemies.³¹ Erikson wrote that “It is an ideological mind... which is ready to be confirmed by rituals, creeds, and programs which at the same time define what is evil, uncanny, and inimical.”³² At this healthy point in Mugabe’s development, his perception of this “evil” was neither excessive nor a windfall which Zimbabwe would enjoy only up until Mugabe’s mental unraveling after his wife’s death.

When Sally succumbed to a kidney ailment in January 1992, Mugabe “lost not only a trusted companion who had stood by him through years of imprisonment and revolutionary warfare but a friend able to moderate his moods.”³³ Mugabe was devoid of any other close friends, and he genuinely seemed to “freeze in his presidential duties.” He immediately withdrew to the Irish farm of Heinz millionaire Tony O’Reilly, and he uncharacteristically began to interject his government in the internal conflicts of both South Africa and Mozambique.³⁴ Andrew Norman chronicles the rapid degeneration in his biography:

Increasingly, Mugabe behaved like an autocrat, ignoring the advice of the IMF, the World Bank and potential investor-countries, and he deluded himself that he could go it alone. Court rulings by judges (who were predominantly black) were ignored, and pressmen were assaulted, tortured and vilified when they dared to say a word against him.³⁵

In Mugabe’s momentous internal conflicts, it was Sally’s death which crowned despair and not ego integrity as the victor of his eight developmental stage. Erikson argues that ego integrity “implies an emotional integration which permits participation by followership as well as acceptance of the responsibility of leadership.”³⁶ It is clear that Mr. Mugabe became unwilling to fill the role of “follower” in any sense; instead, he was enslaved by his need of gaining and holding absolute power. Mugabe is truly a compelling contemporary case study for Erikson’s depiction of despair: “[It] expresses the feeling that the time is now short, too short for the attempt to start



another life and to try out alternate roads to integrity.”³⁷

To vigorously apply Erikson’s psychoanalytic framework to the defining determinants in Mugabe’s identity development is a fascinating exercise, for it yields compelling patterns of emotional composition and behavior. Nevertheless, Erikson is a social scientist whose theories have been widely applied to “western” subjects, and thus, its accommodation to an African leader such as Mugabe must be accepted with a circumspect confidence. It would be accurate to assert that Mugabe’s personality is incredibly complex, and it can hardly be reduced to a single grand stroke of theoretical supposition. Likewise, it is quite possible that some of Erikson’s eight stages of development interlock more cogently with Mugabe’s material life story than other individuals. The fact remains, however, that a substantial amount of deeper comprehension can occur through the selective and intelligent application of Erikson’s framework to a leader as multifarious as Mugabe. In determining the psychological background behind Mugabe’s fall to totalitarianism, Erikson’s theories provide an imperfect but altogether uniquely insightful glimpse into the leader’s otherwise perplexing combination of determination and lonely rigidity. ■

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Transnational Politics: Dominicans in Providence, RI

By Brett Heeger

Between 1961 and 2001, 850,026 Dominicans were legally admitted to the United States, more than from any other country in the Western Hemisphere except for Mexico.¹ It is estimated that 10-20 percent of the entire Dominican population lives abroad—the majority of which live in the U.S.—and these expatriates send home billions of dollars in remittances every year. At the same time, technological advances in transportation and communication and the loosening of Dominican restrictions on dual citizenship have made it even easier for immigrant communities to maintain ties with their home countries.

Largely as a result of these innovations, it has become increasingly evident that most migrants maintain at least some formal or informal attachment to their country of origin. In whichever aspect these connections are maintained, these migrants are not contained by national borders—they are, in effect, transnational.

Among Dominican immigrants, one of the most intriguing aspects of this trend relates to transnational political participation. Dominicans abroad continue to be involved in politics at home while Dominican government and political party officials actively reach out to expatriates for support. In 2004, new absentee voting regulations in the Dominican Republic allowed Dominicans around the world to vote in their homeland's elections. Additionally, growing populations of

immigrants continue to rise in political importance as they settle into communities in the United States. According to Guarnizo and Smith, any evidence of transnational practices can be divided into top-down and bottom-up approaches. When governments, state agencies, and political parties attempt to promote transnational practices—and, in most cases, align those practices with particular goals—transnationalism is being promoted from above. Alternatively, transnationalism from below usually consists of those activities that migrants would engage in anyway as they attempt to adjust and incorporate into a new society.² Through a case study of Dominican immigration to Providence, Rhode Island, this paper will explore the factors leading to this transnational political participation and the effects of this participation on both Dominican

communities in the U.S. and the larger societies that receive them.

In the political and economic stability of the 1960s that followed the assassination of the Dominican dictator Rafael Leónidas Trujillo, immigration to the U.S. from the Dominican Republic rose sharply as restrictions on international movement were removed.³ Although migration during the Trujillo period was very limited, some of the dictator's most vocal opponents went into exile in the U.S. and continued their opposition from there, focusing their efforts on monitoring and publicizing evidence of the repression that was occurring in the Dominican Republic. Nicolás Silfa, a founding member of one of the major Dominican political parties, the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), had become a U.S. citizen and had served in the U.S. Army during World War II before returning to the Dominican Republic and becoming involved in politics shortly after Trujillo's assassination.⁴ The repressive policies of President Joaquín Balaguer in the late 1960s


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and early 1970s also led to significant politically-motivated immigration. Although the 1978 election of PRD candidate Antonio Guzmán was considered the country's first democratic election, recurrent economic crises in the 1980s continued to motivate Dominicans to travel to the U.S. in search of jobs and opportunity. As shown in Figure 1 below, the U.S. admitted over 27,000 Dominicans as legal immigrants in the year 2005. However, it is also important to note that because an overwhelming majority of these entries are permitted on the basis of family reunification, the increasingly high improbability of receiving a legal visa has fuelled undocumented immigration.

Historically, an issue of major contention among Dominicans has been the allowance of dual citizenship for Dominicans living abroad. While any Dominican citizen is constitutionally guaranteed the right to vote, voting by overseas migrants was resisted by the Dominican government's Central Electoral Authority (JCE) out of fears that non-resident Dominicans would eventually assume all of the power to elect the government from abroad. Luis Eduardo Guarnizo frames this debate as a power struggle between the historic landed

Figure 1: Dominicans Admitted to the United States from 1996-2005⁵



elites of Dominican Republic and the emergent migrant elites that made most of their money abroad.⁶ Not only were returning migrants faced with the predictable resistance that would come from any social group challenging the political power of another, but they were also challenged by negative perceptions at home that resulted from the involvement of certain Dominican immigrants in the growing illicit drug trade. David Howard describes: "Popular

rhetoric reproduced images of this emergent class as villains or ne'er-do-wells involved in illicit trading, generating inflation, promoting economic and social vices, and bringing problems back to the Dominican Republic which had not existed before."⁷ Lower-income Dominicans who have returned after supporting their families for years are generally admired, but negative images continue to haunt those who manage to do particularly well for themselves.

Although migration during the Trujillo period was very limited, some of the dictator's most vocal opponents went into exile in the U.S. and continued their opposition from there, focusing their efforts on monitoring and publicizing evidence of the repression that was occurring in the Dominican Republic.

In the year 2004, approximately one million of the nearly five million Dominicans eligible to vote in that year's election lived overseas.⁸ One PRD leader explained: "In addition to their economic clout, [remittance-sending migrants] also influence social and political decisions. Be it the father, mother, brother, or sister who migrate, a relationship of dependence is created because the person here needs the money that is sent. When their migrant relatives tell them how to vote, they listen."⁹ In response to the

potential influence that migrants can offer, the two leading Dominican political parties—the PRD and the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD)—played a substantial role in encouraging the passage of a dual citizenship measure in the Dominican Congress. Political parties already are an essential part of the

electoral process in the Dominican Republic, as representatives of major parties are stationed at each polling location to formally approve ballot counts and ensure a fair election.¹⁰ At the same time that political parties were pressing for increased dual citizenship rights, recent improvements in public financing legislation and enforcement in the Dominican Republic have helped decrease party reliance on diaspora funds and allay some of the JCE's

concerns.¹¹

Dual citizenship for Dominicans living in the U.S. was also promoted in an effort to help migrants gain more political power in their receiving communities. One PLD leader claimed in 1992: "in order to achieve respect, to achieve a share of power, [Dominicans in the U.S.] must have political power... and in order to have political power, it is necessary to have the right to vote... and to have the right to vote

it is necessary to have double nationality."¹² Political influence for immigrants continues to be especially important in the face of anti-immigrant sentiments that these populations continue are faced with periodically. Additionally, for a country like the Dominican Republic that is able to maintain strong ties to its expatriate population, enhanced transnationalism can be an especially good thing: "these states help migrants achieve the most stable conditions possible, and in so doing they guarantee migrants' role as a reliable source of economic and political support for their 'homeland.'"¹³

Alternatively, Eva Østergaard-Nielson points out that nature of its fundamental transnational relationships means that the Dominican Republic does not necessarily have to formulate especially inclusive policies for its international community. Rather, clearly observed trends that 1) migration will continue and 2) emigrants send most of their money home to support their individual families suggest that the country does not have to fear a significant decline in remittances in the near future.¹⁴ This theory is further supported by evidence that besides a select group of politically active immigrants and migrant elites, the majority of Dominicans living in the U.S. were fairly uninvolved in the push for dual citizenship. Guarnizo explains, "Overworked and underpaid Dominicans, who constitute the majority of the migrant population, have generally not had either the time or the resources to devote to this cause."¹⁵

In August of 1994, the Dominican Congress passed a bill giving full citizenship rights to Dominicans with dual citizenship. Two years later, Leonal Fernández Reyna, a 42 year old Dominican who had lived in Washington Heights in New York for almost a decade was elected President of the Dominican Republic. Applauding the positive aspects of transnationalism, Fernández made a campaign promise to the Dominican newspaper *El Siglo*: “If I win the presidency, I will turn the Dominican Republic into a little New York.”¹⁶ One of Fernández’s earliest initiatives was to change government standards so that all expatriates would be referred to as *dominicanos residentes en el exterior* [Dominicans living abroad] rather than as *migrantes* [migrants].¹⁷ In 2002, then President Hipolito Mejía fulfilled a significant transnational campaign promise that he had made to migrants in Rhode Island by visiting schools, government agencies and community organizations in Providence.¹⁸

Castles and Miller describe the U.S. as a “classical immigration” country, indicating that historically it has more or less encouraged the permanent settlement of legal immigrants and treated them (or at least their children) as future citizens.¹⁹ Within this context, traditional notions of assimilation view the complete social, political, and economic integration of migrants into American society as a target for both policy makers and immigrants.²⁰ So far, Dominican attempts to build influence in the United States have been limited to local politics. In part, this is explained by the fact that cities offer many jobs for low-wage migrants and extensive Dominican immigrant networks have developed in many major urban centers. Dominican political mobilization is aided by an understanding among immigrants

Additionally however, local politics have been a focus for immigrant communities because increasingly, many U.S. cities are allowing all legal adults (including non-citizens) to vote for local offices.

that the potential impact that they can have on community politics in the U.S. are substantially more than what is possible on a nationwide scale. Additionally however, local politics have been a focus for immigrant communities because increasingly, many U.S. cities are allowing all legal adults (including

non-citizens) to vote for local offices. This trend began in the 1960s when New York City allowed all parents (including illegal immigrants) to vote in school-board elections. While similar laws have been passed in many cities, voter turnout among non-citizens continues to frequently be quite low.²¹

Even though major political parties and the Dominican government continue to facilitate and encourage dual citizenship for migrants, in general this has only met with mixed results. Both migration scholars and policy makers continue to explore the issues of when and why migrants actually choose to naturalize in the U.S. when the option is available. In their examination of the effects of dual nationality on political participation among Latino immigrants, Cain and Doherty find that U.S. citizens with dual citizenship are less likely to register and vote in the U.S. than are single-nationality citizens. They further suggest that high costs (especially in terms of time and energy), low perceived benefits, and weak socialization into U.S. civic norms are all important factors that help explain this drop in participation.²² If migrants do not feel that they will have equal or more influence in the U.S. than in the Dominican Republic, they are unlikely to naturalize.

Based on interviews with Dominicans in Boston, Peggy Levitt suggests four primary reasons why migrants do not naturalize: 1) they plan to return to the Dominican Republic; 2) the process is too difficult; 3) they feel that Dominicans are deliberately excluded from local politics; and 4) they simply care more about the Dominican Republic than about the U.S.²³ Along similar lines, Louis DeSipio analyzes a more quantitative survey of

immigrants from Mexico, El Salvador, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic. Among all immigrant groups, those that stated an intention to stay in the U.S. had a much higher likelihood of pursuing naturalization. Of these groups however, Dominicans were the most likely to have participated in home country

elections and the most likely to respond that they had more influence in their home country than in the U.S.²⁴ With nearly 20 percent of eligible Dominican voters living abroad, these expatriates can continue to have enormous sway over national politics in their country of origin.

Peggy Levitt writes: “To be a serious political player, new groups must become citizens, vote, make campaign contributions, and work on election campaigns.”²⁵ Dominican immigrants continue to be highly concentrated in New York City but over time have also dispersed throughout New England, including to Providence, RI. Although the particularly large Dominican community in New York City has managed to establish a significant constituency in that city’s politics, Dominican immigrants in Boston and other major cities have achieved only modest gains. As of 2003, 45 percent of naturalized Dominicans in New York City were registered to vote, forming 20 percent of the total Latino voters.²⁶ Notably, the high number of Dominican voters and political allies in New York City led both Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and his democratic challenger Ruth Messinger to visit the Dominican Republic during their 1997 electoral campaigns.²⁷ In 2006, Providence Mayor David Cicilline traveled down to the Dominican Republic to help monitor that country’s elections as an official elections observer. Cicilline, who had visited the Dominican Republic a number of times in the past, was nominated to the position by a number of Dominican political leaders whom he considers friends including President Fernandez and the mayor of Santo Domingo, Roberto Salcedo.²⁸

After Puerto Ricans, Dominicans were the largest Latino group in Rhode Island in 2000 (17,894 Dominicans out of 90,820 total Latinos²⁹) and by 2004, the U.S. census reported that the total number of Dominicans in Rhode Island had risen to 24,000.³⁰ Latinos as a group account for approximately 30 percent of the population of Providence, and are the largest minority group in the state.³¹ Dominicans play a variety of leadership roles in the economic, political, and cultural activities of the city of Providence and in recent years have elected community members to school boards, the city council, and to the state legislature.



Twenty-six Dominicans nationwide currently serve in elected positions of city councilman or higher and three of them—state Senator Juan Pichardo, state Representative Grace Diaz, and Providence City Councilman Miguel Luna—are in Rhode Island (in comparison, five are in New York).³² Notably, Mr. Pichardo was the first Dominican in the U.S. to be elected to any state Senate and Ms. Diaz was the first Dominican-American woman in the country to reach a state office.

Of course, Dominicans present a voting bloc that can be mobilized in support of more than just Dominican candidates. As state Senator Juan Pichardo noted while attending a 2006 Dominican community celebration: “10 years ago, voter turnout in the South Providence neighborhoods [an area with a large Dominican population] was 20 percent of the eligible voters, but today it is closer to 40 percent.”³³ Because of their growing political influence in the state, local leaders in Rhode Island are increasingly reaching out to the Dominican population (and the Latino population as a whole) for support. Former U.S. Senator from Rhode Island Lincoln Chafee describes: “Hispanics in Rhode Island are very much an organized voice—and each national group has their own organizations within the Hispanic community... During my 2000 and 2006 campaigns, I definitely made an effort to appear on Hispanic radio stations and be accessible to the various block parties that were held in the different neighborhoods.”³⁴ Chafee, a Republican, also noted however that Hispanics in Rhode Island tended to vote Democrat. This appears to be especially true among the Dominican community in Rhode Island, where Senator Pichardo, Representative Diaz, and Councilman Luna are all ardent Democrats. Additionally, in 2003, Dominican Melba Depena was appointed to the position of executive director for the Democratic Party in Rhode Island. Depena, a long time community organizer and grassroots activist in Providence, was the party’s first female and Latina executive director; a move that Democratic leaders claimed were indicative of the party’s mission to embrace the many new minority voters in the state.³⁵

In addition to its other features, transnationalism suggests that at least some

political and organizational skills learned in one country should be applicable to politics in another. Although there are no formal political connections between political parties in the Dominican Republic and parties in the U.S., some useful connections and interactions have occurred. Peggy Levitt describes how members of the PRD had the opportunity to visit and observe the Democratic National Convention in 2000: “As a result, when the PRD articulated an agenda to address migrants’ needs, it did so based on hands-on experience with the U.S. political system, a fact that made its transnational efforts more likely to succeed.”³⁶ However, important differences in overall approach appear to persist when the parties in the U.S. and the Dominican Republic are compared. After being involved in politics in both countries, Representative Grace Diaz explained: “In [the Dominican Republic], campaigning is like a 24-hour party. We don’t have too many debates there. Instead, the candidates show their power by marching through the city with tons of supporters and merenge music. They throw big parties.”³⁷ This method of campaigning may be an influential factor in the trend that Dominican political parties only appear to seriously activate in the U.S. during election time in the Dominican Republic. In general, Dominican parties seem to have difficulty taking more than an informal role in major U.S. issues, including immigration legislation.

In his essay on rising Latino political influence in Rhode Island, Miren Uriarte cites two possible explanations for the particular political success of Latinos in local and state government. One possibility is that Latino power resulted from a growth in activism conveniently at the time that former Providence Mayor Vincent ‘Buddy’ Cianci’s political machine was falling apart, leaving open important doors for new political players.³⁸ Alternatively, many Latino activists insist that the Latino population had been growing and becoming more organized for a long period of time and therefore would have become powerful regardless of Cianci’s fall from power. In the end, it is likely that the combination of local activism, a growing Dominican community (because of continued migration), unmet socioeconomic needs among the population, and new opportunities

to use political skills and organization combined to allow Dominicans in Providence to become actively and successfully involved in local politics.

Even in situations where migrants have not become naturalized and/or participated directly in U.S. politics, many did become involved in political and other community based organizations in their new homes. According to DeSipio’s survey, approximately 70 percent of all immigrants engaged in transnational organizational activity and Dominicans were the most likely of the groups to do so.³⁹ Explanations for this increase compared to community organization involvement in the country of origin include a wider variety of organizations in recipient communities and an increased social role for all types of community associations. Among Dominicans in Boston surveyed by Levitt, “Nearly half of all return and current migrants reported they attended meetings of community organizations... at least periodically. Over half of these individuals said they had not belonged to similar groups before they left.”⁴⁰

Migrants are faced by many challenges when they arrive in a new community and, in addition to helping migrants adjust to their new lives in the United States, community organizations also help to maintain ethnic identities within the contemporary society.⁴¹ For example, Quisqueya In Action, a Dominican youth organization in Providence, was founded in 1987 in order to: “bring these young people together to enlighten their knowledge regarding the Dominican Republic and develop a common belief of creating and inspiring the community with meaningful information about the beautiful island, its people, its rich history and culture.”⁴² Quisqueya organizes and hosts a Dominican Festival in Providence every year, which is attended by over 15,000 people, including plenty of campaigning local political leaders.

Other organizations help with community development (both in the U.S. and in the country of origin) or lead advocacy campaigns on issues related to specific ethnic group needs. In Rhode Island, the Center for Hispanic Policy and Advocacy (CHisPA) provides a variety of educational, financial education,

health education and disease prevention, and social services/case management programs to Latino families and individuals in addition to performing advocacy work on their behalf.⁴³ Lincoln Restler, a leader of the Dominican Studies Institute in New York City and graduate of Brown University noted that the Providence area consistently represents one of the five best-organized Dominican communities in the U.S.⁴⁴

Regardless of the original goal of a given community organization, participation in and development of these groups can provide invaluable grassroots organizing experience to an immigrant population. Explaining the rise of Dominican political power in New York City, Guarnizo points out that, “[Dominicans] had formed a wide range of organizations, which became the seed bed for political action.”⁴⁵

“Nearly half of all return and current migrants reported they attended meetings of community organizations...at least periodically. Over half of these individuals said they had not belonged to similar groups before they left.”

Among Dominicans, Quisqueya In Action played a major role in organizing and hosting the first meeting of the Dominican American National Roundtable—a non-partisan association that seeks to bring together the different voices of people of Dominican origin in the United States.⁴⁶

Based on her comparison of Portuguese and Vietnamese community organization development in Boston and Toronto, Irene Bloemraad suggests that local governments in particular can help encourage migrant political participation by facilitating community building.⁴⁷ In Rhode Island, Uriarte confirms that this trend holds true. He notes that the growth of the Latino population in Rhode Island coincided with cuts in support for community organizations from the federal government. Rather, “meeting the community’s needs has meant obtaining access to decision making at the state and city levels.”⁴⁸ Additionally, financial and technical support for local community organizations in the U.S. from the Dominican government has also been minimal. The victorious party enjoys a winner-takes-all spoils system for government jobs after elections in the Dominican Republic that results in highly competitive politics and

frequent concerns about corruption. Because of this, Former Dominican Ambassador to the United States Bernardo Vega insists, “the most effective and lasting means of politically organizing Dominican Americans would be through a process of self-management, created and developed inside their own community.”⁴⁹ Looking back at Guarnizo and Smith’s top-down vs. bottom-up model, Vega appears to clearly favor transnational practices from below.

For Dominicans immigrants in Providence, transnationalism is a real and significant part of their identities and certainly of their political decision-making. New regulations in the Dominican Republic have made voting among expatriates easier and more efficient while improvements in communication and transportation have reinforced social,

cultural, and economic ties between migrants and their communities of origin. At the same time, increasing populations and improved organizational capacity have made Dominican immigrants a powerful social group in the politics of Providence and the entire state of Rhode Island. Surely, these transnational practices will continue. However, while Dominicans in Providence appear to grow in political power based on the strength of their efforts at community building, concerns that Dominicans abroad will increase their influence to a disproportionate amount may continue to be problematic. Transnational practices may allow Dominicans to successfully maintain these connections, but it is unclear if these links are strong enough to justify the extensive economic, political, and social influence that migrants have already established over domestic communities. As individuals, organizations and governments attempt to control this potential power, transnationalism will become an increasingly important issue among policy makers, scholars, and immigrants themselves. ■

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Lessons In Mongolian Throat Singing

By Alec Walker

Abruptly, the man stopped playing his horse-head fiddle, and, smiling, carefully set it along with its bow inside his wooden box. My throat stung and I swallowed several times. This caused something just behind my tongue to stick to the dry back wall of my mouth, and tears rushed to my eyes. I kept swallowing and tearing as he smiled at me until the museum guide came rushing into our little room. Although never truly in a hurry, she took a surprising multitude of small, jerky steps in rapid succession whenever she moved about. Her feet shuffled to a stop and she tilted her head at me, also smiling.

“Well,” I managed, trying with clenched fists not to cry, “I guess the lesson is over?” I’d been shouting almost non-stop for an hour and a half in this little room in a cultural museum in Ulaan Baatar, Mongolia, trying to match my instructor’s melody and to get my throat to resonate and produce a second octave distinct from the one I sang. His di-tones were flawless harmonies, and both his voices filled the room and overpowered his horse-head fiddle.

The guide addressed my instructor in Mongolian, translating my question, and he turned back to me, renewing his smile. He spoke clearly and slowly, perhaps to encourage some direct understanding on my part, but my Mongolian was still limited to only a few words and phrases, and at the time I was able only to think how remarkable it was that he could speak so clearly after throat singing so robustly

and without resting for such a long time.

He stopped speaking, and the museum guide spoke up enthusiastically in her broken English. Her words came bubbling out like she was positively overjoyed at whatever she had to say. “He says that you are a very goody student.”

I smiled respectfully, wondering a bit as to his sincerity.

“He says that you that can also becomes a master throat singer.”

I imagined this apparent possibility for the first time. My head was filled with visions of myself on a college stage playing a horse-head fiddle and throat singing di-tone harmonies more than three octaves apart.

“He says that you can learn quickly. He says,” and her voice grew particularly enthusiastic, like the hostess of some children’s television show, “you only need 18 years!” I gasped in disbelief and was immediately forced to resume swallowing. She paused, pursing her lips, then lit up again,

having remembered the last part of what she needed to translate. “...and a lot of pain,” she finished, happily. I continued tearing and swallowing in pain and amazement. A tear rolled down my cheek.


We spoke a bit more, this throat-singer and I, and our encouraging translator never lost a smidgen of her zeal. It occurred to me, towards the end of our conversation, that what was said had been funny. 18 years? I can learn to make di-tones after 18 years of pain? I began to laugh, and it hurt, and I kept talking and laughing until tears were flowing down my face. My instructor stayed smiley, and the guide enthusiastic, but neither of them once let on the slightest indication that they had been amused or that they were at all aware of what I personally found to be so funny. ■



Photo by Alec Walker

Bits from Around the World





Left. Group of Palestinian boys being watched by members of the Israeli military.

Top Right. The face of McGlobalization in Tangier, Morocco

Bottom Right. Scene at town center in Aleppo, Syria.








Top Left. Dividing Wall in baalbeck, lebanon.

Bottom Left. Botswana, South Africa, natives go hunting and fishing in the Okavanga Delta.

Bottom Right. Indigenous boy diving in Lago de Atitlan, Guatemala.

Bottom. Dome of the Rock in the Old City of Jerusalem. Inside the Dome is the rock that binds the three main monotheistic religions, as it is the supposed place where Abraham was asked by God to sacrifice his son Isaac.





Sunday school students in the village of Nqonknqonkweny in South Africa put on a performance for their Baptist Church.

HIV Treatment Access for Rape Survivors

The Role of Gendered Structural Violence in South Africa

Photos and Essay by Jessica Anderson

Approximately 11% of the South African population is living with HIV.¹ While other countries have a higher prevalence, South Africa holds claim to the greatest number of HIV positive people in the world. There is a body of literature that explains the number of HIV+ people in South Africa, but I would argue that the significance of the dual epidemic of sexual violence is often ignored, despite the fact that the country claims one of the highest incidences of reported rape in the world as well.² The correlation between sexual violence and HIV is apparent if one takes into account that young women aged 15-24 are four times more likely to be HIV+ than young men.³ How did the schism between HIV prevalence among men and women come about? Why are women more susceptible to HIV infection, and how was this vulnerability created? I argue that the gulf derives from social constructions and their resulting power dynamics, and are a symptom of the gendered identity that South African culture has built and assigned to women. Gender constructions ultimately



invade both private spaces through rape and public spaces through inequality of levels of policy, treatment by the criminal justice system, and cultural attitudes at large. Structural violence thus serves as an explanatory model for rape in South Africa as well as the current inability of sexual violence survivors to access HIV treatment.

Objective

The unique political and social histories of South Africa paint a portrait of gender inequality that can only be understood by exploring the historical context and power relationships within South African society during the Apartheid era. Through this socio-historical context, violence against women⁴ is both a manifestation of gendered structural violence as well as a means of spreading HIV/AIDS. The objective of this research paper is then to explain how sexual violence results from gendered structural violence and to explore the ways in which it restricts the efficacy of current policy and thus rape survivors' access to HIV/AIDS treatment.

Roadmap

I will begin by unpacking the concept of structural violence and placing it in the South African context. I will then explore gender inequality in South Africa's past, and demonstrate how this historical context has ingrained gendered structural violence and a correlating high prevalence of sexual violence throughout the nation. From here I will proceed to discuss the relationship between rape and HIV, as well as the necessity of providing HIV treatment to rape survivors. The empirical section of my research will then demonstrate that there is a schism between policy and its implementation for HIV treatment access, and that gendered structural

violence invades this space. I will focus on how gendered structural violence is impacting rape survivors' access to HIV/AIDS resources, especially through the obfuscation of public and private domains. Qualities of gendered structural violence appear in communities, the criminal justice system, and national decision-making related to sexual violence, and all of these obstacles are impacting PEP access for rape survivors. By drawing attention to the inadequacies of current practices, I ultimately hope to draw attention to the pervasive nature of gendered structural violence, as well as specific barriers to HIV/AIDS treatment for rape survivors in South Africa.

Structural Violence

To understand physical manifestations of violence in South Africa, such as rape or restricted access to HIV/AIDS treatment, the concept of structural violence⁵ provides an explanatory model that unearths the impact of relationships between various groups within society.⁶ Put simply, "structural violence is about structures that generate or cause conflict in society."⁷ Rape in South Africa is consequently a mode of conflict that is ultimately upheld through power-manipulating structures.⁸ By construing a problem within the framework of structural violence, however, a perpetrator is eliminated by instead extending the burden of responsibility onto a system: "structural violence is violence exerted systematically—that is, indirectly—by everyone who belongs to a certain social order."⁹ The "perpetrator" is therefore the system, and as such, remains faceless; everyone is culpable for allowing the system to exist, and yet no one is ultimately responsible. The 'perpetrator' can also adopt a variety of forms since structural violence is completely based on social constructions—racial, class-based, and gendered constructs are the most frequent

defining mechanisms through which structural violence occurs. It is important to note that a structural violence framework is not objective — it is inherently intended to inform the study of the social machinery of oppression.¹⁰ In this manner, a structural violence model seeks to expose inequity by explaining social conditions through the prism of subjugation.


By explaining social conditions with a model of structural violence, it is crucial to examine not only current factors, but also the historical processes that allow current societal conditions to exist: "Those who look only to powerful present-day actors to explain misery will fail to see how inequality is structured and legitimated over time."¹¹ In order to unpack the legitimizing of structural inequality, then the question that must be asked is, "What construction materials were used, and when and why and how?"¹² This is essentially the goal of this paper: to explore the construction materials used in South Africa to build the current gender identity of South African women, and to explore the impact of these materials on both rape and HIV/AIDS resources for rape survivors. The unique historical context of South Africa has created a situation whereby government action can best be understood only in light of its politics of memory¹³ By failing to recognize the gradual legitimization of gender inequity as a social norm¹⁴, what Arthur Kleinman refers to as "the

This is essentially the goal of this paper: to explore the construction materials used in South Africa to build the current gender identity of South African women, and to explore the impact of these materials on both rape and HIV/AIDS resources for rape survivors.

violences of everyday life" are partially masked, and yet continue to profoundly shape people's overt acts of violence.¹⁵ The construction of gender in South Africa, then, is both caused by and perpetuates structural violence.

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Elders in the village of Nqonknqonkweny in South Africa discuss issues affecting their town.



Patriarchal Structural Violence

Access to power is heavily influenced by the way in which people are gendered, and the capacity to access this power is a culture-specific construct.¹⁶ Beyond the scope of culture, however, the process of becoming gendered, and therefore possessing power, is both historical and contextual: “Gendering’ as a process is vulnerable to the influence of past and present political forces.”¹⁷ As such, political systems are capable of exacerbating culturally defined markers of gender through particular practices, policies, and established norms. By embedding gender identity even further within a society, a political system such as South Africa’s can enshrine a “social power structure that creates and maintains social expectations.”^{18, 19} While patriarchy and its associated social expectations are universal, it is important to recognize the cultural, social, and political diversities between patriarchies, and to ultimately examine these differences in how they define the personal, physical, and institutional power than men exert over women in a society.²⁰ It must be emphasized that this power dynamic is strictly an artificial creation:

Acknowledging that gender and difference are culturally constructed, are constantly shifting and changing, and are also mediated by other inequalities, never a unitary, fixed process or identity, should not constitute a denial that gender difference is there, is here, in all its slippery manifestations.²¹

The necessity of scrutinizing the ‘slippery manifestations’ is the crux of understanding gender power dynamics in South Africa. In the process of accepting gender as a construct, it also must be accepted that gender constructions are a reality, and a reality that interacts uniquely in the context within which it is created. For South Africa, gender constructions are embedded within a history of inequality that renders its construct of male and female roles exceptional.

Gender roles are firmly rooted within discourse on sexuality whereby “patriarchal structural violence relegates ‘women’s issues’ to the ‘private’ realms; they become private matters that the state doesn’t address.”²² The blurring of public and private spheres is thus a major aspect of South Africa’s brand of gendered structural violence, in which sexuality is construed as a domain in which

men largely determine a woman’s reproductive health choices. In contrast, gender roles also compromise men’s health by encouraging men to equate risky behavior with manliness.²³ By obscuring the boundaries between public and private, patriarchal systems contribute to the eventual expressions of direct violence²⁴, where sexual violence is often the physical manifestation of direct violence. Sexual violence is thus a symptom of the underlying patriarchal structure, and “sexual violence is characterized by social and political conflict, and the breakdown of law and order which can occur in the wake.”²⁵ While sexual violence and its underlying gender constructions are hierarchically structured in terms of power, this power can only be understood as a consequence of a culture’s particular social and political conflicts.

South Africa’s Patriarchal Structural Violence: Removing Race

Even though gender inequity is a pervasive feature of most modern societies, South



Africa is unique for a set of gender roles ingrained by a historical legacy centered on violence and hierarchal formations of power, where “Apartheid groups legitimized violence by the dominant group against the disempowered.”²⁶ While initially directed toward those disempowered by race, this paradigm is being shifted toward women, and

as the dominant group in this context, men are perpetuating legitimized violence. The legacies of institutionalized violence therefore remain in the acceptance of violence as a legitimate means of settling disputes.²⁷ South African society has become desensitized to a hierarchical system of power that behaves in this manner since the etiology of patriarchal

and race-caste systems closely parallel each other:

Both systems, the patriarchy and the race-caste system rest upon a relationship in which the dominant or superordinate has made the dominated or subordinate an instrument of the dominants will and refuses to recognize the subordinates

Children wait for Sunday School to begin at the Nqonknqonkweny Baptist Church in South Africa.



independent subjectivity.²⁸

Apartheid's race-caste system of exclusion thus remains in place with a different target population: it currently serves as a means of subjugating women and reducing their power through such tactics as sexual violence.

However, it is important to note that the



legacy being replicated is not a racialized one—instead, the concept of hierarchies and the use of violence as a means of resolving conflict have been transferred. The commonalities between racial and gendered means of subjugation must be noted: “Both forms of violence, men’s sexual attacks on women, and racist attacks shaped by Apartheid ideology reveal the anxiety of the perpetrator class about possible loss of their dominance.”²⁹ The fear of losing control and the reassertion of that control through physical displays of power are constant themes in South Africa. Men, and not exclusively those disadvantaged by Apartheid, continue to replicate this reassertion. In this manner, control is maintained across racial and class borders, as violence against women is equally prevalent in all socio-economic classes.³⁰ Using race as an indicator of rape only serves to further marginalize those disadvantaged by Apartheid, and fails to provide an explanation for the high incidence of rape in present-day South Africa. Furthermore, by racializing rape “the issue of rape has been hijacked by narratives that foreground race, not gender”³¹, and the consequence of linking gender with racial discourse means that it is more difficult to respond to rape crimes with a strictly gendered response.³² The history of Apartheid in South Africa has played a fundamental role in shaping the current climate of gender inequality, but the symptom of rape is being dangerously interpreted in terms of race where it does not belong. The problematic nature of these definitions is evident in the gulf between the perceptions and realities of Apartheid’s legacy:

The legacy of Apartheid has contributed two critical problems: our subsequent focus on race still tends to repress open scrutiny of gender issues; and the capacity of Apartheid to drive violence into intimate and domestic spaces continues to fuel the epidemic of sexual violence.³³

The colonial project was re-interpreted after union in 1910 as segregation and subsequently as Apartheid; the consequence of these processes has been to construct a society conditioned to hierarchies of power and the use of violence as an accepted means of control. These ideas underlie norms of sexuality, gendered identities and currently

define the ‘legitimate’ patterns of domination and subordination between men and women.

Spheres of Patriarchy: Rape and Structure in South Africa

The consequence of blurring public and private spaces is that power within relationships is diverted to men in sexual relationships; by defining sexuality as a private issue, it facilitates the ability of men to control power in sexual interactions. Just as Apartheid violence infiltrated the daily life and political environment of black South Africans, patriarchy invades the private and public lives of South African women by pervading gender relationships both in the home and in society overall. Sexual violence in post-1994 South Africa is amplified by Apartheid-rooted discourses³⁴ that emphasize Apartheid’s social rankings and stratifications along racial lines. These lines essentially mirror gendered hierarchical structures in South Africa and an alarming rise in sexual violence since the institution of democracy.^{35, 36} An extremely high prevalence of sexual violence is therefore a consequence of South Africa’s history and serves as a means of controlling South African women both in the microcosm of the home and in society at large:

In South Africa, gender-based violence exists in every community, in millions of households, in every form of institutions within all public spaces; in short, wherever people interact.³⁷

This ubiquitous infiltration of violence in both public and private spaces of South Africa ultimately exemplifies the impact of gendered structural violence and its ability to impact multiple layers of society simultaneously.

The challenge for South Africans committed to the transformation of oppressive social norms is to untangle both “victim” and “perpetrator” from their interlock of violence³⁸, since blaming individual actors conceals the etiology of sexual violence. Instead, understanding how power is diffused and roles constructed play a pivotal role in exposing the “story” of sexual violence in South Africa:



The story of sexual assault in our culture is not just about rape. Rapists are not born, they are made. And remade. And the culture which makes them also makes “us”. The questions of why some men rape is thus connected to the question of why sexual violence is tolerated. The connection exists at a double intersection: between attitudes and actions, between violence and notions of masculinity.³⁹

How the story was constructed, and how individual action and societal attitudes intersect illustrate the malleable role of sexual violence as a mechanism for securing and maintaining men’s dominance.⁴⁰ Sexual violence is the “private space” consequence of patriarchy, and is intertwined with “public space” consequences such as limited access to HIV/AIDS resources for rape survivors. By coming to a holistic, historical, and contextualized understanding of gendered structural violence, it is possible to own the extent of inequity fomented by gendered structural violence and discover how this inequity is impacting the health of rape survivors today.

Linking Rape and HIV in South Africa

The extent of sexual violence is sobering: a woman is raped every 26 seconds in South Africa.⁴¹ Furthermore, South Africa has among the highest prevalence of reported rape in the world⁴², with estimates suggesting that the actual incidence of rape is between 20 and 36 times larger than what is reported.⁴³ And while rape narratives generally present an “othering” of rapists that portrays an intimidating stranger-figure as the perpetrator, most rapes occur within the rapists’ community.⁴⁴ The localized nature of rape in South Africa is especially dangerous as the stigma attached to rape often inhibits women from seeking health care treatment.⁴⁵ Such an inhibition is problematic because rape renders its victims vulnerable to contracting HIV/AIDS. Not only does rape occur in circumstances where a condom won’t be used, but the violent nature of rape creates a higher risk of genital injury and bleeding, increasing the risk of HIV transmission.⁴⁶ Ending gender-based violence

Gender-based violence partially accounts for the disparity between male and female prevalence rates, and has been scientifically associated with increased HIV seropositivity. This link requires a dual solution to the symptom of HIV transmission to rape survivors, as well as the broader issue of violence against women overall.

and improving women’s position in society has subsequently been proclaimed critical to both the root of the current AIDS epidemic in South Africa, as well as preventing HIV.⁴⁷ Moreover, with the current prevalence of HIV among women at 13.3% compared with a male prevalence of 8.2 %, ⁴⁸ it is clear that there is a gender-specific dimension to the AIDS epidemic in South Africa. Gender-based violence partially accounts for the disparity between male and female prevalence rates, and has been scientifically associated with increased HIV seropositivity.⁴⁹ This link requires a dual solution to the symptom of HIV transmission to rape survivors, as well as the broader issue of violence against women overall.

HIV and PEP

In order to prevent the transmission of HIV to victims of sexual violence, it is necessary to begin anti-retroviral therapy⁵⁰ within 72 hours of the attack. This form of treatment is referred to as post-exposure prophylaxis, or PEP⁵¹ and rape survivors who reach medical care within 72 hours can receive a course of PEP to prevent the transmission of HIV/AIDS.⁵² The crux of the treatment issue, though, is having accessible PEP outlets for victims of sexual violence. Access to treatment is constrained by a series of barriers, ranging from peer pressure and stigma to the nature of national policy and legislation. The corollary of these obstacles is that approximately 1/3 of women raped who do not receive PEP will go on to become HIV+.⁵³ Such a high incidence of HIV infection following no treatment, coupled with the various barriers to PEP access, necessitates action towards facilitating treatment access for rape survivors. However, the symptom of restricted access to PEP cannot simply be addressed through a ‘magic bullet’ response of dispensing medication more widely. Tackling the etiology of violence by challenging communities to examine

violence-perpetuating assumptions is needed concurrently with a re-evaluation of the factors that reduce PEP access.⁵⁴

The provision of PEP as an integral component of addressing the HIV epidemic in South Africa fails to acknowledge how gender dynamics are currently driving HIV policies in South Africa.⁵⁵ The provision of PEP cannot be implemented in isolation, but instead must be the core of a systematic approach to caring for rape survivors.⁵⁶ A systematic approach necessitates strong policies providing for the provision of PEP, as well as an effective implementation plan. Implementation includes cooperation at the local, provincial, and national levels of government, as well as societal support. Without a holistic consideration of gender and rape, policy will fail to yield results and render the treatment services available for rape survivors ineffective in practice.

Exploring the Gulf between Practice and Theory

We’ve got some very good policies.⁵⁷ There is definitely a breakdown in implementation though. The South African government will say that they lack capacity. We know that there’s money available. Why not use the money to build capacity? It makes one question the political will.⁵⁸

An indifferent “political will”⁵⁹ appears to be counteracting policy for rape survivors, and in doing so, it further entrenches gender inequality under the guise of effective legislation. While policy can create a backbone of equal gender norms, it can only extend so far in promoting gender equality: “Women’s oppression is so much more deeply entrenched than just legislation.”⁶⁰ Legislation consequently creates an opportunity for change that must be implemented in conjunction with other reform

tactics, such as the creation of more satellite rape centers, more funding for counseling, training programs for police officers, and advocacy events at the community level.⁶¹ While a law may protect the right to freedom from violence, “If the state refuses to enforce these policies then the right exists only on paper.”⁶² The constant reiteration of lacking ‘political will’, failures at the implementation stage, and an inability to provide comprehensive care demonstrates a breach in the ideal of a gender-blind society. There appears to be an implicitly institutionalized lack of attendance to “women’s issues” that pervades all levels of society and allows society to defy policy without consequence. It is through these breaches in implementation that gendered structural violence is perpetuated at the national, provincial, and local level.

Local Levels: Obscuring the Public and the Private

A fundamental barrier to the implementation of legislation for rape survivors is the construction of a mutually-accepted definition of what exactly constitutes rape: “In South Africa, we distinguish between the kinds of rape we feel the criminal justice system takes seriously and those that are part of the everyday,


ordinary hardships of daily living.”⁶³ These ordinary hardships often come at the hands of people that the rape survivor knows intimately, and as such, the schism between personal and legal matters quickly becomes blurred. With respect to rape in Khayelitsha, “mostly it’s family members. Fathers, uncles, boyfriends, neighbors”⁶⁴ - they’ll promise to kill you if you come forward.”⁶⁵ When violence occurs in the domestic sphere, the ability to accept rape as a crime is difficult. It is considered a ‘trouble,’ and an overwhelming amount of ambiguity surrounds the issue: “Was it something I did? Was it my dress? That’s the gray area.”⁶⁶ In the end, the blurring of private and public spheres inhibits South African women from coming forward about rape crimes, either because they don’t consider an act to constitute rape⁶⁷, or because the intimacy of their relationship with the perpetrator denies the opportunity to press charges without familial ramifications.

Additionally, the power dynamics of intimate relationships further inhibit survivors from pressing charges and seeking treatment: “Some people don’t come forward because it’s happening within the house. When you rely on the breadwinner, you don’t want to report.” The intimacy of rape in this scenario ultimately constructs rape as “a perpetrator-less crime, squarely categorized as part of the burden of womanhood”, one of the nastier but inevitable

risks inherent in having a female body.”⁶⁸ When the home is interpreted as exempt from rape rhetoric, ‘perpetrator-less crimes’ persist without public space consequences. Moreover, the power dynamic in this situation is often further exacerbated by financial dependence.⁶⁹ Regardless of the motive however, the frequency of rape in the private sphere renders the boundaries between these spaces inoperative. A microcosm of society’s perception of gender roles exists in the home, and these identities manifest themselves both in how women define rape, and how unwilling they are to come forward about inter-family rape.

Shifting the Burden of Responsibility— Women “Asking” For It

While rape within domestic spaces holds a more implicit mold of gender inequity, sexual violence that takes place in the public sphere carries a more blatant disregard for gender power dynamics. For instance, 42% of South African men believe a woman who drinks and wears a miniskirt is asking for trouble, while 27% of men believe that if a woman has been drinking, it is her fault if she is raped.⁷⁰



A sanitation worker takes a break outside of his home in Joe Slovo, the informal slum settlement on the outskirts of the township of Langa in South Africa.



Alcohol is frequently used as a justification for rape, and in Khayelitsha many girls are held responsible and then rejected for their own rape.⁷¹ Alcohol, immodest clothing, and flirtation are all considered deviant, and by participating in these practices “a woman is simply being “taught a lesson” . . . it is somehow not rape at all.”⁷² Rape is subsequently a means of realigning “skewed’ power relations— it is a means of control that is justified by placing responsibility on the victim instead of the perpetrator.

According to a Mowbray police inspector, “[the problem] isn’t the dress code, it is the mind of the perpetrator.”⁷³ The perpetrator’s mind is far from unique; instead it reflects assumptions about power and gender that are ubiquitous in South Africa and further entrenched by such forces as politics and the media. For instance, the action of political elites plays an important role in shaping the

By operating outside of the justice system, not only are rape survivors discouraged from seeking justice, but their pain is being commodified while the perpetrator remains at large.

nature of rape discourse: “The Zuma case declares, it’s ok, if you do something like rape it’s ok.”^{74, 75} Norms are further engrained and rape considered increasingly acceptable through each such high-profile act:

Our justice system cleared a prominent political leader of rape charges and the judgment was clearly influenced by the patriarchal thinking about the myths around women and rape. Rape is so prevalent that it is almost becoming an expected and normal behaviour.⁷⁶

Furthermore, just as the high-profile Zuma trial influences perceptions at the community level, local practices for handling rape cases also perpetuate the same gender regulating tendencies.

You’ll notice that after a week the rape charge will be dropped. The families agree on a price and settle outside of court. 2,500 is a common settlement. Then you can just go ahead and rape the next one. It perpetuates more rapes.

For the lady to receive the payment is better than getting nothing. If he goes to jail there’s no benefit to her. The make would obviously rather pay 2500 rand than go to jail. It’s safe to say that most of the dropped cases were because of payment.⁷⁷

By operating outside of the justice system, not only are rape survivors discouraged from seeking justice, but their pain is being commodified while the perpetrator remains at large. Moreover, agency is removed from the survivor by having the cash settlement determined by family members. Overall the practice serves to delegitimize the crime of rape, prevent women from coming forward to the police, and perpetuate a culture of achieving justice outside of legal processes. The stigma attached to the definition of rape, coming forward about rape in the home, and working through the criminal justice system all culminate to reflect biased and gendered attitudes towards what is socially acceptable. At the local level these perceptions create an oppressive atmosphere in which women are unwilling to come forward about rape at all. By failing to report their attack, rape survivors are unable to receive medical treatment, and specifically, the PEP therapy that is necessary for preventing the transmission of HIV.

Police Authorities: Inequity Through the Prism of Inefficiency

While women are dissuaded from reporting rape for a variety of socio-cultural reasons, they face additional obstacles upon reaching the police authorities as well. Implicit markers of bias are exhibited with the inefficient nature of police proceedings on matters of rape. In spite of a considerable effort post-1994 to reform the criminal justice system, survivors of intimate violence still



Children run through the shacks of Joe Slovo, the informal slum settlement on the outskirts of the township of Langa in South Africa.

consistently experience discrimination and inefficiency.⁷⁸ A major issue hampering the specialized sexual offence authorities in fight against gender-based violence is the shortage of staffing:⁷⁹

The FCS covers 13 police stations as it is, from Simonstown to Mowbray. They are understaffed. Say there are supposed to be 35 officers. Well, there are 11. And 2 are out on burn-out, a couple more are sick. . .you're left with a handful.⁸⁰

With such a limited supply of staff, it is difficult for officers to treat each case with the attention it demands and rapists accordingly realize that there is a significant chance that they will not be held responsible for their actions. While more police and specialized courts would act as a deterrent to rapists,⁸¹ the quantitative shortage of officers has a qualitative dynamic as well. A Mowbray police inspector willingly admitted that “A lot of our new officers are not well equipped to deal with rape situations.”⁸² Insufficient training for handling rape crimes results in dismissive attitude that fails to prioritize rape as a ‘real’ offense.

We need the police to be sympathetic, we need them to be properly trained. We have grief constantly because of the inefficiencies dealing with these cases. It goes back to the patriarchal system. The police are male dominated and they are dragging their heels.⁸³

Attitudes and Training

The mindset of untrained officers reflects how communities at large frame rape discourse, which construes rape as a strictly domestic matter: “You will see that if a male goes in and reports domestic violence it is taken more seriously than if a woman reports the same case. It just isn’t taken seriously.”⁸⁴ The deeply embedded nature of rape’s rank as a ‘domestic issue’⁸⁵ then needs to be inverted; the aim of training shouldn’t be simply to provide information, but to slowly shift how officers consider rape offences.

You can train as much as you want to, but if the attitude doesn’t change then the service delivery won’t either. What we need is continuous training. It needs to

be a process, this is the problem. It’s not a change in mindset now. It’s not just about informing the person, it’s about shifting the way they think.⁸⁶

The more precedence given to rape crimes within the criminal justice system, the more trusting rape survivors will be in coming forward to police authorities. The current lack of willingness to come forward has been

The continuation of behavior that discourages rape survivors from reporting their crimes simultaneously restricts the ability of the victim to access health care services and specifically PEP treatment.

addressed by Treatment Action Campaign as a factor restricting access to HIV treatment. The organization demands that, “the South African Police Forces must increase significantly the number of rapists arrested and charged. Rape is a crime. We call for an immediate end to police intimidation incompetence, including the ‘losing’ of docets.”⁸⁷ Inefficiencies indicating a lack of attention to supposed ‘domestic’ issues mire a system that ultimately delays justice and dissuades survivors from claiming charges.

Training needs to be ongoing. Every three months there are new officers, but no one seems to want to take on re-training them. The only way to access medical care is to go to the police station, open a case, and then wait there for an ambulance. Women would be waiting for hours, alone in the police station. The officers would be so insensitive.⁸⁸

These deterrents implicitly suffuse the police authorities in South Africa, and when gender bias impairs the ability of police to recognize violent behavior, it ultimately limits the provision of HIV treatment as well.⁸⁹

Explicit Discrimination: The Danger of Secondary Trauma

The implementation and acceptability of recent laws addressing gender equality and gender-based violence has been hampered by continued discriminatory attitudes and practices among law enforcement agencies.⁹⁰

Beyond matters of inefficiency, understaffing,

and a lack of priority for rape cases, the police authorities are also culpable of inflicting secondary trauma on survivors entering the criminal justice system.⁹¹ “Myths around women and rape are prevalent, and this has an impact on how a policy is implemented—By bringing societal values into the workplace, people tend to judge the behavior of the survivor and not the perpetrator.”⁹² This

judgment can translate into verbal abuse and secondary trauma at the hands of charge officers:

People are afraid to go to the police station because of the difficult questions you are being asked. What were you wearing? Was it nice? How did it feel? There’s the reception room where all of the criminals are. There’s no privacy. Everyone, all of the charge officers are listening to what you are saying. The women are thinking, why did I come here to report this case?⁹³

While this sort of degrading interrogation is a response given to a sober rape survivor, discrimination is exacerbated if alcohol is involved. “The police would say, ‘look at you you’ve got a short skirt. You were drunk. You are worse than a dog.’”⁹⁴ Not only is substance abuse thought to make the survivor more responsible for their rape, but a woman who was drinking is often treated derogatively by authorities. Alcohol and shebeens are therefore a considerable problem; if a survivors comes to the police station and they have been using drugs, the officer will tell them that it is a given a sexual encounter took place.⁹⁵ Insensitivity and discrimination can also surpass words, and result in further criminal activity. “Some police do funny things—one girl was naked and they were touching her in the private parts.”⁹⁶ Secondary trauma can consequently oscillate from insensitivity to both verbal and sexual abuse. While only representative of a few select officers, the underlying norms that make this behavior acceptable are insidious. The continuation of behavior that discourages rape survivors from reporting their crimes simultaneously restricts the ability of the victim



to access health care services and specifically PEP treatment.

Treatment Access through Policy Implementation

While organizations claim that the policies guaranteed under law are strong in theory, the implementation breach can most visibly be seen by examining rape survivors' access to satellite rape centers. The fact that survivors are hypothetically guaranteed healthcare and access to treatment means little in the context of actually delivering services. In order to report a rape and receive treatment, it boils down to issues of access and issues of transport: "It takes money, it takes someone to look after the children."⁹⁷ Survivors consequently need a reliable means of getting to health care centers, given that there is one in their surrounding area. The inability of many women to access sexual violence services illustrates how heralding individual centers as successful does little to extend effective care; instead it is crucial to also replicate similar sexual violence services elsewhere.⁹⁸ The vast majority of reported cases in Khayelitsha, for instance, are from the nearby surrounding area: "Most survivors are from Site B because we're located in Site B. It's just not accessible for others." This availability heuristic was replicated in the SBCWC as well, where approximately 80% of shelter clients come from Manenberg, Mitchell's Plain and Heideveld respectively.⁹⁹ Replication and sustainability is the key to counteracting the current nature of restricted availability:

Sustainable mechanisms are necessary to address the physical and mental health needs of the survivors of sexual violence . . . the provision of rape crisis centers and help lines, health services, shelters, and refuges.¹⁰⁰

However, funding for such mechanisms is scarce, and few resources are available for organizations to provide more hours and support services.¹⁰¹ This emphasizes the need for not only more centers, but also a need for a holistic approach to providing care that takes into account difficulties of access and transportation. By providing effective policy

on paper, but failing to address the pragmatic concerns of the target population, government action is leaving behind the bulk of rape survivors with respect to care and access to HIV treatment. By lacking a comprehensive vision for rape response, "everyone is isolated so people fall through the cracks. The government doesn't see this as their role through. They don't prioritize the health of women."¹⁰²

After Access: The Necessity of Counseling

Women who have access to sexual violence institutions subsequently have free access to PEP. However, the government fails to consider the gendered dimension of providing services, and does not fully appreciate the impact of a traumatic experience such as rape. It is necessary to respond to the gender-specific needs of survivors, who, for instance, may prefer female counselors and health care providers.¹⁰³ As it stands now, "victim support services remain uncoordinated, fragmented, duplicated, ad-hoc, and unsustainable."¹⁰⁴ The consequence of an ineffective support services system is that rape survivors are left wanting; the level of want provided the impetus for a recent Treatment Action Campaign demand for better psychosocial support and comprehensive services for all rape survivors.¹⁰⁵ While the lack of government funding for counseling services indicates that counseling is not considered a means of reducing HIV transmission, there is in fact a powerful connection between counseling and effective PEP treatment:

It is crucial that medical staff administering medication to rape survivors take into account the shock rape survivors might still be in and the impact this might have on their ability to absorb information and instructions. Failing to do so can lead to medication not being taken properly.¹⁰⁶

And yet, governmental funding is siphoned off towards specific functions, such as payroll for health care staff.¹⁰⁷ Counseling provides the psychosocial support that survivors need post-trauma in order to follow through on PEP

but such a holistic interpretation of treatment is lost in the governmental sector: "No one wants the responsibility of the counselors . . . the government doesn't see counselors as a priority."¹⁰⁸ Cost-effectiveness arguments fail to realize that in order for PEP to be effective, it must be taken consistently. The effects of trauma inhibit the ability to take medication consistently, and this needs to be mitigated through both effective health care and counseling. However, this can only occur once the fact that counseling is necessary for HIV treatment is accepted. Until then, gendered attitudes will prevail and restrictions to effective PEP treatment will continue unabated.

Conclusions

This paper sought to explore how sexual violence results from gendered structural violence, and to explain the way in which this same concept is restricting women's access to HIV/AIDS treatment after rape. To convey this idea, I unpacked the concept of structural violence and placed it in the South African context, demonstrating how this historical context has engrained gendered structural violence as well as a correlating high prevalence of sexual violence. From here I proceeded to discuss the relationship between rape and HIV, as well as the necessity of providing HIV treatment to rape survivors. The empirical section of my research then focused on the disparity between theory and practice for supplying HIV treatment, and how gendered structural violence is underlying the breach in policy implementation. Targeted aspects of the limited nature of access were outlined, with attention focused on the behavior, attitudes, and norms underlying each barrier.

The Cycle GSV in Implementation

Obstacles perpetually restrict the ability of rape survivors to come forward about their rape crimes and receive treatment, and yet the etiology of these restricting variables is rarely addressed. Gendered structural violence is one interpretation that appears to account for the majority of these factors. Survivors are influenced in the home and by a

community stigma from reporting their rape. Once issues of transportation and access are surmounted, survivors who step forward are forced to contend with potentially insensitive and discriminatory police forces. Those who successfully press charges are further restricted by a support service system riddled with gaps that fail to guarantee access nearby or counseling services. These barriers gradually wear down both the dignity of South Africa's women as well as the ability of rape survivors to gain HIV treatment. In this manner, dual epidemics are simultaneously raging; the more silent violence of disease results from physical violence as a consequence of a structural violence that fails to realize the discriminatory practices taking place under the guise of

By haphazardly treating the symptoms of disease instead of the underlying causes, gendered structural violence and its physical manifestation of rape will continue unabated. This is materializing at the community, local, and national levels by invading both the public and private spheres of women's lives.

effective, gender-neutral policies.

Underlying Concepts

While gendered structural violence impacts rape survivors' access to HIV/AIDS resources, the scope of impact continues to grow through the ambiguity attached to public and private spaces. Qualities of GSV implicitly and explicitly pervade these spaces in society. The act of rape constitutes a "private realm" explicit action that counters the more subtle restrictions to PEP access. Inefficiencies in the criminal justice system illustrate an implicit instance of GSV whose explicit, private space foil is discriminatory, sexist comments from charge officers. At the national level, limited funding for counseling is an implicit, silent violence that is alongside the sort of overt sexism exhibited in media attention for Zuma's trial. Private sphere actions are allowed to be more explicit since they are concealed from the public domain, whereas the public instances of GSV remain implicit and as such, relatively unnoticed in the society. Drawing attention to the creation of these spheres, and framing rape as a public space issue are vital for eliminating the prevalence of gendered structural violence

in South Africa. In addition to revealing specific barriers to HIV/AIDS treatment for rape survivors in South Africa, my fieldwork has unearthed an explanatory concept of public and private spheres tangled within the gendered structural violence framework.

A doctor at Simelela's Khayelitsha center conveyed the truth that, "It simply doesn't make sense to do the mopping up work all of the time."¹⁰⁹ By haphazardly treating the symptoms of disease instead of the underlying causes, gendered structural violence and its physical manifestation of rape will continue unabated. This is materializing at the community, local, and national levels by invading both the public and private spheres of women's lives. Private realm injustices must be brought into the public sphere in order to tackle the current attitudes and structures, of gender inequity. However, this is increasingly difficult considering that "it isn't the government's job to change mindsets."¹¹⁰ Unfortunately, mindsets are at the core of what is perpetuating rape and restricted HIV treatment access in South Africa, which suggests that perhaps now is the time for South Africa to reassess just what exactly its job entails. ■

Endnotes

1. "5.5 million of the 47 million people living with HIV in South Africa" "Gender and HIV/AIDS." Cape Times. 22 Nov. 2006: 5.
2. "Between April 2004 and March 2005, 55114 cases were reported to the police South Africa." South Africa: Sexual Assault Hidden in Culture of Silence.
3. "Gender and HIV/AIDS."
4. Used interchangeably with gender-based violence in this study. The United Nations General Assembly in 1993 adopted the definition of violence against women as "any act that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or psychological

harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life. It encompasses, but is not limited to: physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital cutting and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation; physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere; trafficking in women and forced prostitution; and physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the state, wherever it occurs."

5. "Structural violence is the condition in which human beings are unable to realize their full potential" Mwangi, Makumi. *Conflict; Theory, Process, and Institutions of Management*. Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000
6. Galtung, Johan. Structural and Direct Violence: A Note on Operationalization. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 8, No. 1 1971, 73-76.
7. Mwangi
8. Mwangi
9. Farmer, Paul. "Anthropology of Structural Violence." *Current Anthropology*, Ed. Vol. 45: (2004). 305-325.
10. Farmer, 307.
11. Farmer, 309.
12. Farmer, 309.
13. Farmer, 319.
14. The legitimizing of gender inequity as a social norm closely mirrors the legitimizing of racial inequality as a norm in South Africa as well. The connection will be explored in depth later in the paper.



15. Farmer, 320.
16. Bennett, Jane. "SA Higher Educational Institutions Challenging Sexual Violence and Sexual Harassment: A Handbook of Resources." Cape Town: African Gender Institute, 2002. 18.
17. Bennett, 19.
18. Elder, 7.
19. To elaborate: "Through forms of social arrangement and cultural traditions gender relations are contextualized and accepted as 'normal' and 'abnormal' The system of patriarchy thus maintains and sustains structures of male dominance through systems of collective ideas, and shared assumptions about gender." Elder, 5.
20. Shefer, Tamara. "'Psychology and the Regulation of Gender.'" In *Introduction to Critical Psychology*, edited by Derek Hook, 187-208. Cape Town: UCT Press, 2004.
21. Shefer, 196.
22. Abrahams, 135.
23. Dean Peacock, Andrew Levack. "The Men as Partners Program in South Africa: Reaching Men to End Gender-Based Violence and Promote Sexual and Reproductive Health." *International Journal of Men's Health* (2004).
24. Abrahams, 138.
25. Gordon and Orehan.
26. Moffett, Helen. "These Women, They Force Us to Rape Them: Rape as a Narrative of Social Control in Post Apartheid South Africa." *Journal of South African Studies* 32, no. 1 (2006).
27. Bennett, 21-22.
28. Moffett, *These Women, They Force Us to Rape Them*, 17.
29. Moffett, 17.
30. Jewkes, R. and Abrahams, N. (2002). The epidemiology of rape and sexual coercion in South Africa: an overview. *Social Science and Medicine* 55, 1231.
31. Moffett, *Rape, Race, Rhetoric*, 16.
32. "The police are combating rape effectively and those who suggest otherwise are not only racist, but also guilty of demonizing the sexuality of African men."
33. Moffett, 16.
34. Moffett, 9.
35. Moffett, 14.
36. This alarming rise is largely attributed to an increase in reporting since the end of Apartheid. It is hypothesized that gender-based violence was equally prevalent in the past, and that race-based hierarchies and gender-based hierarchies existed parallel to each other.
37. Bennett, 21.
38. Bennett, 21.
39. "Rape Crisis Annual Report." Cape Town: Rape Crisis, 2003
40. Tshesane, Mpho. "Women Abuse in the Family Context: An Ethological Approach." *Crime Research in South Africa* 3, no. 3 (2001).
41. "Rape Crisis Annual Report." Cape Town: Rape Crisis, 2003
42. "South Africa: Sexual Assault Hidden in Culture of Silence."
43. "Rape Crisis Annual Report." Cape Town: Rape Crisis, 2003
44. "Rape Crisis Annual Report." Cape Town: Rape Crisis, 2003.
45. Gordon and Orehan.
46. Gordon and Orehan.
47. Shefer, 288.
48. "Equal Treatment." 6.
49. Dunkle et al. "Gender-Based Violence, Relationship Power, and Risk of HIV Infection in Women Attending Antenatal Clinics in South Africa." *Lancet* 363, no. 9419: 1415-21.
50. Administration of anti-HIV drugs within 72 hours of a high-risk exposure, including unprotected sex, needle sharing, or occupational needle stick injury, to help prevent development of HIV infection
51. PEP can stop the transmission of HIV if given within 72 hours of infection.
52. 2005 Simelela Annual Report. Simelela. 2005, 2.
53. Simelela Annual Report." Cape Town: Simelela, 2005, 16
54. "Rape Crisis Annual Report." Cape Town: Rape Crisis, 2003, 2.
55. Kim, 109.
56. Kim, 103.
57. The current sexual offences bill allows for PEP access and treatment for rape survivors. Contrastingly, the new sexual offences bill requires that criminal charges to be filed before PEP access is guaranteed.
58. Irma Maharaj, Personal Interview, Athlone, South Africa, 21 Nov. 2006.
59. Examples of a lack of governmental "political will" will be expanded upon later.
60. Elaine Salo, Personal Interview, Rondebosch, South Africa, 1 Dec. 2006.
61. Suggestions emphasized by Maharaj, Mathese, and Hendricks during personal interviews.
62. Nazma Hendricks, Personal Interview, Athlone, South Africa, 23 Nov. 2006.
63. Moffett, Helen. "Race, Rape, and Rhetoric: Constructing Narratives of Sexual Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa." University of Cape Town: Centre of African Studies Gallery, 2002.
64. Andrietta Sishuba, Personal Interview, Khayelitsha, South Africa, 23 Nov. 2006
65. Zukisa Klaas, Personal Interview, Khay-

- elitssha, South Africa, 29 Nov. 2006
66. Salo, Personal Interview.
 67. To expand upon this thought further: "In our curriculum we explain the types of rape. Where to report, and what you can get, expressing PEP and the importance of getting it. Couple's rape- kids just don't believe its rape. "I'll never be raped by my partner—they don't recognize what rape is. The perception is "That is you're saying no, you're actually saying ok, it's fine." Andrietta Sishuba, Personal Interview, Khayelitsha, South Africa, 23 Nov. 2006
 68. Moffett, *Race, Rape, and Rhetoric*: 5.
 69. Sishuba, Personal Interview.
 70. "Gender and HIV/AIDS."
 71. 2005 Simelela Annual Report. 16.
 72. Moffett, *Rape, Race, Rhetoric*, 16.
 73. AJ Minnaar, Personal Interview, Mowbray, South Africa, 21 Nov. 2006.
 74. Misbah Cassiem, Personal Interview, Athlone, South Africa, 23 Nov. 2006.
 75. Former deputy president Jacob Zuma was acquitted from rape charges after a highly publicized trial contesting that Zuma had raped a young woman. Zuma received a significant amount of media backlash for claiming that he was safe from HIV since he took a shower after the encounter, as well as for making sexist comments about the role of women in society.
 76. Chantel Cooper, Personal Interview, Observatory, South Africa, 4 Nov. 2006.
 77. "Of 81 reported rapes from March '05 to April '06, 30 of the charges were dropped. Approximately 40% of charges were therefore dropped, and Smit suggests that most of these were because of out-of-court settlements. Marius Smit, Personal Interview, Langa, South Africa, 26 Nov 2006.
 78. Moffett, "These Women, They Force Us to Rape Them" 13.
 79. Josias, Personal Interview.
 80. Hendricks, Personal Interview.
 81. "Simelela Annual Report." Cape Town: Simelela, 2005, 25.
 82. Minnaar, Personal Interview.
 83. Maharaj, Personal Interview.
 84. Ilze Mathese, Personal Interview, 21 Nov. 2006.
 85. 'Domestic' can be thought of as synonymous with private with respect to the private and public space concept discussed earlier. Realizing that such a 'private space' issue is in fact public is the goal of training workshops that address police officers' attitudes, and the missing link with police authorities that presently do not take reported rape crimes seriously.
 86. Mathese, Personal Interview.
 87. "Equal Treatment." 21.
 88. Josias, Personal Interview..
 89. Abrahams, 136.
 90. Fox, Susan. *Gender-based Violence and AIDS in South Africa*. Centre for AIDS Development, Research and Evaluation (CADRE), for the Department of Health, South Africa, March 2003.
 91. Rape Crisis 2003 Annual Report. 1.
 92. Chantel Cooper, Personal Interview, 4 Nov. 2006.
 93. Vathiswa Kamkam, Personal Interview, 29 Nov. 2006.
 94. Genine Josias, Personal Interview, 17 Nov. 2006.
 95. Josias, Personal Interview..
 96. Sishuba, Personal Interview. Charges have been filed against the officer involved with this case.
 97. Hendricks, Personal Interview.
 98. This is the case with Simelela. While the organization has been very successful so far, it by no means is able to provide support to the 500,000+ inhabitants of Khayelitsha.
 99. Maharaj, Personal Interview.
 100. Gordon and Orehan.
 101. Cooper, Personal Interview.
 102. Josias, Personal Interview.
 103. Gupta, Geeta Rao. "Gender, Sexuality, and Hiv/Aids: The What, the Why, and the How." International Center for Research on Women. , 2003. 5.
 104. "NICRO Annual Report." Cape Town: NICRO, 2003. 4.
 105. "Equal Treatment." 14.
 106. Simelela Annual Report." Cape Town: Simelela, 2005. 16.
 107. Josias, Personal Interview.
 108. Josias, Personal Interview.
 109. Josias, Personal Interview.
 110. Salo, Personal Interview.

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